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ABSTRACT 
This is a study of the system of intercity goods transport 
between Paris and LeHavre. Between 1820 and 1860 horse-drawn 
road and river transport were replaced by a railway and steamers 
operating in an improved river channel. In the 1820s there was 
an unsuccessful attempt to build a maritime canal to Paris. 
Owing to the advance of railway technology and to innovations 
in transport on the Seine, the project was dropped. Steam was 
first effectively applied to river transport in 1826 by the use 
of tugboats. Operating at first. only between LeHavre and Rouen, 
these were first used from Rouen to Paris during the 1830s. 
Statistics of port and river traffic show that during the late 
1830s goods moving by river and by road in the lower Seine valley 
increased more rapidly than in the past. During this decade there 
were several attempts to initiate construction of a railway from 
Paris to LeHavre. These were complicated by controversy over 
which route'it should follow, and for this and other more general, 
economic reasons, these attempts failed. A successful company 
was formed in 1840 to build a railway from Paris to Rouen". One 
third of its total capital came from Great Britain. This line 
was completed in 1843 and extended to LeHavre in 1847 and Dieppe 
in 1850. Using statistics of river traffic and railway financial 
data, the competition which followed is analyzed. Goods traffic 
by road was largely absorbed by the railway by 1850. River-borne 
traffic was at first little affected, though the revenues of boat 
operators was reduced. Extension of the railway to LeHavre and 
the general economic crisis from 1847 to 1849 created a crisis in 
river transport. Satisfactory means had been found for canaliza- 
tion of the Seine, and owing to the threat to river transport 
from the'railway, this programme was accelerated in the mid-1840s. 
During the first years of the 1850s prosperity brought large 
traffic to all modes of transport. In 1854 the transport of wines, 
traditionally carried by river transport from Rouen to Paris was 
diverted to a newly completed railway line from Bordeaux to Paris. 
This and other new sources of competition tended to slow the 
growth of railway traffic. New faster steamers helped river trans- 
port to. retain a large share of the total traffic. By 1860 the 
railway was'carrying less than half the goods traffic from LeHavre 
to Rouen,. and somewhat more than half of that from Rouen to Paris. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Relatively little has been. written about the development 
of transport in France. The few general histories available, 
by Cavailles. and Dauzet1 for example, are rather unsatisfactory. 
This is not to say that outstanding scholars have not interested 
themselves in this subject, and produced work of value. The 
writings of Maurice Jouffroy . and Marcel Blanchard, 
3 
and more 
recently of Louis Girard, 
4 
Frangois CaronS and Bertrand Gille6 
are worthy of very close study. Most of what these and other 
writers have published however, has been concerned primarily 
with the planning and construction of railways which was begun 
during the July Monarchy and continued through the Second Empire. 
-Very little attention seems to have been given to the vast prog- 
rammes of improvement to the nation's waterways and roads which 
were begun during the Restoration and cut short by the beginning 
of the railway era. These programmes were of consuming interest 
to contemporaries, and they absorbed very large sums of money. 
Even after railways became the main subject of interest, gov- 
ernments continued to spend large amounts for improvement of 
some waterways and roads. What was the effect upon these prog- 
rammes begun in earlier decades of the rapid advance of railway 
technology? What was the effect upon other modes of transport 
of the progress of railways? 
The study contained herein is an attempt to answer these 
questions within the confines of a small part of France's trans- 
port system, albeit a very important one. Louis Girard has 
written that "the process of invention and innovation in trans- 
port has... a rhythm and internal logic of its own". 
7 
This study 
is an attempt to describe with completeness and in detail the 
whole process of change in a transport system, taking into account 
all of the important modes of transport. It begins two decades 
before the advent of railways, one decade before they were even 
being seriously mentioned. The system of transport in the lower 
Seine valley was the principal one feeding Paris from overseas 
and from the very large coasting trade; it was therefore of great 
12 
importance. It had a prominent place in most attempt's to 
improve the nation's transport system, and the railway built 
there was one of the very earliest long inter-city lines built 
in France. During the four decades studied, from 1820 to 1860, 
this system underwent almost complete change. Horse-drawn road 
vehicles and river vessels were replaced by a railway and by 
steamships operating on a greatly improved river. 
8 
I should like to acknowledge the generous assistance of 
the British Council, the Canada Council and the University of 
-London Central Research Fund, and the indulgence of the Canadian 
Ministry of Transport; without. these the chapters to follow 
could never have been written. 
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PART ONE 
Transport was a subject which attracted great interest 
in France during the 1820s, and this decade was very fertile in 
ideas for improving the transport system. This interest and 
some of, these ideas were*stimulated-in part by the remarkable 
development which-had been taking place in other countries, 
particularly in Great Britain. --They also had independent roots 
in the later years of the previous. century; their fulfillment 
at that time had been cut short by the Revolution. In the 
valley of the Seine and in some other parts of France there was 
an increasing demand for faster and more economical inter-city 
goods transport. There was a remarkable number of ideas put 
forward for'meeting this demand. From among these emerged 
most of the-few important innovations which were to dominate 
the transport system during the remainder of the century. The 
State played only a small role in this process. Its energies 
were directed toward. reviving ideas and completing programmes 
which had been of greater importance in the past than they would 
be in the future. The State was concerned largely with expanding 
the system of artificial waterways, and with finding means for 
improving the country's roads. In-neither was it notably succes- 
sful. during, the 1820s. The. motive. force behind most of the 
important innovations in this decade, and in the rest of the 
century, was steam power. in the Seine valley and everywhere 
else in France, the decade began with the traditional system of 
transport unaltered. This system depended entirely upon natural 
(animal, human and 'meteorological') sources of power. Through 
the modest efforts of small private entrepreneurs, by the end 
of the decade steam power had been 'successfully applied to 
river transport, and the elements needed for its application to 
railway transport had been perfected. 
.'ýi 
CHAPTER ONE 
Trade and Transport in the Early 1820s 
Paris had a very large part in the considerable flow of 
trade which took place in France during the early decades of 
the nineteenth century. Although it was not then the predom- 
inant centre of economic activity it has since become, its very 
large and densely concentrated population was a voracious 
consumer of goods of all kinds. It lay at the centre of an 
extensive transport system of radiating roads and waterways 
(shown*in Figure 1), feeding it from all directions. These 
roads and waterways were very heavily used, bringing into Paris 
an amount of goods probably in excess of two million tons per 
year in the early 1820s. 
Among the largest cities of Europe, Paris alone was not 
a seaport. With its-relatively good inland communications it 
had been able to develop away from the sea. Though often 
shallow, uneven and unreliable, and always very slow, the 
system of radiating navigable waterways extended hundreds of 
kilometres from Paris, giving access not only to the 
surrounding regions of Burgundy, the Champagne, the Orleanais, 
Ile-de-France, Picardie and Normandy, but also to places 
farther afield. In 1823 over 16,000 boats arrived in Paris, 
bringing an estimated 600,000 tons of goods; to this were added 
almost 7,000 rafts of timber and firewood, amounting to another 
860,000 tons. 1 Vast quantities of firewood, timber and charcoal, 
as well as wines, fish and other goods came down the Yonne, one 
of the busiest waterways. Smaller quantities of wine, grain and 
iron came from the lower reaches of the Aube. The Marne was 
deeper, and bateaux marnois of up to 250 tons navigated down 
from as far as St. -Dizier, over 340 kilometres from Paris. 
Shallower and narrow canals fed goods into the upper Seine from 
the Loire. A hundred or so small boats and over 2,000 toues 
brought timber and firewood from the upper Loire, wines from 
Burgundy, the Orl6anais and even.. from Languedoc and Rousillon 
(via the Canal du Centre) and a few colonial goods from the port 
of Nantes, 
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Down the Oise to the Seine at Conflans came thousands of tons 
of firewood and charcoal from the Aisne, coal from the north, 
grain and hay from Picardie. Finally, out to the west flowed 
the Seine, and up its slowly meandering current from Rouen and 
LeHavre came goods from the coasting trade, the colonies and 
abroad. For these Paris was almost entirely dependant upon 
the Seine. 
The Lower Seine Valley: the Road to Paris from the Sea. 
Sea transport played a very large role in domestic as 
well as in foreign commerce,. a fact that few historians have 
/ thought, to.. stress. Although. the volume of goods arriving in the 
seven major ports of Paris exceeded by far that at any seaport, 
it is evident from Figure 2 that seaborne trade was considerable. 
Where possible, owing to the high cost of inland transport, 
merchants used the coasting trade, especially for bulky goods 
such as stone, wood, wine, salt and oils. The easiest access 
to Paris from many parts of the country -- all the Midi, the 
Bordelais, Charente, Brittany, lower Normandy -- was by sea. 
Goods flowed out of the, interior to the ports by road and water- 
way, were carried around the coast to other ports, trans-shipped 
and carried once more by inland transport to their final des- 
tinations. A very large part of-foreign trade and all but a 
very small proportion of colonial trade to Paris were also 
carried by sea. Access by Paris to both foreign and domestic 
ports was almost entirely by way of the lower Seine. It should 
also be mentioned that such goods as raw cotton, coffee, sugar 
and a few other denreesýcoloniales used in-the industrial regions 
of northeast France, Switzerland and south Germany came partly 
by way of the lower Seine ports. 
Among the several waterways feeding Paris therefore, the 
lower Seine was certainly one of the most important and one of 
the most heavily used. The lower Seine was not entirely devoted 
to its function as the road to Paris from the sea, but very 
little of what arrived in Paris from downstream came from the- 
towns above Rouen, or even from the little ports toward LeHavre. 
In 1824 some 150,000 tons of goods moved upstream by water from 
Rouen and LeHavre to Paris, 2 and another 50,000 tons were carried 
by road. Downstream traffic by water was almost 190,000 tons, 
by road almost 26,000 tons. From. the coasting trade to Paris 
came large quantities of wines and spirits, timber, salt, 
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chemicals, soap, metals, stone and other goods.. From the 
colonies and abroad came more metals, chemicals, timber, and 
such goods as bois d'ebenisterie, sugar, cotton, dyestuffs, 
hides and coffee. On the return journey. the principal commodities 
carried to Rouen were wines . 
(from Burgundy and the Champagne), 
plaster (from Treil and Vaux), stone, grain, and much smaller 
quantities of semi-manufactured goods and articles de Paris 
for local consumption and 'export. 
At the western end of the Seine, the intermediaries in 
this trade to and from Paris, stood the rival ports of Rouen 
and LeHavre. Since the middle of the previous century these 
ports had become increasingly specialized. With ships 
continually increasing in size, the rapidly growing and 
lucrative trade with the colonies and with the Americas had 
gone to LeHavre. 3 Beyond LeHavre the Seine had always been 
"assez difficile", 4 permitting only the much smaller ships. 
engaged in the domestic and European coasting trades to venture 
"up to Rouen. The resulting roles-for these ports were succinctly 
summarized by Stephane Flachat, a contemporary engineer and 
publicist. 5 LeHavre, he said, 
... fait'la navigation de long cours, ach6te les denrees et 
matieres exotiques, soit ä son compte, soit au compte des 
maisons de Paris, et revend ä Paris, comme negociant, ou 
comme commissionnaire. Lä, se borne la nature de ses oper- 
ations, car ce port est presqu'entierement etranger au com- 
merce du bassin de la Seine avec les autres ports de la 
France. 
Rouen, -on the-other hand, 
... s'est ä peu pros retir6 du commerce de long cours; mais il regoit presqu'exclusivement le grand et le petit cabotage, 
c'est-ä-dire les navires venant des ports d'Europe et des 
ports Frangais, pour approvisionner Paris et le bassin de 
la Seine. Rouen est, purement et simplement, commissionnaire 
entre, les ports d'Europe et de France, et Paris. I1 regoit 
1es marchandises, en soigne le d6chargement et le recharge- 
ment, soit sur les voitures, soit sur les bateaux qui remont- 
ent jusqu'ä Paris.... 
Very closely rivalled by Bordeaux and Nantes, LeHavre was the. 
country's most important port of entry for colonial goods, and 
it far surpassed any other port except Marseille in its trade 
in foreign cargoes. Rouen was one of the country's most active 
coasting ports. Their relative importance in these trades is 
clear in Figure 2; the sources of their trade in 1824 can be seen in Figures 3 and 4. '(Considerable detail on the coasting and 
Italy 
20 
Russia 
Great arMilin 
Oriýer 
Han se 
Nef+ýier/ands 
Sweden 
FOREIGN TRADE 
COASTING TRADE 
FIGURE 3: ROUEN SEABORNE TRANSPORT 1824- 
Rouen 
Colonies 
£ Cori66can 
Upper 
Normondy United States 
Wer Offer 
Lower 
No vnandy AMcyile 
ýunkcýýue Scandnavla 
Mediter-'r1 ýordEný/fc 
8rari/ 
Greet zfc y 
Britain fussla x h'ense 
COA S7'1 NG TRADE Russia 
FOREIGN TRAPS 
FIGURE ý. d.: LE HAVRE, SEABORNE TRANSPORT . 1824- s 
21 
foreign trades of LeHavre and Rouen, both origins and destina- 
tions and the commodities handled, are given in Appendixes I 
and II. ) 
Traditional Water-borne Transport. 
Though it carried most of the traffic up to Paris, the 
lower Seine remained a very imperfect means of transport. It 
was, and is, divided into two very distinct sections, the 
"Basse Seine" between Paris and Rouen, and the "Seine-Maritime" 
between Rouen and LeHavre. 
&. Bridges at Rouen formed the divis- 
/--ion between the. two sections, and Rouen was the point of de- 
parture for river boats to Paris. 
Navigation on the Seine-Maritime. The Seine-Maritime in 
its natural state was a useful and heavily used maritime water- 
way. However., though quite deep in most places, many soft 
shifting sand banks, a few more solid reefs, and a regular. 
tidal wave created often unavoidable dangers. Although the 
mouth of the Seine was shallow in'comparison with other major 
estuaries like. the Escaut o'r the Elbe, 
7 it was not a serious 
obstacle to shipping. It was fairly easily navigated on a good 
tide, 8 though several days or weeks could sometimes be spent in 
waiting for one. Real danger began only at Quillebeuf. Here 
one encountered the Banc de Tot, fixed but changeable in size, 
9 
and. between Quillebeuf and Tancarville there were violent-cross- 
currents strong enough to push a steamboat off its course. 
10 
Nothing indicated the "trace sinueux de la route ä suivre", 
said a late nineteenth century president of the Chambre of 
Commerce in Rouen, "et le pilote n'a pour se guider que la con- 
naissance des amers de la cote: clochers, maisons, bouquets 
d'arbres sur les falaises. "11 Even at this point the river was 
still very wide, 2,700 metres just below Quillebeuf, 
12 
and the 
waters spread out very thinly over this great width; huge banks of 
sand were continuously, almost daily, shifting position. For 
ships proceeding up to Rouen it was usually necessary to stop' 
here at the little port of Quillebeuf, and wait for the next 
good tide. With, a pilot on board. vessels then set out to cross 
the most dangerous section of the Seine-Maritime, between Aizier 
and'Villequier. This was the so-called "Traverse", a long 
22 
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shifting bank of sand beginning close to the right bank at 
Aizier and gradually widening to fill almost the entire width 
of the, river toward Villequier. The depth here at the highest 
tide was 3m. 30 on the shallowest part of the Traverse, but at 
low water it was only Om. 40.13 Much of this bank was composed 
of soft-sand washed out of, small natural indentations-in the 
shore,. calledT"trous" or "anses". 
14 
The Traverse and most of 
the other banks. in the Seine were formed by soft debris being 
broken away from the shores of the river by the violent action 
of the tide and currents; the trous assisted in this by setting 
jup eddies and lateral currents. --Leaving the Traverse, the pilot 
then had to find his way past the Banc de la Barre opposite 
Villequier, the-Chaussee du Caudebecqu6, the formidible Banc 
des Meules, and finally the Banc du Trait. From a little above 
LaMailleraye the river was narrow and deep. However, it was 
still very winding, and owing to this, sailing ships had to be 
towed by horses; some smaller ships were propelled only by the 
upward flowing tide. 
15 
Voyage times from LeHavre to Rouen 
were on average about eight days, but not infrequently rose to 
three weeks or a month. 
In many places the tow paths were in very poor condition. 
There were fences to climb over or around, flooding was a per- 
enial problem, and sometimes the path became so narrow as to 
force the horses to-wade in the edge of the river. The anses 
made continuous towing very difficult, and contributed to making 
frequent crossings of the river-necessary. Between Val de Leu 
and LaMailleraye, said Pierre Frissard, a Ronts et Chauss6es l6 
engineer assigned to the study of improving the Seine-Maritime, 
il n'y a pas de chemin de halage; le halage se fait ä travers 
des prairies, ; es vergers, les plantations sur la crate des 
murs de soutenement, dans le fond des anses; les hommes et 
-les chevaux courent de grands dangers. 
Most dangerous of all to shipping was the notorious 
"barre" (translated by the English "bore"), a tidal wave of 
great speed and force, often a metre or more high. 
17 Any ship 
wishing to sail up to Rouen had to time its departure from 
LeHavre and arrival at Quillebeuf to avoid being caught in the 
river when it arrived. Beginning at Berville, it. surged up the 
bay, attaining its greatest force'in the narrows at Quillebeuf; 
ships had to be securely anchored, at Quillebeuf if. they were 
not to be carried along by it and cast on to a sand bank. Any 
24 
ship in such difficulty was almost certainly buried in up to 
four metres of sand within 24 hours. Between 1829 and 1843, 
according to a 
'publication 
of the Chambre of Commerce in Rouen, 
18 
48 ships were lost from this and other causes between Tancarville 
and Villequier; since during all this time tugboats were avail- 
able in the Seine-Maritime, it'is likely there were many more 
in the earlier 1820s. 
Owing to these dangers few. ships larger than about 120 
tons (the average was about 60, tons, compared with almost 200 
tons for'those coming to LeHavre) ventured into the Seine. 
Those ships used simply in the coasting trade need not concern 
us here. As for'the ones used entirely between LeHavre and 
Rouen, most were simple lighters or "alleges", often referred 
to locally as "heux" or "houx". Though of many shapes and 
rigged in many ways, they were all small vessels of 60 to 100 
tons and'one to'two metres draught. Constructed to be "de la 
plus grande soliditg"19 in order-to resist damage both from ice 
and from grounding in the Seine and in the avant-port of LeHavre, 
they had internal members on a scale sufficient for ships of 
300 tons. There were about 100 of these vessels in operation 
in the early`1820s 'according to Charles B6rigny, a Ponts et 
Chauss6es engineer, compared with about 35 in 1789, and only 
four in 1811.20 Owing to high risks and tö high operating costs, 
operating these alleges had very seldom been profitable. To 
-reduce the impact of both physical risks and financial 
losses, 
they were most often owned by'groups of armateurs and n¬gociants 
of LeHavre and Rouen, who formed companies in which each member 
held a share of'one-eighth, one-sixteenth, or even one-thirty- 
second'. 
21 
Inland Navigation on the Basse Seine. Above the old Pont 
des Bateaux in Rouen, only shallow-draught boats could proceed. 
Maritime navigation therefore ended at Rouen, and all goods 
coming from LeHavre. or any other port had to be transferred to 
river boats to continue upstream to Paris. The extra costs 
this imposed. upon shippers were considerable. Shipping rates 
from LeHavre to Rouen averaged about 12F per ton. Unloading, 
storage and'reloading at Rouen were estimated on average to 
cost about 3F per ton, almost ten per cent of the total'cost of 
25 
transport from LeHavre to Paris. 22 Furthermore, goods were 
exposed to damage and to theft on the quays. "Les reglements du 
port", pointed out a tugboat operator in the late 1820x, 
23 
prescivent, pour eviter l'encombrement, que les bateaux 
restent au dessu du pont de Rouen, et n'entrent pas dans 
la partie de la riviere oü stationnent, les navires de 
cabotage. 11 faut donc que les marchandises soient dechargees 
du navire sur le quai oü il est amare, puis soient transportfies 
de lä sur le quaff oü stationnent les. bateaux, et y soient 
chargees; les quais de Rouen n'etant point- bordes de magazins, 
les marchandises. y restent exposees aux intemperies de l'atmos- 
phere.... 
During the eighteenth century there had been several unsuccess- 
ful attempts to eliminate the need for trans-shipment, 
24 
and 
the project for a maritime canal during the 1820s was intended 
by the same means to obtain this result. Legal requirements 
also stood in the way, for customs regulations permitted neither 
direct voyages nor direct trans-shipment of most goods. In 1818 
a prominent group of Paris negociants petitioned the Conseil- 
general des manufactures to aid in establishing direct navigation 
to Paris with ocean-going ships, but although the Conseil 
welcomed the idea, *it decided that the reglements de Douane 
requiring inspection of all goods at Rouen (the head of maritime 
navigation) would make this impossible. 
25 
The obstacles to navigation above Rouen were even more 
numerous than those below. First there was sheer distance. 
From Rouen to-Paris by the Seine was 240 kilometres; by road it 
was only 126 kilometres. Second there were the many shallows', 
rapids, bridges and weirs. The Basse Seine was divided roughly 
into thirteen relatively easy sections or "räcles", with depths 
never less than two metres,, and fourteen difficult sections, or 
"tremates", with depths of as, little as Om. 70. -These tremates 
contained rapids and shallows and were often accompanied by 
bridges with narrow arches. Beyond Rouen there were eleven 
other bridges to pass through on the way to Paris; the Pont de 
l'Arche, probably the worst among them, had been built in the 
year 960 and was not replaced until 1858.26 At the Pont de- 
Vernon the river was further obstructed by fishnets. 
27 Here too 
the tow-paths were mostly in poor' condition; they were too narrow, 
too low and subject to flooding, and they crossed from shore to 
shore forty to sixty times depending upon the water level. During 
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four or five months of-the year water levels were much too low 
for boats to carry full loads, and in winter and spring when 
the water was high there was sometimes trouble with ice. 
28 
Seasonal variations in water levels seem to have had 
considerable effect upon freight rates; this was to be expected, 
as the cost of carrying one ton of freight would rise as fewer 
tons were carried. Charles Collignon, a Ponts et Chauss6es 
engineer who did considerable research on transport costs in 
the 1840s, provides'some interesting figures to confirm this. 
29 
He found that as the height of water in the Seine measured by 
the scale at Vernon varied from lm-. 00 to lm. 60, the following 
water borne transport costs per ton were observed: 
lm. 60 7F. 70 lm. 20 10F. 50 
lm. 50 8F. 10 1m. 10 11F. 50 
1m. 40 8F. 90 lm. 05 12F. 50 
lm. 30 9F. 50 lm. 00 14F. 00 
The variation was considerable, and costs evidently rose more 
rapidly as lower water levels were reached. One can conclude 
that the wider the variation, the higher was the average rate 
over the year. Seasonal variations tended on average therefore, 
to push transport costs up. That variations in water levels 
were quite wide is clearly shown in Figure 7. 
Figure 7 
Daily Variation in Water Levels on 
the Basse Seine, 1825. 
(measure at the Pont de la Tournelle) 
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The total costs resulting from transport were increased 
by very long journey times. With the methods used during the 
ancien reime and in the early 1820s boats took anywhere from 
ten to forty days to make the trip, and the average time was 
about. fifteen days; a further twelve or so were needed to 
discharge in Paris. On the return journey the time taken was 
less= an . average, perhaps of nine days. 
30 Boats were pulled by 
the same team of horses all the way from Rouen to Paris, and did 
only a few kilometres each day; a reglement of the seventeenth 
century compelled all navigation to cease at sunset. Along the 
way time was wastedýin a number of ways. First, the bateliers 
were forced to wait at bridges and rapids while each boat slowly 
made its difficult passage. The passage of rapids and bridges 
was not only time-consuming, but at times also dangerous. Some 
idea of the great difficulties involved can be gained from the 
account of two Ponts"et Chaussees engineers who made the trip 
in 1829 and 1830.31 . They were in'a medium-sized boat of about 
lm. 30 draft, somewhat less than normal, pulled by eight horses. 
At the, town of. Poses they had their first major trouble: 
On commence (at 3.30 am) ä pr6parer les manoeuvres pour 
remonter le pertuis. Seize aides. portent un cordage de 
pieu en pieu sur les Iles pour empecher le bateau d'etre 
emporte par, un courant etroit et rapide, tandis que douze 
chevaux, six a droite et six a gauche le halent. Au 
milieu de file d'amont de droite les six chevaux de droite 
"sont envoyes ä gauche dans un bateau et les douze chevaux 
tirent ensemble, tandis que les aides assistes d'une foule 
d'habitants de Pose empechent les cordages de s'engager . dans les pieces desassemblees d'un revetement en charpente 
degrade. (At 6.05 am) On arrive au bras d'Anet que huit 
chevaux passe a gue (avec un peu plus d'eau, il faut un bateau); ils font les plus violents efforts (un cordage est 
casse) pour faire remonter le bateau contre le courant rapide 
qu'un gravier saillant eloigne de file; a 6h. i ce courant 
est remonte; le passage du pertuis proprement dit est termine. 
On paie le chef du_pertuis qui part avec ses aides. On fait 
passer (at 6.38 am) en bateau les huit chevaux de file du 
Trait dans celle de la Ronde, puis ä 7h05 de cette lie a la rive gauche oü les quatorze chevaux tirent a la fois. (Then about 2 km further on, at) bras de Pampon, borde aux 
basses eaux de graviers et des falaises saillantes, le bateau touche plusieurs fois; on'evite avec peine une pierre dangereuse, cacheee sous l'eau. (At 10.25 am) les quatorze 
chevaux'sont remplacCs par sept. 
It had taký, _, n«six hours to go a distance of about four kilometres, 
and this was not the only such passage. 
29 
These difficulties. had caused loud complaints during the 
eighteenth century. More than one author stated that it had 
become so difficult and costly that many merchants preferred to 
use the road, despite its very high rates. 
32 One of their chief 
complaints though had been removed by the Restoration. This was 
the. burden of pea es, or tolls-. The pages on a fully loaded 
rg and-. bateau} between- Rouen- and Paris' could be as high" as-792 
Livres plus other fees, 
33 
and collecting them at many places 
along the Seine was. very time-consuming. ' Although progressively 
transferred in large numbers away from private hands to the 
f6rmiers-generaux, the 6ages had not been finally abolished 
until 1790. 
Despite a considerable increase in traffic on the Seine, 
the methods and types of boats in use had not changed since the--- 
previous century. ' There were several types of boats in use, 
although one type'tended to predominate. They are most readily 
classifiable by size, and can be grouped roughly into two main 
categories. The larger of these comprised the grosse marine. 
The largest-boat in use in this period was the bateau-besogne 
or foncet, of up"to 64 metres long, nine metres Wide and 2m. 10 
in draught. By the end of the-decade they had probably gone out 
of use, as they were much too large to navigate easily, and could 
not use "the canals opened through Paris in the early 1820s. 
34 
The'-most numerous'kind of boat used was a type of open barge 
called a bateau normarid or bateau-besogne. They seem to have 
varied considerably in size, from 32 to 48 metres in length, 
4m. 70 to 7m. 50 in beam, and lm. 20 to lm. 80 in draught. 
35 An 
official-document of 183436 gives two types in common use, one 
of 48 metres by 26 pieds 11 opuses, with a capacity of 480 tons, 
and the other of 38 metres by 22 to 23 pieds, with a capacity of 
250 tons. ' These boats were the same size approximately as those 
in use on the canals of the Nord and Picardie, but very much" 
larger than those used in most other parts of France. Large 
bateaux normands were by far the most commonly used boats for 
-carrying goods from Rouen to Paris; according to the Statistique 
of Paris, they comprised 89 per cent of the boats arriving in 
Paris from the Basse Seine in 1821.37 For shorter journeys on 
the Seine between the smaller ports, like Vernon, Pont de l'Arche, 
Poses, Gaillon and Les Andelys, a greater variety of smaller boats 
... 
; 
30 
were in use; these were loosely called the ep tite marine. 
Bateaux normands'were often accompanied by two kinds of 
auxiliary craft, flettes, long and narrow, 21 by 2 metres, and 
60 to 80 tons capacity, to act as lighters at shallows and 
rapids, and bachots, which ferried horses from shore to shore. 
38 
As far as can be determined, these boats were owned by individual 
maitres-. 'mar±niers', in much the-same way as the auto-moteurs and 
peniches are owned now by patron-batelliers. Some of them may 
have been owned by manufacturers who principally carried their 
own goods. There is one documentated example of this from the 
1840s and 1850s, the CHARLES a large bateau normand of 490 tons 
owned by Jean-Baptiste Danton, a small filateur at Oissel. 
39 
Road Transport in the Seine Valley. 
While water-borne transport remained in its primitive 
state in'the early 1820s, road transport had been steadily 
improving both in speed and in economy. Road transport was not 
so exclusively important in the Seine valley as in most other 
parts of France, but nevertheless they carried a sizeable 
proportion of the traffic between LeHavre and Paris, about 25 
per cent in the 1820s. The main road along the Seine from 
LeHavre through Rouen to Paris was the Route Royale 14. From 
Rouen to Paris, where it was called the route d'en haut (the 
less-used Route Royale 13 was called the route d'en bas), it 
had existed for some time, though like most roads, in rudimentary 
form until early in the eighteenth century. A road from Paris 
to Rouen and Dieppe is listed in Estienne's Guide des Chemins de 
France of 1552.40 Although a road from Rouen to LeHavre is shown 
in a "Carte des postes" of 1632,41 it was not until more than one- 
hundred years later that it was improved. Early in the eighteenth 
century road traffic over the plateaux to LeHavre was slight; 
what traffic there was, and LeHavre was not an important port at 
that time, went by the river. Then as trade with the colonies 
grew and the volume of costly goods grew, the need for better 
road. transport made itself felt. Whereas during the Regency 
there were only four or. five wagons a month coming to LeHavre, 
by-1778 there were over forty. The good road from Paris to 
Rouen was extended to LeHavre in 1766.42 
' ... 
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By the 1820s this road from Paris to LeHavre was not in 
good condition, and continued to suffer as well from natural 
disadvantages. During the 1790s. and the later years of the 
Empire maintenance of roads in France had been neglected. In 
1811, out of the` 8,000 leagues of road in France, there were 
only 2,900 in good condition; by 1815 this had been reduced to 
2,500, and many bridges were destroyed by the retreating armies. 
43 
Heavy winter rains in 1816 did further damage. 
44 
in the first 
years'of the Restoration the'funds allocated'to the Administration 
des Ponts et Chaussees were far from adequate for 'anything more 
than light maintenance,. and it was'not until the late 1820s that 
any real progress seems to have been made. Information on the 
condition of particular roads is not plentiful, but there is 
one very valuable source, the Statistique des routes royales 
de France, published in 1824 and 1837.45 On the condition of 
Route Royale 14 in about 1820, it states, "sur cette route les 
pavages sont partout a'relever ä bout. Les chaussees d'empierrement 
ont perdu leur bombement et leur epaisseur. Il ya des terrasse- 
ments considerable ä executer. " Unofficially opinions were more 
strongly expressed; the road from Paris to LeHavre, wrote the 
editor of the Journal de Havre in 1827,46 "est siir'une grande 
partie de sa longeur dans un etat aussi deplorable que les autres 
routes de France.... " For commerce this meant "des retards clans 
la reception des marcriandises, des speculations manquees, la vie 
des voyageurs exposee ä chsque. instant.... " And he concluded, 
somewhat cuttingly, "les plaintes sont unanimes, elles trouvent 
des echos partout, et nos voisins d'outremer ne nous epargnent 
pas les sarcasms. I1 faut avouer que nous les m6ritons.... " 
The 126 kilometres between Rouen and Paris were divided 
almost equally between stone-paved roadway ( ap ve''s)and gravelled 
surface (empierrement), the former beginning at the town of Magny 
in the Seine-et-Oise. Between Rouen and LeHavre the entire 
distance of 86 kilometres was gravel, except through the centres 
of towns. Of the 113.8 kilometres scheduled through the Seine- 
Inferieure, only 2 kilometres of pavement were considered 
officially to be in good condition; 21.6 kilometres of pavement 
needed large repair's or complete' rebuilding, and 90.2 kilometres 
of gravelled surface needed large repairs. In the Eure the 
" situation was a little better; most-of the pavement, totalling 
" 
_.. 
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only 5 kilometres was in-good condition, but only 6.3 out of 
31.1 kilometres of gravel were. In the Seine-et-Oise almost 
the whole distance was paved, and 47.2 out of 55.8 kilometres 
was in good repair. In the Seine the ap ves were also in fairly 
good condition. 
This condition of "etat d'entretien" implied only that 
large overhaul was not needed. In the words of the Statistique 
of 1824, 
si elles sont pav6s . they will need) des relev6es ä 
bout periodiques, et de simples repiquages; si elles 
sont en empierrement, le travail journalier des 
cantonniers statiornaires, aides a certains epoques 
par des ouvriers auxiliaires, et des fournitures 
regulieres de materiaux proportionnes a l'importance 
de la circulation.... 
Even good roads required considerable effort and expense to 
maintain their viability. The soil and climate along much of 
the route made maintenance difficult. The effects of rain could 
be very destructive on the chaulky Normandy plateaux where good 
foundations and drainage were not easily obtained. With any 
more than a thin layer of 
became very heavy. Jules 
expert writer on transpor 
of this phenomenon. 
47 
It 
well maintained road with 
mud, ruts began to form, and the going 
Burat; a publicist, economist and 
t in the 1830s gave a graphic description 
was rare, he said, to find any tolerably 
real ruts during the dry summer months. 
But 
il nest pas de meme en hiver. Quand viennent les pluies, 
les frayes se forment; presque immediatement apres commencent 
les ornibres. I1 n'y en a que deux sur les routes peu 
frequentees, mais sur les routes que le sont davantage, il 
s'en forme quatre, six, et jusqu'ä huit.... Si on n'apporte 
pas les plus grands soins ä l'entretenir, eile n'offre plus 
qu'une serie de sillons qui se rejoignent dans plusieurs 
endroits, et qui creusent des especes de mares; les eaux 
ne trouvent pas d'ecoulement;. les chevaux pietinent dans 
la boue, et depensent inutilement une partie de leur 
force;... 
That this phenomenon occurred to some extent on Route Royale 14 is 
confirmed by the average loads pulled per horse recorded monthly 
in 1825 and 1826: 
48 
Jan. (, 18251 725 kg. May 803 kg. -Sept. 917 kg. Feb. 689 June* 847 Oct. 848 
Mar. 657 July 836 Nov. 713 
April 835 Aug. 877 " Dec. 704 
", 
4 
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The smaller loads indicated in the five winter months, November 
to March, result partly, says the source of these figures, from 
the smaller permitted maximum gross weight (5,000 kilogrammes in 
winter compared with 6,000 kilogrammes in summer) and partly 
from a poorer road surface. If one assumes if the road surface 
were the same. -in winter and summer, 
for a reduced gross weight 
in winter°few3r horses would-be, used, and approximately the same 
load would be pulled by each as in summer, then one must conclude, 
as this was not so,. that. the road surface was not as good, and 
each horse was capable of pulling less. An added natural dis- 
advantage for traffic along this road were the steep hills; 
going out of Rouen to LeHavre, the Mont-Riboudet hill had a 
gradient of 8 per cent, and toward Paris there were gradients 
of 10 and 13 per cent. 
49 
Better maintenance and considerable repairs were obviously 
needed on this road, especially in the Seine-inferieure. During 
the previous century considerable technical and organizational 
advances had been made in this field, 
50 though in practice 
notable deficiencies remained. First, there was too little 
regular-maintanance. A contemporary memoire51 estimated that 
in about'1828 each full-time cantonnier could tour his section 
of road an average of only once per week, whereas proper 
maintenance demanded one tour per day. A decree of 16 December 
1811 had instituted a system of, cantonniers adjudicataires, 
, 
contractors whose. job it was-to give full-time attention to a 
section of road. These contractors also supplied the needed 
stone, usually insufficiently. In 1816 they were replaced by 
cantonniers stationnaires, 
52 day-paid workers under the control 
of a supervisor. In theory maintanance was to be daily, with 
careful removal of dust and mud as it formed, but in practice, 
it was performed by spreading a thick layer of gravel and leaving 
it until the next inspection when it was again raked smooth. 
53 
Proper economical maintenance was a question of, employing the 
right proportions of labour and materials in a systematic way, 
and over the next two decades much important research into this 
question was done by Pönts et Chauss6es engineers. 
Between LeHavre and Paris, one particular type of large, 
.: 
two-wheeled-, wagon predominated. This . was the charette with a 
wheel rim size (width) 'of ßm. 17 and'a maximum permitted gross 
ý' 
."f 
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weight of 5,000 to 6,000 kg. These were huge vehicles, (one 
of which is shown in Figure 8)"5m. 30 long, 3m. 50 to 4m. high 
when loaded, and 2m. 60 wide. They were very solidly, even 
massively,, built, weighing a total of 1,500 kg.; the body 
weighed 500 kg., the axle 150 kg: and the huge iron-banded 
wheels. "850 kg. together, almost a ton. They were usually pulled 
by a team of eight horses harnessed in "flache" formation, one, 
behind the other, bringing the total length of the wagon and its 
team to almost 25 metres. In 1825, out of 5,267 wagons leaving 
LeHavre, only 142 were four-wheeled; the rest were these two- 
wheeled charettes, with an"average gross weight of 5,055 kg. 
5 
" It was argued that the legislated maximum winter and 
summer gross weights of these vehicles made them the most 
economical to run: they had the highest proportion of useful 
to total weight. 
55 
Since 1806 road vehicle load regulations 
had specified the maximum weights to be carried by vehicles with 
certain wheel. rim widths. it was believed that if a larger load 
were carried on a proportionally wider rim, the effective pressure 
exerted on the road surface would be the same. 
56 
All vehicles 
were first divided into two classes, "chariots" with four wheels, 
and "charettes" with two. These classes were then divided into 
five categories, each of which was given a maximum summer and 
winter gross vehicle weight. As the solidity of construction of 
different size vehicles varied, the "useful" or net weight also 
_varied. 
It was highest for charettes and chariots in the class 
with rim widths of Om. 17. 
Traditionally road transport, or roulage, was 
* 
organized in 
a way, analogous to that described on the river. Individual 
voituriers or rouliers owned wagons and horses; in many places 
these were nothing more than local peasants putting their horses 
to-good use in the off-season. However, by 1820 on the well- 
travelled Seine route there were-very few of these; the wagons 
needed were beyond the means of casual operators. The services 
of individual rouliers were hired by commissionnaires de roulage 
who received goods for transport and took responsibility for 
their safe delivery. The commissionnaires owned warehouses and 
stored goods consigned to. them until there was sufficient for a 
wagon-load on any route; then they'were sent on their way. They 
had contacts with many correspondents and could send goods to 
35 
Figure 3: Two-Wheeled 'Charettes' (Vehicles 
most commonly Used in Road Transport from 
LeHavre to Paris). 
(From Schwilgu6, "Memoire sur les. routes et 
sur le roulage", Annales des Ponts et 
Chauss6es, (1832.2) Plate. )' 
Image removed due to third party copyright
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destinations not directly served by their own. rouliers. With 
this system, the speed of transport had. remäined roughly the 
same since the 1770s, about eight'days between LeHavre and Paris. 
According to a"memoire'prepared in the. Ponts et Chaussees, it 
had fallen a little behind the national average in this respect. 
The cost however, had fallen very considerably, from about 90 F 
per ton in 1770-75 to 35 F in 1827.57 
Even before. 1815 these traditional methods had begun to 
be superceded by a, better'form of organization, roulage acceldre. 
This provided much greater speed and regularity than the traditional 
froulage ordinaire, and was undoubtedly the most, important innova- 
tion in road transport for. many decades. Wagons operating acceler6 
were owned by the commissionnaires and departed at scheduled times, 
travelling both night and day on fixed schedules. Instead of 
being pulled by'the same team of horses throughout the whole 
journey, they used relays spaced along the route in stages 
(there were five from Rouen to Paris) and driven by hired drivers. 
-Both garcon-relayeurs and horses were hired on monthly contracts 
from maitre-rela ey urs. 
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The speed and regularity provided by 
roulage accelere however, -had to 
be paid for. More horses were 
needed to keep up a constant speed. First, extra horses were 
used on the steeper hills, two extra over a distance of about 
30 km, and one extra over several more. Relay horses doing the 
same route, back and forth each day worked less efficiently than 
ordinary horses which rested at the end of each trip. At 3.5 kph, 
a normal speed, the work efficiency of relay horses was found to 
be about ninety per cent of that of ordinary horses. 
59 Owing 
to more intensive use of the wagons (an average of 64 kilometres 
per day between Rouen and Paris, compared with only 24 kilometres 
for roulage ordinaire), depreciation was much quicker; the wheels 
of voitures accelerees lasted only ten months, the body only two 
and a half years, while those of an ordinaire lasted two years 
and six years. 
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For a large wagon with rims of Om. 17, the re- 
placement cost was considerable: for the wheels 615 F, for the 
axle 288 F, the body 140 F, -and accessories 157 F, a total of 
. 
1,200 F. The annual costs of depreciation, interest and main- 
tenance-of a voitiire ordinaire were 530 F; for a voiture acceleree, 
they. were 1,200 F. However, owing to greater speed, and more 
intensive use, the'difference in cost per kilometre was less 
than this might suggest.: about 1F. 02 per league (4 kilometres) 
37 
Table 1 
Commodities in Transport Through the Lower Seine Valley, 1824. 
I. From Rouen to'Paris, except as indicated (tons): 
By River By Road 
Bois de construction ....................... '1,600 Sel ...................................... 12,846 Bois de teinture ......................... 600 Marbres et pierres (from Bouen, the Oise 
and-quariesýon the Basse Seine) ....... 9,345 Fers et fontes .............. Bois d'ebenisterie ....................... 
2,465 
1; 036 1,500 
Riz '(LeHavre to Paris) .......:. '.......... 950 , Savons ................................... 9,674 
Plomb ............................. '....... 
Zinc et etain ............................ 
3,900 
850 
Sucre (Rouen to Paris) ................... 13,884 
, Sucre (LeHavre & Rouen-to Paris) ......... 
14,000 
Potasse ..............:................... Soude, sel de soude et salpetre........... 
3,032 
4,000 
Soufre ................................... 1,200 
Autres produits chimiques ................ 478 
400 
Tabac (LeHavre & Rouen to Paris) ......... 2,268 
413 
Harengs et morues ........................ 1,000 . Peches 180 ............ ...................... 
Haile d'olive ............................ 935 11500 
Autres huiles 150 10 ............................ Fruits et grains oleagineux .............. 120 Eaux-de-vie et esprits ................... 9,199 Cafe (LeHavre & Rouen to Paris) .......... 7,768 Cuivre ........................ "........... 1,625 2,400 Cdton (LeHavre to Paris) ................. 10,000 
Autres matieres exotiques ................ 
2,286 
Autres denrees coloniales ................ 1,887 Peaux bruts (LeHavre & Rouen to Paris) ... 1,000 Vin s............................ 
004000000 
65,153 
Cotonnades ............. 0.... .. ý 
4,000 
....... ... . .. Poterie ................................... 240 
Machines (LeHavre & Rouen to Paris) ...... 208 Draps (Louviers & Elbeuf to Paris) ....... 
3,000 
Papier 
........................... 00000000 
1,000 
. Autres 2 078 15 . ................................. , 
TOTAL ....... .............................. 149,8,36 50,359 
II. From Paris to Rouen, except as indicated (tons): 
Engrais .................................. 1,700 
Charbon de bois ......................... 4,500 Charbon de terre (Paris to Rouen) :...... 21,695 
Charbon de terre (Paris to töwns in 
the valley) .......................... 16,956 Charbon de terre (Oise to Rouen) ........ 10,031 Charbon de terre -(Oise, to towns in' 
the valley) ............................ 8,349 Plätre (Lafrette, Vaux,. Triel, Argenteuil' 
to Rouen and environs) ..........:.... 64,000 Plätre (to towns in the valley) ... '. "..... 25,000 
4 
/continued 
Table 1 continued 
II. From Paris to Rouen, continued: By River 
Ardoises_(Paris to Rouen & the valley) .. 9,167 Briques et tuiles (Paris to Rouen & towns 
in the valley) ...............:....... 9,700 Carreaux de meules-et meules (Paris to 
Rouen, Oise & towns in the valley) ... 20,651 Bois ä briler (Oise to Rouen & valley) .. 20,000 
Bois ä brüler (Vernon, Lyon & Pont de 
1'Arche-to Rouen) .................... 19,000 Cereales ................. "............... 30,000 Fers et fontes .......................... 4,138 Fers et fontes (Paris to towns in the 
valley & to towns beyond Rouen by the 
roads of upper Normandy) ............. Tabac indigene (Paris to LeHavre) ....... 
Vins (Paris to Rouen & towns in valley) . 6,300 Cuivre lamine ........................... 
Antimoine ............................... 50 Regrets d'orfevre ....................... 273 Laines '(Paris to Rouen, Elbeuf & Louviers 
Graisses (Paris to LeHavre & Rouen) ..... 360 Colle et nerfs .......................... 1,200 . Sang de boeuf ........................... 1,200 
Garance ...:............................. 
Noix de galle ........................... 
Gaudes .................................. 
Chiffons ................................ 300 
Chardons cardieres ...................... 
Acide sulfurique ........................ 250 
Salpetre raffine ......................... 476 
Sulfate de fer (Paris & Oise to Rouen) .. 990 Acetate de fer et de plomb .............. 15 Cruse ........ :.............. ........... 183 Encre ä ecrire (Paris to LeHavre) ........ 
Couleurs, fines (Paris to LeHavre) ....... 
Eaux de senteur (Paris to LeHavre) ...... 
Epices preparees ........................ Medicaments (Paris to Rouen & LeHavre) .. Poterie (Paris & Oise to LeHavre & Rouen) 756 
Porcelaine (Paris to LeHavre) ........... 
Miroirs (Paris to LeHavre) .............. 
Verreries (Paris to Rouen & LeHavre) .... 
Librairie (Paris to Rouen & LeHavre) .... 
Papier (Paris to Rouen & LeHavre) ....... 
Papiers peints (Paris to Rouen & LeHavre) 
Peaux (Paris to Rouen & LeHavre) ........ Cordonnerie (Paris to LeHavre) .......... Pelleteries (Paris to LeHavre). .......... Chapeaux de paille (Paris to LeHavre) ... Meubles (Paris to LeHavre) .............. Instruments et horlogerie (to LeHavre) 
Boissellerie (Paris to LeHavre) ... 
"....:. 
Machines (Paris to LeHavre) ............ . Tabletterie et mercerie" (to LeHavre) .... Feutre (Paris to LeHavre) .............. . 
TOTAL ........... ......................... 292,549 
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By Road 
4,500 
11,000 
630 
1,000 
3,000 
150 
9 
100 
300 
100 
148 
59 
234 
36 
44 
116 
39 
463 
179 
200 
252 
221 
196 
19. 
2'0 
758 
1,106 
190 
101 
337 
31 
25,538 
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per ton for roulage ordinaire,, and 1F. 50 for. "acc. e1ere. For 
this extra 47 per cent in direct costs, the. added speed was 
100 per cent. 
By the mid-1820s roulage accelere was well-established on 
the road from LeHavre to Paris. From Rouen to Paris there had 
been an accelEre service at least since 1806, serving textile 
manufacturers who rushed their-finished goods to the Paris 
wholesalers to obtain the best prices on buying days. Once 
foreign trade resumed in large volume after 1815, this service 
was extended to LeHavre. PYiilippe Barrey states61 that the 
first was in 1818 by a commissionaire named Durand. However, 
there is evidence of another operating to LeHavre from Paris 
in 1817.62 In 1818 a commissionnaire who had operated for many 
years from'Rouen to Paris, extended his operations to LeHavre: 
Veuve Auffant fils aline et Lecoq, "desirant , de plus en plus 
procurer aux Commergans la promptitude dans les transports, " 
they said in a printed circular, 
63 
set up an office next to the 
port and guaranteed delivery in Paris in three days. Delivery 
in`Paris'by accelere from Rouen, 'they said, was still guaranteed 
in thirty hours. This was half the usual time, and it was not 
significantly"improved upon during the next two decades. 
Road and Water-borne Transport in Competition. 
Most-goods transported between LeHavre and Paris went by 
water. This is evident from the few statistics available, which 
are given in Table 1. Although water-borne transport was very 
slow, it was also. much less costly than road transport, and any 
goods for which speed was not imperitive naturally went by water. 
However, -fqr, the many costly goods shipped from the Americas. 
and the Caribbean-to the entrepöts of LeHavre (cotton, sugar, 
tobacco, dyestuffs, coffee), * a few goods going to Rouen 
(especially non-ferrous metals),. or manufactured there, and the 
manufactures of Paris-shipped out for export, time was important. 
For, this reason these goods often went by road. The cost of time 
was beginning to be appreciated, and businessmen tended to conduct 
their affairs to minimize it. "Le. temps", remarked the writer 
of the Statistigiie des Routes Royales in 1824,64 
"est une valeur qu'on-apprecie-mieux aujourd'hui qu'on ne le faisait autrefois: il entre dans tous les calculs des 
sp6culateurs, qui. le regardent"avec raison comme un des 
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principaux elements de la production et de la distribution 
des richesses; et on le sait tres bien qu'une perte de 
temps equivaut ä une perte d'argent. 
River transport was quite suitable'for many goods such 
as wood, coal, raw salt, stone, and many'bulky foodstuffs, raw 
materials and semi-manufactured goods. Large quantities of 
firewood were used in Paris and in the main centres of popula- 
tion along the lower Seine. Timber for construction was also 
important during the building boom between 1815 and 1825. Con- 
sideräble"amounts were received in LeHavre (20,900 tons in 1824) 
and in Rouen, mostly from Russia, and 1,600 tons went on to Paris, 
all by water. Its value was only about 40F per ton in LeHavre, 
and it could'be stored in the warehouses of Bercy for only 70 
centimes`a ton per month. 
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The industries of Paris, textiles, 
metallugical`, chemical and others, also received many of their 
raw materials by water. One of the most important water-borne 
commodities was wine. Enormous quantities of it arrived each 
year in Paris, 214,131,000 litres in1824.66 About one-quarter 
of this came by river from Rouen, then through the Canals de 
St. -Denis and St. -Martin to the entrepöts of Paris. A number 
of factors determined its use of water transport. First perhaps 
was tradition, and the entrepöts used to store it were adapted 
to receiving goods from the water; near'Rouen there were huge 
cellars at Dieppedalle where wines were stored after their 
arrival direct from the Gironde, and in Paris there were large 
entrepöts at Bercy, St. -Bernard, Neuilly and Courbevoie, which 
held a stock of some 80 million litres. 
67 Slow transport added 
about 12F to its value of 300F in Rouen. 
68 However, by road 
from Rouen to Paris the direct cost of transport would have 
been about 40F, whereas by water it was only about 15F. Including 
the costs of time, the difference is still about 17F. The 
advantage usually held by road transport of not having to trans- 
ship at Rouen, which would have further reduced the difference 
by 5 
_to 
10F, was absent, since wines were almost all landed at 
Rouen in any case. 
For many goods however, road transport was preferred. A 
good example was coffee, valued at about 860F per ton. Large 
quantities. of it were imported from Haiti, South America and 
the French Caribbean islands, and stored in the entrepöt at 
LeHavre. Prom there much of'it went to Paris, almost all of 
41 
it by road. For 1824, one'source lists 7,768 tons by road, 
69 
while another list'733 tons arriving by water. 
70 Consumption 
in and around Paris was about 5,000 tons; 
71 
and the remainder 
went on to Switzerland and south Germany "in transit". The 
time factor seems to have been decisive in making it follow 
the road in preference to the river. There were many other 
goods which did the same. Sugar is another notable example; 
half, of the 20,000 tons sent to the 25 refineries of Paris 
in 1824 went by road. Almost all denrees-coloniales and 
matie-res exotiques went this way. Manufactured goods almost 
all went by road, as did cotton goods from Rouen, woolens from 
Elbeuf, and a wide range of articles de Paris. 
Road traffic between LeHavre and Paris was considered 
officially to be excessive. The slowness and difficulty of 
navigation on the Basse Seine was forcing far too many goods 
to use road transport. Not only did this mean high direct 
transport costs, but it resulted in higher road maintenance 
costs. The vicious circle created both for users and for the 
Administration is clearly'stated in the following extract from 
a Ponts et Chaussees memoire of 1828: 
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d6s lors ä moins que le chemin par terre ne soit impraticable 
il est prefere, et ... aussitot qu'on le repare, 
la 
Navigation est abandonnee; on en a un example recent sur la 
route du Havre ä Rouen qui borde la Seine dans toute sa 
longeur. Elle etait il ya quelques annees, dans un tel 
etat de delabrement que des plaintes s'elevZýrent de toutes 
. parts, des sommes considerables furent consacrees a sa 
reparation et aussitot qu'il fut en etat, le roulage 
quadrupla sur la route aux de'pens de la navigation et vint 
rendre nulles aprbs peu de temps les sommes enormes qu'on 
avait depensees sur cette route. 
The total of over 75,000 tons carried by road in 1824 represented 
about 19,000 heavy wagon loads during the year. Maintenance 
costs were increased it was thought by the use of very large 
and heavy vehicles. Schwilgue, a Ponts et Chaussees engineer, 
. suggested73 
that they could be reduced by half between Rouen 
and Paris if maximum permitted loads were reduced by one-quarter. 
It was very clearly recognized that the total, direct and 
indirect, costs of transport could be reduced by a better dis- 
tribution of traffic between road and river. That the Administra- 
tion des Ponts et Chaussees understood this . is evident in the 
excellent introduction to the Statistique des Routes Royales of 
1824. ''1t was understood, it stated, that certain classes of 
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goods naturally found road transport more economical. Economic 
advance had increased-the value of time, and 
dans 1'etat present de la societe, il est un grand nombre 
de besoins at de services publics et prives qui ne se 
trouveraient qu'incompletement satisfaits par la voie 
reguliere mais necessairement un peu lente, de la 
Navigation. 
Under freely competitive conditions, the calculation of cost 
would be the ultimate criterion of choice, "et l'on congoit 
qu'il. est bien d'occasions ofl ce calcul"sera. necessairement 
ä l'avantage des communications' par terre. " The key therefore 
to moving traffic away from the roads and back onto the water- 
ways was to reduce the cost of transport on the latter. "Les 
routes cesseraient d'etre fatigues par un roulage destructeur; 
elles conserveraient toujours un bon tat de viabilite, at 
leur entretien deviendrait moins dispendieux. "74 it was estimated 
that if all routes royales could be restored to an tat 
d'entretien, annual maintenance costs could be reduced by almost 
thirty per cent to about 16.5 MF. The ultimate conclusion, 
though this report did no more than imply it, was that the key 
to more economical transport was improvement of the waterways 
and of the craft which used them. 
S 
r 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Maritime Canal, Revival of an Old Idea 
It was obvious that transport in the Seine valley, 
ought to be improved. Even before the Revolution, the rapid 
growth of colonial and overseas trade through LeHavre and 
Rouen had prompted several schemes to improve navigation on 
the Seine. In the early years of the Restoration not only 
"was there a strong revival of trade, which once more pointed 
out the need for better transport, but there was also the 
very successful example of similar improvements made in 
England. Better inland transport could come about in two ways, 
from innovations affecting the vehicles of transport, and from 
innovations to the 'way'. The first was quite within the power 
of the private operators of transport, but it would mean 
'successful adaptation of very recent inventions, principally 
steam power. The second would depend largely upon initiative 
from the Ponts et Chaussees, but for some years after 1815, 
while the State's resources were overwhelmed by the burdens 
of foreign occupation and a huge indemnity, any such initiative 
was quite impossible. Nevertheless by 1820 both possible 
avenues of improvement were opened. Relative prosperity had 
returned to the economy, permitting private entrepreneurs to 
invest in costly new steam power, and by the same date not 
only had the national Treasury recovered a delicate sort of 
equilibrium, 
1 but the government had also appointed an energetic 
new Directeur-general des Ponts et Chaussees, its chief agent. 
in planning and executing transport investments. Why then by 
the-end of this decade had the Ponts et Chauss6es made so 
little progress in, improving the , 
'way' while the private 
operators of transport had had such great success in improving 
their vehicles? The answer to this is interesting, for the 
resulting delay in a successful 'initiative by the State to 
improve water-borne transport had effects which were to last 
for several decades. 
Disagreement Over Means for Improving the Lower Seine. 
Interest in water-borne transport and'in its improve- 
ment were very high in the early decades of the nineteenth century. 
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During most of the eighteenth century the waterways had been 
largely neglected while attention was concentrated upon 
improving the roads. Even in the last years of the Old Regime, 
though there had been -a revival of interest in the waterways, 
little real progress had been made in the*few years before 
the Revolution. By 1789 there were about one thousand kilometres 
of. canals in. France (most of them built in the previous century), 
and an equal, length of navigable rivers. About 200 kilometres 
of canals were completed during the Empire. 
2 
Louis Becquey, 
the newly appointed Directeur-g6n¬ral des Ponts et Chauss6es, 
3 
took as his first task to revive the declining momentum of the 
programmes begun by former regimes, and gave particular attention 
to the needs of water-borne transport. In 1820, less than three 
years after taking office, he presented to the government a 
comprehensive report on the nation"'s waterways, 
4 both summarizing 
their existing situation and proposing measures to improve and 
extend them. It attempted to set down the outlines of a 
complete national system of waterways, -and though it was 
certainly a very ambitious plan, it seems to have been widely 
accepted. Important and concrete results came from it almost 
immediately. Following recommendations contained in the Report 
of 1820, loans were negotiated with a number of financial 
syndicates (later sanctioned by law in 1'821 and l822), in order 
to finance construction of improvements on fifteen waterways. 
Considerable work had already been done on some of the waterways 
involved, at a cost of almost 53 MF, and it was estimated that 
the additional cost of completing these and about 2,000 kilo-' 
metres of new waterways would be over 126 MF. 
5 
At the same 
time as work was begun on these, technical studies were begun 
by engineers of the Ponts et Chaussees on other waterways in 
the national system, including the lower Seine. 
With few exceptions, all of the improvements undertaken 
in the programme of 1821 and 1822 involved artificial waterways, 
that is canals. Though the Report of 1820 explicitly recognized 
the obvious need also to improve the country's many good 
natural. waterways, there was nevertheless a strong inclination 
by contemporary experts to favour entirely artificial' means 
for doing this. In many parts of the country of course 
construction of artificial canals was unavoidable if any kind 
of'navigabl'e waterways were to be created. In other places 
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" however, as on the lower Seine, navigable waterways already 
existed which merely needed. to be. improved. Amongst the 
techniques available for doing this there was a clear 
alternative, either to 'canalize'. the river channel itself, or 
to build a parallel, or so-called lateral canal. Existing 
theory and experience indicated that lateral canals were the, 
better solution. It was Joseph Dutens, reputed to be one of 
the principal authors of the Report of 1820 and ingenieur-en- 
chef in the department of the NiZ&. vre, who later wrote the 
authoritative Histoire'de la navigation. int6rieure (1829), in 
which he stated the classic arguments for canals, derived 
principally from British experience-. Engineers had not, he said, 
been able to devise a good technique for canalizing rivers, and 
those who had sought to combine canalization with sections of 
lateral canal had usually finished by building an entire lateral 
canal. "On connait ce mot, " he wrote, 
6 
si souvent reproduit de Brindley, ä qui au sujet d'un canal 
qu'il persistait ä etablir pr6s dune riviere, on demandait 
pour quel objet il pensait que la Providence eüt cree des 
rivieres: ce fut, repondit Brindley, pour alimenter les 
canaux. Nous pensons, en effet, qu'il nya que des 
obstacles insurmontables qui doivent empecher se substituer 
a la navigation fluviale la navigation en canal.... 
Experience in canalization of rivers in the eighteenth century 
had not been successful, and proper techniques had not yet 
been developed and tested. 
Improvement of the lower Seine was an important element 
in the national plan. One of the principal long lines of communi- 
cation sketched out in the Report of 1820 was that joining the 
Mediterranean to the Ocean by way of the Rhone, Saone, the 
Canal de Bourgogne, the Yonne and the Seine. Completion of the 
Canal de Bourgogne was one of the projects authorized by the 
law of 1822. As for the Seine, the Report made the tentative 
suggestion that a canal be built from Honfleur to Villequier, 
but left any firm decision until after detailed studies could 
be completed. A thorough survey of the lower Seine was in 
fact soon begun by a group of eleven Ponts et Chauss6es 
engineers under the direction of Charles. Berigny, inspecteur- 
divisionnaire for the Seine-basin. From these studies emerged 
two reports by Berigny, the first describing a project for 
canalization of the river, as was being undertaken on the Oise, 
and the second for a large maritime ship canal from LeHavre to 
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Paris. 7 Although canalization was technically the, more 
adventurous of the two, since the methods for doing it were 
still undeveloped, the-project for canalization was the one 
favoured by Berigny and his engineers. Pierre Frissard, for 
example, who studied the section between Villequier and Rouen, 
recommended a form of canalization, a modification of which 
was 25 years later applied. 
8 
In the Seine-et-Oise the ing6nieur- 
en-chef-Antoine Polonceau concluded that the only realistic 
method of improving the Basse Seine would be canalization; 
artificial navigation by means of lateral canals or derivations, 
he wrote, would inevitably prove much too expensive and would 
run up against the innumerable obstacles of bridges, roads, and 
established river interests. 
9 
Though not recommended by Berigny, the idea of building 
a maritime ship canal to Paris and by this means creating a 
"Paris, port de mer", was very much favoured in Paris during 
the 1820s. 'Such a canal would give a depth of six metres, as 
opposed to only two by canalization. By bringing ocean-going 
ships all the way up to Paris it was thought that the costs of 
trans-shipment at Rouen and LeHavre could be avoided and over- 
all transport costs reduced. Moreover it would facilitate the 
creation of useful and profitable warehouse facilities for over- 
seas goods in Paris. By no means was this a new idea; most of 
the projects undertaken, during the 1820s, including the maritime 
canal., were based upon ideas and, plans developed in-the previous 
century. In 1768"and 1769 a captain Bertholot had made four 
voyages from LeHavre to Paris with an ocean-going ship of 160 
tons; and at about the same time an engineer, Sieur Passement, 
had designed a canal to bring such ships up to Poissy. 
10 A 
decade later Gouffier proposed a maritime canal from Dieppe to 
Paris, 
11 
which was recommended to the government by the munic- 
ipalit6 of Paris. 
12 
In 1787 and 1788 Sieur Isnard, ingenieur 
des op nts et chaussees, proposed another such canal to follow. - 
the Seine, Eure, Vegre, Ivette and Brievre from Rouen to Paris. 
13 
Another similar project was put forward in the Year IX by one 
Lesueur, directeur de la"flotille maritime de la. Seine, who took 
it up again in 1816.14 During the. Restoration the idea was 
revived, and a request was made in 1818 to the Conseil-general 
des manufactures by a number, of Paris merchants for direct sea- 
going navigation from LeHavre to Paris: The request was rejected 
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for the time being as impractical, 'but'in 1819 the Minister of 
the Interior asked that the Council reconsider the matter and 
advise him how best to establish "navigation directe entre 
LeHavre et Paris" and a "gare d'eau ä Paris. "15 
Bdrigny believed that for economic reasons a maritime 
canal could not be justified. The technical problems he was 
sure could be overcome, but ocean-going ships would find no 
real advantage in-goingýany-farther inland than Rouen. They 
could not use their sails on a canal and their masts would 
interfere with bridges; their crews were much larger than 
needed for a horse-drawn river voyage, and their capacity much 
/too small to compete with large bateaux normands. Shallow-draught 
river boats, he argued, could carry three to four hundred tons, 
and with smaller-crews and reasonably short voyage times would 
retain their existing advantages regardless of the cost of 
trans-shipment at Rouen. The potential benefits from a maritime 
canal did not therefore seem sufficient to justify the very. 
large costs likely to be incurred, carefully estimated by 
Berigny at about 200 MF. The benefits to. be obtained from such 
a project were estimated by comparing existing transport costs 
with potential future costs. The total annual saving if all 
goods then being trans-shipped at LeHavre and Rouen were taken 
directly to Paris would have been 2.73 MF over the existing 
costs of about 6.2 MF. This indicated a rate of return on 
investment of little, more than one per cent per annum, and it 
would take over seventy years for accumulated savings to equal 
the original cost. of a canal. 
16 
If, he stated, 
17 
one were to 
se borner ä des speculations basees sur les produits 
certains que l'on pourrait obtenir dans 1'etat present des 
affaires, il faudrait se restreindre au simple perfectionne- 
ment de la navigation actuelle, et rester toujours en lit ' 
de riviere. 
Despite Berigny's very clear advice however, it was the 
maritime canal and not the more modest scheme for canalization 
of the Seine which was chosen for further study in 1825. There 
were two main reasons for this unfortunate choice. The criterion 
of economic feasibility was generally but rather vaguely accepted 
in the 1820s. It was accepted on two different, though not 
necessarily conflicting levels. First, all projects it was 
thought ought to be financially viable, since they would 
probably be financed by private capital. The Report of 1820 
had mentioned the need. for "projets bien congus, bien etudigs, 
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dont la possiblita est certaine, dont les-profits peuvent titre 
calcules at mis an balance avec les frais qua des particuliers 
voudront prendre ä leur charge., 
18 In practice however, this 
general advice was only very loosely adhered to. For on a 
second level, every project was thought to have additional' 
benefits, not accruing directly to its owners, but to the economy 
in general. Any doubts about the immediate profitability of 
a project could be dismissed by a contemplation of its almost 
certain immense indirect benefits. The Report spoke of increased 
land values, rising employment, expanded internal markets and 
faster growing industry. Great Britain of course was taken as 
the example of what was possible. But the analogy was much 
too facile, as C. -J. Minard, a Ponts at Chauss6es engineer and 
economist recalled a couple of decades later. 
19 "On a cru", 
" he wrote, "qu'il suffirait d'ouvrir des canaux an France pour 
obtenir un grand commerce interieure. " Many of the canals 
built under the programmes of 1821 and 1822 were planned for 
their development potential, but in fact lay idle and incomplete, 
and were a gigantic financial failure. This was owing partly 
to a miscalculation of their costs, but also to an over-estima- 
tion of their benefits. Similar exaggerated expectations seem 
to have been partly responsible for the maritime canal scheme. 
The enthusiasm of baron Charles Dupin, polytechnicien and 
publicist offers a good example. "Des navies de fortes 
dimensions, " he wrote, 
20 
pourraient, an evitant les sinuosites at les longeurs du 
fleuve, arriver avec rapidite jusqu'au pont d'Iena, dans 
un vaste port qu'on ouvrirait aupres des Champs-de-Mars. 
Cette seule entreprise suffirait, peut-titre pour changer 
les destinees commerciales at maritimes de la France. 
Appelons sur eile l'attention de tous les amis de notre 
puissance nationale. 
The usual argument was that even though there was not at 
present sufficient commercial activity to make a scheme pay its 
way, the new activity it would create, added to the old, would 
do so. This was not necessarily incorrect, but most often this 
argument was little more than an exaggerated faith in the 
efficacity of the technically grandiose. It permitted Bdrigny's 
very practical objections to the canal to be passed over. 
This kind of naivety was less current within the Ponts 
et Chaussee's than among the general public, 'and there is ample. 
evidence to show that the Administration*des Ponts et Chaussees 
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was never in favour of the maritime canal. However, it was 
rendered incapable of, executing its own choices 
, 
by-another 
aspect of. contemporary 'doctrine', the belief in the need for 
private financing. ' The governments of the Restoration were not 
willing to invest public funds in; large public works projects; 
they contented themselves with'maintenance work and with some 
improvements to the roads. The same Charles Dupin complained 
in. 182421 that since the end of the wars, "dans la plus grande 
prosperite de nos finances",, the government had been spending 
only 31 MF each year on public works. Michel Chevalier commented 
in 184822 that "le göuvernement de la Restauration"parait avoir 
et6 constamment domine par le desir"d'avoir des finances dans 
un ordre parfait, et ii y avait reussi. " Perhaps it was too 
; conscious that the Revolution of 1789 had been provoked by a 
financial crisis. it-is-also true however, 'that never during 
the eighteenth century had the State spent large sums from the 
Treasury to improve the waterways; funds for this purpose had 
come to a large degree from private financial sources. 
23 The 
system adopted during the Restoration was merely a-reversion 
to this tradition, encouraged once more by the example of 
Great Britain. Joseph Dutens had been sention a mission to 
study British methods at first hand, 
24 
and the Report of 1820 
concluded that 
l'experiencea-demontre l'efficacite du mode employe par 
nos voisins. dans. ce* sortes-d'affaires: l'administration 
devra examiner si, en adoptant, au moins en partie, un 
semblable systeime, nous ne pourrions pas receuillir les 
memes avantages. 
The effects of this system on the lower Seine however, were un- 
fortunate. Because the State was unwilling itself to undertake 
any large projects,., the ultimate decision as to which projects 
would be undertaken was put into private hands. The Ponts et 
Chaussees was made incapable of offering any competing alternative 
Despite an inclination in the Administration to follow the advice 
of B&rigny, the maritime canal therefore was allowed to proceed. 
The Maritime Canal: its First"Stages, from 1824 to 1828. 
Sometime in 1824,, Charles Dupin tells us, 
25 just as 
construction of the canals of 1821 and 1822 was begun, an 
inf-luential, group was formed to study the possibility of building 
either, a lateral'ship canal or-. an improved. river, navigation on 
the Seine between LeHavre and'Paris. " They went almost immediately 
.ýýi 
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. 
to Great Britain, as many had before them, to study the forms 
of association common there for financing such large projects. 
The government of Villele was-very favourable "to 'this scheme, 
partly. because. it hoped to gain political credit from its 
expected economic success,. and it put every facility at the 
group's disposal. They were welcomed in London by the Prince 
de. Polignac, the French ambassador, and put in contact with 
Dupin,,, who had many knowledgeable and influential friends in 
England, ýand who was himself something of an expert on public 
works in, Great Britain. In October 1824, when the association 
-were decided on their course of action, they sent a letter 
to-Polignac26 containing an outline of their plans. They took 
as their project the old idea-of a maritime canal. A company 
should be formed, they wrote, stock sold to the public, and 
commercial and technical studies made, after which construction 
could,. commence. All the preparatory stages they thought would 
take about one year. The rates charged by the company would 
be moderate. and give considerable economies over existing 
transport costs. 
The skepticism of the Ponts et Chauss6es was revealed 
almost immediately. The Minister of Finance was asked to 
grant a concession to the embryo company, and he referred the 
affair to Becquey for advice. His reply clearly indicated the 
different direction he thought further studies should follow. 
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Onzoncoit que. pour amener les bätiments de mer jusqu'ä 
Paris il faudra se jetter dans des ddpenses enormes, 
tandis qu'il sera possible ä moins de frais circuler de 
Paris ä la ider, et reciproquement, des bätiments d'eau 
douce qui porteraient le meine tonnage que les navires. 
Dans le premier cas, il est vrai, il, n'y aura'ni station- 
nement sur la cote ni transbordement de marchand±ses et les 
speculateurs qui se presentent aujourd'hui devront examiner 
si 1 economie qu'on assure par la au commerce peut compenser 
la difference des tarifs plus eile s auxquels il faudra 
l' assuieter nniir cnuvri r1 ac frei c Iii nrPmi ar P- b1-Lssement 
0 
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Interieur des terres au ela des limites ue la nature 
semb e lui avoir assign es. 
According to a recent study, he continued, a depth of nine feet 
could be obtained at far less than the immense cost of this 
canal, and would enable flat-boats of up to 800 tons to enter 
Paris. However, he recommended that: the scheme be allowed to 
proceed since the organizers of the, company seemed-to be familiar 
with their subject. A formal application was made for a "con- 
cession" to build and operate the canal, and on 16 February, 1825 
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an ordinance was published authorizing, the company to go ahead 
with studies. 
28 
_ 
The structure of the company then setup was unique 
and specially adapted to the limited objectives set'by the 
ordinance. It was not a cociete anonyme, nor did it issue any 
stock for sale. At the head of the company was sort of 'steering 
group', -the Conseil-directeur, composed of seven eminent 
personalities. When it met for the first time on the 10th of 
March 1825 its members were29 the Prince de Polignac and his 
brother the duc de Polignac, both closely connected with the 
regime; the baron de Vitrolles, an ultraroyalist and adviser to 
1Charles X; the comte Mollien, a financier and former Minister 
" of Finance of long and varied' experience; the comte Beugnot, a 
Napoleonic prefect and later a liberal deputy from Rouen; Berryer 
fils, a liberal (though later Legitimist) avocat; and the baron 
Charles Dupin, already mentioned, who incidently had been 
Berryer's collegue on the defence at the trial of Marshall Ney. 
Under this-council worked a very small staff headed by Stephane 
"Flachat. All the plans and calculations of the company were 
to be submitted to two committees, one of three Ponts et 
Chaussdes engineers, to verify cost estimates and to check 
technical details, and the other of five negociants and 
bankers to verify estimates of traffic and to set a tariff. 
The financial resources required by the company during 
the planning stage were not expected to be large, but for 
construction it would require as much or more than those brought 
together for all the waterways included in the programme of 
1821 and 1822. Financial backing seems to have come from a 
variety of sources. The principal organizer seems to have been 
Charles Ardoin, head of the firm of bankers Ardoin et Cie. 
3V- 
He had been associated. with Jacques Laffitte in the Cie des 
Quatre Canaux of 1822,31 and-in loans to Germany, Poland and 
Russia in the early Restoration period, 
32 
and he was involved in 
property development in Paris. Ardoin was the chief among the 
. 
five members of the commission des n6gociants which had had the 
task of estimating the company's- revenues and setting its 
tariffs; with him on this committee were also Lafond fils, 
Charles Vital-Roux, a Regent of the Bank of France and head of 
a bank established with the aid of'Jacques Laffitte in 1823, 
and Larreguy, secretary of the Societd commanditaire de 1'industrie 
established in 1826 as the commercial arm of Guerin de Foncin, 
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another banker. 
33 Last among its members was Drouillard, of 
the firm of Blaque, Droulliard et Certain, also bankers. 
The first obstacles encountered by the canal's promoters 
were technical. The technical problems involved in building 
such a deep canal along the Seine, beginning with a wide estuary 
and continuing along the river's very winding course, were very 
considerable, and nothing on this large scale had ever been 
attempted before.. Detailed surveys of the canal were fairly 
quickly completed between Rouen and Bezons (about 40 kilometres 
west of Paris) and submitted to the committee of engineers. In 
this section it was planned that the canal would have a uniform 
depth of five and a half metres and it would cross the Seine 
at seven points by means of partial dams across the river. 
In April 1827 the committee's rapporteur. Cavenne returned 
-a favourable report and no objections seem to have been raised. 
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Next the plans were sent to the*Commission des canaux of the 
Conseil-general des Ponts et Chaussees, and there they did not 
pass so easily. There. it was objected that the canal's relation 
to the river and its existing traffic had been insufficiently 
considered; the seven partial dams might seriously interfere 
with river traffic, steadily growing in the*1820s, and they 
would be strongly opposed by river transport operators. The 
rapporteur to the Commission des canaux, Brisson, an old and 
respected engineer, took up this problem of the seven dams and 
in a very imaginative report recommended a radical change in 
the company's plans. He suggested a new route, entirely on 
the north shore, from Oissel to Paris, which would avoid all 
crossings of the Seine. He admitted however, that this would 
greatly increase the canal's cost. 
35 In the second draft of 
the company's plans the number of crossings was reduced to four, 
but the problem of interference with the river was never properly 
solved. 
The seaward section, from Rouen to LeHavre, was far more 
difficult, particularly in the estuary of the Seine. Techniques 
for deepening estuaries and controlling the effects of tides 
were still very primitive and controversial. The first proposal 
made by the"company's engineers on this section, Pattu and 
Pouettre, both of whom had worked with Bdrigny, was for a long 
dam between LeHavre and Honfleur. It would be built to the 
height of low-water level, protected by an advance breakwater, 
and detached from the shore at each end to allow the river to 
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-flow outward and ships to pass inward. Long jetties attached 
to the north shore would direct the main stream toward Honfleur. 
It=was hoped by these means to slow down the-outflow, creating 
a greater depth behind the dam, and to reduce the destructive 
effects of the tide and the barre. 
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Objections were immediately 
raised against'it. Some said that a dam and breakwater could 
never withstand the force of sea and tides. The most determined 
opposition came from A. -E. "Lamblardie. His father, J. -E. 
Lamblardie, had been the well-known and respected engineer in 
charge at the port of LeHavre at the end of the Old Regime, and 
it was he who had made the first extensive study of the tides 
; and currents on the Normandy coast and in the Baie de Seine. 
He had also taken an interest in the problem of improving 
navigation on the Seine, and had proposed that a canal be built 
from LeHavre to Villequier on the right shore. 
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A similar 
project by baron Cachin, who was still a member of the Conseil- 
gen6ral des Ponts et Chaussees in the early 1820s had got as 
far as' being examined by the Legislative Assembly in 1792.38 
As for the dam proposed by Pattu and Pouettre, A. -E. Lamblardie 
believed that its effects would be first to block LeHavre's 
harbour with coastal gravel and later to flood its quays. 
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Lamblardie seems to have gathered some support among the- 
Conseil-general, for the company was forced to ask the minister of 
Marine to setup a special commission of engineers to study the 
question, 
40 
and although only one of its members', Sganzin, agreed 
with the objections of Lamblardie, 
41 
who-was his step-son, and 
wanted, to-reject the dam-entirely, the majority of the commission 
gave only conditional approval to the plan. 
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Their conditions 
were that a study must be made"of the tides'on the coast of 
Normandy from Cherbourg to Dieppe to remove any doubts about 
their effects upon. LeHavre, and before any part of the dam was 
started, --a canal must be built through LeHavre from Sainte- 
Adresse to Ingouville, --to provide, an alternate route around the 
dam. At the same time another of the company's engineers, 
Fresnel, had been continuing surveys of a larger canal from 
LeHavre to-Villequier (the same, route recommended by the elder 
Lamblardie),. and in view of the opposition to the dam, the 
Commission des canaux recommended-in its final report in October 
1827 that this project be adopted. ' Though its cost was estimated 
at about 70 MF,,. the company reluctantly agreed. 
43 
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It was now the spring of 1828. The company had spent 
three years and 700,000 F on its's tudies, and they were far 
from complete. 
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Perhaps with a view to forcing the pace a 
little, in February 1828 it sent'a partial project to Becquey 
for his consideration. The Commission des canaux to which the 
project was sent for examination was not at all satisfied. Not 
only was the total cost of the project still very uncertain, 
but the company had apparently still not decided which route it 
wished to follow above. Rouen. In any case the project it had 
submitted went no farther than-Bezons, and there were no plans 
for the entrepöt in Paris, the commercial heart and raison., 
d'etre of the project. The total cost of building the canal 
and its accessories was estimated by the company at 160 MF; 
I 
, this included 70 MF from LeHavre to Rouen, 66 MF from Rouen to 
Bezons, and 24 MF from Bezons to Paris, including the entrepöt. ---- 
These were enormous amounts, which could easily be exceeded, 
and the Commission wondered whether the advantages of lower 
transport costs might be more economically obtained by other 
means. 
45 
En d'autres_termes faut-il consacrer 200 millions au 
prestige dune Navigation Maritime si, par exemple, ii 
suffisait de depenser 25 millions pour assurer le transport 
du Havre ä Paris, dans un meme temps donne, et au meme 
prix, d'un meme tonnage de marchandises, ä l'aide dune 
navigation fluviale de deux metres de tirant d'eau? 
Without the continued support of the other governments which 
followed that of Vill6le, 
46 
the company was forced'as a result 
of this unfavourable report by the Commission des canaux47 to 
reconsider its entire project. 
The company decided to proceed only with the section of 
the canal between Rouen and Paris. This decision seems to have 
been prompted not only by opposition to its plans in the Admin- 
istration des Ponts et Chaussees, but also by the accumulation 
of risks which threatened the financial success of the project. 
Stephane Flachat, one of the company's leading organizers, 
wrote48 that owing to uncertainties about both costs and 
revenues,, the company was forced to. reduce its plans to smaller 
and more predictable proportions. ' In its original form it 
would not have been sufficiently attractive to"potential investors. 
Attractiveness would. depend on both the probability of an 
economic rate of return on capital (at'that time usually, 
taken to be about six per cent for:. a risk-free investment), and 
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an adequate premium for risk. According to its own estimates, 
the company would'offer a return to investors-of. about ten per 
cent; the total capital costs would be about 160 MF, and the 
annual'net revenue about 16.5 MF. This rate of ten per cent 
however, depended upon revenues rising quickly to their full 
amount after completion of the canal; it also depended upon an 
uncertain estimate of-the canal's ability to compete with 
existing river transport and an equally uncertain estimate of 
costs. Transport on the river had been considerably improved 
in the'last two or three years by the introduction of steamers, 
and by fast chalands pulled by tugboats; journey times as a 
'result hadbeen much reduced.. Therefore the canal's ability to 
compete would have been considerably reduced. More likely to 
affect the potential investor's confidence were the uncertain 
cost estimates. This was particularly worrying in 1828, for 
it was just then becoming evident that the estimated cost of 
the canals begun'in 1821 and 1822 would be far exceeded. In 
his'report on the Situation des Canaux in 182849 the Minister 
of the. Interior had revealed that the latest cost estimates 
exceeded the original ones by 37 per cent; the costs of land, 
labour and materials were all rising as demand for them by a 
growing number of projects increased. The cost of urban land, 
of which the maritime canal would need a great amount, he said, 
had become especially high. The-consequences of all this for 
the maritime canal were obvious; the four per cent estimated 
risk premium offered to its prospective shareholders was 'far 
from adequate. 
Premature Plans for a Railway. 
There were even rumours at this time that the maritime 
canal scheme would be abandoned in favour of a railway; they 
were carried in the relatively unimportant Paris newspaper 
Le Courrier des Chambres in June 1828.50 Nothing came of them. 
A railway had been planned in 1825, but it also had soon been 
dropped in face of technical and economic uncertainty. Spec- 
ulative activity in transport had not been confined in 1825 t6 
canals. In that year England had experienced its first very 
small 'railway boom', though only a-few short lines of railway 
were begun. It had faint . echoes"ih France, but its concrete 
results there were even smaller. Most interest in railways 
in France was still at-this early stage very local and 
specific, centred on the coal mines of the upper Loire and their 
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need for better communications with Lyon and the Rhone valley. 
As commercial enterprises. railways were completely untested 
and still in a very elementary stage of their development. 
They were considered suitable only, for relatively short routes 
and for hauling specialized cargos like coal. In 1824 however, 
this circumscribed role had been exceeded for the first time in 
the ambitious plans for. 'the Liverpool to Manchester railway. 
The analogy between this route and that between LeHavre and 
Paris was an obvious one. to contemporary'observers, and prompted 
perhaps by the canal-company's application for a concession, 
two groups of engineers-and bankers applied for permission to 
build railways along the same route. Although neither of these 
, groups was able 
to take its project beyond the early planning 
stage,. they are both historically interesting for the accuracy 
with which they pointed, to. the. future. 
. The first application, about which very little is known, 
came in early February 1825 from a group of English capitalists, 
sponsored-by an engineer called Isaac Sargent. Sargent seems 
to-have had. no; previous experience of railways; he was a manufac- 
turer of bricks and tiles. in Paris in partnership with a certain 
Thomas Hodgkin. 51 The-, group formed to build the railway took 
the name of Isaac Sargent et. Cie, and on 28 April 1825 they 
obtained a patent for the importation and development of "routes 
en,, fer. ou en bois,, destinees aux-transports des marchandises et 
des voyageurs, a l'aide de voitures dune construction particu- 
liere, mises; en mouvement par des machines ä vapeur, hydraliques, 
ou-autres moteurs fixesn52 British capitalists and manufacturers 
had been engaged in France for many decades, but this was their 
first-venture-into railways; fifteen years later, the successful 
Paris, to Rouen and LeHavre line retained its-place as the first 
French railway to be financed substantially by British capital. 
A=few weeks later another application was received from 
a: French group. Much more is known about this company. Francois 
Bartholony, later connected with the Paris-to-Orl6ans Railway, 
tells us5hat its main source of capital was a number of Paris 
banking houses, and he listed five of them: a recent addition 
to'the 'haute banque-parisienne', C. de Lapanoüze; two newcomers 
to Paris, B. Paccard. and Dufour, and two departmental receveurs- 
gn6raux, Michel de Saint-Albin and Adrien de, la Hante. As 
Navier, the company's engineer, commented, 
54 these 5were names 
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from the "premier rang des maisons. de banque de la capital. " 
This too was an important indication of future'sources of rail- 
way capital; until the 1830s, the small number of railways 
built were financed by combinations of-mining and metallurgical 
companies and canal interests with a small contribution by 
local bankers. 
Both. companies clearly saw the railway as an alternative 
to the canal or to any other improvement of the river. 1'L16- 
tablissement--d'un-chemin de fer entre Paris et Rouen, " wrote 
Navier in 1826,55 "prdsentera'au commerce un moyen de transport 
/, 
beaucoup plu s prompt, plus sOr et plus economique que tous ceux 
qui existent aujourd'hui; ""and it would conserve "tous ces 
avantages, et meme celui d'6conomie, quelque soit les travaux 
fait pour am6liorer la navigation dc la Seine.... " Navier 
carefully calculated its-cost of establishment to be about 31 
MF56 which was certainly much less than the canal. He thought 
it would be *a more economical alternative to the canal partly 
. because any-economies from improvement in water-borne trans- 
port would inevitably be cancelled out by an equal rise in 
navigation dues. In any case, noýimprovement of the river could 
provide the. faster transport which was undoubtedly "un des 
principaux besoins du commerce. " 
Predictably, ' reactions to these proposals were not 
unanimously-favourable. The plans of both companies were 
transmitted almost immediately by the Minister of Public Works 
to,. the Chambres of Commerce-in-Paris, Rouen. and LeHavre. The 
Parisians welcomed the idea, but were skeptical that it could 
overcome inevitable technical and-other obstacles. " However, 
they requested the Prefect of the Seine to ask the Directeur- 
g6n6ralRdes'Ponts-et Chaussdes=to draft a cahier des charges 
for the line`, and to makea concession to the lowest bidder. 
To reduce its cost; they recommended that the 30,000-tons of 
iron rails needed for the line be imported free of duty from 
Great Britain; the use of imported rails would prevent inflation- 
ary pressure-, on the-price of iron in France. 
57. The Chambre of 
Commerce in LeHavre. also responded with enthusiasm, and in- 
LeHavre as well the railway seems-for a while to have been seen 
as-a feasible alternative'to the-canal. 58 In Rouen however, as 
was expected, the reaction was entirely` hostile. The Chambre 
of Commerce in Rouen-admitted 59 that it. would perhaps effect 
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considerable savings in transport costs; on a ton of raw sugar 
for example, it calculated that the present direct transport 
cost of 4,100 F-could be reduced to about. 3,100 F and an 
additional 1,350 F could be saved by shorter transport times 
and cheaper insurance. However, it was obvious that the opera- 
tion of such a railway would do irreparable damage to the port 
of Rouen and its associated transport and other industries. It 
cited the owners of 1,500 to 2,000 charrettes and the twelve to 
fifteen thousand horses engaged in roulage, four shipbuilding 
yards, and one-hundred businesses engaged in maritime commerce. 
There are several reasons why this first attempt at a 
railway failed, though their relative importance is difficult 
to judge. First, it was technically before its time. When 
-powered by horses a railway had few clear advantages over 
existing methods-of transport,. almbst all of which also used 
horsepower. The fundamental limitation of the horse was its 
lack of speed. Its'most efficient speed was reckoned to be 
somewhere between three and four kilometres per hour60 and 
above this its load-pulling capacity fell quite quickly. This 
optimum speed of course was the same for all forms of transport, 
waterways, roads. and railways. A horse walking at about four 
kilometres per hour on a railway could pull only about one- 
fortieth of the weight it could pull on a canal with still water. 
Canals could therefore operate more cheaply. At higher speeds, 
the load-pulling capacity of horses on water and rails became 
equal (at about twelve kilometres per hour), but at this speed 
the efficiency of both was considerably reduced, and the cost 
increased. Where there was an adverse river current, as in 
upstream travel on the Seine, the advantages of horse-drawn 
water transport over its equivalent on rails was greatly reduced, 
but it was still two to one on the lower Seine. Though on 
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the level, a horse-drawn railway had an advantage over an 
ordinary road surface of about-seven to one, this quickly 
disappeared on any more than the smallest gradient (of which 
there were many between, LeHavre and Paris). 
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For pulling a 
large völume. of general cargo over long distances therefore, 
horses were not considered suitable. The directors of the 
Liverpool änd Manchester Railways the first to be built in 
England specifically for general cargo, were convinced in 1829, 
59 
that "pour l'immense mouvement commercial qu'on pr6voyait 
devoir avoir lieu sur le chemin de Liverpool a Manchester, les 
chevaux 6taient hors de la question..... 
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Secondly, opposition to the railway was strong, first 
from Rouen whose whole commercial existence depended to a large 
degree upon poor inland transport, and from protectionist iron- 
masters who opposed the essential imports of rails. A remark 
in the Journal du Havre in. 182764 indicated that this was a 
very important factor in its-failure. G, Lefranc has stated 
much märe recently65 that the project was rejected by the Admin- 
istration des Ponts et Chauss6es for fear that it would create 
competition for the maritime canal. However, it seems unlikely 
that the project ever-reached the stage of being actively consid- 
ered by the Ponts et Chauss6es; there is no evidence to suggest 
that it did. The most effective and immediate reason for fail-__. 
ure was probably withdrawal of financial support. There'was a 
serious financial crisis early in 1826 and'the speculative bubble 
burst; it is likely that neither the British company's backers 
nor the Paris bankers could afford in such circumstances to 
commit any of their assets to such a long-term and speculative 
project like a railway. In any case, by 1826 there was less 
need for a railway owing to the considerable imprövements which 
had been made in river' transport. 
Revision-and Abandonment of the Maritime Canal Project. 
' The maritime canal company, quickly prepared a new and 
shorter=project from Rouen toýParis, and during the thirteen 
months from its presentation to the government in the Revolution 
of'1830, most of, the stages toward its final approval seem to 
have been completed. Theinew project was prepared for the 
company by M. Bayard de Lavingtrie, 
66 
and though all the nec- 
essary'surveys had not been completed, it was presented for 
approval on 25 June 1829., 
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, Some of the changes suggested in 
the previous year were accepted, and the number of river cross-- 
ings between-Oissel and Paris was reduced from seven to four, 
only three of them needing dams. The width and depth would, be 
made sufficient for ships of'up to 200 tons, including steamers, 
which the company firmly believed would benefit from using the 
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canal. The total cost, though raised by the greater width 
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needed by steamers, was reduced in, this, new project from 90 MF 
(for the Rouen to Parisýsection'of the original larger project) 
to 64 MF. Although the Conseil-gdneral des Ponts et Chaussees 
had several reservations and suggested-other less costly methods 
for improving-the Seine, 69 the project was-submitted unaltered 
by the Directeur-gdneral to public inquiries in January. 1830. 
The Company's purposes in building its canal were un- 
changed despite its great reduction in size. They were still 
to eliminate trans-shipment at'Rouen, and to centralise both 
the control and the actual processes of French maritime trade 
", in__Paris. It was still expected that shipping rates direct to 
Paris would belittle more 'than existing ones to Rouen. The 
company-did not believe that Rouen would suffer in the long 
run, because being mainly a manufacturing city, it would benefit 
frombetter., 
w, access, to_ markets: and raw materials. Overseas 
shipping would still be conducted from LeHavre, and with the 
greater depth provided by the canal, alleges and steamers could 
. easily navigate 
directly to Paris. An equally important element 
in the company's plan was a group of warehouses it would build 
west of Paris on the plain of Gennevilliers, modern "magazins 
que. les navires et. les bateaux puissent accoster d'un cote, et 
des chariots de l'autre.... " The port established next to them 
would replace the several scattered existing ports of Paris, act 
as ,a customs. warehouse"or "dock", and give direct access "a 
toutes les natures detransports". ° Transport to the centre of 
Paris they thought might be provided by a "route a la Stephenson". 
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Similar so-called "docks-entrepots" had been operating in London 
and Liverpool. -for more than a 
decade. 
Both Rouen and LeHavre were naturally hostile to the " 
project, and they had an opportunity to express their opposition 
officially during the public. inquiry held in January 1830.7,1 
The reasons for Rouen's hostility are obvious; the-Chambre-of 
Commerce objected thatýthe canal would seriously hamper estab- 
lished'transport on the Seine, and anyway, it said, 
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nest-il pas, etonnant que l'on-. s'occupe d'un canal pour 
faire monter les grands navires a Paris, lorsque dejä ils 
ne peuvent plus arriver a Rouen sans de grands dangers. 
Avant de travailler dans la haute-. Seine, ne devrait-on pas- 
chercher a faire disparaitre ou diminuer ces dangers? 
LeHavre was more optimistic about its own powers of survival, 
and its Chainbre ' of Commerce thought *the canal would.. be very 
U 
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worthwhile, but it'°was entirely opposed to the idea of a large 
entrepöt in Paris. It would damage Leiiavre's traditional 
entrepöt business. 'La nature elle-memell., it suggested, 
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was 
opposed to such a-project. 
Despite this'opposition, negotiations between the company 
and the Bureau de Commerce for a concession began very soon 
after the company had submitted a definitive request'. 
74 
They 
were not easy, since the company's demands were large. Though 
the Bureau de Commerce approved the company's tariff schedules, ' 
and agreed with its estimate of net revenue, it refused to 
permit the company to charge any fee to river boats passing 
through its dams, and limited the company's monopoly of transport 
on the canal to only twenty-seven years. - It stipulated further 
" that only the city of Paris could be given the responsibility 
for building and operating the"entrepät. 
75 The company reluc- 
tantly agreed to these modifications 
76 
and seemed optimistic 
that a, concession would soon be'granted. Then came the July 
Revolution and nothing"further was heard from the company for 
fifteen months. 
There were several causes for this long silence. Several 
of the company's most important supporters were closely associa- 
ted with the deposed regime, and had been compelled to leave 
Paris, either to exile or prison.. Some financial support may, 
also have been withdrawn in'the economic crisis which followed 
the Revolution'in 1830 and 1831. Several of its backers were 
affected. Laffitte's difficulties are well known. Ardoin was 
forced to declare bankruptcy. 77 Guerin de Foncin and Vital-Roux 
were both forced temporarily out of business in 1830.78 Many 
other companies also'found it impossible to sell their shares 
or bonds; the canal companies set up in 1821 and 1822 were 
especially badly affected. Two departures from the company were 
especially damaging-. 
_ 
In July 1830 resignations came from the 
two brothers Stephane and Eugene Flachat, who had directed much 
of the company's research. 
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When resuming contact with the 
Administration des Ponts et Chaussees late in 1831 itýwas dis- 
covered that, many of its documents and valuable'maps were missing 
from the official files, and the company had to reconstruct-its 
case without the help of'its two main experts. ' 
-, 
.0 
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The new government and administration were not sympathetic 
to the company's project, which had been actively promoted, by 
some of its predecessors, and the company restarted. its negotia- 
tions". under.. conditions. very, different from those of. 1829. The 
advice of the Directeur-gendral and Conseil-g6neral des Ponts 
et Chaussees were now given more attention by the government 
and thisýdid much to retard the-company's progress. The engineers 
on the Conseil-general had never been satisfied with the dams 
which must be built across the Seine at several points where 
. the canal crossed it. They_had recommended in February 1830 
. 
that should a concession be granted, each of the company's dams 
should be approved before being built. After convening a 
meeting with representives of the company and his own Ponts et 
Chaussees officials in November 1831, the comte d'argout, Minister 
of Public-Works, decided that a thorough study of this question 
must be made and a definite policy decided before further negocia- 
tions could take place. ' 
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There had been great progress made 
, 
in improving transport facilities on the Seine since the company 
had begun its original'studies in 1824, and the Ponts et 
Chauss6es were concerned that it not be diminished or further 
progress retarded as a result of the maritime canal. One reason 
for limiting the canal company's monopoly to twenty-seven years 
had been to lessen the adverse'effects such a monopoly would 
have upon-technical progress. In his report on the question of 
the damsr in°, March 18321-Tarbe de Vauclairs- reluctantly recommended 
that. the dams-be accepted inýprinciple; the Conseil-g6neral 
added that, the company must be compelled to pay for any additional 
locks needed when improvement of the river itself took place, 
and, that it must give free passage to all boats if the locks or 
dams were ever damaged. 
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These were difficult conditions for, 
the company to accept, and negotiations did'not continue for 
much longer. The Conseil-g6neral considered the scheme for the 
last time in May 1832. 
The Maritime Canal Becomes Obsolete. By 1830 there was 
a lively debate going on amongst engineers as to the technicai 
merits of various means of improving land and water transport. 
82 
There had been great skepticism in"the Ponts et Chauss6es about 
the wisdom of building a maritime canal when the idea had first 
been-put forward in the mid-1820s, and this was now more widely 
and articulately expressed. In a. post-script to its final recom- 
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mendations the Conseil-general des Ponts et Chaussees expressed 
its regret that it had never been permitted to consider any 
possible alternatives to a maritime cana1.83 Several recent 
studies had, shown there. were simpler and much less costly 
methods of improvement which would accommodate flat-bottomed 
river boats. A memoire describing one of these, by the 
engineers Coic and Duleau, 
84 had been widely read and was-sent 
in September 1830 to Legrand, secretary of the Conseil-general. 
These studies reinforced the view that other feasible means 
. existed, and although it is-evident from a reading of the rroces- 
. yerbaux of the Conseil-general that there was no agreement on 
the relative merits of various methods, it was accepted that one 
could be found which would be technically sound and offer benefits 
at least equal tö those from a maritime canal, and at a far lower 
cost. Whether a project were financed by private or public 
means, remarked a member of the Conseil-general, 
85 it would use 
up scarce capital resources. The Conseil-general therefore 
should recommend the project which promised the greatest benefit 
for the least estimated cost. This principle, an early hint of 
present-day benefit-cost analyses, had been more explicitly 
stated by C. -J. Minard in a course drawn up for the Ecole des 
Ponts et Chaussees in 1831.86 
By this time the railway had also emerged as an 
alternative to the maritime canal. It is clear moreover that 
the establishment of the railway as a practical means of long- 
distance general transport was a decisive factor in the collapse 
of the canal project. The railway projects put forward in 1825 
had failed owing partly to their dependance'upon horses for 
motive power, but in 1830 with the development of the locomotive 
as a viable source of power, this dependance was abruptly ended. 
While there were many who still predicted that the future role 
of railways would be limited to carrying passengers and the 
few goods then carried by messageries,. after this date their 
relative superiority over such costly alternatives as the 
maritime. canal was well established. 
There is little doubt that the locomotive's sudden 
emergence as a viable source of power made a clear impression 
upon interested observers-in France. The development of rail- 
way technology was closely followed in France by several eminent 
engineers, and a few of them added their own innovations, some 
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of the greatest importance. The first locomotives appeared 
in France in 1829, after the Compagnie'du chemin de fer de St. - 
Etienne'ä Lyon ordered two of the most advanced types from the 
factory, of Robert Stephenson at Newcastle. 
87 One of them was 
sent to the factory of Hallette at Arras, the other to Marc 
Seguin in Lyon, both to be used as models for construction of 
other locomotives. 
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After tests however, it was discovered 
that the average speed*, of these, machines was no more than six 
kilometres perhour, hardly better than horses. Most engineers 
in both Great Britain-and France remained unconvinced that loco- 
motives would soon become a satisfactory source of power for 
railways. In 1829-when the directors of the Liverpool to 
Manchester railway, were trying-to decide what form of motive 
. power to use on their 
line, they commissioned two eminent 
engineers, Walker and Rastrick, to-investigate the relative 
merits of fixed and locomotive engines, by then thought to be 
the only alternatives. These two men, in a lengthy report later 
published in France, 
89"concluded that fixed engines were pref- 
erable; although locomotives would require less initial capital 
investment, , the annual expense of operating them and therefore 
the cost of transport, would be greater. One of the main reasons 
for-higher-annual costs was the supposed damage their great 
weight would cause, to: the track. 
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Only on the insistence of 
Robert-Stephenson, the company-'swengineer, did the directors 
decide -; that. a' contest should beheld to encourage engineers, to 
perfect the locomotive and prove its superiority over fixed 
engines; ýit was this challenge which resulted in the famous 
Rainhill trials of October 1829, and the subsequent revolution 
in the technique and economics of railway operation. 
The change of opinion which occurred in France after the 
Rainhill trials is very clearly shown in a publication of 1830.91 
In 1828 two engineers,, L. Coste and A. A. Perdonnet, travelled 
to England and s Scotland. to look at the most recent developments 
in railway technology. Using the data of Walker and Rastrick, 
the latest-generally, available., they could only conclude in 
their report that between fixed engines and locomotives there 
was-no clear choice. However, after the Rainhill trials they 
were coý2pell'ed to add a new conclusion. "Ce-memoire", they 
wrote; 
. 
imprimd en grande partie avant"que nous ayons eu 
connaissance a Paris des r6sultats extraordinaires auxquels 
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a conduits le concours de Liverpool, renferme necessaire- 
ment plusieurs conclusions oü opinions, quit bases sur 
des observations que nou8 avons faites l'annee derniere 
en Angleterre, demanderaient aujourd'hui a etre modifiees. 
Les experiences (of Rainhill) semblent promettre aux 
chemins defer un brillant avenir. Il parait incontest- 
able que les nouvelles machines locomotives, unissant la 
force ä la leg6rite, a 1'economie et ä d'autres qualit6s 
moins importantes, sont infiniment superieures aux 
anciennes. 
This same conclusion was drawn by all; "depuis cette epoque, " 
wrote an English author in 1830, translated into French in 
1831,93 "la question entre les*machines locomotives et les, 
machines stationnaires doit etre regardee comme jugee par 
l'experience. " Another French author confirmed that it was 
, "la solution complete du probleme de . 
'application de la force 
de la vapeur a la locomotion sur'les chemins de fer. "94 The 
"Rocket" which caused such excitement at Rainhill used a multi- 
tubular boiler, an invention first successfully developed by 
Marc Seguin and patented in 1828.95 By this means Stephenson 
succeeded in greatly reducing the weight of the locomotive 
required to generate a given horsepower. Compared with all 
previous locomotives its performance was quite remarkable. Its 
own weight was only four and a half tons, yet it averaged more 
than twelve miles per hour (nineteen kilometres per hour), 
and"at times.. did better than twenty miles per hour, pulling 
loads of A twenty " tons .96 Its -power, was equal to that of 
its 
immediate -predecessor the "Lancashire Witch", which had'twice 
its weight. Moreover it seemed to give a considerable economy 
in fuel consumption. 
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The "Rocket" was quickly improved upon 
by Stephenson, and the model, he sent to France for the St. - 
Etienne-to-Roanne railway and put into service in July 1832 
(it-was the first in France) could pull a load of-sixty tons at 
twenty kilometres per hour. 
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With such performance from railways using locomotives, 
their ability to compete with horse-drawn transport, as was 
planned on the maritime canal, seemed to be quite definitely 
established. Stephane Flachat wrote in 1832 at about the time 
the maritime canal was being discussed for the last time in the 
Conseil-general des Ponts et Chaussees, 
99 
that"he believed a 
railway had become the best means of providing economical and 
fast transport along the Seine. In October 1831 when the 
company was restarting its project-,. B6rard, the new Directeur- 
general des Ponts et Chaussýes,, expreýsed the-view that the canal 
66 
could no longer expect. to compete against a railway. 
100 
A 
railway had been studied again and several companies had 
proposed to build one along the Seine; the results of any 
competition. between it and. a canal were indicated, he said, by 
the "grand nombre de chemins de fer qui en Angleterre longent 
des canaux et leur font une concurrence ruineuse. " 
Applications to build short sections of line from Paris 
toward the sea had been made by two companies in 1831, and on 
15 October 1831 (two weeks before"B6rard's letter quoted above). 
the administration had decided-to award a concession to Mellet, 
Henry, Ruolz et Cie, for a line to Pontoise, with an option for 
its extension to LeHavre and Dieppe. 
101 
Although this concession 
was later revoked by the Conseil d'Etat, the feasibility of the 
-project seemed to have been broadly established. An arrete of 
the Prefect of the Seine-Inferieure on 15 July 1832 set up a 
commission of engineers to produce an avant-projet for a Paris- 
to-Rouen railway. They estimated the total cost of 122 kil- 
ometres of line at only 14.5 MF. 
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It would'carry goods at 
ten to twelve kilometres per hour and passengers at twenty-five 
to thirty; this meant goods could go from Rouen to Paris in 
only seven to eight hours. Its rates, it was hoped, could be 
set at averages of 24F. 40. for Rouen to Paris and 18F. 30 for 
Paris to Rouen. It was apparent that the maritime canal could 
never compete with the railway's speed, and if the railway 
took about one-fifth of the total water-borne traffic, as the 
commission estimated it would, the canal's revenues would suffer 
very seriously. Although some of those involved in the canal 
company stubbornly clung. to their project, 
103 
much of their 
financial support. seems to have been transferred to railways. 
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It is clear that the canal company's career was at an end. 
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CHAPTER THREE. 
Successful Innovation in River-Borne Transport 
The maritime canal failed to materialize because it was 
too ambitious and too costly', and because it was a technical 
anachronism. Before. the difficult problems associated with its 
planning could be solved, it was overtaken by progress in inland 
transport. Though a railway would not be built for more than 
a decade, very concrete progress was being made with river 
! transport even by the mid-1820s. The most important technical 
element in this was steam power, but the crucial factor in 
successful innovation was its adaptation to the peculiar 
conditions on the lower Seine. Success went to those with 
modest ambitions and modest means. Though the earliest exper- 
iments were not successful, this'was a remarkably inventive 
decade, and as operating experience was gained, new ideas came 
forward, modifications were made,, new combinations were tried 
and permanently viable innovations evolved. It was not until 
the early 1850s"that they were superseded. 
The Simplest Solution,. Freight-Carrying Steamers. 
To provide greater speed and regularity, the steamboat 
was the obvious choice of means. For some years however, the 
efforts of several companies to establish steamers on the lower 
Seine from LeHavre to Paris brought at best only limited success, 
and more often complete failure. Steamers of course were not 
a new invention, and primitive craft had been demonstrated on 
the Seine by Robert Fulton during the Consulate. 
l 
Since then 
they had been operating successfully and profitably in Great 
Britain and North America. The Seine was-one of the first 
waterways on the continent of Europe to make use of steam; the 
first practical steamer arrived on'the Seine to begin a service 
between Rouen and Elbeuf in 1816. The ELIZE, built entirely in 
Great Britain, and powered only by a single ten-horsepower 
engine, continued in-service until 1818 when it was forced to 
" 
retire owing to certain"unknown "ingidents techniques". 
2 
The 
first unsuccessful' attempts at steam navigation were not made on 
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the Loire or the Rhone until 1822.3 
During 1822 and 1823 several steamers belonging to three 
companies began operating on the lower Seine. The first of 
these companies had been formed in 1820 and operated four 
steamers between Rouen and Paris. In the summer of 1819 a 
mechanic and inventor. named Joseph Raymond had obtained a patent 
for a paddle-driven steamboat, and early in the following year 
sold it to a company formed in Paris under the management of 
J. -J. Magendie. 
4 
The initiative in forming this company, known 
both as the Cie Magendie and. as the Societd Anonyme des Trans- 
, "ports 
Äcceleres, probably came from a group of Parisian ne o- 
ciants wanting faster transport from the sea to Paris. Finance 
capital came from these negociants, one of whom, a certain 
Bentabole, owned almost half the company's capital of 400,000 F, 
5 
and from a number of bankers, lawyers, fonctionnaires, landowners 
and aristocrats, few with any apparent previous interest in 
transport on the Seine. The initiative in forming the second 
company', whose ships operated over the entire distance from 
LeHavre to Paris, came from Great Britain. British investment 
in France in this period was very common, and especially in 
Normandy. 6 
. It seems to 
have originated'with the desire-to 
exploit 'another invention, the iron hull. The principal 
organizer of this company was Aaron Manby, manager of a Stafford- 
shire coal mine, builder of steam-engines, and an inventor of 
considerable ability. For a decade he had been managing partner 
of the Horseley Coal and Iron Co. near Tipton in south Stafford- 
shire, and had used and probably built several iron barges for 
this business. In 1820, for reasons which are unknown, Manby 
extended his activities to France, beginning with steamshipping 
on the Seine. in that year he (or perhaps Daniel Wilson, his 
future partner in the Charenton iron works in Paris, acquired 
by them in 18227) induced several others, including Captain 
Charles Napier, then a resident of Paris, to join in forming a 
company and to pilot its first ship. 
8 
In 1821 Manby and Napier 
obtained -a French patent protecting the invention of iron hulls,. 
and permitting them to be imported. A soci6t6 en commandite was 
formed in 1822, and in exchange for*the use of his patent, Manby 
received one-third of the company, '6 share-capital of 600,000 F. 
9 
This company was known as both the Cie Reynaud, after its manag- 
ing director, and as-the Soci6t6 Parisienne pour les Bateaux a 
.y, 
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Vapeur en Fer sur la Seine. About the third company little is 
known. It began operations in 1821 with one ship, the DUCHESSE 
DE BERRI, which carried passengers between LeHavre and Rouen. 
10 
In 1823 it built another ship, the first of four more, for 
carrying goods over the same route. 
The first few years after 1820 were-favourable ones for 
the formation of'new companies of this kind. After a sharp 
industrial and financial crisis in 1818, industrial production, 
prices. and profits remained stagnant. Investment opportunities. 
were few, and the returns to be-gained usually small. Both in 
France and across the Channel there were abundant funds available 
without profitable employment. Late in 1820, says Bertrand 
Gille, 11 bankers were complaining of a "nullit6 des affaires", 
. and an excess of credit, "presque inouie". At the same time 
the volume of goods being carried on the lower Seine was growing 
fairly quickly, rising from less than 100,000 tons in 1819 and 
1820 to almost 150,000 in 1822, and after a short fall in 1823 
rising again to almost"180,000 tons in 1826.12 
The performance attained by the new steamers was quite 
remarkable when compared with the traditional means of water- 
borne transport. Under favourable conditions their voyage 
times were very close to those of road transport, while their 
rates were about half. From LeHavre to Paris for example, 
roulage ordinaire took eight days and cost about 75F-per ton, 
while-roulage accelere took , four days and cost about 115, F per 
ton. Steamers took about five days for the same journey and 
charged only about 50 F per ton. By the traditional alleges 
and bateaux normands, the trip could take up to six weeks and 
cost from 20 F to 40 F. 
13 
The steamers of the Cie Mägendie, 
using horses at some difficult passages, sometimes travelled 
from Rouen to Paris in less than two days. They could carry 
90 to 115 tons with safety and relative regularity. 
14 Between 
LeHavre and Rouen steamers had the great. advantage of avoiding 
the dangers of the traverse and the barre and eliminating the 
need to use the very poor tow-paths. Competition was very keen 
between companies to reduce their voyage times. In June 1822 
the Compagnie Reynaud distributed a prospectus announcing that 
it would transport goods from LeHavre to Paris in the same time 
that the ships of the Compagnie Magendie'took merely to go from 
Rouen to Paris. The*latter_then kept one of its ships at Rouen, 
fully loaded, and ready at. any time to race the iron steamer 
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AARON MA. NBY when it appeared from LeHavre on its way through 
to Paris. In the event a race did take place-in-1823 and the 
MANBY was beaten. 
15 
Steamers also offered the,. first means of simplifying, 
transport methods. Both these companies attempted to eliminate 
or reduce the costs and delay of trans-shipment at Rouen. With 
Captain,. Napier'*s influence, the Cie Reynaud obtained exemption 
from the normal obligatory customs inspection at Rouen, 
16 
and 
its ships were able to steam right through to Paris. A decision 
by the Minister of Finance in January 1823 extended this exemp- 
17 
tion to all ships with sealed hatches, in effect all steamers. 
/The Compagnie Magendie was less successful. Because its ships 
were unsafe for operation in the Seine estuary and could not 
be used on the Seine-Maritime, the exemption from customs inspec- 
tion was of no use to it. The firm's manager made an-arrange- 
ment with a firm in LeHavre which offered to run a speedier 
service of alleges to Rouen, and hand over to his steamers all 
, 
goods destined for Paris, 
18 but this lasted only a few months 
before, Magendie was forced into liquidation. 
The advantages offered by steam shipping were considerable 
for a few goods, and for a few years, as the figures in Table 2 
show, the volume of freight carried by steamers grew steadily. 
19 
However, äs a proportion of, the total goods shipped these amounts 
were still very small., In 1824 the total tonnage both ways 
between Rouen and Paris was over 400,000 tons20 and of this less 
than two per cent was carried by steamers. Even on the Seine- 
Maritime where the advantages of steam were larger and steamers 
soon assumed greater importance the volume of goods. carried 
remained small. In 1824 they carried only about 5,700 tons, 
21 
twelve per cent of the total goods carried by water from LeHävre 
to Rouen. The cost of steam transport simply remained too high 
for most goods. 
Table 2 
Goods Transport by Steam from Rouen to Paris, 1822-26. 
Number of voyages 
1822 12 
1823 35 
1824 66 
1825 58 - 
1826 48 
tonnes 
1,416 
4,130 
7,798 
6,844 
5,664 
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The Problem of Under-Utilization. The greatest problem 
faced by-these early steamers, and the reason for their high 
operating costs, was simply under-utilization. The cost of 
each ton carried was high because the steamers were unable to 
carry sufficient freight during the year to spread their total 
costs thinly enough. The main cause of this was the insufficient 
depth of'the Basse Seine during three or four months each 
summer, which forced steamers to-cease operations there. A 
second-cause was frequent enforced idleness for maintenance 
and repairs, and a third, both cause and effect, was simply 
lack of demand for steamer transport. 
The problem of insufficient depth, or to put it another 
; way, of excessive draught, was most serious for the Cie Magendie. 
This company had four ships, built in 1820 and 1821, the GENIE 
DU COMMERCE, the DUC DE BORDEAUX, the VILLE DE ROUEN, and the 
VILLE DE PARIS, all of similar construction with a single paddle- 
wheel at the stern, and a draught when loaded of about lm. 60. It 
was estimated that owing to water depths sometimes'being too low 
they could make only about eighteen return voyages per year. 
22 
This of course reduced the number of tons over which annual opera- 
ting costs could be spread. Certain costs were fixed from year 
to year and were related not to the amount of cargo carried, but 
to the value of the ship. For steamers this was much greater 
than for traditional bateaux. Their wooden hulls with a cargo 
capacity of about 100 tons cost 25,000 F, the same amount paid 
for a bateau normand of about 450 tons. Their thirty-horsepower 
engines, built in England by Aaron Manby, cost another 35,000 F 
each, plus a customs duty of 2,1 per cent; 
23 French engines were 
said in LeHavre to be both higher in price and inferior in 
quality. 
24 
Amongst fixed costs were a large part of maintenance 
and depreciation, an economic interest on the value of the ship, 
and a share in the company's general expenses; there were also 
nine crew members on each ship in continuous employment. Some 
costs of course were related to the amount of cargo carried. 
fuel, droi. ts de navigation, pilotage horses, and a certain propor- 
tion of maintenance and. depreciation. But these-were only 40 
to 45 per cent of the total costs of owning and operating one 
of these ships. . High fixed costs made the short season a 
serious problem. The cost per ton from Rouen to Paris was 
about 41 F, but according to a contemporary authority, the 
25 
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rate offered rarely exceeded 25 F. Competition was very severe 
with the rival Cie Reynaud, which could offer its superior 
uninterupted service from LeHavre to Paris. In 1825 traffic 
seems to have declined considerably from the previous extra- 
ordinarily active year, and with insufficient revenue to 
satisfy its pressing creditors, the Cie Magendie was forced 
into liquidation. 
The second cause of under-utilization, excessive enforced 
idleness for repairs,. seems *to have been, especially serious for 
the third company, which operated only on the Seine-Maritime. 
The draught of its three ships, - lm. 
_80 
fully loaded, was too 
great for them to operate on the Basse Seine. This company was 
the victim of frequent engine failures, groundings in the Seine, 
and other mishaps, as well as being forced at times to suspend 
operations owing'to low water. For these reasons, according 
to Tourasse''and Mellet, contemporary authorities on steamboat 
design, 26 this company's ships were capable of only about 
twenty voyages per year. In fact, 'their performance was even 
worse; in 1826, the last full year in which the company's ships 
operated, ' the numbers of round-trip voyages made were: for the 
VILLE DU HAVRE, nine, the COLBERT, nine, and for the DUC 
D'ANGOULEME, fifteen. 27 The last of these ships had various 
stop-overs at LeHavre lasting 'eleven, fourteen and twelve days, 
and one of more than two months. The repairs themselves were 
costly, and together with depreciation, which occurred at a 
faster rate-than expected, accounted for almost forty per cent 
(25,000 F'of 67,000 F) of each ship's annual operating costs. 
28 
This company led a precarious and somewhat dangerous existence. 
On 2 March 1827 one of its ships, the COLBERT, ran aground on 
the "poulier du sud", a sand bank at the entrance to LeHavre, 
and had to be abandoned. -Soon after this incident the company 
was forced into bankruptcy, and its two remaining ships and the 
COLBERT's salvaged engine were sold by auction. 
29 
The Cie Reynaud were able partly to overcome the first 
cause of under-utilization'by their innovation in hull construc- 
tion; the use of iron. 'The much higher capital cost of its 
ships made under-utilization potentially a more serious problem, 
but owing to their iron hulls, these ships were both shallower 
in draught and stronger in construction. - Its iron hull gave it 
5 
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a greater freight capacity (116 tons compared with the DUC DE 
BORDEAUX's 80 tons). for a smaller draught (1m. 45. fully'loaded, 
compared with lm. 601, and much greater ' strength to resist the 
dangers of grounding in the Seine-Maritime. It was powered by 
a single thirty-horsepower engine. This meant they were able 
to operate on both the Basse Seine and the Seine-Maritime, and 
so could offer a through service from LeHavre to Paris; 'this 
attracted more cargo and probably reduced the proportion of 
unproductive time spend in port. Of even greater importance 
for the survival of the company, stronger construction also 
enabled them to operate on the shorter route from LeHavre to 
/Röüen in the low-water season. The company's first ship the 
AARON MANBY was the world's first iron ship. It was built at 
Manby's Horseley. works and sent in sections down to London, 
where it was assembled and steamed for Rouen in May 1822.30 
Its advantages did not come cheaply; its initial cost was almost 
150,000 F, compared with 60,000 F for the DUC DE BORDEAUX. 
31 Up 
to 1827 this company added four other ships, all with iron hulls 
and even greater capacity (120 tons) and greater horsepower (50 
horsepower); these were the COMMERCE DE PARIS, the SEINE, the 
HIRONDELLE, and the CHARLES X. 
According to calculations made by a committee of the 
Bureau de-Commerce in 1826,32 these ships were able to operate 
for about nine months in a normal year between LeHavre and 
Paris. On average a voyage lasted eighteen days, leaving time 
for about fifteen each year by each ship. For the remaining 
three months of the year, the ships colald operate between 
LeHavre and Rouen only, and make about eight more voyages. 
Under these conditions, the company could charge rates of about 
55 F per ton from LeHavre to Paris and 25 F per ton to Rouen, - 
and in the first three*or so prosperous years when it had almost 
full loads on every voyage, the company obtained a net return 
on its capital of more than eleven per cent. Without the extra 
revenue from eight voyages to Rouen, this company would have 
been placed in the same position as its unfortunate rival the. 
Cie Magendie; the entire burden of its fixed costs would have 
fallen upon revenue from regular voyages to Paris, and net 
return reduced to probably. less than one cent. 
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After 1826, when prosperity'and traffic declined, and 
when strong competition began frbm. other innovations in trans- 
port, these profits were for a time reduced to nothing. The 
Cie Reynaud was forced to abandon. its service on the Basse Seine, 
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and it was not resumed until 1831. High costs 
, 
and-resulting 
high freight rates were the reason; had these steamers been 
able to reduce the time needed for the difficult voyage from 
Rouen to Paris from five to two and a half days, costs would 
probably have fallen sufficiently to lower the freight there 
from 25 F to 20 F or-less. 
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Competition might then have been 
successful. 
At 25`F per ton the company could not attract enough 
cargo to fill its ships, and they were often forced to spend 
unproductive periods of several days or weeks waiting at the 
quayside. Excessive building of new ships before the end of 
1826 had created too much capacity and added considerably to 
ifixed costs. On 12 June 1826,, some months after the financial 
and industrial crisis had begun, the company bravely announced 
in the Journal de Havre that in future it proposed two regular 
sailings each week from LeHavre and from Paris. A close 
examination of the arrivals and departures of the company's 
ships at LeHavre3.5 however, indicates a very irregular pattern, 
averaging from 18 June to 31 December 1826 1.4 arrivals per 
week; the'number of arrivals in a week ranged from none to five, 
of departures from none to three. During the same period, the 
times spent in LeHavre averaged about a-week for the MANBY and 
the SEINE, and two to three days for the CHARLES X. At about 
this time, the-end of 1826, a dispute. occurred in the company 
between Captain Napier and Varnier, the company's agent in 
LeHavre. Napier accused Varnier of' mismanagement, and partic- 
ularly of allowing the ships to remain too long in LeHavre 
between voyages; 
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each ship. was equipped with a small derrick, 
and Napier believed that with the help of these only eight to 
twelve hours were needed for cargo handling. Vanier of course 
denied the accusation of mismanagement; 
37 he said that turn- 
around times could not be reduced below two days. Furthermore, 
he pointed out, there was not enough cargo for any more voyages; 
each ship could at most do three voyages per month-at present 
they never left with a full load-and Napier's demand for six 
each per month was quite impossible. Sugar seems to have been 
the only substantial cargo upstream, and after May 1826 there 
was competition for this from barges pulled by steam tugboats 
at a lower rate. The shortage of return cargos was even more 
. 
'. ý, 
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accute. The company advertised in the Journal de Havre (12 June 
1826), suggesting that 
MM., les n6gociants qui chargent ä bord des navires 
americains. trouveront de 1'avantage ä recommender a 
leurs correspondants de Paris, d'expedier leurs mar- 
chandises par les Bateaux ä vapeur en fer.... 
But the. suggestion was not taken up. All that remained were 
partial and poorly paying cargos of flour, wine, empty casks,. 
plaster and. other kinds of ballast. 
Interest payments seem to have been kept up only out of 
. the company's capital, by neglecting maintenance. At the 
. beginning of December 1826 M. Reynaud died, and by the terms of 
the acte de societe of 21 February 1825, the company had to be 
liquidated. The liquidator kept the ships operating until a 
new company could be formed in the following July. The new 
company, called Delaistre et Compagnie, bought the assets of 
Reynaud et Compagnie (five steamers with iron hulls, two of 
them built in 1826) for only 280,000 F; 
38 the * value of the. 
AARON MANBY and the COMMERCE DE PARIS alone had been officially 
assessed at a total of almost 385,000 F in July 1825.39 Of the 
three steamer companies formed in the early 1820s, only this 
one survived into the next decade. By 1831 the proportion of 
total traffic carried in steamers reached what was probably 
a maximum at almost nine per cent. 
Attempts to Solve the Problem of Under-Utilization. 
Other more economical ways of using steam power were 
evidently needed if its potential benefits were to be realized. 
One way, which was obvious in its simplicity, would be to 
separate the steam propulsion unit from the cargo-carrying vessel. 
In this way the costly steam. engine would not be forced to 
remain idle while the cargo was unloaded, its considerable 
weight would not occupy scarce cargo space, and it could be put 
to a greater variety of revenue-earning uses. In principle, 
the separate propulsion unit could be used either to push or 
pull the cargo vessel. Both ideas were tried, but after a 
brief false start with pushers, it was the tugboat which, begin- 
ning in 1826, proved successful. , 
A False Start with "Pushers"-, 1824-26. One obvious method 
for combining separate propulsion and carrying units was to 
have one push the other. With this object a soci6te en commandite 
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was formed on 31 December 1822 to. exploit a patent recently 
obtained by its promotors, Francois Margeridon and Andre 
Frossard, for their invention of a so-called "bateau articule"40 
Little is known about this company, and it never succeeded in 
operating more than intermittently before it collapsed in 1826. 
Its capital however, must have been large, as it built four 
steamers of 40 to 80 horsepower, nine "porteurs" of 120 to 180 
tons, and several smaller craft. It began its career during 
1823 and 1824 on the same short wave of. easy credit, and limited 
expansion of traffic, as had the other steamer companies, and 
evidently it hoped to undercut their rates. With one steamer, 
the new "Entreprise des Transports par Bateau ä Vapeur, du Havre 
,a Paris", obtained an agent in LeHavre, M. Cottin, whose alleges 
to Rouen were to provide a temporary connecting service. During 
1825 and 1826 the company received three more new ships, and in 
January 1826 they announced the beginning of a twice-weekly 
service direct from LeHavre to Paris, to take eight days at the 
most. 
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This however, was evidently too ambitious; and in July 
another announcement was made that service would be reduced to 
once a week, and maintained "aussi reguliere que possible". 
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Very soon the company was divided in two: Lecoq and Lavenant 
taking over operation between LeHavre and Rouen, which it is 
doubtful had ever begun, and Bouvet and Devertpre those from' 
there to Paris. Very goon after both succombed to bankruptcy. 
In the first months of 1827, when traffic on the Seine fell 
sharply from the previous year, judgements were obtained against 
the original company in LeHavre in favour of Aitken and Steel, 
builders of its steam engines, for over 52,000 F.; in July its 
other assets were also sold by auction. 
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The reasons for its 
failure are not clear. Tourasse suggests44 that its ships were 
too slow, partly owing to serious difficulty in steering with 
stern paddles. Full services were also delayed by a lawsuit 
for invasion of patent rights; its finances were probably 
compromised as well by the financial crash at the end of 1825, 
just as its two last ships were being finished. 
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The Success of Bertin et Cie., 1826. A. definitive 
solution to most of the economic and technical problems of steam 
propulsion was föund*in the tugboats and barges of the Compagnie 
Bertin. They began operating from LiHavre in May 1826, and for 
,'ýi 
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the first seven or eight years the tugs went only as far as 
Caudebec or Rouen; the barges, called chalands, were then towed 
on to Paris by relays of horses. It was only after about 1833 
that. Bertin's tugs and others of similar design extended their 
operations to the Basse Seine and to Paris. 
The innovation made in 1826 was evidently the idea of 
Alexandre Bertin of LeHavre, a modest n6gociant in LeHavre 
engaged in trade with the Baltic area. He frequently advertised 
in LeHavre to sell naval stores, 'firearms and furs. 
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He seems. 
therefore to have had no previous direct interest in transport 
on the Seine. The identity of his associates in financing the 
tugboats and chalands is not known; - later, in the 1840s, and 
probably some years earlier, shares in the company were traded 
-on the bourses of LeHavre and Rouen. 
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It was not until 1 August 
1826, when his tugboat REMORQUEUR änd about ten chalands had 
been operating for five weeks, that he formed a societe en com- 
mandite with Jules-Ernest Nay of Paris, who seems to have been 
a commissionnaire de rbulage. Less than a year later this 
company was dissolved and succeeded by another, with Pierre-Marc 
Rey-Thorin, negociant, also of Par. s. 
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The company's capital 
at this stage was 400,000 F. 
-The: keys. to competitive success fpr Bertin's innovation 
were a lower unit cost and a high standard of performance, 
achieved by-intensive use of the company's good equipment. The 
company's chalands were smaller than other commonly used river 
craft, about 200 tons capacity, and therefore shallower in 
draught, more manoeuvrable and faster in shallow water or narrow 
passages. -They were very strongly built of wood, and safe 
against the dangers of collision and grounding in the Seine. 
REMORQUEUR NO. 1 (it was followed by two sister-ships) was a 
large and powerful steamer for its time; its 80-horsepower engine, 
built by Manby and Wilson at Charenton, enabled it to pull 300 
tons at twelve kilometres per hour (the ships of Reynaud et Cie. 
could do about thirteen kilometres per hour). 
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With its assured 
speed and considerable, power,. it could get past the traverse and 
avoid the bar re, arriving at Caudebec or Rouen on a single tide, 
thus saving the vessels it pulled much time and exposure to 
danger. When the tug was not-pulling a chaland to Rouen, it 
could"be gainfully employed in a second 'role, towing coasting 
vessels over the same route. In"either case, once the vessel 
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under tow was delivered to its destination, the tug could begin 
another job, and not stand idle'while the cargo was handled; 
it could often return to LeHavre the same evening. Tonrasse 
calculated50 that these tugs could do eighty return voyages 
per year; in 1827 REMORQUEUR NO. 1 pulled 63 chalands to Rouen, 
plus an-unknown number of other ships. 
51 Therefore even with 
annual fixed costs for maintenance, depreciation and interest 
running to 30,000 F (compared with only 22,500 F for one of the 
iron steamboats), the cost per ton from LeHavre to Rouen was 
kept down to about 13 F. 
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-The same voyage cost 14 F per ton 
Ito-the Cie Reynaud. 
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The chalands were therefore able to 
compete very effectively with the steamers for goods needing 
fast transport. 
Navigation Acceleree, a Conservative Solution. Like 
roulage accelere, navigation acceleree involved no new means of 
propulsion, but was merely a, reorganization of the traditional 
one. ' The capital investment required was negligible. Although 
. Bertin's chalands used this system on the Basse Seine for a 
few years, its main operators were of another kind. To provide 
navigation acceleree groups of individual mariniers, each with 
one and sometimes two boats, formed co-operative associations. 
The first of these, and the least obscure to the historian, was 
the "Bateaux acceleres normands" formed early in 1826 apparently 
with the leadership of-Henry Maillet-Duboullay, a courtier de 
commerce at LeHavre. Their object, they said, was to provide 
greater speed and order, while preserving their traditional 
economy. For this no "grande-et nombreuse administration" of 
the kind organized by the steamer companies would be needed. 
The members of the group, they said in 1826,54 
convaincus par une vieille experience, ont regarde comme 
demontre, qu'urie amelioration reelle et constante doit 
etre obtenue, non par des'nouveautes irreflechis, mais 
par le perfectionnement des moyens deja connus par la 
pratique. 
The means they would use were three. Loading of the associa- 
tion's boats would be done by turns (ä tour de role), and 
departures would be regularly scheduled. Secondly, continuous 
movement would be assured by 
.a 
constant supply of relay horses, 
provided to the association by contractors. Thirdly, to facil- 
itate this continuous movement, authority would be obtained 
from the central Administration for"trematage; 
55 
this was the 
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right to overtake and to take priority'of passage at weirs and 
bridges over other slower boats voyaging ä longs 'off urs, without 
relays. This was granted to Maillet-Duboulläy and the Bateaux 
acceler6s normands by the Minister of the 'Interior in June1826.56 
This new method made possible considerable improvements 
in service, especially in speed, at little extra cost. Fixed 
costs for interest, depreciation and maintenance were not in- 
creased, since the same traditional boats were used. Under- 
utilization was therefore not a serious economic problem. 
Overhead costs for administration hardly existed, whereas they 
had accounted for about eight per cent of the annual expenditure 
; of the steamboat companies. The day-to-day business of the 
mariniers in LeHavre, Roueri and other ports was handled by 
agents or brokers called cochemates. They and their commis, in 
the words of the Prefect of the Seine-Inferieure, 
57 
were the 
commissionnaires des mariniers et pourvoient a tout 
ce qui concerne le chargement et le dechargement des 
bateaux, guident et conseillent les mariniers dans leurs 
divers rapports avec le commerce d'une place que la 
" plupart d'entre-eux ne connaissent pas. 
For their services, the cochemates received from the consigners 
of goods a commission of three per cent. The extra cost of 
relays seems to have been slight, perhaps three or four -francs 
per ton added to the normal rate which varied between 12 and 20 
F per ton. For this voyage times were considerably reduced, to 
about seven days in winter and ten in summer. 
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The success of the Bateaux accdleres normands seems to 
have been so immediately evident that they were soon imitated 
by. several others, and by'1828, as Table 3 shows, 
59 
only about 
one-fifth of the goods transported on the Basse Seine were 
being carried by the traditional slow means. In August 1826 
the Sieurs de 'Ribegpre , pare et fils, with a fleet of sixteen 
boats, obtained rights of tr6matage, and within a year merged 
with the Normands. 
60 M. Fleury-Desseaux of Rouen headed another 
association of about twenty-five owners of thirty-one boats, 
and a M. Molet formed a fourth group. With the chalands of 
Bertin, this made a total of four companies operating accelere. 
During*1030 and 1831 there were two other small companies which 
also carried a small amount of goods. 
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Table 3 
The Moyement'of Goods Upstream on the Basse Seine 
from 1828 to 1831 (tonnes). 
1828 1829 1830 1831 
TOTALS 169,211 182,415' 209,056 145,801 
Bateaux a longs 34,279 34,365 52,862 21,145 
fours (20%) (19%) (25%) (21%) 
Bertin et Cie 20,487 23,539 20,827 24,319 
(12%) (13%) (10%) (17%) 
Delaistre et Cie - 1,413 1,337 12,724 
(1%) (1%) (9%) 
Bateaux acceleres: 
Bateaux accel- 62,276 72; 314 63,949 39,920 
eres normands 
Fleury-Desseaux 33,374 28,841 30,011 18,449 
Molet 18,796 17., 381 30,323 23,949 
Herfort et Cie* - - - 2,670 
Delanneau et Cie - - 4,540 1,103 
(67%) (66%) (62%). (60%) 
The benefits from these innovations came in three forms, 
in the availability of greater speed and improved safety in 
water-borne transport and in reduced traffic on the roads 
between LeHavre and Paris. They may also have forced a slight 
reduction in the cost of. river transport by the traditional means. 
By the use of steamers, voyage times between LeHavre and Rouen 
, could 
be reduced to a day or so, ' and thoseýin the much more dif- 
ficult Basse Seine to about five. Voyacte times between LeHavre 
and Rouen by the more economically viable chalands were reduced 
to about two days from what had formerly been up to a mon h in 
alleges; by the use of tugboats they had also been made much safer. 
The same benefits of increased safety-and speed had also been 
brought to alleges and coasters by their use of tugboats. Voyage 
times by the grosse marine operating acc6ler6 between Rouen and 
Paris were reduced by 1834 to-between twelve and fifteen days 
from what had formerly been up to a month. 
61 Chalands 
operating on the Basse Seine, where they were still towed by 
horses, were able to travel from-Rouen to Paris in five 
a 
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to eight days. 
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The greater availability of speed on much 
cheaper water-borne transport produced a marked beneficial effect 
on the volume of road traffic. Pierre Frissard, the Ponts et 
Chauss6es ing nieur du port at LeHavre, wrote in 1832 that 
since 1824 road transport between LeHavre and Rouen had been 
reduced by half, from about 20,000 to about 10,000 tons per 
year. 
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Schwilgue, the ingcnieur des routes for the Seine- 
Inferieure during the late 1820s confirms that it had a similar 
though less marked effect between Rouen and Paris. 
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The 
-advantages of fast river transport over the road were enthus- 
"iastically pointed out by the Chambre of Commerce in LeHavre in 
1829; 65 
the bateaux acceleres"it said, could 
effectuer leurs transports dans un delai aussi court que 
celui employe par le roulage; qui'ils ne prennent que la 
moitie du prix de colui-ci, et qu'encore la marchandise 
toujours a couvert, et ne recevant pas les soucouses 
inevitables d'un, transport par terre, est beaucoup mieux 
menagee, et n'eprouve pas de coulage, coriune eile is fait 
par le roulage. 
The effect of these innovations upon the price of trans- 
port is not clear, though because of increased speed, safety 
and reliability, their overall impact must have been to reduce 
total transport costs. According to a report to the Chambre of 
Commerce in Paris in 1831,66 the cost of transport from LcHavre 
to Paris by chaland varied between 18 F and 21 F according to 
conditions on the river and the type of goods being carried. 
This was . 
little different from the rates charged by bateaux 
ordinaires acceleres, whose speed was slower. According to 
. another source,, the bateaux ordinaires had even been able to 
lower their rates after a few years of operating acceler¬. 
Charles_Berigny, ingenieur-- en- chef des op nts et chaussees wrote 
in 183467 that average. rates for bateaux ordinaires acceleres 
had fallen by about one-quarter since the late 1820s. Apparently 
contradictory evidence is given by Michal, 
68 
another Ingenieur 
des ponts et chaussees, who reported in the early 1850s that 
no long-run downward trend took place until after the advent of 
railways in the mid-1840s. He gave annual maxima and minima 
charged for-horse-drawn river transport between Rouen and Paris 
beginning in 1827, which are shown in Table 4. Because of wide 
seasonal variations in rates it is"difficult to choose between 
the evidence given by Michal and by Berigny. 
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Table 4 
Annual Maximum and Minimum Freight 
for River Transport from Rouen to Paris, 
Rates 
1827-1850 
(franc per ton) 
maxima minima maxima minima 
1827 19.20 10.55 1839 16.20 12.50 
1828 12.70 9.90 1840 17.60 11.90 
1829 14.15 10.80 "1841' 18,. 60 10.70 
1830 . 16.00 14.50" 1842 24.10 12.60 1831 13.30 11.70 1843 19.00 10.50 
1832 13.40 10.70 1844 13.80 10.90 
1833 19.90 11.10 1845 13.00 11.00 
1834 16.80 12.30 1846 13.40 11.00 
1835 15.10 11.40 1847 11.65 10.50 
1836 16.30 11.50 1848 10.20 10.00 
1837 16.50 13.30 1849 10.40 9.50 
1838 14.20 10.90 1850 9.20 8.80 
The Threat to the Port of Rouen 
Rouen's position, between LeHavre and Paris, was a very 
vulnerable one, and owing to the improvements described above it 
was becoming increasingly so. To gain time and reduce handling 
costs, one of the chief preoccupations of transport operators 
was to organize direct transport from LeHavre to Paris; the 
chälands of Bertin et Cie, the maritime canal, the steamers 
of, Reynaud et Cie, and later the railway all had this object 
in mind. Yet the future prosperity of Rouen's port depended 
upon maintaining a break in navigation at Rouen, and its 
defenders opposed almost every attempt to eliminate it. As an 
alternative to this its only strategy could be to attract ocean 
shipping up the dangerous river beyond LeHavre, to be the 
competitor of LeHavre. This competition for ocean traffic had 
begun in the late eighteenth'century, as overseas shipping 
increasingly shifted its base from Rouen to the deeper harbour 
at LeHavre. 
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To attract these ships back to Rouen two things 
were needed, greater depth and greater safety in the Seine- 
Maritime between LeHavre and LaMailleraye, and throughout the 
nineteenth century the Chambre of Commerce in Rouen, followed 
by the municipal Council, vigorously promoted these two objects. 
While the Ponts et Chauss6es studied the complex problems of 
how to obtain the first, Rouen tried in the 1820s and the 1830s 
i 
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to organize the second. 
The operation of tugboats for ocean and coastal 
shipping on the. Seine-Maritime was first proposed in 1822 by 
a maritime insurance agent at Rouen. Similar proposals continued 
to be made through the 1820s and most of the 1830s. 
7° 
The 
potential value of such an innovation was admitted by all; to 
make it an economically viable operation however, proved a 
difficult and complex problem. Fundamentally, the problem was 
the familiar one in transport of-the need for a large initial 
investment, with the added difficulty of a considerable time- 
lag between the payments made by individuals who would benefit 
and the benefits they would receive. An initial investment in 
tugboats of about 500,000 F was needed; annual operating costs 
. were estimated at about 
125,000 F. To recover the capital with 
interest and pay the operating costs, charges on users would be 
needed. If however, the charge were made to the ship being 
assisted, freight-rates would immediately go up and frighten 
away traffic. Shippers and receivers of cargo were unlikely all 
to wish to pay this increase without an immediate lowering of 
other costs, particularly loss and, damage, insurance premiums, 
and the costs of. time. Several possible remedies to this 
dilemma were suggested. The first was a, compulsory charge on 
all ships in the Seine-Maritime to pay operating' costs and a 
compulsory division of a rate charged to users of the tugs to 
pay capital costs. This, was resisted by the Ministry of Marine 
and the Directeur-general des Ponts et Chaussees, neither of 
whom thought a compulsory charge could be levied for what they 
considered tobe a project of purely local interest; they wanted 
a private company to undertake the scheme. A law of 24 March 
1825 providing for the droit and demi-droit de navigation to be 
handed over to local authorities to-finance transport improvement 
projects gave an alternative to this compulsory charge, but the 
Directeur-general des Ponts et Chaussees found that the tugboat 
scheme did not come within its terms. The compulsory division 
of a freight-rate between the ship and the goods (in the propor- 
tions successively suggested of 1/5-4/5,1/4-3/4 and 1/3-2/3) 
was found to be contrary to Article 406 of the Code de Commerce, 
and all attempts to have this amended failed. The alternative 
of course was to run tugs as a normal commercial venture. This 
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was suggested in September 1824, and the Chambre of Commerce in 
Rouen, on the initiative mainly of Jean Rondeaux, one of its 
members and a negociant in Rouen, 
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obtained permission to 
import two or three boats from England. Forty-four merchants 
in Rouen undertook to pay four-fifths of the rate to be charged 
for the service. It was hoped that its benefits would soon 
become evident to all, and this unnatural system of charging 
be replaced by the ordinary freight-rating system. Taking wine, 
one of_Rouen's largest imports, as an example, Rondeaux estimated 
that net savings of 1.25 per cent on the value of the goods 
could be obtained. A tugboat72 began operations late in the 
spring of 1825, but after only two. months was forced to stop. 
Technically the service had been very successful, but a large 
. number of merchants refused to pay their four-fifths share of 
the tugging charge upon receiving their goods, and the company 
could not recover its costs. This only served to demonstrate 
the need for a compulsory charging system. 
For such a high-risk venture capital funds were very 
difficult to obtain. Despite the importance of this project 
for the future of Rouen, local people could not be persuaded to 
invest in it. In 1826, fearing that ill-effects would follow 
from the recently begun direct service by chalands from LeHavre 
to Paris -the Chambre of Commerce had already during 1825 
opposed the railway proposed by Navier - Rondeaux distributed a 
questionnaire to local negociants, shipping brokers, ship- 
builders, ship-captains and pilots, asking first whether Rouen 
was indeed being reduced "au role de spectateur oisif des 
passages qui s'operent le long de ses rives sans y aborder,, 
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and if they believed this to be so, whether tugboats might be 
a remedy. Those who answered agreed that Rouen was threatened, 
and that tugboats offered a good solution to the problem. 
However, only 41,000 F of the necessary 300,000 F were subscribed 
to the company and the idea had to be dropped. 
The only alternative remaining was a set of commercial 
expedients to ensure economics. to-users"of tugs, and reliance 
upon the tugs'of Bertin to pull ships when no chalands were 
available. Early in 1828 the Chambre of Commerce persuaded 
Rouen 'insuränce brokers to reduce their premiums by one-quarter 
for both hull and cargo using tugs. At the same time the 
Chambre'of Commerce announced that it would try to persuade the 
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Administration to alter the law so that any emergency in which 
use was made of ,a tug would be classified as avarie rý osse, 
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in which case the receiver of the goods would be obliged to pay 
part of the cost of tugging. Ship-owners were in the meantime 
encouraged to stipulate in contracts that tugs should be used 
in circumstances of avarie grosse. To relieve ship-captains 
of the need to add the tugging charges to their freight-rate, 
the r6glement de pilotage, over which the Chambre of Commerce 
of Rouen had been given control during the previous century, 
was amended in August 1828 to give a rebate of one-quarter of 
pilotage dues to those using tugs.. This unsatisfactory patch- 
work of expedients lasted for a few years. Bertin helped to 
increase its success by stationing one of his tugs for a few 
years in the Seine-Maritime between Quillebeuf and Caudebec. 
After 1836 in conditions of greater prosperity Rouen obtained 
its own independent tugging company, but the threat to her 
maritime commerce was never kept long at bay. 
Greater Efficiency Through Regulatory Change. 
Although the innovations made during the 1820s increased 
the speed and economy of transport in the Seine valley, they 
also created new problems. The new systems-of navigation 
acceleree and chalandage were soon discovered not to be entirely 
compatible. Moreover, the regulations governing transport on 
the Seine since\the time of the Consulate were found to hamper 
efficient operation of the small chalands. Reforms were suggested 
and attempted in the 1820s, but were successfully implemented 
only in the 1830s. Such reforms were important if the full r 
benefit from innovations made during the 1820s was to be obtained. 
The Administration des Ponts et Chaussees was fairly active at 
this time in promoting improvement of water-borne transport, 
but unfortunately its regulatory powers were inhibited by its 
own, the government's and parliament's understandable reluctance 
to damage economic interests, regardless of their apparent 
inefficiency. In any case, economic efficiency was not yet 
regarded as the primary criterion in such matters. During the 
July Monarchy however, largely following the impetus given by 
its. Directeur-general Legrand, the Ponts et Chaussees undertook 
several important reforms and innovations.. 
.. 
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The speedy operation of transport on the Seine was 
hampered by a system of regulations begun under the Consulate 
and Empire which tended to encourage the use of very large 
boats. Most important was the octroi do navigation int¬rieure 
fixed by a law of Floreal An X (1802) 
. 
User charges were 
imposed in order to finance badly needed maintenance and improve- 
ments. However, the method of charging was too crude, with the 
result that not only did the tolls vary greatly from one river 
basin to another (which might be 'considered reasonable), but 
also from place to place on the same river, and from one size 
of boat to another. The basis for assessing the tax to be paid 
was simply the length of the boat; "no systematic account was 
taken of the distance travelled, collection bureaux being 
-located only as custom dictated. The chief effect of this was 
to encourage boats with the greatest possible ratio of capacity 
to length, and to discourage use of smaller, faster boats, like 
the ones used by Bertin et Cie. Under the law of 1802, accord- 
ing to calculations made from ,a parliamentary committee 
in 1834,76 
the effective charge upon a large boat of 48 metres in length 
and 480 tons capacity was about 0.536 F per ton of cargo for a 
journey from Rouen to Paris and return; for one of 38 metres and 
250 tons it was about 0.831 F per ton; for one of 33 metres and 
200 tons it was about 0.901 F per ton; for one of 30 metres and 
100 tons about 1.528 F per ton; -and for a flette of 21 metres 
and 10 tons, about 4.745. F per ton. The effects of this system 
of tolls began to be serious only when the wars of the Empire 
had ended, and the normal volume of transport had been re- 
established on the Seine. By about 1820 nine-tenths of the 
-goods shipped from Rouen to Paris were being carried in large 
bateaux normands. Since their draught was greater they were 
generally, slower and their general use tended to decrease the 
speed of transport on the river and force more traffic onto the 
roads. 
An unsuccessful attempt was made in the 1820s to reform 
the droits de navigation, as they, had become known. There were 
complaints from all parts of the country against the inequity 
of the system set up in 1802. On the Seine operators and owners 
of the' etite and moyenne marine, and the owners of the Paris 
canals which could not accommodate boats'of the grosse marine, 
were particularly vocal. The initiative for reform was taken 
87 
by the Minister of the Interior in 1820,77 and in 1821 a 
commission mixte of the Ministries of the Interior and Finance 
was appointed to study the problem and recommend changes. The 
result was a2 rojet de loi presented to parliament in 1824? 
8 
Lacking a reliable method of measuring the real load on board 
a boat,. the commission had proposed to tax boats on their total 
capacity. However, after the p rojet de loi was strongly criticized 
by the mariniers of Normandy who feared that its effect would 
be to greatly increase the droit, 
79 
the commission changed its 
-recommendation and the bill-had to be withdrawn. 
,.. _ 
With the growth of navigation accdldree from 1826, a 
solution to the problem became increasingly necessary. Bertin's 
chalands were particularly hampered by having to share the right 
of trematage with the large bateaux normands of Maillet-Duboullay 
and later others. Neither could overtake the other, although 
the chalands were usually capable of going faster particularly 
in low water. Charles Dupin stated in 182980 that the petite 
marine was capable of doing the voyage from LeHavre to Paris 
in eight days; owing to delays caused by slower large boats 
however, their voyage time was increased to 14 or 15 days. The 
conflict grew as traffic increased in the second half of. the 
1820s. The effect it had upon the operational efficiency of 
Bertin's chalands can be seen by a close examination of the 
movement of goods in bateaux acc6leres of the grosse marine and 
in chalands at various seasons from 1828 until 1831, when the 
first reform occurred. 
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At all seasons the large bateaux 
acceldres normands carried more goods than Bertin's much smaller 
and less numerous chalands. Moreover, during the month of 
August when water depths were smallest, the proportion of the 
total goods transported by both of these increased; this was 
the season when river transport was most difficult and slow, and 
when shippers made greatest use of navigation accelerde to main- 
tain speed. Although the smaller chalands suffered much less 
from low water than the larger boats of Maillet-Duboullay, and 
might have been expected to increase their proportion of the 
total traffic at low water, the division of traffic between 
chalands and bateaux acc6leres remained constant. Owing to 
their equal rights of treinatage, both'were reduced to the same 
speed. During August of 1831 however, after some reform had 
taken place, a new trend seems to have occurred; the percentage 
of goods carried by chalandc increased, while that carried by 
88 
bateaux normandsr both accel6res and a longs j ours decreased. 
Complaints from Bertin and other operators of the petite 
marine, and concern expressed by the Compagnie des Canaux de 
Paris, prompted Becquey, the Directeur-general des Ponts et 
Chaussees, to revive the earlier attempt-at, reform. Late in 
1828 with the support of the Minister of Commerce, 
82 Becquey 
had commissions of inquiry established at Rouen, Evreux and 
Versailles. 83 Rival interests soon manifested themselves. A 
large group of negociants and mariniers, 'owners of the petite 
marine, including many from the-Oise and the Marne, sent 
petitions to the Minister of Commerce in favour of reform. 
84 
Only one of the mariniers was from Rouen, centre of the marine 
normande, the grosse marine. The Chambre of Commerce in Paris 
wrote in favour of reform, 
85 
as did the Chambre of Commerce in 
LeHavre. 
86 
The grosse marine and the Chambre of Commerce in 
Rouen were, opposed to reform; Rouen feared once again that 
growing use'of navigation acceleree would result in increasing 
numbers of boats going direct from LeHavre to Paris. 
87 
The 
Administration's point of view, expressed in 1831, was that it 
seemed, in effect, "peu juste d'enchainer ä la suite de la grosse 
marine celle qui pent effectuer en huit ou neuf jours ce qui, 
pour l' autre, est l' affaire de-di.,,. ä douze. "'88 Only a partial 
reform was achieved, and only after considerable delay. A 
conference of boat owners agreed on a simple formula which 
allowed-the. faster boats priority of passage; 
89 
reform of the 
droit de navigation and eventual reduction in the numbers of 
large boats had to wait. 
As indicated above, this reform seems to have had bene- 
ficial results. Bertin's chalands took over a larger proportion 
of traffic during the late-summer low-water season. However, 
1831 was a year of greatly reduced traffic, almost a third less 
than in 1829. During 1832 traffic resumed much of its previous 
volume, rising by 21 per cent and in November 1832 after what. 
may have been another difficult low-water season, the Cie Bertin 
again petitioned for reform. The petite marine was still un- 
satisfied with the discriminatory droit de navigation. 
90 Bertin 
was again supported by the Chambre 'of Commerce'in Lefiavre, 
91 
and 
also more importantly this time by a petition from 54 of the 
most important firms, banks, negociants and armateurs of LeHavre. 
92 
Lelavre was a stronghold of Orleanist opinion, and Thiers, the 
recently appointed Minister of the Interior, marked the petition 
89 
for prompt attention. Within a fortnight the petitioners were 
informed that their requests would be given careful considera- 
tion. On the same date, the comte d'Argout, Minister of Public 
Works, requested Legrand that the reform abandoned in 1825 be 
taken up again; the droit de navigation should be based, he 
wrote, upon the load being carried in a boat, not upon its 
length, and a new schedule-of charges and classification of 
goods should be drafted, based upon the value of goods and their 
use by. industry. Special attention was to be given to the 
problems of navigation accel6r6e. 
93 Within thirteen months, in 
, February 1834, ap rojet de loi for radical reform was presented 
to the Chambre des deputes. "94 
The bill for reform of the droits de navigation on the 
Basse Seine was intended to be a test of general principles to 
be applied later, if successful, over the whole country. Whereas 
the drafters of the 1802 legislation seem to have been concerned 
Ml 
only with raising revenue, the concern of the Administration in 
. 1834 was also with the effects the tax would have upon the 
eff iciency'of transport. An attempt was made to formulate a 
'neutral' tax, one which over the long-run favoured no size or 
type of boat or commodity. As the Minister of Finance stated 
in introducing the-more general legislation in 1836,95 
On a reconnu que le prix des transports par eau, devant 
en g6neral etre proportionne ä la distance parcourrue, 
au poids des marchandises, ä leur valeur relative et ä 
l'encombrement qu'elles occasionnent ä bord des bateaux, 
les memes elements devaient entrer dans l'assiette de 
1'impot. 
The tax, he continued, should be levied upon the amount of goods 
carried, not upon the size of boat whatever its load. The new 
system proposed in 1834 was for loads to be determined by a. 
simple "echelle me"trique" measuring deplacement, which would be 
required on all boats. This"method had been considered imprac- 
tical in 1824. Two classes of goods were established, the second 
to be taxed at only half the rate on the first. In the second 
class were placed goods with a very low value per ton, notably 
coal, whose movement all wished to facilitate,. and charcoal, 
peat, manure, fertilizer, sand, slate, tiles, bricks, stone, 
firewood, and timber. The schedule 'of new rates in. the rojet 
de loi, intended to recover the same revenues as before, suggests 
that the Administration wanted actively to discourage growth 
of the grosse marine. For a typical return journey the toll on 
goods carried in the largest boats would. be more than doubled, 
90 
from 0.536 F per ton to 1.17 F per'ton; this would probably 
have increased total costs per ton-kilometre by about one- 
eighth. 
96 
The rates for all sizes of boats, except the smallest 
of about 100 tons, would be raised by diminishing amounts. 
Naturally all operators protested against these proposed 
increases, which would have affected the acceleres as well as 
the grands bateaux normands. The commission of the Chambre 
des deputes was more concerned to protect established economic 
interests, and to lower the toll for all users -another 
. 
commission in the following, year, 1835, asked that the droit 
de navigation be entirely abolished - and after hearing submis- 
sions from the boat owners,. considerably altered the proposed 
rates. It recommended that the proposed rate per ton be lowered 
from 1.17 F to 0'. 715 F, with the effect that the toll would be 
raised only for the largest class of boats; the toll for other 
classes of boats would be lowered, though in diminishing amounts, 
so that the smaller craft would gain a relative advantage. The 
commission also recommended postponing implementation of the 
new law from the 1st of July to the 1st of September 1834 to 
give operators more time to comply with its requirements. 
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The operators seem to have cooperated fully in the new scheme' 
of assessing tolls, and all seem to have agreed that it was 
entirely 'successful, at least from an administrative point of 
view. In 1836 it was extended to cover thirteen other main 
rivers and canals. Its economic effects seem to have been 
much longer in manifesting themselves. 
There was another minor reform in these years which 
contributed modestly to greater efficiency. " All along the Seine 
at every bridge, weir and rapids, there were agents of the Ponts 
et Chaussees employed to act as pilots, to give assistance to' 
passing boats and bf course to collect fees for their services. 
The origin of these agents, who existed only on the main rivers 
leading to Paris, the Seine, Yonne, Oise, marine and Aisne, was 
the Service d'Approvisionnement de Paris, organized in 1672, 
and responsible for the supply of timber and firewood to the 
capital. -Considerable reorganizations had taken place in 1789 
and in 1799, but by 1830 the service was in great need of 
reform. -98 The question was considered by the commissions of 
river users which were convened in 1829, visits were paid to 
91 
the places where agents existed, and recommendations made for 
reforms. As a result, several chefs de" op nts and their aides 
were eliminated, or their, numbers reduced, while others were 
increased in number; their- salaries, and the fees which paid 
for them, were adjusted to-fit more closely the extent of their 
duties. 99 The fees to be paid to, the remaining chefs, aides 
and ag rdes at eight bridges and four weirs or erp tuffs, were 
adjusted and graduated to length and tonnage carried. 
100 
These reforms did not remove every possible cause for 
complaint. Steamers and remorqueurs were still subjected to 
" several unnecessary regulations. For example, they were 
! required to be handed over to a chef de passage at all the 
pertuis on the Basse Seine; this seemed a little irrational, 
said one eminent observer in 1836,101 "car qui'mieux que le 
pilote connait l'effet et la force de son gouvernail? " On the 
Seine-Maritime every chaland was required to have a pilot in 
addition to those on the tug pulling'them. 
102 Bertin and the 
Chambre of'Commerce in LeHavre attempted to have these require- 
ments relaxed, 
103 
and although they. were not entirely success- 
ful, the pilotage dues on steamers were reduced to half by an 
ordonnance of 1841.104 - 
.. 
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PART TWO 
Innovations during the 1820s had successfully applied 
steam power to the propulsion of river-borne and railway trans- 
port vehicles. The task which remained was to provide the 
infrastructures, an improved river channel and a railway track, 
on which these vehicles could economically operate. The State 
had not played an important role in the successful innovations 
of the 1820s. It now became much more closely involved. The 
railways required large amounts of-land and finance capital, 
and in order to obtain these economically, they needed inter- 
vention by the State. The State was even more intimately in- 
volved in river-borne transport, für both institutional and 
economic reasons. The Administration des Ponts et Chaussees 
and its large corps of engineers had gained almost a monopoly 
of technical expertise"and administrative control over most of 
the country's waterways. The economic structure of transport 
on the Seine and on other waterways tended, to perpetuate this 
institutional arrangement. On each waterway there was a multi- 
tude of small independant operators, who, had neither the means 
nor the financial incentive to become directly involved in 
improving their infrastructure. Successful intervention by the 
State to promote the development of railways proved to be very 
difficult. It required not only adequate private and public 
financial means, but also the political will both nationally 
and locally to bring them together. The main obstacle to im- 
provement of the lower Seine was the lack of adequate technical 
means. This obstacle was removed by 1840. 
S 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Railway to the Sea, aDecade of Frustration 
When the maritime canal project was finally abandoned 
in 1832 there were barely fifty kilometres of horse-drawn 
railway in operation in France. Yet within only eight years, 
by 1840, railways had become a-well proven method of transport 
for both passengers and goods, and well over 2,000 kilometres 
of line were in operation in Great Britain and on the continent 
of Europe. Of this total however, barely 300 kilometres were 
in France. Although public interest in railways grew steadily 
from about 1830, and the many difficult issues they raised 
were actively debated, inability to resolve these issued during 
the following decade, and perhaps equally important, the inabil- 
ity of the economy to provide adequate financial and material 
resources for the task of building railways, left France far 
behind its neighbours in railway development. The most impor- 
tant issue, upon which agreement was not reached until 1842, 
was that of who should be responsible for financing and building 
railways, and if, left to private companies, how if at all should 
these companies be assisted by-the State. For the railway from 
LeHavre to Paris, another question of particular importance was 
which route should be followed. ' During the 1830s no final 
answers were given to these questions, and attempts by four 
companies and by the Ponts et Chaussees to organize and build 
a railway through. the Seine valley led to nothing. 
The Beginnings, From 1831 to 1835. 
These years might be called the 'naive period' for French 
railways. Though several companies were formed to build rail- 
ways, very little was known of their costs or the technical 
problems involved in their construction. In the beginning, 
planning a railway was little more than-an exercise of faith. 
As Maurice Jouffroy has. remarked, 
l 
il nest pas certain quo, a notre dpoque, oti domino 
essentiellement un rationalisme plus organisateur 
qu'intuitivement createur, une teile entreprise ne serait 
" trait¬e de folie et ne serait-elle pas tentee. L'atmosphere 
romantique, des annees 1830 le permit'. 
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It was soon learned that enthusiasm was no adequate substitute 
for knowledge. Real knowledge however, was still very small, 
for railway engineering was still in its infancy and the little 
experience acquired in the 1820s had become obsolete with the 
advent of effective locomotives. The design criteria for the 
permanent way had become much more exacting, with the effect 
that construction costs were considerably increased. The cost 
estimates contained in the project submitted by Mellet, Henry, 
Ruolz et Cie in 1832 were based upon their own limited exper- 
ience. since 1828 in building the railway from Roanne to 
Andrezieux. This railway had been designed to accommodate lo- 
comotives over only half its length, the remainder comprising 
a series of inclined planes with very steep gradients. Compared 
2 
with the eventual cost of this railway of 90,000 F per kilometre, 
" Mellet et Cie estimated that the line from Paris to Rouen, which 
had to cross a series of river valleys and plateaux, would cost 
only 84,000 F per kilometre. 
3 To have done an exact survey and 
cost estimate would have been very costly, and was avoided by 
the company. Its plans therefore were rather vague, and the 
project it submitted in 1832 contained nothing more, in the words 
of the Conseil-general des Ponts et Chaussees, than an "indica- 
tion... fort peu detaille". 
4 
As a consequence of this, when the 
project came before the Conseil-general"des Ponts et Chaussees 
in November 1832, it was rejected. 
It was evident to the Conseil that some guidance 
("eclairage" was the word used) must be given if planning of 
such projects were to be done thoroughly and realistically. In 
April 1833 the government of Marshall Soult requested and 
received from parliament a grant of 500,000 F to undertake a 
detailed study of the main lines of a national railway network. 
This was a deliberate policy designed to remove the chief dif- 
ficulties faced by companies planning railways, which said 
Thiers, 
5 
the Minister of Commerce and Public Works, "partout en 
France, en empechent souvent', et en retardent toujours 1-'execu- 
tion. Ce qui rend difficile l'entreprise des chemins do fer, " 
he continued, "c'est la depense des etudes preparatoires, le 
delai sous la verification de ces etudes, et la longeur des 
enquetes prealables. Ces etudes sont fort coüteuses. " Already 
in September 1832, shortly before Legrand had been appointed to 
replace Berard as Directeur-general des Ponts et Chaussees, a 
small commission of*engineers had been appointed to prepare 
plans for six main lines out of Paris to Rouen and LeHavre, Lille, 
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Strasbourg, Marseille via Lyon, Bordeaux and Nantep, 
6 
and once 
adequate funds had been assured'by the grant of 500,000 F, 
engineers were appointed to study specific railway lines. At 
the same time others were sent to see the most recent develop- 
ments in Great Britain and America, 
7 
and experiments were begun 
on important technical problems. 
8 
Thiers allowed Mellet, Henry, 
Ruolz and their rivals'Ardoin, Noblot et Cie to submit further 
plans in February 1834, but once. again, and for the same reasons,. 
they were turned away. 
9 
In its session öf 12. April 1834 the 
Conseil-general des Ponts et Chaussees decided to consider no 
more railway projects until its own surveys and cost estimates 
had been completed. These were carried on actively between 
, Paris and LeHavre through the summer of-1834 under the 
direction 
of two engineers, Mallet and Defontaine, and the report they 
submitted contained the first realistic appraisal of the line's 
probable cost. Defontaine's estimate was about 220,000 F per 
kilometre, or thirty million francs for the 137 kilometres of 
line to Rouen; a line the whole distance to LeHavre, plus 
necessary branch lines, he estimated would cost over sixty 
million francs. 
10 
Although this was still much lower than the 
final real cost, it was an 
, 
estimate upon which serious discus- 
sion could begin. 
A very important issue with both economic and political 
implications which had. not yet been explored in any depth was 
the extent to which the State would become involved in construc- 
tion and finance of railways. It was thought very improbable 
that the State would assume the predominant role in this field 
which it had assumed with respect to waterways. In introducing 
the bill later known as the Grande Loi des Travaux Publics 
at the end of April 1833, the Minister stated that it was not 
his intention to "tracer des chemins de fer aux d6oens de 
1'Etat; non, Messieurs, " he told the deputies, "une teile pensee 
ne saurait entrer ni dans votre esprit, ni dans le notre. ""11 
During the 1820s every line of railway authorized in France - 
only three eventually totalling 137. kilometres, all serving 
metallurgical industries ' in. the upper Loire -- had been built 
by private companies. Now that they were likely to be of more 
general use and require much larger investments, the question 
might well be asked whether. this could' continue. There were 
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some people, especially the Saint Simonians, who would have 
preferred to see the State assume complete chärge' of railways 
as well as waterways; such a policy they believed would avoid 
the evils Of speculation and competition and would allow 
coherent planning and construction of a national network. Their 
hostility to private enterprise entering this field is clearly 
evident in an important book written in 1831 by four young 
engineers, Lame, Clapeyron, and Eugene and Stephane Flachat. 
12 
They wrote with obvious distaste of the "speculateurs qui vivent 
-et agiotent sur les projets_colportes par eux aux capitalistes 
.... " However, the government, in view of its already large 
commitments to improvement bf-waterways and roads, was unwilling 
to involve the State in what would probably be very large 
expenditures on railways. Expenditure by the State on the 
canals begun in 1821 and 1822 had already reached 28 MF up to 
the end of 1832, and this was raised to 90 MF in 1833; these 
amounts were in addition to the 130 MF borrowed when the canals 
were begun. In the same year more than 20 MF were committed 
to special road projects. 
The governments of the July Monarchy, with much encour- 
agement from Legrand, were nevertheless very active promptors 
of improvement in transport. In 1835 the first stage of a 
very extensive programme to improve the nation's waterways was 
begun, and at the same time the first steps were taken to 
encourage construction of railways. 
13 
It had become apparent 
to the government once the first studies by Defontaine and 
others elsewhere in the country were completed that the task of 
building railways would be far beyond the resources-of private 
companies. Though it did not wish to take upon it:: elf any 
responsibility for their financing, it was obvious that if any 
lines were to be completed even within the present decade, some 
means must be found to encourage and assist private capital 
wishing to undertake them. Not willing merely to await events, 
the government of the duc de Broglie decided to proceed with 
concession of one key line of railway, the line from 
Paris to Lefiavre and Dieppe. This was the line most desired 
by transport users, said Thiers, who was still Minister of 
Public Works, and though it was the shortest of the so-called 
'grandes lignes', it would join Paris with Rouen, one of the 
country's most important towns, and'with London. This first 
venture, he continued, would test the strength of railway com- 
panies and the merits of various methods of assisting and 
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controlling them. One form of assistance suggested by many, 
the guarantee of interest, was rejected by Thiers as too un- 
predictable and potentially too large a financial burden upon 
the State. The method he proposed was taken from experience 
in America, where the State had often assumed part ownership 
in railway companies. Specifically the government proposed 
to award a 99-year concession to a company chosen by. open 
competition, and would then purchase one-fifth of the company's 
equity capital. The route proposed by Thiers was the one 
recommended by Defontaine, crossing the plateau to LeHavre and 
Dieppe via St. -Denis and Gisors, with branch lines to Rouen 
and Pontoise. 
Choosing a Route from Paris to LeHavre, 1835 to 1837. 
ýý 
Before a concession could be granted there was a 
lengthy process of consultation, official deliberation and 
legislation to be completed. It is likely that Thiers hoped 
to have legislation passed in the'session of 1835 that would 
allow him to complete the other stages during 1836. His rojet 
de loi however, was never even voted upon, for the commission 
of the Chambre of Deputies nominated to examine it immediately 
found itself confronted by the question of which route the 
railway should follow. Being unable to answer this question, 
the commission could recommend only that it"receive further 
study. About one thing there was no doubt, that the government 
would make the final choice, though it would listen first to 
the advice given in public inquiries and to the recommendation 
made by the Conseil-general des Ponts et Chaussees. As for the 
route from LeHavre to Paris, it had seemed best in the general 
interest, said Thiers, to "aller a la mer par la ligne la plus 
courte,... avec embranchements commodes sur les points importans 
"""" 
14 Unfortunately the only company an yypy prepared then to finance 
and build the line was opposed to this route. The Cie Riant, 
which had taken over documents and some financial backing from 
the former Cie Ardoin et Noblot, stated. to the parliamentary 
commission late in April 1835 that it would only agree to build 
a line if it'went through the valley of the Seine, passing 
directly through Rouen. Just a month earlier Jacques Laffitte, 
one of Riant's backers, had written to Thiers urging him to 
accept this'route, pointing out the larger potential traffic from 
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the many cities and towns in the valley. 
15 
Mellet., Henry et 
Ruolz had proposed to build their line by way of the plateau, 
and at an inquiry held in Rouen in 1832, there had been several 
objections to it, that it would involve a long and steep 
approach to Rouen and its quays, and that the numerous valleys 
to. cross along the route would require too many cutting, tunnels 
and viaducts. It had been. suggested then that a valley route 
be carefully surveyed before granting any concession., and at 
the urging probably-of Barbet, Mayor of Rouen. and one of its 
members, the parliamentary commission recommended once more that 
the Ponts et Chaussees undertake such a survey. 
There is no doubt that by 1836 local opinion still 
favoured the valley route. Riant et Cie submitted their first 
complete project in January 1836, and public inquiries were 
held that summer in the four departments crossed by the railway 
line, the Seine, Seine-et-Oise, Eure and Seine-Inferieure. All 
but one of the representative bodies consulted stated a pref- 
erence for the valley route. Their reasons for this were best 
expressed by the Chambre consultative des Arts at Manufactures 
of Yvetöt, a small textile town between Rouen and LeHavre. 
"I1 Importe beaucoup", said its submission to the. inquiry at 
Rouen, 
l6 
de choisir uri direction qui soit de nature a favouriser 
. 
le plus grand nombre d'interets et ä exercer une heureuse 
influence sür le commerce, l'agriculture at 1'industrie, 
en satisfaisant . la fois aux conditions de celerite, 
de securite at d'economie dans les relations non seulement 
do Paris ä la mer, mais aüssi des villes populeuses at 
commergantes. 
Two Ponts at Chaussees engineers, Polonceau and Belanger, had 
been engaged by the company during the previous summer, and 
they had done a detailed survey over the whole route from 
Paris to Lefavre. Their plans included not only a line passing 
through Rouen, but also branch lines to the important towns of 
Elbeuf, Louviers and Evreux. Their estimate of the cost of 
this line was 74 MF (the first estimate of Defontaine had been 
60 MF), and Riant offered in order, to strengthen his case to 
forgo any financial assistance from the State. 
17 
Only LeHavre 
expressed any misgivings about the valley route, but agreed 
not"to. oppose Riant since his project had the obvious advantage 
18 
of serving more communities,. and apparently required no subsidy. 
' 
_. 
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LeHavre's misgivings had been prompted 
received from the Directeur-g6neral des Ponts 
for when consulted by the Minister in'October 
of Commerce in LeHavre had expressed no prefe 
route. It had been Defontaine's conclusion 
19 
by införmation 
et Chaussees,, 
1835, the Chambre 
rence for either 
after his own 
surveys in 1834 that the valley route was quite unsatisfactory 
owing to "difficultds presque insurmontables" which would make 
it impossibly costly to extend the line beyond Rouen., and so 
to serve LeHavre. He had recommended therefore that the line 
not be brought down-to river level, but taken along the plateau 
and-brought to Rouen only by way of a branch line. Early in 
1836 Legrand warned a delegation from the municipal council in 
LeHavre that a line passing through Rouen by way of the valley 
. would be very difficult and costly to extend to LeHavre. 
20 
The delegation, which was invited by Legrand to visit him in 
his office in Paris, were told of his surprise at the small 
amount of interest being shown in LeHavre in the railway 
question, especially by the Chambre of Commerce. Legrand told 
them that his engineers had serious doubts about the accuracy 
of the surveys done by Polonceau and Belanger. The delegates 
promised to take these warnings back to LeHavre, with the 
result that both the Chambre of Commerce and the city council 
wrote to Legrand21, asking him to ensure that their interests 
were adequately protected. Then two months later in May 1836 
M. Bouchon, a representative of Riant et Cie, was invited to 
address a meeting of the Chambre of Commerce. When he formally 
committed the company to immediate extension of its line to 
LeHavre, the Chambre's fears were somewhat allayed, and they 
agreed to indicate tentative approval of the valley route at 
the forthcoming public inquiries. 
22 
Although this might have been the end of the argument, 
with a concession being awarded shortly to Riant et Cie, it 
was not. Defontaine was determined that the plateau route 
should receive a further hearing. He and Mallet had done a 
brief examination of a possible valley route, as requested by 
the parliamentary commission, and had concluded that it was 
not economically feasible. Then following the public inquiry 
they hhd also decided to revise their plans for the plateau 
route, in such a way as to satisfy most of the objections to it, 
especially those of Rouen. They redesigned the route so that 
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the main line passed through Rouen (as is shown on the map in 
Figure 9), though the station remained a considerable distance 
from the quayside. With this in hand the Minister, now 
Hippolyte Passy, decided to order a new round of public 'inquiries 
to begin in October 1836.1" 
Defontaine appeared before the commission of inquiry in 
Rouen and very ably defended the route he had proposed. 
23 
First, 
he said, the argument that there were more and larger towns in 
the valley was incorrect. There 'were few such centres along 
the valley route, and they were not industrial, whereas on the 
plateau there were several, the many small industrial towns 
and villages in the valleys running down to the Seine. All 
they needed was better communications to "arriver a un haut 
"degre de prosperite". 
24 
Elbeuf and the wool towns of the Eure, 
Evreux. and Louviers, could easily be served by branch lines. 
The plateau line, Defontaine argued, would be straighter and 
shorter, and be more easily extended to LeHavre. For these 
reasons it would be better able to serve the 'transit' trade. 
There was sharp rivalry among the main ports of northwestern 
Europe to attract the trade in raw materials, especially cotton, 
going to supply the industries of south Germany, Switzerland 
and central Europe. - LeHavre was concerned that as railways 
were built to serve its rivals, and especially those near the 
mouths of the Rhine, Antwerp and Amsterdam, its traditional 
and valuable trade with the Americas would be damaged. Accord- 
ing to M. Devilliers, an inspecteur-divisionnaire des ponts 
et chaussees consulted by Legrand, this must be "la question 
dominante" in the choice of routes. 
25 
This argument however, 
naturally found little support in Rouen, whose share in the 
transit trade was neglible. Even for LeHavre, Polonceau pointed 
out, 
26 
the transit trade was still "a creer pour la major partie", 
amounting to less than two per cent of it total foreign and 
colonial trade. Few in Rouen moreover agreed that'in order to 
serve the future transit trade, it was necessary to build a 
railway across the plateau, which-would-not properly serve 
27 Rouen. Defontaine partially redesigned his route to meet 
these objections, but this concession did little to satisfy his 
critics. 
a 
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one argument used by Defontaine provoked great interest 
in Rouen and had important implications for the future. Rouen's 
needs, he said, were well served by the river, and-it would be 
uneconomic to build a , railway through the valley which would 
compete directly with river-borne transport. This was 
especially so, he continued, as the Administration intended 
shortly to-begin large improvements to the lower Seine. 
28 
As 
he spoke'the Conseil-general des Ponts at ChaussEes was in fact 
considering means by which this might be done. Going far beyond 
" what was proper in his position, Defontaine stated to the 
. commission of inquiry that 
ces intentions sont tellement formelles, que, des le 
commencement de la session prochaine un projet de loi 
sera propose aux chambres pour que 20 millions soient 
appliqu6s a 1'amelioration de la Seine. 
This statement was very soon repudiated by Legrand, who added 
that not only had the Administration as yet determined no final 
preference for either route, but also its choice in this matter 
would not be influenced by any plans to improve water-borne 
transport. 
29 
It had long been believed, and was still believed, 
that railways and waterways would complement rather than compete 
with each other. It was the view of both the government and 
the Cie Riant that the railway would carry principally passengers 
and the sorts of light-weight costly goods imported from the 
colonies and the Americas and presently carried by Koala e; all 
other goods, which were the great majority, would continue to 
be carried by water. 
. 
Defontaine's arguments_were persuasive, for despite 
Rouen's continued hostility to the plateau "route, the commission 
of inquiry for the Seine-Inferieure,. sitting at Rouen, voted ten 
" to, three in its favour. 
30 
This was not unexpected, as most of 
its members came from towns which would benefit most from a 
plateau route. LeHavre became convinced from this time on that 
only by construction of the plateau route could its interests 
be protected. Inquiries in the other departments also largely 
favoured the plateau. 
31 
With this result Defontaine and Mallet 
were in ä strong position to present their project to the 
Conseil'-general des Ponts et Chaussees in the first months of 
1837. Even there Defontaine continued actively to argue the 
advantages of his route. Both in a letter sent to Legrand early 
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in January, 32 and in several personal appearances before the 
Conseil-general he argued very persuasively in favour of his 
route and against that of Polonceau and Belanger. The Conseil- 
g6neral concluded however, that they were of equal technical 
merit, 
33 
and after prompting from Legrand, who chaired its 
meetings, focused its attention upon the economic issue: which 
route would most economically and best serve the needs of Paris, 
LeHavre and Rouen? 
34 
Its final decision on the 16th of March, 
after-debating the matter during 'seven sessions, was to recommend 
the plateau route. Riant et Cie had asked to be informed of 
the course of the Conseil's debates, and it requested that 
Defontaine not be admitted to the Conseil unless it were also 
given a chance at the same time to defend its project. These 
-requests were both denied, 
35 
though the company was given 
opportunities during two sessions to appear before the Conseil. 
The Parliamentary Stage and the Emergence of Open Rivalry 
Between . LeHavre and Rouen, 1837 and 1838 
,,, 
$t the routes question apparently answered, within 
dw, 
. only 
` rý weeks, at the beginning of May 1837, Martin (du Nord) 
the iieCd i.... nister of Public Works presented. to the Chambre of 
Deputies a rý ojet de loi for a railway from Paris to Rouen. 
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This was only one of ten such proposed railway lines in a large 
and ambitious programme of railway and waterway development 
initiated by the new Mole Ministry. It was hoped that private 
companies would come forward to build most of the seven main 
lines amongst these, and in order to encourage this the gov- 
ernment offered them liberal terms. As for the Paris-to--Rouen, 
Martin proposed that parliament contribute a grant of seven 
million francs toward the total estimated cost of 38 MF; more- 
over, not only need the line be built only as far as Rouen in 
this first stage, but the government would leave the choice of 
route open to the companies. The Conseil-general des Ponts et 
Chaussees had of course made nothing more than a recommendation. 
This was a bold and sensible beginning. The government 
had resisted pressure from local interests to require that the 
line be built at once all the way to Lellavre. Shortly before 
the bill was presented, the Chambre of Commerce in LeHavre had 
written to the Minister reminding him that building the railway 
at first only to Rouen could result in almost indefinite 
postponement of the more difficult. and financially more risky 
37 
section to LcHavre. This fear. was, confirmed, they wrote, by 
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information they had received that much of the capital 
subscribed for Rinnt at Cie had-come from Great Britain on the 
express condition that the railway be built only an far as Rouen. 
In reply to this, Logrand wrote to the Chambre of Commerce that 
for practical financial reasons the government could not insist 
that the entire line be built at this time, but that between 
the present parliamentary session and the next the Administra- 
tion would try to find moans for financing the second stage* 
30 
Two days later Riant at Cia wrote to the minister accepting the 
cahior des charges annexed to the bill, but refusing the finan- 
cial assistance it offered; however, it also suggested that a 
way night be found for both sections of the line on either side 
of Rouen to be built simultaneously. 
39 This suggestion indicated 
that such a project was possible, and with this in hand a 
commission of the Chambre of Deputies very soon recommended 
that the govornment's project be extended immediately to LcJ! avre 
and Dieppe. 
40 The government accepted this recommendation and 
on the 3rd of June Aiartin submitted a new root do loi for the 
whole line to LoIlavre, this time offering a subvention of ten 
million francs. 
41 
over the next two weeks, events worked just as quickly 
to reverse this result. The new pro et de loi was sent back to 
the same commission, and when a week later it reported to the 
Chambre, 42 it reversed its first recommendation. Railways, 
stated the rapporteur, would be enormously costly to build, and 
especially in France where iron and coal were so dear. 
43 For 
this reason they must be built only where there would be dense 
flows of passenger traffic. A line from Paris to Rouen was 
likely to carry a largo passenger traffic and to be very 
profitable, as was indicated by Rinnt's offer to build it without 
subvention; the lines to Lellavro and Dieppe would not, and a 
subvention of only ton million francs was unlikely to be 
sufficient to attract any company to build them. The commission 
therefore recommended that the Chambro reject the second bill 
and pass the bill first submitted by the government. Though 
Lallavre was disappointed, this result had not been unexpected 
by the Chambre og Commerco. 44 Nor however, was even this 
minimum bill passed into law. The-short time remaining in the 
parliamentary session was taken up with a debate on the general 
principles which should govern railiay devolopment. 45 
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During this general debate it was seriously suggested 
that the State should assume the entire financial responsibility 
for railways, and it became apparent that opinion in the Chambre 
seemed now to favour such a course of action. it was feared 
that the private sector of the economy would be incapable of 
providing the huge sums needed. 
46' 
Riant seems to have been 
compelled to obtain about half the subscriptions for his 
company in Great Britain. 
47 
There had been a small railway 
'boom'. since April when the first Paris-to-Versailles railway 
. 
had been launched, 48 and during 1837 there are said to have 
. 
been 38. MF committed to railway construction, compared with a 
'total amount invested in railways up to that time of only 
31 Mr. 
49 
As shares in several companies found their way onto 
the Bourse however, there were rumours of considerable specula- 
tion,. and. fears were expressed both in the Chambres50 and in 
the press51 that further speculation would precipitate a 
financial crash.. Etatist political ideas seem also to have 
. 
had a role in this, change of opinion. Both roads and waterways 
had since 1830 become the exclusive responsibility of the State; 
Belguim had, its State railways system. Count Jaubert received 
an enthusiastic response in the Chambre when he stated52 that 
it was , 
les principes de la centralisation qui font la gloire et la 
puissance de la France; je ne le cache pas, je tiens... sur ce 
point aux doctrines de 1'Empire; j'y ai ete eleve! Mon reve 
serait de concilier la puissante et bonne administration de 
1'Empire avec les formes et les garanties de la monarchie 
constitutionelle.... La centralisation... doit etre fortifiee 
plus que jamais: en voici une grande occasion. 
New legislation was introduced in 1838. The. government 
was determined on success, and strengthened by the results of 
an election in November 1837, it tried to satisfy the main 
objections and suggestions voiced in the previous year's debate. 
On the 15th of February 1838 Martin, who remained Minister of 
Public Works in the second Mole I'inistry, presented a group of 
projets de loi for several railway lines. 
53 Instead of the 
piece-meal approach, which had been strongly criticized in 1837, 
he now presented them as part of a national plan for transport, 
embracing both waterways and railways, and taking into account 
the economic functions of-both. To provide for the two principal 
functions of railways, transport of passengers and of costly 
goods including those in the transit trade, the Minister outlined 
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a system of nine main lines mostly radiating from Paris, one of 
them to LeHavre. However, to-avoid excessive' strain on the 
economy and the nation's finances, he said, the network of 
railways must be built gradually and integrated in the most 
efficient way possible with the existing and planned waterways. 
From Rouen to LeHavre, he continued, "la navigation ä la vapour 
peut jusqu'ä un certain point, et pendant quelques tems du moins, 
suppler les voics de for. " Reverting therefore to the original 
plan of the year before, he proposed once again that only the 
" line from Paris to Rouen be-built first, but 
in such a way as 
., to ensure that 
it could be easily extended to LeHavre. 
The Minister also proposed that the State 'should take 
full responsibility for finance and construction of the main 
lines of railway. This, he said, would ensure rational develop- 
ment and permit the State to set uniform and low rates of. 
carriage. There was great dissatisfaction at this time with 
the high rates being charged by the companies given canal 
, concessions 
in 1821 and 1822. Following the elections in 
November 1837 the government had set up an extra-parliamentary 
commission to study this and other questions, and it had advised 
that the State assume the main responsibility for railway develop- 
"ment. 54 The main reason for this recommendation was the fear 
of speculation, and even corruption, which one of its members 
pointed out had occurred in Great Britain. This change in 
government policy was welcomed in LeHiavre, since it was believed 
there that only if the State undertook to build railways would 
one be built over the plateau; even though the government had 
stated that it could not immediately build ä line from Rouen 
to LeIiavre, State construction nevertheless offered the best 
" guarantee of an eventual extension. On the other hand, with 
the Cie Riant in existence, Rouen naturally favoured construction 
by a private company, as this would ensure a railway through 
the valley. 
LcHavre's Successful Campaign for a Railway by the Plateau. 
Martin's new bill was the signal to begin six months of intensive 
political activity. The bill had satisfied no one, and the 
government and the unusual. eighteen-rnember commission des 
finances nominated by the Chambre to examine it55 were beset on 
all sides by petitions and delegations. They came to Paris 
from LeHavre, from Rouen and from Dieppe, while the represen- 
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tatives of the Cie Riant had been in Paris for some years. 
The delegation from LeHavre provides a very interesting study 
of local initiative and political action in support of a rail- 
way project. Through correspondence preserved in the Chambre 
of Commerce in LeHavre, their activities can be followed quite 
closely. 
56 
LeHavre's efforts were fairly intelligently conducted, 
though some credit for their eventual success in overcoming a 
very weak position must go to their collegues from Dieppe. To 
co-ordinate their actions the Chambre of Commerce and the 
Municipal Council in LeHavre had formed in December 1837 a 
joint railway committee or commission mixte. 
57 
Its task was 
to devise a strategy to obtain a railway as soon as possible all 
. the way 
from Paris to LeHavre. There was a choice of three 
alternatives to the government's plan. They could try to per- 
suade the government to extend the line all the way to Lefavre 
in asingle stage, or they could encourage the formation of a 
new company to build all or part of a line along the plateau. 
Or, finally they could fall back upon the long-standing offer 
from Riant et Cie. The committee favoured the first alternative, 
and it would have been ideal. However, they were forced also 
to devote considerable effort to the second. For some time 
there seemed to be a good chance of persuading the government 
to amend its p rojet de loi; LeHavre was an important transit 
port, and there had been. general agreement in the extra-parlia- 
mentary commission during November when Legrand stated that the 
line should be built all the way to LeHavre. The tendency of 
opinion in the Chambre of Deputies seems ironically however, to 
have changed since the previous summer, and information at 
LeHavre was that most deputies--now favoured giving responsibility 
for railways-to. private enterprise. 
58 
It was possible then that 
the Chambres would vote this way; to cover this possibility, 
which was considered strong, LeHavre's strategists had also 
-actively to pursue the second and third of their alternatives. 
Whatever the outcome, they wanted-to ensure that any line built 
should be by the plateau, and be built all the way to LeHavre. 
To execute its strategy in Paris, the committee nominated 
a delegation of three, Pierre Frissard, ingdnieur-en-chef des 
oonnts'et chaussees and directeur du port'at Leflavre, Antoine 
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LeMaistre, former deputy and present mayor of LcHavrc, and 
Reilly, president of the Chambro of Commerce. Their first 
task was to deliver a petition to the commission de finances. 
Just two days after its appointment, Mermillod, one of the 
deputies from LeHavre, wrote to his constituents urging them 
to send a petition; it must stress the vital issues, he wrote, 
those emphasized by the Minister, the importance of the transit 
trade and the problems involved in building only as far as 
Rouen in the first stage. 
59 
The petitign was quickly circulated 
in LeHavre, and was apparently well-received by the commission. 
This done, the delegates then spent six tiring weeks in Paris, 
speaking to deputies, to members of the commission, to the 
Minister, to bankers and journalists, and waiting to be heard 
by the commission. Upon arrival the three delegates met with 
Berigny and Mermillod, their two deputies, and it was agreed 
that Berigny would propose an amendment to the projet de loi 
that the State be left to build only the three most important 
trunk lines, from LeHavre to Strasbourg, from Lille to Marseille, 
and from Paris to Bordeaux; the remaining smaller lines would 
be given to the companies. 
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Then they took their arguments 
out into the corridors of the Chambres, where LeMaistre still 
had many friends. They spoke with comte Mole, head of the 
government, and several other deputies. In this way they were 
able to meet and confront the deputies from Rouen, MM Curmor 
and Henry Barbet. Barbet, remarked Frissard, seemed to have 
a very feeble grasp of the facts and issues involved. Taking 
their turn in the procession of many delegation, they also 
visited the Minister, and were well-received. 
61 
The delegates 
also had other means at their disposal for reaching the deputies. 
On the 8th of March they had published in a weekly business 
newspaper, L'Europe industrielle, a special article setting 
forth their arguments for a plateau route and continuation to 
LeHavre. The cost of printing one's own pamphlets, which 
anyway had to compete with a thousand others for the attention 
of the deputies, was not. inconsiderable, so that contacts with 
the press were a valuable asset. 'The journals of course were 
not just looking for good copy; the editors, wrote Frissard, 
62 
have and will write "tout ce quo nous lour proposeraient sans 
iucune subvention et däns le seul espoir d'introduire lour 
journal Bans un localite importantýccomme LcHavre. " 
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While the commission des finances slowly conducted its 
hearings, the delegates also explored their other alternatives. 
A decision in favour of State execution was by no means certain, 
and they had confirmed immediately upon their arrival in Paris 
that opinion amongst the deputies seemed to be in favour of 
the companies. The reason was apparently financial; as 
Frissard. remarked, opinion-"redoute de voir le gouvernement 
s'engager dans d'aussi grandes depenses". 
63 It had already 
been carefully considered in LeHavre whether the city should 
turn to the Cie Riant. Riant et Cie had offered to build their 
line all the way to LeHavre,. and the company seemed to have 
'adequate financial backing;. this alternative; if successful, 
would be an easy way out. However, the committee in LeHavre 
was suspicious of Riant, as the Chambre of Commerce had always 
been, and for the same reasons. They decided that Riant must 
be dealt with very carefully, and they instructed the delegates 
to Paris to "agir avec reserve", to make no commitments and to 
press the company for a full explanation of its position. 
64 
Riant et Cie had remained very active since failing to obtain 
any concession the year befbre, and were also lobbying in Paris, 
with the support of a delegation from the Chambre of Commerce 
in Rouen. They had tried again in January before the opening 
of parliament to obtain concession of the railway. After the 
introduction of the new projet de loi they broadened their 
approach and tried directly to enlist the support of LeHavre. 
First they had approached the three delegates to Paris, who 
were waylaid while travelling from LeHavre. Arriving in Rouen 
at midnight, they were met by M. Bouchon, whom Frissard 
described a little mockingly, but justly, as the "infatigable, 
1'intrepide M. Bouchon, le plus zele procurateur et agent de 
la Compagnie Riant`: 
65 For twelve hours the delegates held 
M. Bouchon at bay, giving nothing, and accepting nothing from 
the company. They spelled each other off every hour or so, 
while M. Bouchon neither ate nor slept. The delegates were met 
again in Paris, and the company offered them a kind of alliance; 
Riant promised that every possible guarantee would be given, 
that the cahier des charges might even be drafted in co-operation 
with the delegates. Very soon afterwards, on the 20th of 
February, Riant and two of his associates wrote to the Chambre 
of Commerce in LeHavre. once more outlining and defending their 
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proposals. The technical feasibility of the line, they wrote, 
could certainly no longer be disputed, and they promised to 
build it in one stage all the way to LeIlavre. Financial 
arrangements were well in hand owing to the success of a capital 
subscription recently opened at the offices of Jacques Laffitte. 
66 
The Chambre of Commerce does not seem to have replied, and 
remained sceptical that the company would fulfill its promises. 
Nevertheless Riant's offer was not refused outright, for as 
Frissard recommended, 
67 "c'est une planche de salut que nous 
devons conserver avec soin, " and. relatidns with the company 
and its representatives always remained cordial. 
What LeHavre's strategists wanted most was a viable 
alternative to Raint et Cie, a company which, they said, would 
'neutralize' Riant. For this purpose the delegates were 
authorized by the committee to make contacts with bankers and 
other potential sources of financial support for a company, 
and while making no promises on behalf of LeHavre, attempt to 
start a stock subscription. For at least a month they appear 
to have made no progress in this direction. Then during the 
second week of March they wrote to LeHavre indicating that two 
contacts had been made, the first with agents or acquaintances 
of John Cockerill, textile mill, foundry and mine owner of 
Liege, and the second with James de Rothschild. The delegates. 
were optimistic of success, and meetings were planned with both 
Cockerill and Rothschild during the third week of March. Their 
optimism however, was short-lived, as Cockerill failed to 
arrive in Paris when expected, 
68 
and Rothschild gave them no 
encouragement. Rothschild was probably very wary of any 
commitment to a Paris-to-LeHavre railway. During January he 
had been advised by a friend, J. -C. Davillier, not to become 
involved in Riant's project, owing to evidence that that company's 
cost estimates were far from accurate; 
69 
now he told the delegates 
that before commiting himself to participation in their company, 
for the plateau he would wait for a decision from the parlia- 
mentary commission. 
70 
The delegates were. disappointed of course, but quickly 
turned to search for other means. What they thought was needed 
was a group of capital subscribers and the backing of the 
largest bank which could be found in Paris. Then, wrote 
Frissard, 71 
on aura des souscripteurs en masse. Je crois meme que tous 
ill 
ceux de 1`a vallde soumissioneront les plateaux.. Mais 
an ce moment il convient'de neutraliser la souscription 
de la vall6e par une autre sur les plateaux et c'est 
chose tres possible. 
On the 18th of March Frissard had an interview with the 
editors of L'Europe industrielle, and worked out an arrangement 
whereby one of. them, N.. Lubis, would help the delegates to 
find subscribers and a banker. The banker-financier he had in 
mind was still Cockerill. Frissard wanted to go right ahead 
with this plan, but LeMaistre, more cautious, -thought it best 
that the subscription not be. opened until after the commission 
des finances had come to a decision. He also suggested that 
the delegates ask for approval from the committee in LeHavre 
, before proceeding with any plan. Frissard felt his initiative 
was being unnecessarily frustrated; "Je ne partage pas cette 
opinion, " he wrote, to his, collegues in LeHavre. 
72 
parceque je pense qu'il serait preferable de presenter 
des ä prCsent la ligne des plateaux avec une souscription 
et une Compagnie a 1'appui. Je ne puis ä moi soul former 
une majorite. Je m'abstiens done de toutes demarches. 
The committee in LeHavre was very slow in replying to the 
delegates, ' letters, which caused them considerable annoyance 
and delay. Again Frissard the activist was frustrated; he 
could not conceive of a mandate so limited, and he asserted, 
73 
je crois que dans une pareille affaire des ddldguds doivent 
" avoir plus de latitude, car il nest pas de position de plus 
facheuse que cello de no pouvoir faire et de ne pas voir 
faire. 
While the delegates from LeHavre waited for instructions from 
their committee however, the delegates from Dieppe were acting. 
The Dieppois had made what was to be a major find, a 
banker of, some consequence, Delamarre of Delamarre, Martin, 
Didier, a Regent. of the Banque de France, who was willing to 
sponsor a subscription for the plateau without any particular 
commitments from either the Minister or the cities concerned. 
To determine the Government's attitude to such a company, an 
interview was arranged for Delamarre and the deputy Charles 
Berigny with Martin the Minister and Logrand on the 25th of. 
March. 
74 
Frissard was quite realistic in assessing its probable 
outcome; "Cette entrevue", he reported, 
75 
"n'aura pas do 
resultat bien po$itif, le govt ne voulant pas s'engager. " But 
he thought Delamarre should, be encouraged; "nous ferons notre 
possible", he wrote, 
pour que Mr Delamarre ne. se r. ebute'pas de 1'incertitude oü l'on pourra le laisser; car l'essentiel est dlouvrir une 
112 
souscription pour la ligne des plateaux pour neutraliser 
cello de la vallee, et je ne doute pas quelle soit 
bientöt accompli. 
Frissard emphasized furthermore the need -for immediate 
financial participation from LeHavre. Once again however, 
LeMaistre was in doubt; he could not decide how to deal with 
M. Lubis and M. Delamarre simultaneously, and asked for advice 
from Lefavre. He was less optimistic about the prospects of 
Delamarre; "nous ne devions peut-titre pas titre arret6s, " he 
reflected 
76 
par les dispositions fort douteuses encore de M. Delamarre 
qui n'aurait pas avec lui M. Cockerill et probablement 
pas d'influence dans 1'opinion pour arriver seul a un 
prompte r6sultat. " 
LeMaistre's problem was soon solved for him by M. Lubis, who 
returned on the 29th to say that the conditions offered by 
Cockerill were unacceptable, and that the idea should be* 
dropped. LeMaistre seems to have become deeply disappointed 
at this news, and came back once again to the idea that perhaps 
the offer from Riant should be accepted. If LeHavre waited 
too long all its other alternatives would be exhausted and its 
bargaining power reduced to nothing. Frissard also kept this 
in mind, and assured the committee in LeHavre that relations 
with Riant remained very good; but he seems to have been 
determined to give Delamarre a while longer-to prove himself. 
The vital decision however, would be made by the 
commission des finances, as it was likely that whatever it 
recommended, the Chambre would adopt. For several weeks the 
delegates had been seeing various members of the commission, 
and they hoped at last to be heard by the commission itself. 
But its hearing went very slowly, and the date on which they 
would be heard was several times postponed. "Quo de patience 
il faut", wrote one of the delegates, 
77 "... pour rester a se 
morfondre ainsi, ballte de tous les vents!! " Then at the 
beginning of April, after hearing the testimony of the minister 
and of Legrand, the commission decided that no further delega- 
tions would be heard and that it would recommend the government's 
bill be rejected. Although the commission's report78 would 
not be tabled in the Chambre of Deputies until the and of the 
month, the outcome seemed certain enough to the delegates, and 
113 
they decided to return home. 
79 
Early in May, as expected, the 
entire projet de loi was defeated by the Chambre. 
Many observers, including the delegates from LeHavre, 
believed the commission's recommendations had been politically 
motivated. Many of its members, like Thiers, were leading 
participants in the so-called "coalition" of opponents of the 
government. The Railway Times in Great Britain criticized the 
"absolute flimsiness" of the commission's report. 
80 
The 
political commentator for the Revue des Deux Mondes, a supporter 
of the government, suggested there had been some political 
collusion. 
81 
He cited the apparent agreement to defeat the bill 
between Odilon Barrot and Adolphe Thiers, both opponents of the 
government, one of whom wanted privately financed railways, 
the other State railways. 
Voila qui est edifiant! Si ces messieurs mettaient 
seulement la moitie de cette bonne volont6 ä s'entendre 
avec le ministre, l'accord serait general et tout-ä-fait 
touchant.... La grande question nest pas de s'entendre 
pour faire des chemins de for, mais de s'entendre pour 
que le ministre n'en fasse pas; voila tout l'esprit do 
la ligue. 
LeMaistre was of the same opinion. "I1 n'etait que trop evident, " 
he said, 
82 
. quo 
nos legislateurs preöccüpes d'intrigues ministerielles 
et voulant avant tout faire prevaloir le systeme de coalition, 
qu'ils regardent comme un nouvel conseil gouvernemental, 
reserveraient le merite de lois utiles aux hommes de leur 
prediliction, et faisant cette annde le moins de bien possible 
pour conclure de cette maniere de l'incapacitd de nos 
ministres actuels. 
However, the commission's rejection of the proposed exclusive 
role for the State in railway development was by then a widely 
supported one. The very large State involvement in public 
works had already been pointed out in the debate of the previous 
year. The total amount spent on public works (roads, navigation 
and irrigation projects and ports) since 1830 was almost 350 MP, 
and there were more than 380 MP yet to be spent on programmes. * 
underway; during 1837 more works were approved which it was 
estimated would eventually cost a further 470 MF. 
83 The total 
ordinary budget in these'years was little more than 1,000 MF. 
84 
Fortunately this setback in parliament was not the 
disaster it had been. in 1837, for just as the government's bill 
was being rejected, the long-awaited company for the plateau had 
i 
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been formed. It is not clear what-had occurred during April 
to make this possible, but there seem to have . been two companies 
in existence by the end of the month. The first was probably 
a company formed by Delamarre with the support of some local 
capital from Dieppe; the second probably had its origins in 
Lellavre, backed largely by the Banque du Havre and another 
local banker and member of the Chambre of Commerce, Chouquet. 
To prevent their resources being spread too thinly, the two 
groups were brought together, largely through the efforts of 
Pierre Frissard. 85 On the 14th and 15th of May the articles 
of association were signed for a single company, to be called 
the Compagnie Chouquet et Lebobe, after its two directours. 
86 
It was widely known that the government planned as soon 
as possible to present another bill for this railway line, 
87 
and on, the 12th of May the about to be formed Cie Chouquet et 
Lebobe had submitted a request for its concession. Riant et Cie, 
with the support of a delegation from Rouen, had done the same, 
and it seemed to have some parliamentary support. Mermillod 
urged LeHavre to send its delegation once again to Paris. 
88 
Negotiations were opened between Chouquet, Lebobe et Cie and 
the Minister, and when they had been brought quickly to a 
conclusion ä new p rojet de loi was introduced into the Chambre. 
89 
l, ccording, to its terms the railway from Paris to LeHavre and 
Dieppe via the plateau, estimated to cost 75 MF, would be 
conceded directly to the Cie Chouquet et Lebobe. Construction 
would be completed within eight years, no competing line would 
be permitted for a period of 28 years, and at the end of eighty 
years the line and its equipment would be turned back to the 
; state. Though there were several hours of debate on the bill, 
it was easily passed. The company was definitively organized* 
as a societe anonyme late in July and began its work soon after. 
The Failure of Chouquet, Lebobe et Compagnie. 
In July 1838 its financial foundations had seemed very 
strong, though within thirteen months this company had been 
voluntarily liquidated, having accomplished nothing. Indeed, 
it had been largely upon the assurance of financial strength 
that the government and the Chambres had agreed to the 
concession. Amongst the original- founders of the soci6te en 
commandite of 14-15 May were several eminent names from the 
115 
financial and business world: Delamarre, the due D6cazes, 
Boigues of Fourchambault, the comte Roy, another maitre de 
forges, Theodore Humann, later Minister of Finance, and Aguado, 
the duc de las Marismas. When the societe anonyme was approved 
in August several other names of equal stature were added to 
the conseil d'administration. 
90 
Three out of the thirteen 
members of the conseil are among seventeen men listed by 
A. -J. Tudesq 
91 
as the wealthiest property-owners in France, 
and they solemnly pledged their honour to carry out the 
obligations entered into by the company. Collectively the 
members of the conseil d'administration were required by the 
company's statutes to own at least-20,000 of the company's 
90,000 shares. Confidence in the company was further increased 
when comte Jaubert, known for his "capacite at la-severite de 
ses principes", 
92 
was appointed general manager of the company. 
The railways were no longer dependant exclusively 
upon bankers and large individual financiers, but had begun 
also to receive funds from the wider investing 'public'. 
Ownership of the company's shares was eventually spread over a 
fairly wide base. The company first offered its shares to the 
public in the form of promesses d'actions with a par value of 
1,000 F during May, and the entire 90,000 offered for sale were 
taken within the first day. 
93 
The total number' demanded is, 
said to have been almost 300,000.9 The stock of Riant at Cie, 
which had also been sold out on its first day of issue, simulta- 
neously suffered a fall of ten per cent on the Bourse. 
95 
A 
considerable number of the promesses issued by Chouquet at 
Lebobe were acquired by merchant bankers96 for later resale 
(at an, inflated price) to smaller investors. This was a kind 
of speculation, and contributed to speculation by others; 
according to Frissard, 
97 
this was one of the greatest contributing 
causes of the company's later weakness. An even greater 
contributor to speculation was the requirement that each share- 
holder be held liable to pay up only 25 per cent of the par 
value of his shares; the Conseil d'Etat"had wanted to impose a 
requirement of 100 per cent, 
98 but was over-ruled by the Minister. 
The same provision applied to other companies being formed at 
this time, the Paris-to-Orleans and the Strasbourg-to-Bile. 
The companies claimed, perhaps correctly; that if their shares 
116 
were to carry 100 per cent liability they could not be sold. 
Despite the initial large role of the bankers, by the time 
the societe anonyme had been formed, almost half of the 
company's shares were owned by relatively small shareholders 
with fifty shares or less. 
99 
These were'not large holdings, 
for although each share had a par value of 1,000 F, the holder 
was required initially to-pay up only 100 F of this. More than 
eighty per cent of the shareholders owned ten shares or less, 
and 96 per cent owned fifty'or less; the corresponding figures 
for Riant et Cie were 69 per cent. and 95 per cent. 
100 Local 
participation was not very large. Only about three million 
francs subscribed by Aguado, who was a land-owner in the area. 
, The town of Dieppe is said to have received but refused an 
offer from the directors of the London and Brighton Railway of 
a subscription of 12 MF. 
101. 
The amount subscribed in LeHavre 
is unknown; the largest known shareholder from Lellavre was 
the banker Chouquet, who bought 1,300 shares. 
102 
The company's first setback was financial. The financial 
depression which occurred in the latter half of 1838 and brought 
the short 'railway boom' to an end seriously affected the 
company's credit. As Bertrand Gille explains, 
103" 
the total 
stock of funds available for bath short and long-term credit 
was not sufficiently large to sustain the investment 'boom' of 
1837 and 1838. The large investment in railway stocks which 
occurred during these years reduced the fund of credit available 
for commercial transactions; as the needs of commerce were 
reasserted, funds were withdrawn from long-term investments and 
the price of stocks fell. The effect of this on several of 
the principal railway companies is seen in Figure ). 
104 The 
Morning Post of London commented on the railway investment 
crisis in France that105 
The weight of the enterprise is too great for the commercial 
capital of France, and it is impossible that any one line 
can be accomplished unless the aid of foreign capital be 
obtained. 
The most serious effect of the crisis upon Chouquet, Lebobe et 
Cie was not the fall in the price'of its shares but its failure 
to obtain further payments of 100 F per share from all of its 
shareholders. After-initial payments of only 100 F per share 
at the time of subscription, several fiirther payments were 
i 
a 
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owed at regular intervals of about three months. The second 
payment, or versement, was due on the 10th of October 1838, and 
the third, for only 50 F per share, was due on the 10th of 
December. On the original sale of promesses the company had 
realized only about 8.5 MF instead of the 9 MF expected; for 
various reasons, 
106 
2,548 shares had remained unsubscribed. 
The first call fora further 9 MF yielded only about 5.6 MF, 
and the second for 4.5 MF yielded less than 2 MF. 
107 
This left 
the company with only 16 MF instead of an expected 22.5 MP. 
As the financial crisis deepened through the winter, there was 
a declining prospect of success with calls for the remaining 
67.5. MF left outstanding. Owing to the crisis moreover, 
provisions in the company's statutes for forcing payment of 
arrears were of little use. Delamarre himself, whose bank was 
a large holder of current accounts of small business firms, 
could not meet his obligations and was forced to obtain a special 
loan'from, the Banque de France to avoid bankruptcy. 
108 By June 
1839 Delamarre still owned 2,787 shares in the company, but had 
made no payments on any of them. At the same time Chouquet, 
Lebobe et Cie had paid out over 167,000 F to Delamarre, Martin 
et Didier in bankers' fees. 
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Before these financial problems had become apparent the 
company had begun, preparations to start work on the railway 
line. The main task of the company's directeur-general'comte 
Jaubert was to prepare and present to the Administration every 
four months completed and detailed plans for the construction 
of sections of at least twenty kilometres of line; the entire 
line was to be completed within a, period of no more than eight 
years. 
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Attention was concentrated initially upon getting 
started on . the 
first twenty-five kilometres of line between 
Paris and Pontoise; it was-here that the greatest traffic 
potential existed, and it, seems to have had the best and most 
complete plans already in. existence. Negotiations were begun.. 
for the purchase of land in Paris and along the route to 
Pontoise, and by. November about one-third of the total required 
had'been arranged. Within Paris the company made arrangements 
to buy parcels. of land worth over 1.5 Mr. Using plans drawn up 
by*Defontaine, work was even begun on part of the line itself. 
Qn. the 15th of September 1838, in the presence of the Minister, 
the Directeur-general des Ponts et. Chaussees, and Aguado, the 
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President of the company, the foundation stone for a bridge to 
cross the Oise at Saint-Denis. was laid. On the 12th of October 
the company formally asked permission to begin construction 
between Paris and Pontoise. 
111 Rolling stock had to be ordered 
far in advance, as owing to large demand for both rails and 
rolling. stock by many companies in both Great Britain and 
France, a long period before delivery was expected. Between 
the middle of September and the middle of October therefore, 
the company placed three contracts in Great Britain for a total 
of fifteen locomotives and three tenders. 
112 
In October 
., attention was also 
turned to making preparations to begin work 
'on the remainder of the railway. An engineering staff had been 
appointed, comprising a total of twenty-seven men. The three 
principal engineers were Virla, in charge of the section between 
Paris and Rouen, Frissard of that between Rouen and LeHavre and 
Dieppe, and Bineau in charge of rolling stock and the permanent 
way. 
113 The Administration's plans, prepared by Defontaine 
, 
in 1835 and 1836, were handed over to the company in mid- 
October, and at the end of the month Frissard established an 
office in Rouen. 
114 
Using Defontaine's plans and cost estimates 
as an outline, he and the other engineers began preparation of 
a detailed project. 
Within a very few weeks it'became evident that Defontaine's 
cost estimates, and perhaps even the route to be followed, would 
require major revisions. This information precipitated a 
crisis, for in view of the difficulties which were already being 
experienced in obtaining funds, it became open to question 
whether the company could continue with its' construction 
programme if its cost were to rise much above the estimate made 
by Defontaine. There were two opinions among members of the 
conseil d'administration. One group believed that the company 
had an obligation to the country to fulfill the promises made 
during the previous summer. It should therefore continue with 
the construction about to begin, and success in this would 
help to revive confidence in the. company's future and facilitate 
its financing. Such a course of action moreover would demonstrate 
the company's good faith and help . 
in persuading the government 
to extend aid or to modify-its cahier des charges. ' The opposing 
" view was that in the interests of the shareholders, to whom the 
directors were mainly responsible, it would be unwise to continue 
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construction until a revised cost estimate had been prepared; 
it might-be discovered that the company had no chance of 
completing the line with its present capital, even if it could 
be realized. It would be better to liquidate the company than 
to build an incomplete and ruinous railway. 
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At a meeting 
held by the conseil d'administration late in November 1838, it 
was decided that the entire line from Paris to LeHavre and 
Dieppe must be re-surveyed and new cost estimates prepared. In 
the meantime all construction on the Paris-to-Pontoise section 
was'suspended, and a'special committee nominated to prepare 
for discussions with the Government to obtain a change in the 
company's cahier des charges. 
116 
At this Jaubert resigned, as 
he firmly believed the company should fulfill its obligation to 
the country and take a bolder course of action, 
117 
and his 
place as directeur-general was taken by Lebobe. Already there 
were rumours in the press that the company would be dissolved, 
and its rivals and enemies among supporters of the old Cie Riant 
and the valley route were the first to point to its obvious 
failure. 
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By April the company had received more detailed and 
reliable cost estimates, which indicated that its-line would 
cost 135 MF, an increase of four-fifths over the 75 MF estimated 
by Defontaine. 
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To restore the company to financial viability, 
its directors decided upon two objectives, to reduce the cost 
of construction and to raise the tariff. At a meeting of the 
conseil d'administration on the 1st of April they agreed to 
submit a formal request to the Administration for a change in 
the cahier des charges. In a letter to the Minister ten days 
later120 the company asked that it be permitted to build the 
railway in three parts, beginning with that to Pontoise, and 
that it be excused from any penalties should it be unable in 
future to build the other sections. Secondly the company 
proposed that the route to Rouen be altered to cross the plateau 
north of the city; this would give Rouen a terminus only on the 
south shore at St. -Sever, and a branch connecting it with the 
mainline. For Rouen the result would be worse than the original 
proposal of Defontaine in 1834, but for the company it would 
shorten the line. by 37 kilometres. The company also asked for 
permission to build only'one track from louen to. LeHavre, and 
for a general 'relaxation of technical minima to allow steeper 
gradients, tighter curves, and more level crossings at routes 
120 
royales. With these changes it was thought that the cost of 
construction could be reduced, to as little as-104 MF. At the 
end of May the company sent another letter requesting that its 
tariff be amended, with increases amounting to almost double 
for passenger fares, and a half more for goods. 
121 In addition 
to these changes, the company also asked at this time that the 
limit of ten per cent on its profits be removed and that it be 
given a guarantee of four per cent interest from the State. 
. 
Discussions with the government were delayed by a 
prolonged political crisis in the spring of 1839. Mol6's 
. 
Ministry was defeated in elections held in March and it was not 
'until mid-May that a new government was found to take office. 
Once in office however, the new ministry of Marshall Soult was 
sympathetic toward the several railway companies in trouble at 
. 
this time, and. within about three weeks an agreement had been 
reached with Chouquet, Lebobe et Cie. On the 10th of June 
Dufaure, the new Minister of Public Works, went to the Chambres 
to ask for changes in the cahiers des charges of several 
companies, beginning with the Paris-to-LeHavre. 
122 To let this 
and other companies fail, said the Minister, would be a 
"ddsastre public", for once they were disbanded it would be very 
difficult to form other companies to take their places. The 
government proposed to relax the cahier des charges of Chouquet, 
Lebobe et Cie to allow it to concentrate its resources upon a 
smaller amount of line; its total cash resources seemed adequate 
to complete the section to Pontoise. 
123 
While this construction 
continued, said the Minister, 
_ parliament 
could consider during 
the next session what additional financial aid should be granted 
to this and other companies. The government also asked for 
authority to alter, upon request from the company, the technical 
minima dictated by the cahier des charges. 
The response to these proposals, both inside parliament 
and out was largely unfavourable. ' A committee of the Chambre 
of Deputies reporting late in June124 recommended that the 
government's projet de loi be rejected. The company had failed, 
it said., 'to. meet any of its commitments, and the personal 
guarantees of its financiers had proved entirely worthless. 
Every reason for awarding-the concession in 1838 had disappeared, 
" the low tariff, the strong financial backing, the high technical 
standards, and an acceptable route. ' By no means therefore 
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should the company or the Administration now be given carte 
blanche to follow the cheapest route or to set its own technical 
standards. The committee believed that dissolution of this 
company would not have the effect either of seriously delaying 
construction of the railway, which was by no means assured by 
the p rojet de loi, or of discrediting the idea of railways 
financed and built by private enterprise. 
This view was supported in the Chambre of Deputies, 
though the motives for this were not entirely disinterested. 
For some months the supporters-of the valley route, and 
particularly those from Rouen, had been watching the company 
in its difficulties. Now they sa w"their opportunity to strike 
back, and possibly later to obtain a new concession for them- 
. selves. The most notable speeches to the Chambre were made by 
Victor Grandin, the member for"Elbeuf, who clearly stated that 
he spoke on behalf of the municipal council in Rouen. 
125 Ile 
attacked both the company and the Ponts et Chausseei. As for 
the first, capital had failed to materialize, he said, owing to 
the bad faith of the company's backers, who had refused to commit 
themselves to a liability of more than 25 per cent of their 
shares. The government had suggested that if the company proved 
unable to continue the railway beyond Pontoise, it should be 
purchased by the State and continued by the Ponts et Chaussees. 
To Grandin, and to many others, this was unacceptable; the State 
solution had been rejected by the Chambre in 1838, and more 
recent events had confirmed the correctness of that decision. 
As for the Ponts et Chaussees, Grandin stated that it had shown 
its incompetence first estimating the cost of the canals begun 
in the 1820s, and now in estimating the cost of railways. To 
pass the government's bill in the face of such incompetence, 
perhaps even culpability, would be to sanction "la plus grande 
scandale dont le pays ait encore ete temoin. " 
Opinion in LeHavre and Dieppe was understandably mixed. 
They did not want to see their company dissolved, but were 
concerned that with the proposed changes the company would not 
continue its line all the way to the sea. The municipal council 
in LcIlavre decided that it should support the ro'et de loi 
and sent the mayor to Paris once"again to lobby for its accept-. 
ance. 
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The Chambre of Commerce in Dieppe took the same line. 
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However; the deputy from Dieppe, the baron de Chasseloup-Laubat, 
122 
argued that the law of 1838 should be maintained unaltered, 
except for some changes in technical minima and in the tariff. 
If the company insisted upon breaking the railway into three 
sections, to be built consecutively, it should lose the conces- 
sion. 
l2ß 
Chasseloup-Laubat was the owner of 100 shares in the 
company, on which 20,000 F had been paid up, and his opinion 
was shared by a meeting of- shareholders held in LeHavre. 
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The Journal du Havre wrote early-in June on the other hand that 
the company should be granted most of its requests, including 
those to divide the line into-three parts. In another article 
on "Rouen et le Chemin de For" it struck back at supporters of 
the valley route, and at Rouen. 
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The interests of LeHavre 
and Rouen should be complementary it said, but instead 
on voit que la ville de Rouen poursuit ses desseins, et que 
le desorganization de la compagnie des plateaux, eile ne 
considcF3re qu'une occasion opportune de revenir a son plan 
de prediliction, plan dans lequel on ne peut c'empecher 
de penser quelle trouve ä la fois deux avantages, celui 
de concentrer chez eile tous les benefices quelle augure 
dune voie directe et exclusive de communications avec 
Paris, et celui plus intime d'en priver une ville quilui 
fait ombrage. 
A few attempts were made in the Chambre to defend the 
company, but the Government's bill was decisively rejected., 
31 
With this result the company was forced to dissolve, and at a 
meeting of shareholders held on the 11th of August 1839, it was 
unanimously agreed to wind it up. 
132 
According to Frissard, 
133 
the loss per share was about ten francs, but there is evidence 
that some of the smaller shareholders received nothing. 
134 
Can the company be blamed for its own failure? It was 
certainly responsible in large part for failure of the gov- 
ernment's p rojet de loi in 1839. By deciding to suspend construc- 
tion in November 1838 it had laid itself open to an attack from 
its rivals in Rouen. This kind of -inaction and evident lack of 
commitment to pursue the railway project despite obstacles were 
very useful to its enemies and discouraging even to its friends. 
Other companies in the same circumstances decided on a much 
bolder course of action; the'Paris-to-Orleans continued 
construction despite ri-sing costs and failure to realize a large 
proportion of its capital; so did the Strasbourg-to-Bale. Both 
of these companits later recovered from their difficulties and 
" retained their concessions. ' The company's directors were also 
accused of speculation, though they denied this. 
135 The company 
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committed other equally serious faults. The project was 
entered into in the summer of 1838 with insufficient care. 
Optimism had been unbounded, the Bourse was at its peak, and 
the company's backers were inexperienced. They might have 
obtained a higher tariff in 1838, and perhaps more liberal 
provisions for its amendment, but they refused them when 
offered. No attention seems to have been given to the question 
of construction costs in May and June 1838, and entire reliance 
was placed upon the estimates of Defontaine, by then four years. 
old. During the debate on the-company's concession in June 
1838, the deputy Billault had raised serious doubts about the 
usefulness of these estimates, in view of the higher prices 
and improved technical standards which had come about during 
. the intervening three years. 
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Cost estimates had been the 
most hotly debated subject in the committee of the Chambre of 
Peers, and the company's representatives had shown complete 
confidence in the ones they were then using. 
137 
As ra2porteur 
for the committee of the Chambre of Deputies in 1839, Billault 
once again pointed all these things out. 
138 
The price of iron 
had risen considerably since 1835, rails of thirty kilogrammes 
per metre instead of twenty kilogrammes had become standard, 
locomotives had become larger, and the. price of land for rail- 
ways had doubled. Some of the increases in costs were owing 
to underestimation by Defontaine of certain quantities required. 
The company for example, estimated it must build 288 bridges, 
mostly where the line crossed roads, instead of the 195 estimated 
by Defontaine; the company said it would need 250 locomotives 
each costing 35,000 F, whereas Defontaine had estimated a require- 
ment for only 130, costing only 25,000 F. So ended almost a 
decade's effort to establish a railway, the company a victim 
both of misfortune and its own mismanagement. Within a few 
months nothing more was heard of this sad affair, save complaints 
from the Oise boatmen about the obstruction caused by two 
derelict and abandoned bridge piers. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
A Decade of Growth and Change 
While the difficult search went on for answers to the 
railway question, transport through the Seine valley continued 
to grow and to change. To say that the large increase in 
goods traffic or the growing demand for"speed'which occurred 
in this decade made railway development a necessity would 
not be true, though they certainly gave it encouragement. 
Relative prosperity returned to France in the second half of 
the decade, and from about 1837 there was a large increase in 
goods traffic on the'Seine.. Rapidly increasing use of steam 
power both for inland and ocean transport was at the same time 
a strong indication of rising demand for speed. Though there 
were no further, innovations during this decade, those made 
during the 1820s were considerably expanded in scope and effect- 
iveness, and water-borne transport on the lower Seine responded 
to growing demand with a rising number of tugboats, chalands 
and steamers. Despite this response however, the'demand for 
speed was also reflected in_a very large increase in road 
traffic. The development. of faster water-borne transport, 
which might have helped to prevent this, was inhibited by the 
need for improvements to the Basso Seine, and in 1837 the first 
such improvements were begun. 
The Growth of Goods Traffic during the 1830s. 
Between 1833 when railways first received parliamentary 
attention and 1843 when the first trains ran to Rouen, goods 
traffic through the Seine valley to Paris increased by over 
half. Over the previous decade there had also been a consider- 
able rise in traffic, amounting perhaps to as much as 100 per. ' 
cent between 1820 and 1830, but this trend had been regularly 
punctuated by sharp peaks and troughs. . 
This is easily seen. in 
Figure 10 on the next page. Water-borne transport from Rouen 
to Paris rose to a peak of.. over 209,000 tons in 1830,1 but in 
the ensuing economic. crisis fell to only 146,000 tons in the 
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following year. After this the volume of goods traffic carried 
by water grew much more smoothly, without sharp peaks and 
troughs. After recovering quickly from-the crisis in 1831, 
it remained for several years on the same plateau it had 
reached at the end of the-twenties. Growth was strongly 
resumed in 1837, with traffic reaching a new plateau on which 
it remained into the mid-1840s. 
2 
Unfortunately there is too 
little known about road transport to describe the pattern of 
its growth, but it is likely to have been similar to that on 
the river. In 1836 the total water-borne goods traffic from 
Rouen to Paris was 170,600 tons; two years later in 1838 it 
had risen to 244,600 tons. The average annual upstream traffic 
in the five years before 1843 was slightly less than 250,000 
tons, compared with only 180,000 tons in the five years from 
1832 to 1836. The increase from one period to the next was 
almost forty per cent. 
Fed by the same demand, the growth of ocean shipping 
into the ports of LeHavre and Rouen showed a similar pattern. 
'From an inbound tonnage of about 280,000 tons in 1836,3 
LeHavre's overseas trade rose to over 400,000 tons in 1838. 
Coasting vessels inbound to the port of Rouen rose from only 
125,000 tons in 1835 to over 280,000 tons in 1838. Between 
1834 and. 1842, the tonnage of ships handled in the port of 
LeHavre approximately doubled, while that handled in the port 
of Rouen increased almost five times. This trend is shown in 
Figure 11 on the next page. Among the major ports of France 
this was very rapid growth; Bordeaux and Marseille for example, 
increased the volume of their shipping by only about fifty per 
cent in this period. The nature of the trade carried through 
the ports of Rouen and LeHavre seems to have changed in no 
fundamental way since the previous decade. LeHavre continued 
to be devoted principally to'overseas trade, serving a large 
hinterland which included Rouen,. the valley of the Seine, Paris 
and the north-east of France. With easy access to deep water, 
the average size of ships engaged in foreign trade entering 
her harbour was over 200 tons. Rouen remained confined to the 
European and domestic coasting trades, with the average size 
of ships coming to her port maritime still much less than 100 
tons. In both ports much the greatest increase in foreign 
trade since the mid-1820s had come from Great Britain; at 
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LeHavre the growth in shipping from. British ports between about 
1825 and 1840 had been almost thirteen times,. and at Rouen it 
was more than 26 times. At LeHavre there seems also to have 
been a large increase in shipping inbound from the Americas, 
which accounted for about forty per cent of the total in 1841. 
This large growth of goods. traffic reflected the return 
to relative prosperity which occurred in France in the later 
1830s. In this period, the same which experienced the first 
'railway boom', France emerged from several years of political 
and social crisis into a period of rapid though uneven economic 
growth. In the ten years from 1835 to 1844, the 'good years' 
; 
pof the July Monarchy, the growth rate of industrial production 
is estimated 
4, 
to have attained a record for the entire nineteenth 
century of 2.9 per cent, and that for the entire national economy 
2.3 per cent, likewise not exceeded until the present century. 
During the previous ten years the average annual rate of growth 
by the entire economy had been two per cent, and by the indus- 
trial sector 2.8 per cent, but this had been largely concentrated 
in the years from 1825 to 1830.5 Among the most quickly expand- 
ing sectors of the economy were the textile industry, leather 
manufacturing, metal processing, building and construction, 
and food processing and consumption, 
6 
and much of the river's 
increased traffic went to supply, these. Commodities which 
showed large increases in volume transported during the late 
1830s were construction timber and stone, metals (especially 
cast iron, wrought iron and zinc), skins, salt, oils and raw 
cotton. 
7 
Some industries using these commodities were growing 
at rates of over four per cent per year. Z\mong industrial raw 
materials cotton was perhaps the most important. Arrivals of 
raw cotton in LeHavre (principally from America) approximately 
döubled between the mid-1820s and the early 1840s, and almost 
50,000 tons of raw cotton were taken from the entrepöt de douane 
in LeHavre during 1840.8 A large proportion of this went only 
as far as Rouen, but more than 3,500 tons were carried as far 
as Switzerland. 
9 Most of this went by road, but in 1840 over. 
3,600 tons were carried up the Seine in chalands. 
Many of"these goods were very costly, and there is 
evidence during the 1830s of increasing'demand for more speedy 
transport. The most visible manifestation of this was a great 
increase in the use of steamers: The direct cost to shippers 
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of steam transport was generally higher than for the slower 
traditional means, and their willingness to pay this higher 
cost indicated a demand for the'speed provided by steamers. 
Evidence of greatly increased use of road transport leads also 
to this concludion. According to an article in the Journal 
des Economistes in 1845,10 the number of steamers registered 
in France grew from only 75 in 1833 to 229 in 1842. During 
the same period, as is shown in Table 5, the volume of goods 
carried by steamer in France grew almost thirty times to nearly 
one million tons. Of the 229 steamers registered in 1842,68 
were used exclusively for passengers, 117 carried both pass- 
'engers and goods, and 44 were. tugboats. At LeHavre the number 
of steamers registered in 1835 was eighteen, of which ten were 
tugboats. By 1842 the number of steamers had reached 31, of 
which only eleven were tugboats. 
11 
At Rouen the number of 
steamers registered rose from only five in 1835 to eight in 
1839 and twelve in 1843. 
Table 5 
Steamships and Steamshipping in France, from 1833 to 1842. 
Year Number of Number of H. P.. Passengers Goods 
Steamships Engines Carried (tons) 
1833 75 90 2,635 1,038,916 38,140 
1834 82 92 2,274 924,063 22,909 
1835 100 118 3,863 1,588,500 121,533 
1836 105 122 4,148 1,248,552 161,500 
1837 124 150 5,408 " 2,190,621 99,353 
1838 160 207 7,493 1,418,189 274,808 
1839 225 300 11,297 1,969,905 213,836 
1840 211 263 11,422 2,548,116 485,539 
1841 227 291 11,856 2,436,627 858,986 
1842 229 337 11,794 2,515,619 996,826 
During the 1840s the numbers of steamers registered in these 
two ports remained almost constant, and began to grow again only 
in the early 1850s. 
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The Expansion of Steam-Powered River Transport. 
There were no new innovations during this decade in 
water-borne transport, but in response to the growing demand for 
speed there was .a considerable expansion-of 
those made in the 
1820s. The expansion of chalandage, using steam powered tug- 
boats, was especially remarkable. Between 1830 and 1839 the 
number of chalands in use on the lower Seine more than doubled, 
from 30 to 68, and the number of tugboats grew from three to 
ten. 12 The first large expansion occurred early in the decade, 
encouraged no doubt by the large growth of traffic up to 1830. 
In 1831 and 1832 three new operations came into existence. The 
first of them was the Cie Maillet-buboullay, which had for some 
years already been running the Bateaux acceleres normands. They 
acquired two large tugboats, the VESUVE of 100 horsepower and 
the HEVA of 110; they also put-into operation four new chalands 
of 400 tons each, which because of their large size operated 
only between LeHavre and Rouen. 
13. 
The second new operation was 
that of Lecoq pere et Cie, with one powerful tugboat, the 
NEPTUNE of 140 horsepower, and two large chalands of 400 tons 
each. 
14 
During 1832 the Cie des Bateaux a-vapeur en fer 
converted the old AARON MANBY to a chaland by removing its 
machinery, and in the following years up to 1836 acquired five 
more. 
15 In 1834 Bertin et Cie, still the largest of these 
companies, added ten more chalands to their existing fleet of 
twenty. By 1835 there were six tugboats and 42 chalands in 
operation on the Seine, thirty of the chalands able to operate 
all the way to Paris. 
There was another large expansion in the number of 
chalands in the period of prosperity after 1836, and in addition 
to the existing operators, there were seven new companies formed 
in the late 1830s and early 1840s. These were Henry Expert et 
Cie, LeNormand-Baudu et Cie, Lahure et Cie, Vieillard et Cie, 
Lasson et Cie, Lamoisse et Cie, and the Cie Rouennaise. When 
the Cie des Bateaux a vapeur en fer was prematurely liquidated 
in 1839-- it had been formed in 1827 for a period of thirty 
years -its-four iron-hulled tugboats were taken over by two of 
these new companies. Henry Expert et Cie of LeHavre bought the 
old CASIMIR of 50 horsepower and four chalands, three of them 
newly built by Pierre LeMarchand at LeHavre, and the other 
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purchased from the Cie Maillet-Duboullay. 
16 
The remaining 
three iron-hulled tugboats'were'bought by the new Cie LeNor-- 
mand-Baudu of Rouen. 
17 
Expert et Cie were involved simply in 
chalandage and tugging of. sea-going ships in the Seine-Maritime. 
LeNormand-Baudu also had two newly constructed iron steamers 
which it used in the profitable passenger and goods trade 
between Rouen and Paris. A third newcomer, the Cie Lahure of 
LeHavre, used its new 100-horsepower steamer LE NATIONAL both 
for regular voyages to Trouville across the estuary from 
LeHavre, and for towing three small chalands between LeHavre 
-and Rouen. 
18 
Another company formed in the period, Vieillard 
et Cie, operated two tugboats', the HERCULE and the ALCIDE, both 
of 130 horsepower, between Rouen and LeHavre, and the HONFLEUR 
entirely within the harbour at LeHavre. By 1843 two more 
companies had come onto the scene, the Cie Lasson with its 
tugboat the QUILLEBEUF, and the Cie Lamoisse with its tug the 
ABONDANCE, 
19 but neither of these seem to have lasted for long. 
. Of the existing companies, Bertin remained the largest, with 
over thirty chalands in 1845. Maillet-Duboullay and Lecoq, 
who merged their operations in about 1842, had between them 
about ten chalands and four of the most powerful togboats. 
The amount of cargo carried by chalands seems to have 
grown fairly quickly, though it is impossible to tell by how 
much, since there are no statistics which separate goods 
carried by this means from the total. An approximate measure 
of the progress made by chalandage is provided in the daily 
reports of departures in the Journal du Havre. The number of 
departures by chalands from LeHavre grew from only 66 in all of 
1827 to over 400 in 1835; ten years later they had reached 
almost 500. This probably amounted to about two-thirds of the 
total traffic from LeHavre to Rouen and points beyond, 
20 
And 
about 35 per cent of all the traffic on the Seine-Maritime. 
Bertin was still much the most important operator in the mid- 
thirties. According to the same records, his chalands made 
about 300 trips from LeHavre to Paris in 1835,. and carried about. 
21 50,000 tons of goods; this was somewhat less than a third of 
the total in that year. Beyond Rouen most of these trips were 
still being made with relays of hörses. Early in this decade 
however, tugboats were used for the first time on the Basse Seine, 
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and strings of as many as three and four chalands"pulled by 
one tugboat are recorded. 
22. 
Low water levels however, kept 
tugboats out of the Lasse Seine during much of the year, and 
even by as late as 1846 about two-thirds of the total goods 
transported by water from Rouen to Paris was being pulled by 
horses. 
Several goods and passenger ste'amers also plied between 
LeHavre and Rouen, and in the late 1830s they were joined by 
others on the Basse Seine. In addition. to Delaistre et Cie, 
successor to the Cie'des bateaux ä vapour en fer, which operated 
four-ships up to 1839, two new companies began operations in 
1835. One of these was the Cie des paquebots ä vapeur sur la 
Seine (directeurs Jallant and Vieillard), with a capital of 
600,000 F. They operated two steamers, the SEINE and the 
NOIU/IANDIE, the latter a large vessel of 120 horsepower and over 
190 tons. 
23 
The other newcomer was the Compagnie Pauwels, an 
outgrowth of a Paris steamship-building firm which built for 
itself two ships, the PETITE EMMA and the LOUIS PHILIPPE. 
24 
These four new steamers were primarily passenger vessels, each 
capable of accommodating 100 passengers or more, but they also 
carried considerable amounts of cargo. The NORMANDIE for 
example carried'about 2,600 tons during the first six months of 
1835, and in 1844 it and the SEINE are reported to have carried 
a total of almost 46,000 tons between LeHavre and Rouen. 
25 
Beginning late in the decade the Cie Pauwels also operated two 
goods-carrying steamers between Rouen and Paris. These were 
the INDUSTRIE and the PILOTE, both of only 40 horsepower and 
fairly small capacity; with a draught of only lm. 20 when fully 
loaded they were able to operate on the Basso Seine during most 
of the year. 
26 
In 1839 the newly formed Cie LeNormand-Baudu 
began operation of the first of its three DORADES, shallow- 
draught vessels which carried both passengers and goods. Within 
only a few months these were joined by the first of two rivals', 
the ETOILES; the identity of the company which operated them 
is not known. Both ETOIES and DORADES had daily departures, 
from the end of the Paris-to-St. -Germain railway at Pecq to 
Rouen; stopping at nine places along the way, they were able 
to do the journey to-Rouen in ten or eleven hours, and back to 
'Paris in twelve or thirteen. 
27 
The amount of goods they carried 
is unknown, though owing to their'size and their primary role 
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in carrying passengers, it is unlikely to have been large. 
According to Charles Minard, 2'8 ingenieur-en-chef'des ponts et 
chaussces, about 70 per cent of the goods carried travelled 
only a small portion of the way between Rouen and Paris, and 
seem therefore to have been mainly messageries. Another steamer, 
the VAUBAN, owned by the Cie Pilte freres of Rouen, also op- 
erated between Rouen and Paris during these years, but its 
career seems to have been a short one. 
29 
An important development during this decade was the 
development of direct water-borne transport between LeHavre and 
: Paris. Almost all the goods shipped direct were carried in 
" chalands, and many of them were pulled by tugboats on the Basse 
Seine. Unfortunately once more, owing to lack of adequate 
statistics it is impossible to determine the amounts of goods 
involved. A considerable obstacle to this kind of operation 
was eliminated in 1835 when the old Pont des Bateaux at Rouen 
was replaced; it had separated the port fluviale from the port 
-maritime and was opened for the passage of river boats only 
twice daily. 
30 
In 1834 the operators of chalands had also 
been relieved of the requirement that their boats be inspected 
on every passage through Rouen; in that year the Minister of 
the Interior established a second commission d'inspection des 
navires at LeHavre. 
31 
There is no doubt that the impetus 
behind development of direct transport on the lower Seine was 
a rising demand for greater speed. One of the commodities 
most frequently carried from LeHavre to Paris was raw sugar, 
much of which had been formerly carried by road. Over 20,000 
tons of sugar were transported each year from LeHavre to Paris 
during the late 1830s. Coffee was another commodity to use 
direct transport, 
"though much of 
it seems still to have been 
carried by road. Much of the iron imported to LeHavre_was 
also shipped direct to Paris. 
The increasing use of steamers in the domestic and 
European coasting trades undoubtedly also acted as a stimulus 
to the development of faster direct transport from LeHavre to 
Paris. Faster and more costly sea transport would be wasted 
if inland transport were to remain almost as costly but much 
slower. In 1839 a total of 880 steamers of almost 145,000 net 
registered tons entered the port of LeHavre, sixty per cent of 
this tonnage coming from foreign ports. In both coasting and 
foreign trades about one-fifth of the ships coming to LeHavre 
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by this time were steamers. Very few steamers were yet 
venturing up the Seine to Rouen; except those coming only from 
LeHavre, and only about three per cent of the coastal shipping 
tonnage entering Rouen in 1839 was steam-powered. Leflavre 
therefore was the terminus for ocean-borne steamshipping, and 
onward connections to Paris had to begin there. looking 
through the pages of the Journal du Havre and its daily lists 
of chargements de navires, one sees that these ocean-going 
steamers carried a wide variety of high-value and perishable 
cargoes; three examples are given in Table 6. Many of those 
, calling at 
LeHavre were of foreign registry - increasingly so 
during the 1840s - but from early in the 1830s several French 
companies engaged in this trade. Of particular interest were 
several companies formed in LeHavre after 1834 to serve Hamburg, 
Amsterdam, Antwerp, Copenhagen, St. Petersburg, London and 
Lisbon. 
32 
Table 6 
Exam les of Steamer Cargoes Arriving in LeHavre in 1839 
(1) The AMSTERDAM of Albrecht et Cie arriving from Rotterdam 
on the 26th of February 1839, with a cargo of: 
5 caisses. de manufactures 
3 caisses de drogues 
1 boite de semences 
359 paquets de peaux 
1 caisse de challes 
2 caisses de vin 
300 lingots detain 
2 caisses de manufactures 
1 caisse de porcelaine 
9 balles de tabac 
1 fat de rubans 
8 caisses de manufactures 
2 caisses de Bois. 
2 caisses de livres 
1 caisse de laine 
612 lingots detain 
262 paquets de peaux 
1,900 fromages 
304 lingots detain 
1 caisse. d'instruments 
5 caisses de liqueurs 
14 flits d'huiles 
50 paniers de terra Japonica 
5 caisses de plantes 
4 baiies de tilleuls 
1 caisse de tableaux 
4 caisses de liqueurs 
6 caisses de ceruse 
3 caisses de ciseaux 
4 caisses de porcelaine 
1 boite de plumes 
31 caisses de cachou 
1 balle de cannel 
1 caisse dents d'elephants 
1 partie de bois 
8 barils de safranum 
2 caisses de gomme 
1 sac de pormes de terre 
16 caisses d'indigo 
2,186 bois de Bresil 
52 paquets de feulliards 
5 caisses de manufactures 
106 balles de tabac 
1 caisse de livres 
1 
. panier 
de saumons 
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(2) The OCEAN of the Cie Neustrienne pour les Bateaux a vapeur " 
entre LeHavre et Honfleur, arriving the 26th of February 1839 from 
Cherbourg with a cargo of: 
128 fflts de salaisons 
6 pores vivants 
2 barils de lard 
163 pots de lard 
18 stares de bois a bruler 
12 colis de marchandises 
12 caisses d'eau-de-vie 
1 fQt d'eau-de-vie 
(3) The PHENIX of the Cie des Paquebots ä vapeur entre LeHavrc 
et Londres (Cie Guillon), arriving the 2nd of March 1839 from 
London with a cargo of: 
1 caisse d'oranges 1 caisse d'historire naturelle 
3 ancres 7 sacs de laine 
15 morceaux d'appareils 2 rouleaux de for 
2 flats de vin 1 caisse do bois de lit 
1 balle de tissus 2 caisses de machines 
1 caisse de calicots 2 roues de machines 
Others were formed in 1837 to serve a number of French ports, 
in particular Bordeaux, Morlaix, Cherbourg and Caen, and by 
1840 there were steamer services operating out of LeHavre 
spanning the whole distance from St. Petersburg to Marseille. 
There had been concern in Rouen for a number of years 
that the growth of direct transport from LeHavre to Paris was 
doing permanent damage to the city's commerce. This fear was 
also reflected in the city's opposition to a railway by the 
plateau, indeed to any railway all the way to LeHavre. A 
, committee 
of the city council delegated to study the matter in 
1833 had stated that "depuis que les chalans remorques et les 
bateaux ä vapeur se sont emparres de la Basse-Seine, la naviga- 
tion des navires ä voiles, la seule qui puisse faire prosperer 
le beau port de Rouen, a toujours ete en decroissant. "33 It 
was imperative that this state of affairs should cease, it 
continued, or the 150 or so allcý. ges would be eliminated from 
the trade and the bateaux normands seriously threatened. The 
best way to prevent its growth was to make it easier for alle es 
to reach Rouen. A protest was made to the Minister of Commerce 
against a rise in rates for tugging alleges by Bertin, which 
"par son exhorbitance, interdit compl'Dtement le remorquage de 
ces batiments. "34 Suggestions were made by an assemblee 
commerciale"in March 1832,35 but against the advice of the 
Chambre of Commerce in Rouen, that tugging of all alleges 
of over fifty tons be made compulsory, in the hope that this 
would help, to convince captains that coming up to Rouen could 
be economic if it were done safely.. This suggestion drew 
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protests from LeHavre, 
36 
and it was rejected by the Conseil 
superieur de commerce. 
37 
At the same time, in amore positive 
vein, efforts were revived to organize atugging company based 
in Rouen and devoted exclusively to serving its interests. The 
commission of the city council delegated to study the problem 
reported its findings in August 1B33.38 It was certain that 
traffic in the port of Rouen could be increased by "un remorquage 
bien organise", and it recommended that the city give a subsidy 
of up to 30,000 F per year for three years to any company which 
would undertake to operate two tugboats exclusively for towing 
sailing vessels between LeHavre and Villequier. Although the 
'offer of a subsidy remained for two years, and was then raised 
to 20,000 F per year for six years, no suitable offers were 
received. 
Success was achieved in 1836, and without the aid of a 
subsidy. In the last months of 1835 a group led by Casimir 
Caumont, president of the Chambre of Commerce in Rouen, began 
forming a company to operate some tugboats, and since they did 
not wish to use the subsidy offered by the city, they asked 
that it be withdrawn. 
39 
By September 1836 the company's 300 
shares had been subscribed, and by January 1837 operations were 
being organized. 
40 
An old tugboat which had been built in 
Liverpool' in 1819 the fifty-horsepower PILOTIN, was acquired 
for 95,000 F, 
41 
and the hull and engines for a second to cost 
230,000 F were ordered. On the last day of 1837 the PILOTIN 
began operations, and by early in 1838 the second tugboat, the 
ROUENNAIS, was also in service. Though the company had been 
formed exclusively to serve the interests of Rouen by towing 
sailing vessels, it was 'not long before it was forced also to 
begin towing chalands. Chalands and sea-going vessels seem 
to have been necessary complementary sources of revenue; chalands 
could be towed when low water or the off season made towing of 
sea-going ships less remunerative. The revenue from towing 
sea-going ships was on the other hand necessary because of the 
very narrow margin of profit earned in towing chalands. The 
company therefore set about to provide a regular once weekly 
chaland of 300 to 400 tons from LeHavre to Rouen. For this 
purpose its capital was more than doubled from 325,000 F to 
725,000 F and another tugboat, the ROUEN of 160 horsepower (the 
most powerful yet to appear on the"Seine), and four large 
chalands were purchased. 
42 
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Road Transport Resumes its Growth. 
Despite the progress made by steam and by chalandago, 
a very large proportion of the total water-borne transport 
from Rouen to Paris was still being carried in large bateaux 
normands. Most operated accelere, but they were still hauled 
by horses and took seven to ten days to reach Paris. In 1845, 
according to Henry Maillet-Duboullay, 
43 
there were about 240 
of these boats in operation owned by about 160 bateliers; 
halage also occupied"seven to eight hundred men and fifteen 
to eighteen hundred horses. As goods traffic increased during 
the late 1830s, the price of water-borne transport also in- 
creased, by agreement among the bateliers according to one 
author. 
44 The rate per ton from Rouen to Paris rose to a 
maximum of over 24 F in 1842 and 1843, double what it had been 
a decade earlier. 
The apparent failure during the later 1830s of water- 
borne transport to provide sufficient capacity with adequate 
speed and at low cost created a rapid increase in the use of 
road transport. This was remarked upon by members of the extra- 
parliamentary commission on railways late in 1837.45 The 
initial effect of the innovations in water-borne transport 
made during the 1820s had been to reduce'greatly goods transport 
by road. After 1837 and 1838 however, traffic on Route Royale 
NO. 14 seems to have risen to a very high level. An in26nieur 
des routes charged with a project to improve a short section 
of the road between LeHavre and Harfleur remarked in 1843 that46 
nous n'avons cesse de dire que le roulage partant du Havre 
ou y arrivant est enorme, quo la masse des transports et 
des voyageurs a cru Bans une proportion peu commune, quo 
les voitures non soumises au pesage, allant au pas pour le 
roulage, ou au trot pour les voyageurs, au galop pour. les 
depeches so multiplient visiblement. 
During planning for the Paris-to-Rouen Railway in 1839 and 
1840, estimates were made from observation and from inspection 
of road haulage company records of the amount of road traffic 
between Rouen and Paris. It was estimated, perhaps somewhat 
over generously, that in 1839 188,500trnsof travelled between 
Rouen and Paris by road. 
47 
This was more than two and a half 
times-the amount carried by road in 1824. Over the same period 
water-borne traffic had increased by only about two-thirds. 
The only reäsonable. explanation for this enormous growth of 
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road transport, and the commission des chemins do for were 
agreed upon this, was that shippers were demanding greater 
speed, and water-borne transport could not provide it. 
Road transport was considerably improved during the 
1830s, as a result of improvements both to the roadway and to 
the vehicles which used it, and there is no doubt that this 
encouraged the growth of goods traffic by road. By the early 
1840s, there were more than a dozen commissionnaires de roulage 
at Rouen and seven at LeHavre. - Varnier freres, entrepreneurs 
des. transports by water and by-road, advertised departure of 
six daily services, and transport from LeHavre to Paris in the 
remarkably short time of only 36 hours. 
48 
This company is 
reported to have adopted four-wheeled wagons late in 1838, 
which were easier to unload, and so helped to reduce much 
complained of damage to goods, which seem often simply to have 
been flung out onto the muddy ground. The use of steam for 
road transport also had its advocates, but nothing came of this 
in France until much later in the century. 
49 
The condition of France's roads improved dramatically in 
the first half of this decade. The length of routes royales in 
good repair increased by half over a period of nine years, from 
about 17,000 kilometres in 1827. to about 25,000 kilometres in 
1836. This is shown in greater detail in Table 7.50 The 
condition of Route Royale NO. 14 between LeHavre and Paris 
followed this national pattern, the improvement being especially 
great between Rouen and LeHavre. The number of kilometres in 
good repair rose from only 68 in 1822 (out of a total distance 
of 210 kilometres), to 117 in 1836.51 As Table 8 shows, there 
was some deterioration of the stone-paved road closer to Paris. 
Table 7 
The State of Repair of Routcs Royales in France 
approximate years: 1822 1827 1836 
the state of repair (kilometres) 
en tat d'entretien . 
14,288'. 
. 
16,820 24,717 
ä reparer 14,348' 12,664 5,852 
a terminer 3,440 3,256* 3,942 
TOTALS 32,076 32,740 34,511 
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Much attention had been devoted during the decade before 
1836 to developing improved methods of road construction and 
maintenance. The first Statistiaue des Routes Royales prepared 
under IIecquey and published in 1824 had stimulated great interest 
in improving the country's roads, and led'to many years of 
discussion and experimentation on the methods used in their 
construction and maintenance. As had occurred in other areas 
of transport, Ponts at Chaussees engineers were sent abroad to 
other countries, especially to Great Britain, to study foreign 
methods. 
Table 8 
The State of Repair of Route Royale NO. 14,1822 and 1836 
(kilometres) 
d6partement etat d'entretien ä rg-parer ä terminer 
1822 3.572 1.800 
Seine 1836 2.991 2.381 
1822 52.566 3.177 
Seine-eb-Oise 
1836 38.950 15.800 
Eure 
Seine-Inf. 
1822 9.851 26.500 
1836 17.746 18.604 
1822 2.005 102.536 
1836 67.136 47.001 
1822 67.994 134.013 
Totals 
1836 116.823 83.786 
2.000 
0.930 
0.930 
2.000 
Although some progress seems to have been made during the 
Restoration on the initiative of individual engineers -there 
were many enthusiasts of British methods - real progress was not 
made until after 1832, when Legrand became Directeur-g6neral des 
Ponts et Chaussees. He took Ponts et Chaussees activity beyond 
the stage of discussion to that of widespread experimentation 
and implementation. Not only did he issue circulars like the one 
sent to all prefects in December 183352 pointing out the need 
for-extra care in maintaining the roads in winter, but also, 
with the aid of stability in the State's finances, began large 
'ý ý. 
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expenditures on road repair and construction. Annual ordinary 
expenditure on roads rose from about 20'MF during the Restora- 
tion53 to over 30 MF by the mid-1830s, and to over 40 MF in 
1847.54 A'law of May 1837 gave almost 115 MP for extraordinary 
works on roads, most of it for already existing roadway. 
There were changes during this decade in road-building 
technique. In 1833, on the suggestion of Berthault-Ducreux, 
one of the country's leading road engineers and a very prolific 
writer on the subject, the Ponts et Chaussees established a 
special service d'experiences to investigate new methods of 
construction and maintenance. 
55 Some experiments on a small 
scale had been carried out during the Restoration on the viability 
of using MacAdam's techniques in France. 
56 
After a visit to 
. Great Britain 
in about 1822 Navier had recommended57 that the 
Administration adopt some of the ideas of MacAdam, and build 
roads with greater attention to sub-soil and proper drainage, 
giving closer attention to daily maintenance; these things he 
. 
believed, would make for better road surfaces than the heavy 
foundations and great thicknesses of surface material then 
thought necessary in France. During the thirties research was 
carried on by engineers of the Ponts et Chauss6es, notably 
Navier, Emmery, Dupuit and Morin, with much of the results 
published in the Journal du Genie Civil and the Annales des Ponts 
et Chaussees. The culmination of all these activities was a 
circular to Prefects on the 25th of April 1839 entitled "Instruc- 
tions sur les methodes A suivre pour llentretien des routes", 
58 
which was repeated annually for a number of years. Roads in 
good repair, it stated, must at all times be kept clear of dust, 
which contributed to the formation of mud, and all materials 
removed from the road's surface must immediately be replaced. 
Expensive traditional methods of road construction, it continued, 
could in this way be avoided; "puisqu'avec des soins continus, 
on est maitre d'empecher quo les degradations ne descendent 
jamais au delä de quelques centimentres, ii s'ensuit quo ces 
grandes epaisseurs de chaussees qu-'on construisait autrefois 
sont completement inutiles.... " The average couche d'empierrement, 
according to Michel Chevalier, 
59 
was reduced froforty or fifty 
centimetres At the beginning of the century to only fifteen or 
twenty-by about 1840. One of the most important conditions of 
effective maintenance, said the circular, "c'est d'avoir toujours 
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sur la route une grande quantitc: de main d'oeuvre ä sa 
disposition. " Four years earlier, in 1835, the cantonniers had 
been reorganized to permit more labour-intensive maintenance, 
60 
and according to a Ponts et Chaussees engineer writing in 1845,61 
the proportion of labour to materials (by value) had increased 
by then to almost seven times what it had been before 1835. By 
1856 the Minister of Public Works was complaining that the 
principles outlined in the circular of 1839 were being applied 
to excess. 
62 
In the meantime however, including the few years 
before the railway was opened to'Rouen and LeHavre,. the evidence 
shows that progress was made in improving the condition of many 
roads. Attempts at the same time to reduce the maximum permitted 
vehicle weights however, were unsuccessful. An ordinance of 
1837 reduced the permitted maximum weight of the largest type of 
two-wheeled vehicle from 5,800 kilogrammes to 4,900 kilogramme-s, 
63 
but owing to pressure from the road transport operators, this 
measure was never put into effect. 
First Steps in Canalization of the Seine. 
One large obstacle preventing any further improvement 
in speed by river transport was the shallow and variable condition 
of the river; nothing could be done about this by the operators 
of river transport. There had been some improvement in speed 
during the thirties over performance in the previous decade, but 
there was, probably little potential for more as long as the 
vessels then in use remained. The average total round-trip 
voyage time for Bertin's chalands had been reduced from forty 
days in 1827 to about 25 days in 1835,64 and by the mid-thirties 
some trips were being made all the way to Paris with the aid of 
tugboats. Charles Berigny had pointed out in 183465 that to a 
great extent "les ameliorations obtenues... sont dues ä l'activite, 
au zt)le, et aux efforts des mariniers. " But, he said, little 
further improvement could be expected from the mariniers while 
the river remained in its existing condition, for "tout ce qu'ils 
pouvaient faire, ils font fait.... " Tow-paths for bateaux 
ha1Cs-remained in very poor condition, and all types of boats 
still encountered stretches of shallow water, portuis and narrow 
bridge arches. Most steamers still had for example to be pulled 
by hand through the narrow arches of the Pont de Vernon, until 
improvements were made tb it in 1844; 
66 Steamers operating only 
i 
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on the Basso Seine, like the DORADES, the INDUSTRIE and the 
PILOTE had very shallow draughts, from Om-. 80 to lm. 20 fully 
loaded, but consequently had very small engines, only forty 
horsepower for all these three boats, and. small capacity. 
67 
Bertin's three REMORQUEURS however, had engines of 80 to 100 
horsepower and drew over lm. 80. With the depth of water falling 
to less than a metre in some places for up to six months of the 
year, operation of tugs was made rather difficult. 
Natural waterways like the Seine had for many years 
been neglected while resources were directed toward building 
canals. In the early 1830s however, there was an important 
change in policy by the Ponts et Chaussees. First, the State 
became much more directly involved in improvement of waterways. 
. For some time it had been evident that the cost of building the 
canals begun in 1821 and 1822 would be much greater than estimated, 
and by the end of 1832 the State had spent 27 MF to cover the 
excess. At the same time it had also become evident that the 
new waterways provided by this programme, of which about half 
were by then in operation, were far from being a complete trans- 
port, system. This could be obtained only by improving the many 
equally important connecting natural waterways. In 1833 there- 
fore, while the government of Marshall Soult asked the Chambres 
for another 62 MF to wind up the still uncompleted canals, it 
also began to study ways to improve navigation on a number of 
rivers. It was at this time also, it will be recalled, that 
a fund of 500,000 F was obtained for the first systematic study 
of railways. 
This was the beginning of an immense programme of trans- 
port development during the July Monarchy, with total public 
expenditure reaching almost 1,300 MF by the end of 1847.68 The 
first concrete manifestation of the hew policy was a group of 
bills presented to parliament in 1835 proposing concession of 
one major railway, the Paris-to-LeHavre, and improvements to 
several natural waterways. Subsequent legislation approved six 
million francs to be applied to five important rivers. Further 
proposals for railway development, it will be recalled, came in 
1837, and in the same year the government obtained an additional 
71 MF for several rivers. 
69 
Further legislation in almost every 
year up to 1,848 brought the total for improvement of waterways 
(both canals and rivers) to. over 375 MF. Though more than half 
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of this was spent on artificial waterways, the imbalance in 
their favour was largely corrected. Whether for fear of competi- 
tion between them development of both waterways and railways 
should continue together hardly became a live issue during the 
1830s. Thiers was quite accurately expressing the prevailing 
belief when he stated in 1835 that70 
La creation des chemins de for est loin... d'etre exclusive du 
perfectionnement des voies navigables. Los chemiris do for 
sont destines surtout au transport des personnes et d celui 
des marchandises d'un prix clove; mais la voie des canaux 
et des rivieres sera generalement preferee pour les matieres 
encombrantes.... Nous devons donc... poursuivre avec ardeur 
1'etablissement de ces deux modes de communication quit sont 
appeles ä rendre des services distincts.... 
Even in 1838, when the railway boom was at its height, Michel 
Chevalier warned-that 
71 
il faut que nous gardions de proceder avec precipitation 
et de toutes parts ä 11execution des chemins de fer, et que 
nous devons reserver ä la navigation la majeure partie des 
fonds que nous pouvons actuellement consacrer aux travaux 
publics. 
In September 1833 the Directeur-general des Ponts et 
Chaussees once more asked Charles Berigny to draft a proposal 
for canalization of the Basse Seine. It was just ten years 
since Becquey had given him the same assignment. The technology 
of canalization had advanced very little however, in the mean- 
time, and although since 1829 several schemes had been proposed, 
no plan had been devised which was clearly acceptable both to the 
engineers and to the existing users of the river. Therefore, if 
any progress was to be made toward improvement by canalization, 
some new idea or invention was required. Though the plan 
proposed by Berigny was not a satisfactory one, his report, which 
he submitted to the Conseil-general des Ponts et Chaussees in. 
January 1834,72 provided an admirably thorough examination of 
the technical problems needing solution. The essence of the 
problem of course was to raise seasonally low water levels at 
certain places on the river to a depth sufficient for the 
largest boats in common use to navigate easily with full loads 
at all times. Berigny suggested that the objective should be 
to obtain a minimum depth of two metres at lowest water, called 
etiage. In order however, to protect existing water-borne 
transport, the system devised to raise water levels had to meet 
a number of conflicting requirements. First, while controlling 
the flow of water to increase available depth at etw, it must 
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also permit uno1structed passage in the main river channel at 
times when adequate water levels existed naturally. It must not 
increase the speed of the current or otherwise adversely affect 
the river's flow, either upstream or downstream from any fixtures 
which might be built. It must be simple to operate and to main- 
tain. It must be strong enough to resist damage from heavy 
, peak water flows and from ice. And lastly, it must also be 
reasonably economical to build. 
The techniques for meeting all of these requirements did 
not yet exist. Indeed, there had been no really important 
advances in the techniques for canalization of rivers since the 
sixteenth century. The first canalization of any river in France 
had taken place on the river Lot in the thirteenth century. 
. The method used was the construction of a partially moveable dam, 
a structure of masonry with openings in which were inserted a 
varying number of horizontal or vertical slats, or gates, later 
known as 'portes marinieres'; these were designed to allow 
passage both of a small amount of water and of boats, and to 
maintain an artificially deep channel upstream from the dam. 
However, this system had a number of faults. The narrow openings 
of the 2o rtes marinieres increased the speed of the current as 
it flowed through and made upstream passage of boats very 
difficult. The narrow outflow through the portes marinieren 
increased the danger of damage to them from seasonal crues and 
from ice, of which there was a considerable amount in the Seine 
during most of the nineteenth century. Finally, the accelerated 
flow of the current caused deposits of sand and gravel, which 
evantually blocked the channel. Several of these problems were 
eventually solved, at least in part, by the introduction of 
simple locks. This had occurred during the reign of Francois 
ter, and was the last important advance in the technology of 
canalization before the mid-nineteenth century. 
73 
The first 
lock in France was built on the Ourcq in 1528, and the first 
river to be canalized with a combination of locks and dams was 
the Vilaine, where work was begun in 1539 and completed in 1585.74 
Attempts had been made at canalization by other means, for example, 
by restricting and directing a river's channel with fixed jetties 
perpendicular to the shore, but this had produced discouraging 
results. 
75 
The system of canalization proposed by Berigny for the 
Basso Seine was a well-known one, using locks and dams combined 
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in much the same way as they had been on the Vilaine. He 
proposed a series of twelve dams and locks, one just downstream 
from each of the haut-fonds or pertuis between Rouen and Paris. 
Each dam would consist of masonry pillars-spaced across the 
river, forming flues or pertuis76 about ten metres in width; 
each pertuis would be equipped with a sort of gate or poutrelle 
built in sections so as to be variable in height or width. At 
one end of each dam would be a lock. The dam would raise the 
water level upstream, and could be gradually opened as the 
natural water level rose, thus allowing a greater free flow and' 
maintaining a fairly constant water level. Berigny estimated 
that the cost of such a system for the whole Basso Seine would 
be about 17.5 MF. 
The Conseil-general des Ponts et Chauss6es was undecided 
about Berigny's proposal. It was sent first to a committee of 
the Conseil, which eventually reported its recommendations in 
March 1835.77 The committee examined not only Bdrigny's proposal, 
but also several others. Among these were two by Coic and 
Duleau78 and by Charles Monier; 
79 both however, were rejected 
as too costly and unlikely to be successful. Though they 
recommended some changes, the committee agreed in principle with 
the system proposed by Berigny. At two places where canalization 
was likely to be especially difficult, Chatou and Maisons- 
Laffitte, they suggested that short sections of lateral canal 
be built; they also recommended that the tow-paths along the 
whole of the Basse Seine be improved or rebuilt, at an estimated 
cost of one million francs. The committee's recommendations 
were not however, accepted by the full Conseil, and discussion 
there went on inconclusively through ten meetings from April to 
July. Five members of the Conseil were willing to accept some 
type of damming, but four were quite opposed to any. 
80 
Some 
of those opposed would have preferred a system using short 
sections of lateral canal to by-pass every shallow section of 
river, or simply a single lateral canal all the way from Rouen 
to Paris. On the other hand, one member, Mallet, who had worked 
with Defontaine on the railway and was also a deputy for the 
Seine-Inferieure, was opposed to any kind of canal or canaliza- 
tion which would involve locks. This was known to be the 
attitude of the river's users. Even among those who were in 
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favour of Berigny's system, there was disagreement as to the 
type--of dams to be used. Some favoured dams like those recently 
built on the Oise,. which would be more fixed, solid and less 
susceptible to damage. It was objected however, that these 
would restrict the flow of water into fewer and narrower pertuis, 
speeding up the rate of flow, causing silting and altering the 
water's flow upstream. The. Conseil was agreed only that a 
minimum seasonal depth of only lm. 60 rather than two metres as 
suggested by Berigny would be sufficient between Paris and Rouen, 
but that any locks constructed, should be capable of. deepening 
to two metres. By mid-July it was evident that the Conseil- 
g6neral had reached an impasse, and that some kind of compromise 
or 'second best' solution would eventually have to be worked out. 
- In the event a way was found out of this impasse almost 
within weeks. The way out was a new type of moveable dam, seen 
later to have been a very important technical advance. Some 
credit for this rapid solution to a difficult problem must go 
to Legrand, Directeur-general and ex officio chairman of the 
Conseil-g6neral. He had very ably provoked and guided the 
discussions of the Conseil, and had remained sceptical of any 
system of canalization which would inhibit passage. of boats 
during the high-water season when dams and locks were unnecessary. 
While ensuring therefore that such an unsatisfactory system was 
not imposed upon the unwilling users of the river, he also 
encouraged the development of innovations which might lead to a 
solution being found. Late in August 1835 Legrand brought to a 
meeting of the Conseil-general two Ponts et Chaussees engineers, 
one a very well-known authority on hydralics, the baron Riche do 
Prony, the-other an unknown ingenieur de service, Charles Poiree; 
each had a new system of dams-to offer. Prony's proposal was 
rather sketchy, and does not seem to have aroused much interest. 
Much more-interest was shown in the proposal by Poiree. Charles 
Poiree had been chief engineer on the Canal du Nivernais since 
1826, where he had been working since late in 1823.81 During 
1834 he and awcollegue, Chanoine, had built a dam of entirely 
new cdnception on the-Carial du Nivernais near Basseville, where 
it crosses the Yonne. 
82 In essence*Poiree's invention, which 
came to be called the. 'barrage a fermettes mobiles', was very 
simple. it made ingenious use of iron in*the form of fermettes 
i 
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or light rectangular frames which could stand upright in the 
river stream, parallel to the direction of flow. The base of 
each fermette was attached to the river bed so that-it could 
turn freely on this axis. During low water, the fermettes would 
be kept upright, a wooden walkway laid across the top and the 
water held back by vertically positioned wooden planks or 
aiguilles. As high water season approached the aiguilles could 
be removed one at a time, and finally the walkway removed and 
the fermettes rotated on their axes to lie flat on the river' 
. bottom. The system had been'-very simple to operate and very 
-rigid against quite heavy--flows, of water. Furthermore, it had 
been quite inexpensive to build. The simplicity and great success 
of the invention had aroused the interest of other engineers, 
and, late in July1835 a committee of them had visited the dam 
site-to observe its operation. It seems then to have come to the' 
attention of Legrand, who was particularly attracted to it. 
Legrand recommended-it enthusiastically to the Conseil-g6neral 
for application on the Seine, where it would allow completely 
free passage of vessels during high water. During two meetings 
over the following week Poiree further elaborated upon his 
system; there was some disagreement however, as to whether such 
a system would be as efficient in raising water levels as would 
that of-BErigny. Finally it was agreed that both systems should 
be-tested on the, Seine. Public inquiries would be held to 
determine the details of construction for Bdrigny's dams at 
Poissy and Andresy, and Poiree was asked to prepare a draft 
project for the whole Basse Seine from Rouen to Paris. 
83 With 
these and other steps taken, the Conseil-general prepared the 
way fora final decision, perhaps during the following year. 
Public inquiries on proposals for the Seine opened in 
December l835"and fully confirmed expectations. As Legrand had 
reminded the Conseil-general on several occasions, the river's 
users were unanimously opposed to any dams or locks which would 
give anything less than completely unhindered navigation during 
the high water season. Many of the public bodies consulted 
during the inquiries also-remarked that construction of locks 
of almost. -any dimensions would restrict future development of 
river boats. '"Il vaudrait-mieux cent fois, " stated the Chambre 
of Commerce in Rouen, 
84 "conserver au fleuve sa liberte native 
avec ses inconvenients-actuels et mdmentanes, que de le captiver 
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dans des liens dont l'avenir ferait ä coup sür ddplorer l'idee. " 
The Chambre of Commerce in Elbeuf described Berigny's proposal 
as an "escalier nautique", an absurdity to which it was opposed. 
Commissions of inquiry in Rouen and in Versailles both rejected 
B6rigny's proposal, and only under protest did they answer 
questions put to them by their respective prefects about lock 
dimensions and other technical details. What the chambres of 
commerce and commissions of inquiry wanted were dredging of 
dangerous haut-fonds, improvements to tow-paths, construction of 
dykes, jetties and dams to close'off secondary arms of the river, 
enlargement of some bridge arches, and canaux de derivation at 
a few places. The Chambre of Commerce in LeHavre was concerned 
, also 
that any improvements should accommodate steam tugs, and 
it asked that the depth at low water be increased to 2. m50; it 
did not mention the tow-paths. 
85 On the other hand, the Chambre 
of Commerce in Rouen began its reply by stating that any improve- 
ments to the Seine should begin with the Seine-Maritime, essential 
to retention of ocean-going shipping at Rouen. 
86 
Any improvement 
of the Seine from Rouen to Paris while it remained unimproved 
from Rouen to LeHavre, it said, would threaten to by-pass the 
port of Rouen almost as much as would a railway by the plateau. 
With this response from the public inquiries, the 
decision to adopt-Poiree's invention was almost inevitable. His 
completed avant- ro was submitted to Legrand in February 
1836,87 and the entire dossier was sent to Cavenne, 'rapporteur 
on the project to the Conseil-general, nine months later. Cayenne 
submitted his report88 at the beginning of December 1836, and 
after four more sesssions of the Conseil a final decision was 
reached. The Conseil recommended to the Minister that Poiree's 
system be given a trial between Bezons and Marly, where it 
would provide a way around the old erp tuffs de la Morue, probably 
the most dangerous and difficult passage on the river. For this 
purpose, and to continue the project, an annual amount of 600,. 000 F 
F should be requested from parliament. 
89 This recommendation 
was accepted by the government, and-the project for the Seine 
included in the large programme of'transport improvement presented 
to parliament in the spring of 1837. 
Four bills were presented for improvements to waterways, 
and the programme also included several'other bills on railways 
and harbour improvements. While those for railways met with 
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Figure 12. The 'Barrage ä Fermettes Mobiles'. 
(From Le Journal de 1'industriel et du 
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great opposition and were eventually abandoned at the end of 
the session, the river improvement bills were quickly and easily 
passed with very little discussion. and very little opposition. 
90 
The total amount voted for waterways in 1837 was over 71 MF, of 
which four million were for the test of Poir6e's scheme on the 
Basse Seine. As well as the project at the ertuis de la Morue,. 
this credit had also to cover enlargement of bridge arches at 
Meulan, Vernon and Pont de l'Arche, dredging at several points, 
and construction of filled-in crossings from islands to shore to 
reduce the number of ferry crossings by tow horses. - Tow-paths 
were also to be improved. There was a further 2,170,000 F granted 
for the upper Seine and the Yonne, and of these amounts, totalling 
over 6 MF, 200,000 F were to be spent in 1837 and 1,680,000 F in 
1838.91 
With his project now embodied in legislation, Poiree was 
given every facility to carry it quickly through into effect. 
The deadline for completion was the 1st of January 1840. Already 
in September 1835, only a fortnight : after being asked to submit 
a plan for the Seine, he had been raised to the grade of ing6nieur- 
en-chef de la premiere classe, and a month later on the 10th of 
October 1835 had been given indefinite leave from his post in 
the Nievre to make a detailed on-site examination of the lower 
Seine and to prepare his draft project. In July 1837, as the 
legislation was'being passed, the Ponts et Chaussees set up a 
new organization to conduct its various projects on all parts of 
the Seine, dividing it into four sections from the Aube to 
Lefavre; from Paris to Rouen was the 3e Section, from Rouen to 
Leilavre the 4e Section. In October 1837 Poir6e was put in over- 
all charge of the Service de la navigation de la Seine, and in 
the following July raised to the grade of ingenieur-en-chef 
directeur. 92 Construction was completed almost on schedule. A 
contract for construction of the. e i. mobile at the Morue seems 
to have been let as early as March 183793 before the legislation 
had even been passed. The epi at the Morue was completed during 
1838, and with obstructions caused by the old pertuis removed, 
it was opened for use in November 1839. It worked very well, 
and the most dangerous place on the old Seine eliminated. The 
derivation at Marty was completed and given over to use in July 
1840. With the numerous other works. done nearby, the total 
expenditure up to the end of 1840 was 2,059,823 F. 
94 
152 
There is no doubt that Poiree's invention of the barrage 
A fermettes mobiles was of major importance, 
95 for without it 
satisfactory canalization of the Seine would have been long 
delayed. Before the invention could be used on the lower Seine 
however, a considerable work. of adaptation was necessary. In 
essence though, the system remained very simple. It had two 
elements. In order to avoid difficult passages of haut-fonds 
and rapids, Poiree proposed to divert the navigable channel 
through secondary arms of the river; in the few places where 
this was not possible there were easily accessible flat banks, 
and sections of lateral canal could be built. In his report of 
the 18th of February 1836,96 Poir6e'gave credit for this idea to 
the engineers Coic and Duleau who had originally suggested this 
in 1830, and also to inspecteur de la navigation Charles Monier, 
who had raised the idea in a slightly different form in 1832. 
In each of these. derivations would be placed submersible locks, 
built so that at periods when the natural water level exceeded 
. 1m. 60, the river would simply flow over their gates; at these 
times of course boats would be using the main channel. There 
remained the problem of maintaining sufficient depth in the 
channel and through the locks at low-water times; it was this 
which had prevented implementation of the-proposals of Coic, 
Duleau and Monier, and it was here. that Poirde's invention came 
in. However-, whereas in its previous application on the Yonne 
it. had taken the form of a complete dam, the volume of flow in 
the Seine was much larger at etia e and only an epi or jetty 
was required. This pi would project into the main channel 
from the shore on which was located the derivation; as the water 
level fell, more of the fermettes would be raised. Maintenance 
of the proper minimum depth of lm. 60 would require simply a 
daily check and adjustment of fermettes and aiguilles by the garde 
¬ pi. During low water, boats going upstream would use the locks, 
those going downstream would pass by the far end of the pi. An 
opening of at least 20 to 30 metres would be left at all times 
on the opposite shore, and steamers could use this for passage 
in both directions. At high water seasons, the epi would be 
entirely lowered, and the river would return to its native state. 
It was an ideal solution, meeting all requirements. 
S 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Building the Railway to' the'Sea, 1840 to 1850 
During the 1840s railways were built throughout the 
length of the lower Seine valley. ' An attempt to build the 
whole system at once had failed., so the-task was now undertaken 
in three overlapping stages by three closely related companies, 
with the rails reaching Rouen in 1843, LeHavre in 1847 and 
Dieppe in 1850. The role of foreign capital, technique and 
even labour was considerable at all three stages, and though 
small but comparison, the role of local initiative and local 
capital was not insignificant. The corner stone in the edifice 
was the line, from Paris to Rouen, where the largest potential 
volume of passengers and freight, and the best prospect of 
solid financial success were to be found. Creation of these 
and other railways may be decomposed into three separate 
processes. The first was organizing a company grouping together 
sufficient capital to build the railway, and concurrently 
obtaining parliamentary sanction for a concession and for any 
required assistance from the State.. The second was constructing 
the railway and equipping it with rolling stock. The third, 
overlapping with the second, was realizing the capital funds 
subscribed by participants in the company and providing for 
extra funds should they be needed. 
Organizing Three Railway Companies. 
Within weeks of rejection by the Chambres of the proposed 
changes to the cahier des charges of Chouquet, Lebobe et Cie, 
and some time before it was formally dissolved, a new company 
was being organized to take its place. The initiative came 
from a hitherto unimportant firm of Paris bankers, Charles 
Laffitte, Blount et Cie, the first partner in which was a 
nephew of Jacques Laffitte. The elder Laffitte had been a 
supporter of the Riant Cie since its beginnings*in 1834, and 
like Riant's, this company proposed following the valley route. 
It also proposed to built its line only'as far as Rouen. Unlike 
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Riant, Laffitte and Blount did not refuse assistance from the 
State', and late in 1839 they were given a tentative offer by 
Dufaure, Minister of Public Works, 
1 
of 6 MF toward the company's 
capital; a short time later this was raised to 16 MF, or about 
one-third of the total required capital. 
For several months the activities of Laffitte and Blount 
seem to have attracted little attention in France. Their main 
area of activity during the rest of 1839 was Great Britain. 
Determined to fortify themselves against the weaknesses of the 
capital market in France, they. decided to search for stronger 
'foundations abroad; the Morning Post of London, it will be 
recalled,. had commented the year before that foreign capital 
would be needed. These two men were ideally suited to pursuing 
, such a 
'foreign strategy', and they were to play a considerable 
role during the next decade in obtaining British capital for 
French railways. Blount was a native of Staffordshire and the 
'firm were bankers for the British Embassy and one of the 
principal agents in Great Britain for the sale of French rentes. 
2 
Great Britain moreover was very open to such a strategy. As 
Britain had become absorbed in her own 'railway mania' of the 
1830s, the sale, of rentes had declined, but British investors 
showed considerable interest in early French railways like the 
Paris-to-St. -Germain. 
3 
By 1839 the rate of railway company 
formation in Britain had fallen very low, 
4 
and British investors 
seem to have been looking abroad for new investment opportunities. 
British investment in continental industry was certainly not 
new, but this initiative by Laffitte and Blount was the first 
direct appeal by a railway for British funds on such a large 
scale, and it resulted in the first large British investment in 
French railways. 
Early in. August 1839 Edward Blount travelled to England, 
visiting a number of people interested in railways in London, 
Manchester and in Liverpool, which at that time was the centre 
of the railway capital market in Great Britain. 
5 In Liverpool 
he saw Charles Laurence, chairman. of the Liverpool and Manchester 
Railway, "and John Moss, a banker and one of the founders of 
the Grand Junction Railway. ' At the same time efforts were 
directed toward those with the greatest interest in the success 
of a railway to LeHavre, the owners of the London and South- 
western-Railway whose terminus was at Southampton. In the first 
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days of August Charles Laffitte went to London and. appeared at 
a Board of Directors meeting. of the L. S. W. R. 
6 
and persuaded them 
to support his enterprise. A few days later on the 7th of 
August Laffitte spoke to the shareholders of the L. S. W. R. during 
their general meeting. 
7. 
He made'no direct appeal to them at 
this stage for funds, but only for the services of an engineer. 
The influencial Board of the-L. S. W. R., including its chairman 
Sir -John Easthope, M. P. and publisher of the Morning Post, 
decided to back Laffitte, and within weeks two. of its members, 
William, Chaplin and William Reed;. accompanied the company's 
engineer-Joseph Locke to France to look over the proposed route 
and, estimate the line's potential traffic. The results of 
their investigations were very encouraging; Chaplin said "the 
traffic between Paris and Rouen surprised him, that it far 
exceeded the traffic upon any route in this kingdom'. ' 
8 
At their 
next general meeting on the 29th of February 3.840 the directors 
recommended-Laffitte's company as a worthwhile investment, and 
furthermore, "highly advantageous as (a feeder) to the traffic" 
of the. L. S. W. R.. 
9 
The growing impetus behind this attempt to organize a 
new company to build a railway by the valley, and only to Rouen, 
could not fail to excite opposition from LeHavre and from Dieppe. 
Indeed, the battle of valley versus plateau had been rejoined 
with letters and, petitions, even before dissolution of Chouquet, 
Lebobe et Cie. 
10 
Although it seems that the Chambre of Commerce 
in Rouen had been active in Paris for some time in support of 
Laffitte and Blount, serious lobbying by LeHavre and Dieppe 
began only after parliament reconvened in December. Early in 
January 1840 LeHavre re-activated its railway committee, and 
within a month it sent a message to Dufaure, pressing once again 
for construction of the plateau route and its immediate continua- 
tion all the way to LeHavre; to, avoid another failure, the 
committee also insisted that the State should finance and build. 
the line. 
11 
At, the same time the Municipal Council of Rouen 
wrote, to Dufaure asking him to give , the new company his fullest 
support. 
12 
As the contest came closer to its conclusion, lobbying 
became more intense, and upon receiving reports from the L. S. W. R. 
general meeting in February, the railway committee in LeIiavre 
once more decided*to send delegates to Paris. 
13 
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As in 1837 and 1838, LeHavre was forced onto the defensive, 
but this time with even fewer weapons to hand. Extension of 
the railway to LeHavre was of course very important, if not 
vital to the town's economy, and the havrais still believed that 
the only economical means of doing this was a plateau line. 
They did not accept the conclusion reached by the Ponts et 
Chauss6es, in 1838ýthat an extension of the valley line to 
LeHavre, was =feasible. Since after the collapse of Chouquet, 
Lebobe. et Cie, they lacked any way of building. the plateau line 
themselves, their. only resource was simply to prevent Laffitte 
and Blount from building one by the. valley. They refused to 
believe the reports. of agreement between Dufaure and Laffitte 
and Blount, and when on the 1st of March comte Jaubert was 
appointed Minister of. Public Works in the new Thiers Ministry, 
they were greatly encouraged. "Nous avons dans M. Jaubert, " 
wrote Clerc, one. of the delegates, "un juste appreciateur des 
plateaux". 
14 
With Jaubert as Minister they trusted that success 
for Laffitte and Blount. would be impossible. Jaubert being a 
convinced: ädvocate of the plateau route, it was thought unlikely 
that he would give any. financial aid to a project for the valley. 
Since Laffitte and Blount could not manage without assistance 
from the State, they would be forced to withdraw. By continual 
lobbyingýof Jaubert, Thiers, and other influential deputies, 
the delegatesiClerc and Delaroche, and Mermillod their deputy, 
hoped to hold Jaubert to the plateau and defeat Laffitte and 
Blount. 
Negotiations between Jaubert and the prospective new 
company however, had soon progressed far beyond the ability of 
LeHavre"to affect their outcome. Jaubert was indeed an advocate 
of the plateau,, but other issues weighed far more heavily in 
his mind than this. -Serious discussion of railways had been 
going on for more than five years, and very little had been 
accomplished; the most wide-spread attitude was well summarized. 
in a few words. by, Michel Chevalier: "il faut ä tout prix sortir 
de la honteuse inaction oü nous somrmes. "15 A plateau line might 
be preferable in the"long run, but-in the Minister's words, "une 
compagnie (existe) et... on ne (pout) priver plus longtemps la 
3ieme ville du Royaume d'un chemin de fer. "16 For several reasons 
therefore, Laffitte and"Blount received-a'sympathetic hearing 
from the new Ministry. * They appeared to have solid financial 
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backing and the technical competance to. go ahead quickly with 
the project; Jaubert was entirely reassured on these points by 
Guizot, the Ambassador in London, 
17 
and by several meetings with 
the company's-British and French promotors. The participation 
of British capital was another large attraction. Although 
Jaubert. did not at first accept the agreement reached with 
Dufaure, `he was forced eventually to come round to similar terms. 
Negotiations went on from March to May with interventions from 
several directions. Guizot wrote on behalf of the British 
promotors, warning that without certain concessions, "you will 
. have-no concurrence from the English capitalists, and... this 
great affair will break down once more. 1118 The city of Rouen 
too kept up its strong lobby, and suggestions were made, and 
later acted upon, that financial aid be given to the company by 
the city. 
19 
At first Jaubert refused to grant the extra 10 MF 
promised by Dufaure, except on condition that it be used for 
construction of an extension to LeHavre. The company seems 
, 
however, to have-insisted, as it later stated to the Chambre of 
Peers,, that such an enterprise "aurait paru trop colossale, et 
n'aurait pu attirer aussi bien les capitaux, dent la masse 
devait"titre plus grande, et dont la confiance aurait diminu6e. "20 
As a second best, the Minister suggested that in order to 
facilitate eventual extension to LeHavre, the company should 
build a branch from Pont de 1'Arche to Beauvoisine, but he was 
soon forced to retreat from this position as well. A final 
agreement including provisions for financial assistance, was 
reached on the 17th of May 1840.21 Approximately equal propor- 
tions of the company's total capital would be obtained from the 
State, from private shareholders in France and from private 
" shareholders in Great Britain. Hearing a few days earlier from 
Casimir de 1'Espee, deputy from the Meurthe and a leader of 
the company, that an agreement was imminent, the havrais were 
very alarmed. To prevent such an agreement, which they said 
would be "une-sorte-de haute trahaison contre les vraies 
int6rets de 1'etat et du pays", 
22 
their deputy Mermillod organize 
a lastýroünd of appointments, with Jaubert and Thiers at the 
top of his list.. Even Lebobe, who seems to have been trying to 
revive his company, was invited along 'in a desperate attempt to 
offer an alternative. 
Jaubert however, was determined not to let this project 
fall victim to local rivalry and the old contest of valley versus 
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plateau. Little more than a week after agreement had been 
reached with Laffitte and Blount therefore, he submitted a 
rojet de 'loi to the Chambre of Deputies. 
23 
It was voted 
through,, 'both chambres,, with only minor delays andýone important 
amendment, being proclaimed law on the 15th of July 1840.24 
Deputies and delegates from LeHavre and Dieppe attempted to 
defeat the bill, butwithout success. At first they demanded 
its withdrawal, and later counted on procedural delays to 
prevent its passage during the 1840 session. Committees of both 
chambres were concerned to obtain guarantees that the line would 
be extended to LeHavre (and the efforts of LeHavre ensured that 
this point was given full attention), but they were satisfied 
by assurances from the Minister that adequate guarantees existed. 
"Laffitte and Blount would be compelled by Article 9 of the 
p rojet de loi to finance half the cost of crossing Rouen as far 
as Deville, and the Minister promised that every effort would 
be made to start the extension to LeHavre within the next year. 
The Paris-to-Rouen railway bill was amended in only one 
important respect, `that affecting the method of financial 
assistance from the State. The question of how the State might 
help in financing private railway companies had once again 
assumed great importance during 1839. The problems faced by 
Chouquet, Lebobe et Cie had not of course been unique, and 
several other companies also found themselves unable to obtain 
all the capital they needed from the private capital market. 
By 1840 there was little opposition to the view. that railways 
should be left primarily to private enterprise, though some, 
like Jaubert, came to this conclusion only reluctantly. Although 
"partisan en principe de V execution par 1'Etat", he stated in 
1840, "c'est`sans aucune arriere-pensde que... je donne les mains 
a 1'intervention large de l'industrie privee.... "25 There was 
equally little question however, that private companies would 
need substantial assistance from the State. To determine how 
best this might be given, Dufaure had appointed a special 
commission-at the end of the 1839-session of parliament. 
26 
Comte 
Jaubert'had been one of its members. 
The method of State assistance proposed in the p rojet de 
loi for the saris-to-Rouen had been arrived at only after 
considerable negotiation. Four methods of assistance had been 
10 
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discussed generally during the 1830s, direct subventions, 
guarantees of interest, simple loans and subscriptions of equity.. 
Laffitte and Blount tried initially to obtain a guarantee of 
three per cent interest, 
27 but when they received an unfavourable 
response seem quickly to have dropped this idea. On the advice 
of the special commission, Dufaure had at first suggested that 
the State contribute its promised one-third of the company's 
capital as a loan. This would certainly have been the simplest 
way, and several other companies receivers loans from the State 
totälling over 37 MF`in 1839 and 1840. Laffitte and Blount 
however, refused this offer. They-replied that they would 
prefer direct equity participation, perhaps thinking this would 
, add more 
to their company's credit. 
28 
Though there was no 
precedent for this type of assistance, the commission was not 
averse to it and had recommended it for the Paris-to-Orleans. 
The compromise eventually reached for the Paris-to-Rouen, and 
contained in the `r 
ojet de loi, was for a combination of two 
methods. Of the company's capital of 36 MF, Jaubert agreed that 
the State would buy 14,000 shares (with a total par value of 7 
MF), and lend another 7 MF at four per cent, repayable in thirty 
years. On its equity the State would receive a return of up to 
four per cent, but only after all other shareholders had first 
received the same amount. The State would be represented in 
the company by a special commissioner, who would have only 100 
votes in General Meetings but nothing more than a deliberative 
voice on the Board'of Directors. 
This arrangement was not accepted by the Chambre of 
Deputies. A committee'of the Chambre nominated to examine the 
bill found that it provided the State too small a return and too 
small a voice on behalf of its large equity. Furthermore, the 
determination of total profits, affecting the amount of return 
to the State on its equity, would involve close government 
scrutiny of the company's affairs. The committee believed, it. 
stated, that "1'etat ne saurait sans inconvdnient intervenir dans 
1'administration d'interets prives-..... "29 At the suggestion of 
the committee and with the Minister's acquiescence, the Chambre 
passed a law in which the State's entire contribution of 14 MF 
was in the form of a. loan, but at only three per cent instead 
of four per cent.. This change to a loan for the full amount 
"ýi 
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would mean a permanent annual interest charge on the company's 
revenues of 420,000 F instead of*only 280,000 F, but a loan 
would be more advantageous if in future its profits exceeded 
about-four per cent. It. could be a considerable burden however, 
if they ever went much below that. The return to shareholders 
of the Paris-to-St. -Germain railway had averaged about seven per 
cent between 1838 and 1840,30 and as the promotors of the Paris- 
to-Rouen were expecting an equally high return on capital, they 
were confident that their shareholders would accept these new 
terms. The changes were in fact-easily ratified at the first 
General Meeting held on the 30th of. July 1840.31 
Subscriptions for the 72,000 stock options issued by the 
company at 500 F each had sold well both in France and Great 
Britain. Applications for them were received in France at the 
offices of Jacques Laffitte et Cie and Charles Laffitte, Blount 
et Cie, and-within a month after, agreement was reached with the 
Minister, more than nine-tenths of them had been subscribed. By 
mid-June according to Jacques Laffitte, 
32 
about 33,000 of the 
36,000 options (promesses-d'actions) available for sale in France 
had been sold, to some 1,227 subscribers. The distribution of 
these. options'was quite similar to the distribution of shares 
in Chouquet, -Lebobe et Cie; somewhat fewer than half, valued at 
just., under 6.6 MF, went to., small subscribers with an average of 
about ten each, while the. -remainder, went to a very small group 
of bankers and other wealthy investors. Six of these held 200 
or more shares, and eighteen held more than 100. Laffitte also 
reported that over 4,800 shares had been sold outside Paris, 
about thirteen per cent of the total available in France. 2,000 
shares worth one million francs, were sold in Rouen, with the 
help of a four per cent guarantee of interest from the city 
council for the first ten years of operation. 
33 
The sale of options in Great Britain had also been fairly 
brisk, and one reader of the Railway Times reported from 
Manchester that all the options available there had been sub- 
scribed even before a prospectus had been seen. 
34 The 36,000 
options offered in Great. Britain were taken up by a far more 
concentrated group of investors than in France; there were only 
350-subscribers in all, who were owners on average of over 100 
options each. Eästhope., Moss and Chaplin for example, are reported 
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to have taken 1,783,1,145 and 1,000 respectively. 
35 
These 
British investors were confident of getting a-large return on 
their shares, and apparently less concerned with ri-sk than 
French investors. In February 1840 William Reed had estimated 
that the railway's annual revenues would exceed a million pounds. 
A more detailed estimate of potential revenues was carried out 
in the summer of-1840 and showed total potential revenues of 
over £676,000, the equivalent of almost-17 MF. 
36 
No estimate 
was made of operating expenses, but except for the cost of fuel, 
. 
it was thought they would bg less than in England. 
The contribution by British capital, and later by British 
'technique, though possibly not essential to this company's 
success, were certainly very valuable to it. The State could 
not have been expected to provide loans or other financial 
assistance sufficient to replace the amount obtained in Great 
Britain, and without this foreign participation the Paris-to--Rouen 
probably could not have been built at this time. Indeed, the 
pace of railway construction during all of the 1840s, to which 
British capital contributed very substantially, might have been 
considerably slowed without it. For this reason the government 
and the business community, with some exceptions, welcomed the 
British intervention. "J'eprouve une vive satisfaction", wrote 
Jaubert tö Guizot late in May, 
37 
. 
de voir enfin en bon train d'execution une Entreprise de 
cette importance; le fait de l'alliance des capitaux 
anglais aux notres est considerable, et du meilleur augure 
pour le developpement de nos grands travaux publics. 
Both the Chambre of Deputies and the Chambre of Peers expressed 
the same satisfaction in seeing "des capitaux anglais venir 
solder du travail frangais". 
38 
It was just a week before the 
signing of the secret Treaty of London on the 15th of July 1840, 
that a committee of the Peers wrote, 
39 
cette union des capitaux de la France et de 1'Angleterre, 
pour concourir ä une entreprise qui doit rendre plus intimes 
les relations commerciales des deux pays, est d'un heureux 
augure pour la continuation de cette alliance qui fait marcher 
ces deux grandes nations, en pretant un muteul appui, ä la 
tote de la civilization, et qui en assure le progres on 
consolidant la paix du monde. 
Even after the Treaty of London had become known to all, and 
despite the diplomatic affront it. -gave-to France, the government 
of Thiers did all it could to facilitate British participation. 
The 'caution' deposit of ten per cent of the capital subscribed 
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in Great Britain was allowed to be deposited in the Bank of 
England, and a generous time limit set for its eventual transfer 
to France. Jaubert feared that an aggravation of international 
tension would cut short the entreprise, and remarked to Guizot, 
40 
confidentiellement, que les actionnaires frangais que 
j'ai vus ne serait pas fächds d'etre nantis de cette 
garantie.... Quel dommage si le developpement de prosperite 
qui se manifeste partout en France venait ä etre arret6. 
Even while Thiers publicly threatened war, the British were 
assured by Guizot and Jaubert that their investment would be 
safe. The British stayed in, the enterprise continued, and by 
the, -spring of 1841 construction was underway. 
Extending the Line to LeHavie and Dieppe. It had long 
been known that building the line from Rouen to LeHavre would be 
very costly. Since 1837 it had been agreed that to continue 
through the valley all the way-to LeHavre was impractical, and 
that beyond Rouen there was no choice but to go by the plateau. 
However, this would require long tunnels and viaducts to avoid 
the very steep gradients and deep river valleys just west of 
Rouen. It was evident that the cost of building each kilometre 
of line would be higher than for the Paris-to-Rouen. At the same 
time it was thought likely the line would earn less revenue. 
The obvious question then was would there be sufficient net 
revenue to provide an attractive rate of return to investors? 
Many people in LeHavre feared that there would not and doubted 
that sufficient funds could be attracted to finance the project. 
Before 1840 they had hoped that by building a line all the way 
from Paris to LeHavre as a single project the high profits 
expected from the Paris-to-Rouen segment would help to attract 
the finance capital needed to build the much less remunerative 
segment from Rouen to LeHavre. Now this line would be forced 
to depend upon its own resources. 
Even before legislation had been enacted for the Paris-to- 
Rouen, the representatives of LeHavre had begun to explore means 
by which it could be extended to the sea. The means at their 
disposal were very limited, but they were fully used. On the 
13th of July. Clerc of the Chambre of Commerce met with Jaubert, 
but was told that every other means must first be exhausted 
before the State could consider building the line. Clerc was 
not optimistic. He also spoke to both Rothschild and the Banque 
Andre et"Cottier and was forced to. conclude that "les capitalistes 
et les banquiers ont la plus mauvaise opinion du chemin de Rouen 
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au Havre. 1141 The Chambre of Commerce and the City council were 
at a loss as to how any commercial company could be formed. 
42 
Their only recourse was to urge the Minister to compell the 
Paris-to-Rouen company to extend its line, to LeHavre. 
43 
A new 
government under the presidency of Marshall Soult came into 
office late in the summer, but it maintained the non-commital 
policy of its predecessor, and in any case was preoccupied much 
of the. time with other matters. Therefore little progress was 
made by LeHavre in 1841, though the municipal council voted. 
20,000 F to pay for further engineering studies, and promised a 
contribution of 500,000 F to any company undertaking to build 
44 
line. 4 
Success came in 1842. With financing and construction of 
-the Paris-to-Rouen well in hand, its directors decided to form 
another company to build the extension to LeHavre. It was 
likely-to-add substantially to their line's traffic by connecting 
it directly to the port at LeHavre, thus avoiding at the source 
any 'leakage' of traffic onto river transport. Charles Laffitte 
went to LeHavre on the 5th of March to announce the directors' 
intention, 
45 
and-by the end of April negotiations with the 
government for a.. concession and for financial aid had been 
completed.. To secure, a lower tariff on the railway, the City 
of LeHavre=was forced to offer a guarantee of interest of four 
per cent on the shares subscribed by its citizens, and a one 
million francoperating subsidy spread over ten years. 
46 
To 
compete for the growing transit trade, LeHavre considered it 
essential, to have as low as possible a tariff. The City of 
LeHavre also agreed with Laffitte to obtain subscriptions for 
at least half the-share capital to be offered in France. 
47 
Financial assistance was also forthcoming from the State. 
Earlier in the-session of 1842, the government had proposed 
what it hoped would become.. a general solution to the problem of 
" State aid to railway financing. Briefly its proposal was that 
the State should finance the roadbed and all structures like 
bridges and tunnels, while private companies would provide the 
rails and rolling stock. This formula received enthusiastic 
support from the Chambres, and was to be widely used in coming 
years. ' Some thought it should be used for the Rouen-to-LeHavre, 
but the government preferred to keep the'form of assistance to 
this line consistent with that to its affiliate between Rouen 
and Paris; the duration of the concessions of these two lines, 
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and later of the extension to Dieppe, were also made conterminous 
To ensure a rate of return acceptable to investors, the amount 
of State aid had to be substantial, greater proportionately than 
for most other lines. The Ponts et Chauss6es had estimated that 
the line would cost about 35 MF, including about 5 MF for half 
the crossing of Rouen, from Sotteville to Deville. Toward this, 
the government agreed to contribute a loan of 10 MF and a free 
grant of 8 MF. 
48 
Although the committee of the Chambre of 
Deputies appointed to examine the bill hesitated to recommend 
acceptance of such'a'large subsidy, it found that even with it, 
the return on share capital was likely to be no more than about 
three per cent per year, and it was forced in the end to 
, acquiesce. 
49 
They estimated that in addition to 8 P1F in sub- 
vention, -the State was effectively contributing a further 3.4 MF 
in foregone and delayed interest. With the committee's reluctant 
recommendation, the law of concession was passed easily and 
was proclaimed-in June . 1842.50 
Perhaps owing to the low rate of return expected, it took 
some months to obtain the necessary number of subscriptions to 
share capital. The company was formed early in May but it was 
December before all capital had been subscribed. 
51 
The company 
was fortunate that confidence in railway investments was growing 
at this time and that therewas a receptive-market for their 
shares. Shares were first quoted on the Bourse, already at 
par, on the 8th of March 1843,52 and were at the same time in 
high demand and rising in price on the Liverpool Exchange. 
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The original subscription of 20 MF share capital was divided 
almost equally between 167 residents of Great Britain and 835 
residents of . France. As the City of LeHavre had promised, 
its 
residents took up half the offering in France; 277 residents of 
LeHävre"'subscribed for 9,939 shares worth 4,969,500 F, of which 
one-tenth had to be paid immediately. 
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Many of these shares 
may soon have been sold -- there was a good market for them --- 
but it is evident that LeHavre, made an important contribution to 
the launching of its railway. . 
It, was not until the summer'. of 1845, two years later, when 
construction was well underway on the extension to LeHavre that 
a company was formed. to build a line to Dieppe. Over a period 
of more than a year several groups were formed to raise funds for 
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this purpose, and eventually Found ways to concert their efforts 
into a single company. This phenomenon of several companies 
being. formed to bid for the concession of one railway line was 
very common during the so-called 'railway mania' of the mid-1840s. 
From early in 1843, the owners of the Rouen-to-LeHavre had been 
discussing means by which an agreement could be made for common 
use of rolling"stock on lines to Dieppe, F6camp and LeHavre. 
However, the first news of anything like a company being formed 
appeared only in July 1844, when a group of British capitalists 
referred to as Scott'and Company were reported to have available 
15 MF for a railway to Dieppe. 
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In January 1845 a group of 
British and French capitalists, referrOd to both as the Compagnie 
Seilliere and Smith and Company, were reported to' have available 
12.5 MF and considerable participation by various Paris banks, 
56 
and some time later-this company merged its resources with those 
of several people involved in the Rouen-to-LeHavre railway. 
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Over'the following months subscribers were recruited to this 
company, the list being closed on the 5th of May 1845. One month 
later, Dumon, the Minister of Public Works, introduced a2 rojet 
de loi for a railway to Dieppe and to F6camp. During the debate 
which followed, a , third company which had been formed in February 
by comte Louis de Sparre and a group of French and British 
capitalists, 
58 
merged with Seilliere and his associates, forming 
an enlarged company with a total equity of 18 MF. 
59 The law was 
passed and promulgated on the 19th of August, 
60 
and an agreement 
of concession signed with the Minister in September. 
61 
This 
company received no financial assistance from the State. Its 
founders were very confident in its financial and commercial 
viability, and subscriptions for the total amount of capital 
required were easily obtained'. As in the case of LeHavre, 
although the majority of the company's capital was subscribed 
in Paris, local residents in Dieppe also contributed substantially, 
as did a number of investors in Great Britain. Of the 36,000- 
shares of'500 F each, '"about 25,000 were subscribed in Paris, 
5,500 in Great Britain, 2,500 in Rouen and 2,000 in Dieppe. 
6.2 
Building the Railway from Paris to the Sea. 
Building the railway from Paris to Rouen, and then on to 
LeHavre and Dieppe was a complex task. It was a task which 
required not only a considerable degree-of engineering and organi- 
zational skill, but also careful"finarcial management. All three 
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companies fell victims in varying degrees to the vaguaries of 
politics and the economy, forces which they merely had to contend 
with and could do little to control. Construction of the Seine 
railways spanned the whole decade from 1841 to 1850. Work began 
on the Paris-to-Rouen in the spring of 1841 and was completed on 
the Rouen-to-Dieppe early in 1850. During these years the three 
companies, "ran, the'full gamut of-recession, 'railway mania', 
financial crisis and revolution, but unlike several others, they 
all survived the ordeal. In each company there was a two-fold 
. division of'duties and responsibilities. The conseil d'administra- 
., tion (Board of'Directors) determined over-all policy and ensured 
`a steady flow of funds to the-builders, while the chief engineer 
planned the railway line and hired and supervised a contractor 
to build''it. '' As will become evident, there was a large element 
of British influence exercised in both these areas. 
Eleven directors of the Paris-to-Rouen company had been 
named in the company's charter. Four of them were British 
residents, all with considerable previous experience in railway 
management. These were Sir John Eästhope and William Chaplin, 
both directors of-the London and Southwestern Railway, John Moss, 
a director of the Grand Junction Railway, and Charles Laurence, 
a director for ten years of the well-known Liverpool and 
Manchester Railway. Maintaining the-flow of funds from 'calls' 
made in Great Britain was their chief responsibility-, and although 
they were kept au-courant, closer supervision of management was 
exercised by-the seven directors'resident in France, who met 
daily. 
63, None of these had much previous experience with rail- 
ways. ' They were Jacques Laffitte and his nephew Charles Läffitte, 
Edward Blount, baron Casimir de 1'Espee and viscomte Alban de 
Villeneuve-Bargemont, deputies for-the Meurthe and the Nord, 
comte Charles de Kersaint, also a director of the Compagnie de 
Saint-Gobain, and viscomteDenys Benoist d'Azy, a prominent 
maitre de forges from the Allier. 
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The company's general 
manager was Adolphe-Thibaudeau, who it may be recalled had been 
involved, in the maritime-'canal company, and who played a consid- 
erable part in the negotiations in 1839 and 1840 with the gov- 
ernment. He had . spent several years 
in England as correspondent 
for the liberal newspaper-Le National.. 
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The company's other 
two senior executives'both came from the London and Southwestern 
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Railway, William Reed the company's secretary, who later became 
the twelfth director, 66 and Joseph Locke the chief engineer. 
Many of these same men had leading roles in the other 
two smaller companies. In this gradually constructed edifice 
of railways in the Seine valley, the Paris-to-Rouen was the corner- 
stone. To ensure that overlapping sources of finance capital 
and connecting routes were-matched by some degree of co-operation 
in management, there were several common directors. Overlapping 
control was greatest with the Rouen-to-LeHavre company. Of its 
. 
ten directors seven were from the parent company, Easthope, Moss, 
Chaplin, Laurence, Reed, Charles Laffitte and Villeneuve-Bargemont. 
"Three more came new to this company, -comte Edmond d'Alton-Sh6e, 
"a 
young radical peer, Xavier-Vincent Feulliant, general manager 
of the Entreprisb generale des omnibus in Paris, and Claude- 
Gaspard Dailly, maitre de postes for Paris. 
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Despite the fact 
that 25 per cent of. the share capital had been subscribed in 
LeHavre, there was. no local representative on the conseil d'admin- 
istration. Overlapping control was much looser with the Rouen- 
to-Dieppe company. On its conseil d'administration there was 
only one member from the Paris-to-Rouen, Edward Blount, and one 
from the Rouen-to-LeHavre, the comte d'Alton-Sh6e. Alfred- 
Charles Dailly, another of the directors and an auditeur in the 
Conseil d'Etat,, was the son of a member of the latter company's 
Board. In contrast to the two other companies, the Rouen-to- 
Dieppe had a large element of local representation on its conseil 
d'administration; five out of its ten directors had close local 
connections: Caumont de Jumieges was a member of the Conseil 
d'Arrondissement-of Rouen and resident of Jumieges,. Henry Barbet 
was mayor and deputy for Rouen, P. -E. Capperon, avocat and 
Ferdinand Osmont, banker, were both members of the city council 
of Dieppe, and the'Baron Michel de Saint-Albin was a property 
owner in the arrondissements of Neufchatel and Dieppe. The 
remaining two were Florentin-Achille Seilliere, a banker, and 
Anne-Theodore Cretu, who was described in the company's statutes 
as an "ancien chef de division au Ministore de la Guerre. "68 
This overlapping of directorships was a widespread 
phenomenon in France at this time, and by this process several 
large and powerful 'syndicates' were formed. Based upon associa- 
tions of banking, metallurgical, mining and railway interests, 
they were. the prototypes of their kind in France. The most 
69 
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important of them were the 'Talabot Group' with a controlling 
interest in several large enterprises-in the Midi and the Rböne 
valley, and the 'P-0 Group', based upon the Paris-to-Orleans 
railway. British interests in French railways were concentrated 
in the Easthope-Chaplin-Moss 'group' which began its activities 
with the Paris-to-Rouen. Chaplin and Moss became directors also 
of'the'Chemin defer du Nord; Easthope was a director of the 
Paris-to-Strasbourg and the Orl6ans-to-Bordeaux. An ally, John 
Mastermän, a , London banker, was also a director of the Nord and, 
organizer of companies bidding for the Chemins de fer du Centre 
and Paris aä Lyon. Connected with this group was a firm of 
British bankers, Denison, Heywood and Kennard, who had large 
interests in the Nord, Tours-to-Nantes, Paris-to-Strasbourg, 
. Orleans-to-Bordeaux, and Bordeaux-to-Cette railways. Edward 
Blount is said to-have been connected with this gr. oup. 
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Economical construction was the responsibility of the 
company's engineers. One of the conditions of British financial 
participation had been'British choice of the company's chief 
engineer. 
71, The British had great confidence in their railway 
engineers, and Joseph Locke was one of the best of them; according 
to a recent study, 
72 he was "the prototype of the great engineer, 
soon to be gilded and flattered as the Sýephensons never were. " 
He had articled with George Stephenson at Newcastle and worked 
on the Liverpool and"Manchester Railway in 1830. After other 
appointments, he had become chief engineer (in charge of construc- 
tion) on the'London and Southwestern Railway in 1838.73 He was 
an ideal choice for the Paris-to-Rouen, a sound designer who was 
not given to virtuosity; in the words of a contemporary, "he may 
be termed the Commercial Engineer, one who made the money go as 
far as possible. ' He was not ambitious of expensive and thrilling 
works .,, 
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By the summer of 1840 French companies had completed 
only about 300 kilometres of railway line, much of it intended 
only for transport of coal, and hardly 50 kilometres of it in 
the region of Paris. 
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French engineers therefore had little 
experience in building railways, and, none in building lines of 
any length. In 1839 Charles Laffitte had gone to England 
especially to seek'British engineering help, 'perhaps with an eye 
to evehtual''shareholder confidence; but it was with excessive 
modesty that he stated that in France they were "children in the 
art of making railways. "76 Locke visited Paris and the site of 
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the railway, and found the plans drawn up by the Ponts et 
Chauss6es and tho3e which had. been purchased from the old Cie 
Riant to be entirely satisfactory. Detailed on-site engineering 
surveys were made in the autumn of 1840, and the first contracts 
for construction let-in February 1841.77 As work on one line 
was finished, cquipmert and men were moved to the next, so that 
there was continuous almost uninterupted activity during a whole 
decade. 
The measures of success for any railway builder were 
economyand speed of construction. Once the comapay's capital 
. 
had been established in line with the estimated cost of 
`construction and equipment, -the question was how close could 
the engineer and his contractor come to completing the railway 
within the limits of the cost estimate and the anticipated 
construction time. Higher than expected construction costs would- 
mean that more capital would be needed; longer than expected 
construction time would mean both higher interest payments to 
shareholders`during construction and a loss of potential opera- 
ting revenue. Either would mean less income for the railway's 
shareholders-. It should be added that it would be surprising 
if costs did not exceed estimates, since this had been common 
experience with canals and with earlier railway projects. 
Measured against the criterion of speed in construction, the 
Paris-to-Rouen achieved considerable success; the Rouen-to- 
LeHavre were not so fortunate. All three companies, exceeded 
their cost estimates, the Rouen-to-Dieppe less than the other 
two. The consequences were severe only in the case of the 
Rouen-to-LeHavre. Appendix IV contains capital cost accounts 
for all three companies. 
The eventual cost-of building and equipping the Paris-to- 
Rouen exceeded original estimates by over 20 MF or almost fifty 
per cent. In the summer of 1840, Locke had estimated that total 
costs would be 46 MF. 
78 
In November 1841, after construction 
had been underway for six months, he revised this estimate to 
52.75 MF. 79 Excessive costs began to be evident within a year 
or so of its opening to traffic, and by October 1844, about 
eighteen months after opening, capital expenditures stood at 
slightly more than 53 MF. . The shareholders were told that at 
least another 6.2 MF could be foreseen, 
80 
which would mean total 
expenses in excess of capjtal of about 7.3 MF. The short line 
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crossing Rouen, financed equally b# the Paris-to-Rouen and the 
Rouen-to-LeHavre further increased excess costs. It had been 
estimated that this section of line would cost 10 MF, but by 
1850 the 5 MF to be contributed by the Paris-to-Rouen company had 
risen to almost 7 MF. 4 MF of this was financed by a State loan 
promised in the Act of 1840. By June 1850 when the capital 
account was closed, total expenses had risen to 66.3 MF, over 
500,000 F per kilometre. Original capital had been only 50 MF, 
augmented by the additional State loan of 4 MF. 
Construction of the Rouen-to-LeHavre also cost more than 
20 MF in excess of original estimates; proportionally the excess 
was almost three-fifths. Construction of the 87.35 kilometres 
of railway to LeHavre began in January 1844, one year after the 
company had-been formed. Considerable delay was experienced in 
making detailed surveys of the route and in obtaining approval 
for the plans drawn up. Late in October 1843 a contract was 
signed with Thomas Brassey and William Mackenzie, who had also 
built the Paris-to-Rouen, for completion in May 1846.81 After 
only two years of construction, by-the end of 1845, the company's 
management saw that there would probably be a large excess of 
costs over their original estimates. There had been some dis- 
agreement, indeed confusion, over the original cost estimates. 
The government had put the total cost of the line from Deville 
to LeHavre at 30 MF, with an additional 5 MF for the company's 
contribution to the crossing of Rouen. The parliamentary 
committee was forced to admit that expenses worth 4 MF had been 
omitted from this estimate. 
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Already this exceeded capital by 
one million. Locke's own cost estimate at this time moreover, 
was 48.75 MF, to which he added the possibility, of a further 
4.75 MF, a total that is, of 53.5 MF. 
83 In the event, by the' 
end of October 1848, expenditure rose to 57.3 MF, which exceeded 
the company's original capital by almost 20 MF. 
The case of the Rouen-to-Dieppe was somewhat different. 
The cost of building both lines which it planned, to Dieppe and 
to Fecamp, had been estimated at just over 18 MF, of which 12. "4 
MF was for the former. 
84 
Owing to difficulty in raising capital 
the line to Fecamp had to be abandoned, which cost the company 
just over 150,000 F. Though within, a year of opening to traffic 
capital costs for the line to Dieppe alone had risen to 14 MF, 
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the company was able to avoid an excess of expenditure over its 
original-capital resources. The shares issued in 1845 had been 
for 500 F each; when the line to Fecamp was abandoned, these 
were reduced'only to 400 F, which yielded a total of 14.4 MF, 
more than sufficient to cover all expenses on the line to Dieppe. 
The total final capital cost for the three lines was over 
137.5 MF, which exceeded original estimates by more than 44 MF, 
or almost 50 per cent. To explain in any detail why the estimates 
of experienced engineers were so widely incorrect is impossible. 
In'any case, as other writers have pointed out, 
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accounting 
practices at this time were rather primitive, and details are 
lacking for careful analysis. An approach to an answer however, 
might be obtained by examining in turn the various elements 
. comprising total capital costs.. The second problem, which will 
be examined later, is the effect these excessive costs had upon 
the three companies. The areas to be explored are four, the 
cost of acquiring land, of rails and of rolling stock, and the 
contractor and his labour force. 
The Cost of Land. The least predictable element in 
railway capital costs was the acquisition of land. It was also 
one of the most costly. This was not an accute problem for the 
Paris-to-Rouen company, but for the Rouen-to-LeHavre it caused 
great difficulties. Despite a system of expropriating private 
property for the 'public utility' which was designed to favour 
the railway companies, the Rouen-to-LeHavre was forced to pay 
very high prices. Owing to problems experienced by the 
Strasbourg-to-Bale railway in 1839 and 1840, there had been a 
new law passed in May 1841 governing expropriation, 
86 
which 
altered the procedure for determining the price to be paid to 
land owners. Once the land had been designated, 
87 its value 
was determined by a local jury, from whose membership interested 
landowners were excluded. Offers were made by the expropriator 
and counter-proposals submitted by the land-owner. The jury 
then had to fix an amount which fell between these limits; 
furthermore, any rise or fall 
to the expropriated party had 
For all three companie 
The difficulties in acquiring 
small parcels to be acquired, 
in the value of adjacent land left 
to be taken into account. 
s the cost of land was quite high. 
it., owing to the thousands of 
were potentially immense. Along 
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the Paris-to-Rouen for example, the company had to acquire 
7,500 parcels of land in 48 communes. The real problems en- 
countered on this line however, were : mall,. By December 1841 
three-quarters of the necessary land had been acquired, most of 
it by private agreement, 
88 
and with very few exceptions the 
price awards made by the local juries were quite reasonable. 
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This is not to say however, -that 
the cost of, land was low, for 
the railway line passed through a well-populated area and 
crossed many towns. Total land costs on the Paris-to-Rouen. 
were over. 5.6 MF, or"about 44,000 F per kilometre, a high. figure 
among railways built at this time. 
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For the unfortunate, Rouen-to-LeHavre company it was 
almost three times as much. The cost of land on this line had 
been estimated by the Ponts et Chauss6es at only 3 MF and by 
the company at about 4 MF. Its, actual final net cost was almost- 
10 MF, 
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or just short of 114,000 F per kilometre. There were 
several reasons for this enormous excess over original estimates. 
The amount of land needed by the company was much greater than 
expected; the company's requirement had been estimated at about 
fifty hectares, but it was eventually compelled to purchase 
over ninety hectares. 
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Among these were sixty properties above 
tunnels which had to be bought "pour &chapper aux d6pr6ciations 
excessives quo les experts avaient estimees. " The line passed 
through rich agricultural land and many towns, both large and 
small, including both Rouen and LeHavre. In the third section 
of the line, nineteen kilometres between Motteville and Alvimare, 
the estimate of cost in the avant-projet had been 300,000 F; the 
final cost was 905,000 F. "Les surfacesde l'avant-projet", 
stated the Directors to the shareholders, 
... sont de 28 ä 30 hectares. Notre expropriation comprend 50 hectares 28 ares, dont un tres forte partie au centre 
meme des villages de Motteville, *de Flamanville, d'Auzouville, 
Lesneval, de Sainte-Marie-des-Champs et de la ville d'Yvetöt. 
Nous avons dü acqu6rir vingt-trois maisons et sept batiments, 
le chemin coupe en deux plusieurs cours de ferme. Pas la 
moindre trace de ces circonstances si graves no so rencontre 
Bans l'avant-projet. 
The prices of more than half the parcels purchased were contested 
before juries, and though the juries were reasonable in their 
valuations,. the prices paid were very high. On a section of 
the line within LeHavre for example, the"company offered a total 
of 682,000 F to expropriated land-owners, they replied with counter 
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offers totalling over 2,460,000 F, and the jury 
, 
awarded a total 
of 925,000 F. The extra 6'MF paid for land was thirty per cent 
of the company's total excess over'original estimates. The cost 
of land'on the Rouen-to-Dieppe was about 1.8 MF, only 35,500 F 
per kilometre. 
The Cost of Rails. The cost per kilometre for rails 
and their 'chairs' was almost exactly equal for the Paris-to- 
Rouen and the Rouen-to-LeHavre. The latter was much more 
fortunate in this area of costs. For the Paris-to-Rouen, obtain- 
ing iron rails in France posed serious problems, both of price 
and of simple 'physical access. In 1840 there were only three 
plants of any size in France capable of making them, LeCreuzot, 
Alais and Decazeville; their combined output, two-thirds that 
of the whole country, was only 23,000 tons per year. 
93 At thirty 
kilogrammes per linear metre, the Paris-to-Rouen alone would, 
require over-15,000 tons, about half the total national annual 
capacity, and. several other lines including the Paris-to-Orleans 
were being built at this. time. All of these factories further- 
more were long distances by road, river and sea transport from 
the railway construction site. It was possible to place orders 
for nearly all the required rails for the line by"November 1841, 
but. the. price was very high, almost double that paid in. Great 
Britain. 
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In the autumn of 1842 however,. the danger arose that 
completion would-be delayed by late delivery of part of the 
rails. Speaking to shareholders in August 1842, Joseph Locke 
said95 he believed the delay, 
, 
may have arisen from the increased demand during the last 
two years for these articles of manufacture, for I believe 
that great exertions have been made by these manufacturers 
to ensure the delivery of, the full quantity in due time, 
and the difficulties of navigation which for want of water 
have arrested vessels in their progress'have increased that 
detention still further.... 
In the event what was said. to have been a fairly "large quantity" 
of rails and chairs were imported from England. 
96 They were -' 
bought for only seven pounds per ton, but transport charges and 
customs duties added another. -eight, - The. total price was therefore 
little different from what would have been paid in France, about 
380 F per ton. Little was added to the company's cost for rails 
by this need to import, but time was lost, significantly 
cöntributing to delaying, the opening date by two months to the 
1st of May 1843. The totals cost for rails on the Paris-to-Rouen 
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up to October 1844 was 9.3 MF, about 72,400 F per kilometre. 
By 1843 when the Rouen-to-LeHavre company was ordering 
its rails demand for them had grown considerably, although 
fortunately so had industry's capacity to. produce them. Tenders 
were called for rails and chairs in June 1843,97 but it was 
almost a year later before all had been ordered. The prices 
paid were between "340 F and 350 F per ton. 
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By the time the 
Rouen-to-Dieppe company was ordering its rails the price had 
again risen to levels higher than in 1841,, to 385 F per*ton, 
though in its case delivery dates were promptly met. 
99 A price 
rise of 40 F per ton meant an increase in cost of about 2,500 F 
per kilometre. The final cost of rails for the single line of 
track from Rouen to Dieppe was about 43,000 F per kilometre, 
-almost 2.2 MF in total. 
Rolling Stock. To ensure timely supply of an adequate 
number of locomotives of good design and at a reasonable cost, 
it was thought necessary by the Paris-to-Rouen company to 
persuade a locomotive manufacturer to establish a plant at Rouen. 
An established British manufacturer, William Buddicom, and his 
partner Allcard, came over to France in 1841, and eventually 
built most. of. all three companies' rolling stock. Despite 
significant early contributions to locombtive technology by 
Seguin and others, less than half of the locomotives being used 
in France by 1841 were of French manufacture. There were about 
five companies in France'capable of manufacturing locomotives 
in 1840, Hallette of Arras, the Compagnie d'Anzin, and J. -J. Meyer, 
A. Koechlin and Willer Stehelin, all of Alsace. 
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Locke seems 
to have been fearful that these plants, all at some distance 
from Paris, would be unable to provide an adequate supply. 
101 
However, although these, factories had been quite fully occupied 
during 1838,1839 and 1840, during the following two or three 
years they received no orders at all. 
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In 1840 of course Locke 
could not have known this would occur. According to the Comit6 
de 1'Union des constructeurs, several offers were made by French 
manufacturers to build- locomotives for the Paris-to-Rouen, but 
the company,. according to the Committee's secretary, 
103 "a jusqu'ä 
present refus6 toutes les offres et exprime 1'intention 
formelle de ne demander aucune Partie de son materiel aux ateliers 
frangais. " . it may therefore have been factors other than ability 
to supply the required locomotives. on time which determined Locke 
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not to place orders with established French manufacturers. { 
None of the plants in France were close to Paris-or to Rouen, 
and transport costs would be high. Furthermore, Locke was 
unfamiliar with the designers in these plants and consultation 
with them would have been difficult owing to distance and 
language. He could have imported them from Great Britain, but 
although by 1841 the price. of locomotives in England had fallen 
well below that in France, a high tariff would have made importing 
them expensive. 
Buddicom offered an almost ideal alternative. He had a 
plant at Liverpool and had built locomotives for the Grand 
, 
Junction Railway; some of them were of the 'Crewe' type, designed 
by Locke. 
104 
Not only was Buddicom a good friend of Locke s, 
but he was also well-known to John Moss, a director of both the 
Paris-to-Rouen and Grand Junction Railways. In December 1840 
Locke wrote to Buddicom complaining that he needed some help in 
France with locomotives; "if I could only get ad -- d good. 
fellow like'you, " he wrote, 
105 "I should be happy. " Soon after 
this an agreement seems to have been made between them for 
Buddicom to come over and set up a factory in France. In March 
Locke gave Buddicom a testimonial letter "for the manufacture 
of Engines on an improved principle.... You need only present it 
to the proper parties, " wrote Locke, 
106 "to ensure yr success in 
obtaining orders for all engines France will... require. " By 
April Buddicom was in France, and the two men had begun to 
collaborate in modifying the 'Crewe' engine for use on the Paris- 
to-Rouen. "Brassey being in France, " wrote Locke from England, 
107 
"you must urge his Men at Waggons to vigorous combat and sweep 
the field for your more important operations. " Later in the 
summer of 1841 Buddicom took fifty men from his works at Liverpool 
over to France, 
108 
and by August 1841 he had begun on a new 
plant at Les Chartreux (Petit-Quevilly), on the left bank of the 
109 
Thomas Brassey, the contractor, took part in Seine at Rouen. 
the enterprise as a shareholder. 
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Production of locomotives and other equipment for the 
Paris-to-Rouen company was soon underway. A first contract was 
signed for the supply of 40 locomotives, 200 goods wagons, and 
120 second and third-class poaches. 
l'l. l M. Arnoux, a'coach-builder 
in Paris, received a contract for 36 first-class coaches. 
Production was reported to be underway by October 1841, with eight 
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machines under, construction. A year later in November 1842 
this first'group had been'ýfinished and were being tested. 
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By April 1843 twenty-four locomotives had been delivered, as 
well as a quantity of'other rolling stock and turntables and 
switches. 
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As would be the case in the other areas of capital cost,. 
expenditures` on",, rolling stock did, not end with opening of the 
line to traffic in May 1843. As-freight service 'was added, and 
as traffic grew, partly fed from the LeHavre and Dieppe branch 
lines, more rolling stock had. tö be added. By September 1843, 
the Paris-to-Rouen company had spent 3.2 p1F on rolling stock; 
from then until the end of June 1850 (when the capital account 
was closed), 'the cöinpany spent another 4.3 MF, most of it 
spread fairly evenly up to the middle of 1848. To reduce the 
cost both of'equipment and-of operations, the Paris-to-Rouen 
and the-Rouen-to-LeHavre had agreed to operate their rolling 
stock jointly. 
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The original cost estimates for the Rouen-to- 
Lellavre had contained only a small provision for rolling stock, 
as it was thought that both railways could be operated with that 
owned by"the Paris-to-Rouen. Traffic between Rouen and Paris 
however, soon grew'beyond expectations and the Rouen-to-LeHavre 
was forced by the end of 1848 to spend almost 3.6 MF on its own 
rolling stock. Some of what it. purchased was for use on the 
Rouen-to-Dieppe, which had none of its own. 
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The rolling stock of all three companies continued to be 
both manufactured and operated on contract by Allcard and 
Buddicom of Rouen, who were soon among the country's largest 
builders of railway machinery. According to an article in the 
Journal des Chemins de Fer in 1846,116 they were the largest 
producers of locomotives in France at that date. Of the 371 
machines which had been produced in France, they are said to 
have produced 80. Other producers were Derosne, et Cail (who 
produced 75), Meyer et Cie (70), Gouin et Cie (38), Frangois 
Cave (35), LeCreuzot (20) , La Ciotät (25), Hallette (16), and 
Andre Koechlin (12)., In. the. same period, according to another 
article in the same journal, 665 locomotives had been imported 
from Great Britain. 
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In the early part of 1843, the firm' 
moved to a new plant. at. Sotteville, the terminus of the Paris-to- 
Rouen railway; it. was essential of coutse that it be easily 
accessible to the railway line. Employing about 700 men, many 
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of them British, it was one of the largest heavy machinery 
plants in France. It consisted-of a group of-buildings occupying 
a site of 6,000 square metres of land; there were sheds for 
locomotives in service, facilities'for repair of coaches, goods 
wagons, and up to 28 locomotives, and shops for fabrication of 
boilers. and other locomotive compönents. There were twelve coke- 
firedr furnaces° and` twenty-two forges. 
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Another very large element of capital cost which continued 
to grow for several years after opening of both lines, to Rouen 
. and t6LeHavre, was that 
for stations. In May 1843, when 
. passenger service on 
the Paris-to-Rouen began, none of the 
facilities for goods transport had been completed; many had not 
even been begun. The many small passenger stations along the 
line were completed by the, end of 1843, but construction of 
goods facilities went on longer. Three large warehouses were 
built at Batignolles goods depot at Paris; several more were 
built at Rouen and at Sotteville. The Rouen-to-LeHavre company 
built large warehouses in LeHavre next to the port, and provided 
direct'access from the quays to them. The totals spent by these 
two companies'on stations up to about 1850 were, for the Paris- 
to-Rouen 5.3 MF, and for the Rouen-to-LeHavre, 8.2 MF. 
The Contractor and his Labour Force. Building the 'right- 
of-way', which included the road-bed, tunnels, bridges and via- 
ducts, everything except laying the rails or building stations, 
comprised a very large proportion of total costs; it was almost 
forty per cent for the Paris-to-Rouen, more than forty-five per 
cent for the Rouen-to-LeHavre, and over fifty per cent for the 
Rouen-to-Dieppe. These works were the responsibility of contrac- 
tors, who for all three lines were Thomas Brassey and William 
Mackenzie. The Paris-to-Rouen was divided into ten sections for 
contracting. When the company tried in 1840 to obtain French 
contractors for the first of these sections, the prices tendered 
were much too high; five or six bids were received, the highest 
at'6.5 MF. Mackenzie and Brassey were persuaded to bid jointly, 
and were awarded a contract for 3.9 MF119 early in 1841.120 
The entire task of construction, including laying the 
rails ('plate-laying'), was given over to the contractors, with 
the. company exercising only general supervision over design and 
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quality of work. Above the company the Administration des Ponts 
at Chaussdes further supervised the work, to ensure that the 
standards dictated by the cahier des charges were adhered to. 
This function was performed by the ingenieurs an chef in each 
d6partement, until 1846 when a special Service des chemins de 
fer was established. 
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When disputes arose between the company 
and the authorities, delays could be considerable, as rapports, 
proces-verbaux and decisions passed between local. engineers and 
Paris. Needless to say, Joseph Locke preferred the more 
pragmatic British approach, in. which almost all responsibility 
was given over to the company's engineers on the spot. 
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Brassey had experience in building railways in Great 
Britain, and would live to become one of the century's greatest 
. railway 
builders. 123 He was certainly very skilled, and used 
every means to reduce costs and construction time to a. minimum. 
The resources available to the contractor building railways in 
France were very few, and on this his first foreign contract 
Brasset' was forced to take along his own. He had just completed 
a contract for the London and Southwestern Railway between 
Basingstoke and Gosport, and he had a considerable force of men 
and equipment immediately available. Wagons,, barrows, shovels 
and other tools were among the first things to begin arriving 
at LeHavre, as_French tools were said to be inferior and unsuit- 
able, for the heavy work ahead. 
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y An attempt was made to import 
at a low rate of duty-about 200 wooden wagons, and agreement 
was obtained from the Directeur-general des Douanes. However, 
after great pressure was applied by the Comit6 des constructeurs, 
the heavy machinery makers' lobby, this was withdrawn, and they 
had to be imported over the full tariff for iron machinery. 
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A very large labour force also came over from Great 
Britain to France. Lacking efficient mechanical means for 
excavating and tunnelling, railway building in this early period 
was very labour-intensive, and large numbers of skilled and 
unskilled workers were required. There were up to 10,000 engaged 
at one time on the Paris-to-Rouen, 
126 
and up to 5,000 of these 
were British. There had been little opportunity before 1841 for 
France to develop an experienced, force of railway construction 
labour', and-as recently as 1837 troops had been used to help in 
. 
building railways near Paris. 
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As construction progressed 
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' however, a greater proportion of indigenous workers were hired, 
but a considerable training, period was required. Therefore, 
to obtain the desired speed of construction, experienced British 
workers were brought in, despite the high wages they demanded 
and the other disadvantages they imposed. The weakness of 
French working men was proverbial in England, 
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and at first 
they were employed only at the simpler tasks, filling and 
hauling wagons of earth. They were paid only half the wages 
received by the British navvies,. from two to two and a half 
francs per day. This was better than local agricultural wages 
of about 1F. 80, and not far below-the average amongst industrial 
wages in early 1841.129 French workers therefore were easily 
hired. They and the British navvies were soon joined also by 
workers of half a dozen other nationalities, Germans, Belgians, 
Piedmontese, Dutch, Spaniards, Poles and even Portuguese. 
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With time local workers went on to the more arduous jobs, but 
although British labourers became progressively less numerous, 
they were retained in a number of skilled trades, which seem to 
have been in short supply in France. Tunnellers, masons and 
bricklayers in particular continued to be brought over from 
England. 
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Deployment and supervision of 10,000 men was a task 
requiring some skill and organization. In Great Britain this 
had been done by a system of multiple contracts and sub-contracts, 
" which facilitated specialization and removed the main contractor " 
from I day-to-day detail. On the Paris-to-Rouen however, all but 
one of the ten contracts were made with Mackenzie and Brassey; 
the bridge at Oissel was contracted to a M. Colne, but the work 
is said to have lagged behind schedule, and according to one of 
the company's directors, it had to be finished by the company. 
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Of sub-contracting too there was very little in France, for in 
the words of Brassey, 
133 "we cannot, find people to undertake" it. 
Most of the supervision therefore fell to the main contractor. 
Brassey set up his headquarters at Rouen in 1841, and constantly 
travelled up and down the line. He had agents at all the major 
construction sites, as well as twenty resident engineers (most 
of whom were French) . 
134. 
Men were supervised in groups of about 
twenty by 'gangers'. The real work units were*'butty gangs' of 
ten or so men, who were often hired as a group to perform 
particular tasks for ari amount agreed iipon in advance. 
135 
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In this way-every effort was made to encourage speed and to 
control the unit costs of-construction. British navvies, though 
they were noted for their heavy drinking and for taking time 
off to recover from its effects, were also noted for their very 
hard and fast work. Methods were devised by. them to speed the 
work of excavation. For example, British workers dispensed 
with 'spoil banks'; taking earth directly from cut to fill by 
laying out temporary rails along which wagons were pulled by 
horses, 136 
A saving in time and perhaps also in expense was effected 
on the Rouen-to-LeHavre line by the. use of large excavating 
machinery. The large steam-driven excavating machine was an 
American, invention, which had first been put to work in France 
on the railway from Paris to the Belgian frontier. 
137 
It had 
already .. been. used on railways in the United States, Great Britain 
and Russia. 
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One of these machines could do the work of 95 
men, and thy effected a considerable reduction in the unit cost 
of excavating a yard of earth; a cubic yard of earth cost a 
minimum of OF. 28 to excavate by hand, and about OF. 11 by machine 
The machine was operated by two men and required six more to draw 
away the loose earth. Six of these machines were, hired from 
their. American owners, Cochrane and Co., and four were put to 
work at Bondeville and Houpeville, near Rouen in July 1844.140 
It' is difficult to estjmate their effect in reducing the total 
number. of labourers required, though there does seem to have 
been considerably fewer labourers at work on the Rouen-to-LeHavre 
than there had been on the Paris-to-Rouen. 
There were strong motives other than direct costs of 
excavation for reducing. the contractor's dependence upon manual 
labour, and especially upon foreign labour. The men had to be 
housed, cared for or compensated in case of accidents, their 
children given some form of education, and even given relief 
during the winter months when construction work slowed down. 
On these lines housing seems not to have been a great problem, 
as billets were easily obtained for British and other foreign 
workers, while the local-French labourers simply lived at home. 
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Rudimentary medical care was provided on all three lines by one 
doctor and several assistants. Accidents were frequent, and 
. under French, law (unlike British) the contractor was fully 
"1 ý 
"" 
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responsible for paying compensation to injured men, even if 
they were. injured by their own carelessness. 
14Z 
About 75,00'0 F 
was paid out in compensation to workers on the Paris-to-Rouen. 
Conditions were somewhat better for injured workers on the 
Rouen-to-LeHavre, and a small hospital was built for one section 
of line. 
143 Some of the workers from Great Britain brought 
families with them. On the Paris-to-Rouen there were no schools 
provided, but this also changed on the Rouen-to-LeHavre. At 
least three schools accommodating over $00 children were opened 
at Rouen, Barentin and Malaunay. 
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Providing relief to unemployed workers was a serious 
problem, which was greatly aggravated by the presence of so 
many transient British workers. Unemployment resulted from 
two causes, seasonal variation in the pace of construction, and 
many more British`workers coming over to France than were re- 
quired. 
145 Unemployment was high in Great Britain, and despite 
the inability of many British workers to find any work on the 
railway between Paris and Rouen, they continued to come over to 
France. The effect of this was felt first of course by the men, 
and second by Gilbert Gordon, British Consul in LeHavre, whose 
task it was to help distressed British subjects. He was 
prevented by Foreign office and Treasury policy from spending 
any public funds for this purpose, 
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yet other means could not 
be found. The crisis'eased considerably after 1842, and for- 
tunately for Mr. Gordon an inundation of poverty-stricken 
British workers did not occur when construction of the Paris-to- 
Röuen ended. Many stayed on to work on the crossing of Rouen, 
and later the other two railway lines, while many others are 
said to have obtained work on the fortifications at Paris. 
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Seasonal unemployment continued however, and Mackenzie and 
Brassey paid relief to over 300 workers during the winter of 
1843-44.148 
The second criterion of success in railway building-' 
was speed. Though the Paris-to-Rouen did well in this respect 
the Rouen-to-LeHavre did. not. On the former there were few 
serious engineering 'problems encountered. Construction of the 
line from Aisnieres, where it joined the St. -Germain railway, to 
Sotteville on the left bank of the Seine at Rouen went ahead 
quickly. The most difficult feats of engineering were four 
. 
'ý 
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tunnels, among them the one at Rolleboise which was blasted 
through 2,600 metres of hard rock, and four bridges. The whole 
line was completed in two years, a remarkably short time. 
(Chouquet, Lebobe et Cie had planned to complete their line in 
eight years. ) The engineering problems to be solved on the 
Rouen-to-LeHavre were not serious either. However, long delays 
arose owing to several causes. Carrying out detailed surveys 
and obtaining Ponts et Chaussees authority to begin construction 
took many months. Attempts were made to obtain permission to 
reduce the line's gradient from Rouen up onto the plateau at 
Barentin. Another long delay was caused by a dispute over 
the route to be followed near the town of Bolbec. Construction 
began in January 1844,149 and continued throughout most of 1844 
on the section between Rouen and Barentin. 
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By the end of 
November 1844, two and a half years after the concession had 
been granted, the shareholders were expressing concern over the 
slow progress being made. 
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Work had been continuing for another year when 
disaster struck. In the middle of January 1846, the long, high 
viaduct at Barentin collapsed. The delay caused by this 
incident was considerable.. The line had been scheduled to open 
for traffic in dune 1846,, but this was delayed until March 
1847.152 Immediately after the-accident, the Administration 
began an investigation. The-Conseil-g6n6ral des Ponts et 
Chauss¬es. appointed Pierre Frissard, who by this time was one of 
its members, to report back to it on the circumstances and the 
causes. It was Frissard's opinion that the viaduct had collapsed 
owing to weakness in the. bases of the pillars; they had been 
built of, a shell of stone blocks filled with rubble and mortar 
which had not set properly. 
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The Conseil-general decided that 
the viaduct must be entirely rebuilt with pillars of larger 
cross-section, and the stone shell-filled entirely with brick. 
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Despite the fact-that failure had occurred. owing to use of 
materials recommended by Locke, and which Brassey had not liked, 
Mackenzie and Brassey took upon themselves the entire re- 
sponsibility for reconstruction. 
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Rebuilding seems to have 
been underway by the middle of April 1846, with 600 men working 
on the new., viaduct both night and day, 
156 
and it was finished 
in six months. But this was not the end'o. f it. Owing to 
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considerable public alarm about the safety of the now viaduct 
and of'the two others'on this line, the Conseil-gdndral des Ponts 
et Chaussees decided that the company must carry out a series of 
strength tests on them; many of the conseilleu rs had at first 
believed that one of the other two, the viaduct at Malaunay, 
should also be entirely rebuilt. For one month, during December 
1846, the Malaunay viaduct was loaded across its entire length 
with three metres deep of 'sand. During January this was also 
done on the Mirville viaduct, and followed on both by moving 
tests with rolling stock. The. company had originally estimated 
that the delay would be two months, but by this time it had 
stretched out to nine. Although the cost of reconstruction fell 
upon Mackenzie and Brassey, the company suffered an equal burden. 
, The interest paid to shareholders at four per cent over nine 
months was at least 600,000 F, and the cost of the tests mentioned 
above was-about 50,000 F. There was also a loss of net revenue 
during these nine months when the line did not operate as had 
been expected. The total loss to the company was probably over 
one million francs. 
Financing Construction 
As Chouquet, Lebobe et Cie had most painfully dis- 
covered, there was a great difference between obtaining sub- 
scriptions-for capital and later obtaining full payment for 
these subscriptions. Moreover, once payments were received, the 
cash resources had to be 'stored', safely and economically. 
Finally, -when costs ran over the limits of original capital, 
more had somehow to be obtained. All of these aspects of 
financing had potential costs which were reflected in the total 
capital costs of the three railway lines. 
For the Paris-to-Rouen company obtaining payments 
from its subscribers was easy. Calls were paid up promptly at 
the prescribed three-month intervals, and'up to August 1842 
when 32 MF of-the total equity capital of 36 MF had been received 
only 94 shares out of 72,000 had defaulted. 
157 In January 1841 
the shares of the Paris-to-Rouen company first joined those. of 
seven other. railway companies on the Paris Bourse, and began 
trading somewhat below par. 
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Confidence in the new company's 
prospects was helped-by a rise in the rate of interest paid 
during construction from three to four per cent, 
159 
and by the 
" 
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summer of 1843 its shares had reached 700 F, 200 F above par. 
Trading was also brisk and prices followed the. same course on 
the exchange at Liverpool. 
When the Paris-to-Rouen company's construction costs 
began to exceed estimates, it became evident that more capital 
would be required. By October 1844 expenditures had reached 
51.8 MF, and further expenditures of almost 9 MF were anticipated. 
A small part of the excess-to date had been covered by the 
862,000 F earned as interest on.. Treasury bonds and bank accounts 
and in penalties from late payments on calls. - For the rest, 
the company would have preferred to issue 18,000 new shares at 
500 F, 160 but was compelled by the' Administration to issue a 
loan instead. Issuing new shares at a par value of 500 F to 
" existing shareholders, when their market price was over 1,000 F 
would only have added to the fires of speculation. Moreover, 
since 3MF of the projected new issues were to cover the possible 
expense of a branch line to Elbeuf'and Louviers which the Admin- 
istration wished to reserve until concession of a line to Basse- 
Normandie, 'the''loan was reduced to 6 MF. 
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Selling these bonds 
however, was not so easy as had been anticipated. When the sale 
was proposed in` 1844 the capital market was just entering its 
most expansive stage, but the investment boom did'not last long, 
and by the autumn of 1845 serious strains were beginning to 
appear. The demands placed on the capital market during 1845 
were enormous. During'this year there were eleven railway 
companies formed with'a total capital of 563.5 MF, and of this 
it was estimated that 105 MF had actually to be paid up during 
1845.162 Very soon after the company's bonds were offered for 
sale the stock market began to fall, and by January 1846 fewer 
than two-thirds had been sold. 
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The causes of this "alerte" 
in 1845, as Bertrand Gille calls it, 
164 
seem to have been very 
similar to those in 1838, excessive. long-term investment which 
caused a shortage of short-term funds, followed by liquidation 
of long-term commitments. Moreover, as the first payments came 
due on the huge mass of subscriptions taken up during the year, 
many investors'had to make a"choice and dispose of some shares. 
There was certainly much less room for new issues coming on the 
market. British shareholders were among the first to liquidate, 
165 
which made the Seine railways with their high proportion of 
British shareholders very vulnerable. 
., 
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By this time the Rouen-to--LeHavre company was also 
in-need of-extra funds. At a, special meeting 'of "shareholders 
on the 10th of December 1845 the conseil"d'administration 
explained that 8 to 10 MF would be required, and that 8 MF of a. 
10 MF bond issue would be put on sale. 
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The interest rate to 
be paid. was set. at the relatively high rate of five per cent, 
for as-the directors explained, "les capitaux (sont) plus rares 
ou'plus craintifs, et dans tous les cas plus chers.... " 
Fortunately during the first half of 1846 the capital market 
recovered some of its strength, and the company's bonds were 
all sold by the end of August 1846.167 While tests were being 
carried out on the viaducts, considerable help was also obtained 
from Laffitte and Blount, the company's bankers. The Paris-to- 
Rouen company was not so fortunate, and it managed to sell only 
half the-remaining. third of its bond issue by January 1847. 
During 1846 the capital market suffered a relapse, 
which developed into something much more serious than the "alerte" 
of 1845. Yet both companies needed still more funds. Since 
about July 1846 the stock market had been declining, and the 
Journal des Chemins de Fer first noticed the trend in the second 
week of August. -168 The fall accelerated through the autumn and 
by January 1847 share prices stood at 75 per cent of their value 
" nine months earlier. A tighter money market owing to. a poor 
harvest, consequent outflow of gold and a higher commercial 
discount rate. contributed strongly to this. 
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The demands made 
upon the capital market by railway companies also continued to 
be very large. It was pointed out by the journal des Chemins 
de Fer in November 1846,170 that over the following, nine months 
135: MF would come due for payment on railway shares. The total 
amounts committed to lines under construction, conceded or 
projected came to more than ten times this sum. 
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It was under 
these conditions both companies went to the market for more 
funds in January 1847. The Rouen-to--LeHavre issued 5 MF at five 
per cent172 while the Paris-to-Rouen decided instead to issue 
up to 5 MF in short-term securities as an interim measure, and 
to consolidate these at a more opportune time; by July almost 
2 MF had been raised by this. means,. at an effective interest 
rate of about four per cent, lower. than the going rate on long- 
term securities. Within the next six months these were con- 
solidated-into a long-term bond issue at five per cent, 3.9 MF of 
180 
which was sold. The Paris-to-Rouen company was also able to 
borrow substantially at somewhat lower cost from its operating 
account; 
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and of this internal borrot". ing, almost 1.5 MF was 
still outstanding by the beginning of 1848. 
As the economic crisis deepened through 1847, the 
companies' needs for additional funds continued. In this 
respect, these two 'companies were not unique, for as the prices 
of iron and other construction materials rose, many companies 
were being forced to find additional funds. Gille lists four 
other companies who put a total of 32 MF worth of bonds on the 
market during the crisis year of 1847.174 The situation of the 
Rouen-to-LeHavre company was becoming increasingly worrisome to 
, its management. As traffic grew in the months following the 
line's-opening'in March 1847, more funds were needed for 
additional rolling stock and station facilities. Late in 1847 
therefore it was decided to issue another 5 MF in long-term 
bonds at five per cent. The situation was worrisome because 
operatinq revenues and profits had so far been smaller than 
expected, and the steadily rising amount of debt was imposing 
a growing burden on these revenues. Should the commercial 
crisis be aggravated and revenues fall even farther, the burden 
of fixed'interest payments could become intolerable. Paradox- 
ically this parlous state of affairs made the company's bonds' 
easier to sell, for as--debt obligations of the company, they 
offered what appeared to be a more assured return. The capital 
market was clearly in disarray through 1847; once again the 
situation is well summarized by Bertrand Gille. 
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Tous les el6ments de la crise etaient r6unis. Pour retrouvor 
leurs donds de roulement dangereusement immobilises, les 
fabricants devaient vendre les titres qui'ils avaient 
acquis ou les marchandises qu'ils avaient en stock. Pour 
payer les versements successifs, les "capitalistes" devaient 
dgalement arbitrer entre leurs titres. Enfin, comble 
d'infortune, les Anglais, eux aussi en difficult6, arbitraient 
automatiquement leurs placements on vendant les titres 
¬trangers, c'est-a-dire surtout les valeurs de chemins de* 
for frangais. 
Railway share prices continued to'fall throughout the year,. 
though the Journal des Chemins de'Fer thought it saw a recovery 
beginning in November. 176 Low profits made investors very wary 
of Rouen-to-LeHayre shares, and rumours of a rock-fall on the 
line in the first-week'of December 18 4" caused a drop in the 
company's stock from 512F. 25 to 471F. 25 it was just this 
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apprehension over low profits and high risk which made investors 
eager to buy fixed interest securities, and the new issue of 
5 IMF was reported to be : elling' well in 'the last weeks of 
December 1847.178 
The growing crisis also had an almost disastrous 
effect upon the Rouen-to-Dieppe company. Its problem became 
very similar to, that experienced by Chouquet, Lebobe et Cie, 
inability to realize its subscribed capital. In the first 
months of 1846, even before any construction on the line had 
begun, a large number of shares were delinquent in answering 
the call for payment of the second tenth of subscribed capital. 
'As many of these were owned in Great Britain, legal action was 
difficult. It was felt also that a defaulters' auction would be 
unwise, since the price of the company's shares had been falling 
ever since they were listed on the Bourse in October 1845. It 
was decided therefore to buy them back instead. 2,045 shares 
were bought by the company, 1,000 with its own resources and 
the rest with the contractors' reserve fund. The same thing 
occurred with the third versement'a few months later, and this 
time the company was forced to sell another 2,000 delinquent 
shares, at a loss of almost 170,000 F. Though the fourth went 
more smoothly, it was clear that the company would be unable to 
realize all of its capital. An obvious remedy would be to 
postpone building the second branch to Fecamp, and to concentrate 
all its resources on the more important line to Dieppe. After 
intervention from the Town of F6camp however, an approach was 
made to the government for aid in the form of a guarantee of 
interest, but when the response to this was-negative, the company 
was forced to fall back upon its first idea. Further large 
numbers of shareholders failed to pay calls between May 1847 and 
January 1848. 
It was in the following weeks that the full extent of 
the Rouen-to-LeHavre company's vulnerability and the Rouen-to- 
Dieppe company's weakness became evident. There seems to have 
been a-growing sense of approaching calamity in France during' 
these first weeks of-1848. During December the Journal des 
Chemins de Fer complained of the unljealthy attitude of French 
investors; this financial crisis,.. it said, 
9 
was one "comme les 
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actionnaires frangais sont souls capables d'en eprouver.... Les 
porteurs de titres... s'abandonnent si facilement aux plus . 
pueriles apprehensions, pr8tant par trop naivement le flanc ä 
la speculation. " Even the price of rentes was falling, it noted 
with the prophetic remark, "comme si l'on prevoyait un ebranlement 
de 1'edif ice gouvernementale.... " Enthusiasm for the Rouen-to-, 
Lefavre company's bonds was short-lived, and it was forced to 
obtain its funds largely by selling short-term securities at a 
discount. In this way the company's dangerous financial situa- 
tion was further aggravated. As the conseil d'administration 
later told the shareholders, 
180 
Les banquiers de la societe qui"negociaient ces valeurs, 
nous avaient, ä divers reprises, avertis des difficultes 
quo cette negociation pourrait rencontrer dans l'avenir, 
et de l'embarras serieux dans lequel ils se trouvaient 
places, si les renouvellements devenaient impossibles: par 
ces motifs nous avions reconnu la necessite dune prochaine 
consolidation; mais 1'etat du credit public et prive ne 
nous avait pas permis d'y proceder.... 
When the financial debacle of February 1848 occurred 
the company's whole financial edifice was very badly undermined, 
though not toppled. Great difficulties were created for the 
Rouen-to-Dieppe company. Any prospect of recovering much from 
remaining calls effectively vanished, and when the Bourse re- 
opened late in February the company's shares fell from an already 
low value of 250 F to little more than 125 F. The resulting 
lack of cash forced the company to suspend construction, 
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until 
resources were found to resume work early in May. The company's 
caution deposit of 170,000 F was refunded by the government; 
about 250,000 F from the company's portfolio of Treasury bonds 
was sold (at a loss); a generous credit arrangement was arrived 
at with Mackenzie and Brässey. 
As for the Rouen-to-LeHavre company, its short-term 
securities could not be renewed, and the Bank of France refused 
to discount them. A considerable quantity of these were held 
in fact by the Rouen-to-Dieppe company, which was left unable 
to redeem them for the cash it badly needed. Laffitte and 
Blount,. the company's bankers, were forced into liquidation 
early in March, owing the Rouen-to-Lefavre company almost 314, 
000 F. " During March 1848, operating revenues were reduced 
almost to zero. Moreover, a request to the government for payment 
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of 500,000 F outstanding on the subvention of 8 MF promised in 
1842 went unanswered. Bankruptcy was narrowly averted only 
because the company's creditors were few in number and willing 
to wait. All payments both of dividends and of interest on 
bonds were suspended until the company's short-term debts could 
be paid off. 
183 
All three companies. however, managed to survive 
the crisis and were able to continue their operations into the 
prosperous 1850s. 
I 
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PART THREE 
Provided with both motive power and track, the railway 
could begin its operations. The immediate result was compet- 
ition with road and river-borne transport. The new railway 
combined speed equal or superior to that-of road transport with 
prices close to those of river-transport, and it took traffic 
from both. Its rivals for passenger transport were almost 
immediately eliminated. Neither of its rivals for goods however, 
was so greatly affected. Road transport, despite its very high 
rates, was able for several years to retain a small part of its 
former traffic. The operators of river-borne transport lost 
relatively little of their accustomed traffic; however, compet- 
ition forced down their rates and their revenues. This loss of 
revenue was aggravated by an, economic crisis in the late 1840s. 
The role of the State was to act as arbitor and protector, and 
for the first time since the Old Regime it became involved in 
economic regulation of transport. The State also retained its 
leading role in the provision and improvement of waterway 
infrastructure., As river-borne transport became threatened by 
competition, the programme begun in the 1830s for canalization of 
the Seine was accelerated. During the 1850s most of a first 
stage of this programme was completed. With this and with 
further innovations, water transport was able to regain some of 
its lost traffic and revenue. 
"4 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The First Experience of Competition, 1843 to 1849 
The first railway trains ran between Paris and Rouen early 
in May 1843. In the beginning they carried only passengers, and 
it was-not-long before almost all intercity passenger transport 
-by other means had been elim-inated. Serious competition for 
-goods transport began in 1844, and considerable quantities of 
, some types of goods were taken from both road and water-borne 
transport. However, it was not until 1647 when the railway was 
extended to LeHavre that it began to make large inroads upon the 
traditional staples of water transport, such as wines and spirits. " 
This was-the first year in which railway traffic from Rouen to 
Paris exceeded that on the river. The Paris-to-Rouen railway 
company consistently returned adequate profits to its shareholders, 
partly owing to its large passenger revenues. Because the Rouen- 
to-Lellavre had much smaller revenues from both passengers and 
goods, and owing to its very high construction costs, it found an 
adequate level of profit impossible to attain. During the crisis 
in 1848, when traffic was-entirely stopped for a time on both 
lines, °the Rouen-to-LeHavre suffered a loss on its operating 
account, as well as being in serious difficulty with financing its 
large debt., The economic crisis which began in 1847 and was 
greatly aggravated after the journ6es of February 1848, had an 
equally serious effect upon the batellerie. ' However, even by 
1849, after suffering the effects of both competition and econo- 
mic crisis, neither road transport nor the batellerie had been 
eliminated. The latter still-carried half of the goods from 
Rouen to Paris. 
Brief Competition for Passengers. 
, 
When it first opened for service on the 9th of May 1843., 
the new railway's activities were almost entirely confined to the 
carriage of passengers. Therefore the first battle in the compet- 
itive struggle between the. railway and. its longer established 
rivals was fought over, passengers. Though the battle was short 
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and the outcome easily fores. een,. its results were important. The 
virtual monopoly soon won'by, the railway provided one of the main 
strong-points from which it could subsequently attack its other 
rivals for a share of goods traffic. It was a decade since the 
first passengers had been carried by rail in France, and there 
was little doubt in anyone's mind that all but an insignificant. 
part of inter-city passenger transport would quickly be taken over 
by railways wherever they were built. Their combination of speed, 
and relative. comfort was clearly superior to either of their 
potential competitors using the roads and waterways. This almost 
universal admission of the railway's superiority was epitomized 
by the reaction of a royal princess upon stepping down from her 
first ride on the new Paris-to-St. -Germain railway in 1837. 
"Vraiment", she said, "cela de'goute de toute autre maniere de 
voyager. '" There is no doubt that superior speed was its most 
1 
effective weapon in defeating its rivals. On its inaugural trip 
from Paris to Rouen, even after making six stops along the way, 
the train took only four and a-half hours from the Gare St. -I. azare 
to Rouen. 
2 
In regular service this was further reduced to only 
four hours, half the time required by road and one-third that by 
steamer. The railway', s fares moreover compared favourably with 
those of its rivals. Fares"were set only slightly below the 
maxima permitted by its cahier des charges, 16 F for a first 
class 
seat from Paris to Rouen, 13 F for a second class seat, and 10 F 
for a third. 
3 
These fares gave. the railway total superiority over 
less comfortable road transport. Passengers travelling by 
diligence were compelled to pay from about 18 F for the poorest 
seats on the outside 'banquette' to 25 F for the best inside 
'coupe' seats. 
4 
Steamers though, while easily beaten in speed, 
were probably no less comfortable than the railway and they 
retained a slight advantage in price. Steamer fares, which had 
been 14 F and 10 F for first and second class accommodation in 
1840,5 had been reduced to only 9F and 6F by 1843.6 
The railway's victory over passenger transport by road was 
predictably swift and almost complete. It was estimated in 18437 
that during the previous year 750,000 passengers had travelled all 
or part of the way by road between Rouen and Paris; this included 
both the route d'en haut (Route royale NO. 14 across the plateau) 
and the less used route'd'en bas (NO. 13 through the valley). 
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About 70,000 of these passengers travelled the whole distance 
between Paris and Rouen. Within little more than"three months an 
agreement was signed with the two principal passenger carriers, 
the Messageries royales and the Messageries Laffitte, by which 
both agreed to cease all passenger transport from Paris to Rouen. 
8 
At the same time they agreed to give up their express traffic 
which went in the same coaches. In future they would act as 
freight forwarders for the railway, which would charge the same 
rate for express as they had, about 49 F per ton from Paris to 
, 
Rouen. 9 To complete this erLtente, early in 1844 M. Simons, 
administrateur of the Messageries royales, filled the place left 
vacant by Jacques Laffitte on-the Board of Directors of the Paris- 
to-Rouen company. 
10 
It is not likely however, that all passenger 
transport by road was ended by this arrangement. It was still 
necessary to carry passengers to and from towns off the railway 
line, especially those on the plateau and in. the Eure valley, 
and it is probable that many shorter journeys were still made by 
road. 
11 
Passenger steamers managed for several months to retain a 
significant proportion of their former traffic. Before the advent 
of the railway, these steamers had carried about 300,000 passengers 
each year all or part of the way between Paris and Rouen, and 
about one-tenth of these are said'to have travelled the whole 
distance. 
12 
An article in, the Journal'des Chemins de Fer in the 
week following the opening of the railway13 reported that the 
steamer operators had been greatly encouraged by the comparatively 
high level of passenger fares on the railway. Thrcugh the summer 
of 1843 an average of about 3, '500 passengers travelled by steamer, 
14 
about thirty per cent of the former traffic. The railway's manage- 
ment, later estimated that this competition from the steamers cost 
it about 100,000 F in lost revenue during 1843,15 and in the 
following year steps were taken toy eliminate it. As with road 
transport, an agreement was made with the operators; of the ETOILES 
and the DORADES in the spring of 1844 in which these companies 
agreed to 
. cease- 
carrying any passengers between Pecq and Rouen. 
However, there was a price which had to be paid. In return the 
railway company granted them an. indemnity of 5,000 F per month 
for seven months each year-for the, following three years. 
16 
if 
the company's estimate of lost revenue was correct, this was a 
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cheap price to pay, and it probably gave the steamer operators 
net revenues very close to those they had been getting during 
the period of competition. The only losers were the travellers 
who preferred economy to speed; the cheapest seat on the railway 
-in uncovered third class carriages --was little less than double 
the cheapest passage by steamer. Means were soon found by which 
the railway could also tap-this low-price market. On the recom- 
mendation of William Reed, who had-seen it done on the London and. 
Southwestcrri, the company began late in. the summer of 1844 to 
attach second and third class. coaches to its goods-trains; -the 
travel time to Rouen was six to seven hours and the third class 
fare was six francs, equal to the lowest fare by steamer. 
17 
The one area of passenger transport in which competition 
was not eliminated was over the short distance between Paris, 
Maisons, Poissy and P"; eulan. Competition here came from two main 
sources, from river steamers and from the Paris-to-St. -Germain 
railway, which ran on the same tracks as the Paris-to-Rouen. 
Owing to higher railway fares and to the relative unimportance of 
the time difference between modes, water-borne transport still 
did well over these short distances. It was reported early in 
184418 that the Paris-to-Rouen railway was getting only about 
half of the passengers travelling between Paris and Maisons, and 
only one-quarter of those to Poissy and Meulan. To get more of 
this traffic, the company considerably lowered its fares between 
Paris and Mantes, and increased the number of trains between these 
two points from six to eleven each day in the summer of 1844.19 
Whatever effect this had is unknown. 
20 
The railway had a very successful first year of operation. 
It carried more than 600,000 passengers and earned gross revenues 
of over 5 MF. 
21 
Operating costs came to only 39 per cent of 
revenues, and even if track and station maintenance had been taken 
into account in this year (they still-remained the responsibility 
of the contractors), this figure would still probably have been 
only about 47 per cent. Passengers were of undisputed economic 
importance to this and other"compan-ies... However, use of the 
railway continued for many years to be limited to a very small 
segment of the total population. One might have expected the 
one-third reduction in fares and a one-half reduction in travel 
time which they brought about to stimulate many new passenger 
"{ 
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journeys. The increase which occurred seems to have been about 
twenty per cent, and thereafter; as is evident in Figure 14, 
the rate of growth was very slow. With the passenger market 
limited by the very low level of incomes earned by the great 
majority of the population, it is doubtful that except in the 
first instance when competitors were being eliminated that many 
more passengers could have been attracted by a reduction in fares. 
Over the next fifteen years in fact no more than one or two 
were 
made. -Passenger traffic, unlike goods traffic, was very 
highly 
-seasonal, and only a small part of it consisted of passengers 
travelling all the way between Paris and Rouen. By 1845, when 
almost 970,000 passengers were carried, eighty per cent of them 
travelled only, part of the full distance. After the Rouen-to- 
LeHavre railway was opened in 1847 very few passengers travelled 
all the way between Paris and LeHavre; only 8.4 per cent of the 
passengers riding the line between Rouen and Lelavre originated 
their journeys east of Rouen. Only ten per cent of the. total 
passengers on the Paris-to-Rouen-travelled first class, the 
remainder-being divided equally between second and third classes. 
22 
Competition in the Transport of Goods. 
Although a limited quantity of goods was carried by the 
railway from about July 1843, full goods service from terminals 
at Batignolles on the northern edge of Paris and at Sotteville 
across the Seine from Rouen was not begun until January 1844. 
Until this time the company had not yet received sufficient 
rolling stock, and owing to delays in construction and a prolonged 
dispute with the Paris-to-St. -Germain railway company, with whom 
the Paris-to-Rouen shared part of its track, 
23 the terminal at 
Batignolles was not ready for use. Even once it had begun goads 
traffic grew only gradually, for competition for goods from both 
road and water-borne transport remained much more effective than 
it had been for passengers. Some'vestiges of inter-city goods 
transport by road remained even in the early 1850s. Water-borne 
goods transport, though its operators suffered considerably from 
competition by the railway, was able to survive through the 
1840s and into the more prosperous 1: 850s. Goods transport was 
much more complex in nature than passenger transport; not only 
speed and price, but also timetabling, conditions of carriage, 
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convenience and other factors helped to determine the distribution 
of commodities among transpört modes. Nevertheless, the rail- 
way's principal weapon in the contest for goods traffic was its 
tariff. Using'this weapon, however, was not a simple task; 
competitive and profitable rates had to be determined for each of 
several hundred commodities, taking into account not only simple. 
considerations of revenue yield and cost (at a time when none 
of the modern techniques for cost and revenue analysis existed), 
but also the possible reactions of rivals who might in turn lower 
some of their own rates. The beginning was especially difficult, 
-when knowledge of these factors was very small. Nor was the 
r 
company entirely free to sei its tariff as it wished; it very 
quickly learned that the law imposed constraints. 
In the beginning the only effective means for determining 
a goods tariff was to experiment, and beginning in June 1843 the 
company made several changes in its rates. Unfortunately this 
brought it into almost immediate conflict with the Administration, 
which considered'such'action to be illegal. The conflict however, 
was short-lived. The Administration seemed anxious that the 
benefits from lower transport costs should not be limited by undue 
constraints upon the'railway companies which would prevent them 
from lowering their rates, and it quickly developed a very sympa- 
thetic and permissive regulatory stance toward them. The Admin- 
istration's experience in economic regulation of transport was 
slight and it seems at first to have been unsure of the means it 
should adopt; since the Old Regime none of the traditional means 
of transport had been subject to such regulation, and until 1843 
there seemed to be no need for any administrative regulation of 
the railways. There were by this time moreover, only the most 
slender of legal bases . for a system of economic regulation, 
nothing more indeed than"the'statutory cahiers des charges for 
each railway company. There was no general legislation setting 
out a system of economic regulation, and the applicability of 
existing codes seems to have been quite unclear. The Administra- 
tion's power to exercise some control over the railways in their. 
commercial affairs sprang from the nature of the 'concession'. 
Unlike the railways of Great Britain-and elsewhere, those of 
France were never granted clear title to the rights-of-way they 
occupied; once expropriated these remained part of the public 
r 
r 
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domain. The concessions by which companies were granted a 
protected monopoly to exploit certain lines of railway were only 
contracts between them and the State. In, return for their under- 
taking to build and operate these lines of railway as common 
carriers,, the companies were given the right to charge rates of 
carriage up to certain maxima, which were set out in the cahiers 
des charges. 
24 
Goods and passengers were each divided into three 
classes, roughly on the basis of their value, and three maximum 
rates of carriage prescribed. Although it"was stated in Article 
35'of the cahier des charges that "tous changements apportes dans 
les tarifs devront titre homologues par des arretes du prefet... ", 
nothing was stated explicitly about-homologation, or official 
publication, of the company's initial tariff. Nor did it 
"explicitly exclude any change in the system of classification. 
. In attempting to control, the company's activities, the 
central Administration tried at first to work almost entirely 
through its local agents, the prefects. This worked in most other 
areas of administration. The prefects however, were naturally 
very subject to pressure from the vested interests of their 
locality. Seeing only its competitors behind the prefects there- 
fore, the railway company resisted their attempts at regulation. 
On the 16th of June 1843 a 'Reglement general de police du chemin 
de fer de Paris ä Rouen' was sent by the Prefect'of the Seine- 
Inferieure to the, company, 
25 
requiring that its tariff receive 
homologation by him before being put into effect. Although the 
company had already sent two proposed, tariffs to the Minister of 
public Works, 'neither had been published and it continued its 
experimenting, in effect ignoring the authority of the Prefect. 
When the company failed to comply with the reglement, the Prefect 
sought instructions from the Minister. 
26 
He soon arrived at an 
impasse. He was told first to issue a simple 2roc6s-verbal de 
contravention against the company, 
27 
and when this had no effect, 
an arrete forbidding the railway to begin any carriage of goods. 
This also proved ineffective -the fine imposed was only five 
francs-but when he asked the Minister if he should use physical 
force against the company, the Prefect was told that he should 
not. 
28 
In effect therefore he was powerless. In Rouen there was 
growing discöntent with the conduct of the railway company, 
especially among the commissionnaires de'roulage, who were the 
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first to feel the effects of. competition. In July-and August 
five of them sent, two petitions to the Prefect and one to the 
Conseil-general of the Seine-Inferieure, 
29 
complaining of illegal 
practices by the company and pleading that failure to enforce 
the law would be fatal to their businesses. In mid-September 
the Prefect asked the Chambre of, Commerce for advice on the subject, 
but while they stated their objections to several points in the 
company's proposed tariff, particularly its departure from the 
system-of classification in the cahier des charges, they were 
generally conciliatory, calling. the company's policy merely an 
"inconvenient excusable comme essai'.... +30 
Despite the restraint exercised by the central Administra- 
tion, a confrontation was not long in coining. Believing itself 
persecuted by the Prefect, the company appealed over his head to 
Legrand, Sous-secretaire d'Etat des Travaux Publics. 
31 In its 
letter, the company complained of continual threats and harassment 
by the Prefect, stating that in its opinion, 
la compagnie nest pas tenue de soumettre ä l'approbation et 
meine ä 1'homologation de l'autorite le tarif qui lui sert de 
point de depart, pourvü toutefois qu'elle se renferme Bans 
les limites du cahier des charges.... 
Moreover, experimentation, it said, was necessary'at the beginning 
when all was unknown, and the classification of goods laid out 
in the cahier des'charges, which was the same for every railway 
company, would certainly need some changes. "Pour trouver la 
classification. convenable pour notre ligne", the letter continued, 
nous n'avons d'autres moyens que de nous mettre en rapport 
avec le commerce, que d'etudier ses besoins, ses rapports 
avec les anciennes voies de transport, quo de chercher ä 
connaitre par la pratique les conditions auxquelles le notre 
pouvait s'etablir. 
Dans la classification il faut prendre en consideration 
32 
non seulement la nature (of-the goods to be transported), 
mais lour provenance, les frais qu'elles ont dejä supportfies, 
leur destination, les habitudes du commerce, de 1'industrie 
et de la consommation, circonstances qui changent scion les 
localites. 
Legrand replied with a sharp rebuke to the company, very clearly 
stating the Administration's"position on every point raised. by 
the company. 
33 
... Vous etes tout-a-fait m6pris sur 1'6tendue 
de vos droits 
et de vos obligations, et lorsque deja, daps plusiours autres 
occasions voüs n'avez tenu aucun cgmp. te des avertissements, 
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des injonctions memo de. l'Autorit6, vous ne devez pas 
etre surpris que cello-ci, clans une question qui touche a 
tant d'interets, ait voulu faire respecter la loi. 
Although the Administration, continued Logrand, had never claimed 
to stand in the way of companies charging rates within the 
maxima set out in their cahiers des charges, it maintained that 
formal administrative sanction by "l'autoritd locale" was 
mandatory. As to the question of experimentation, the cahier des 
charges clearly stated that-any new tariff must be maintained 
for at"least three months, and. that every change must be authorised 
by the Prefect. Furthermore, 'Legrand concluded, 
Je dois... Messieurs, vous faire observer que (la) classifica- 
tion nest pas abandonnee, comme vous semblez le croire, ä 
votre libre disposition. 
This was of the, greatest importance, he said, in protecting the 
legitimate interests of the railway's competitors. 
A compromise was soon reached, both parties adopting much 
more flexible positions than these initial statements seemed to 
indicate. The company replied that while it did not accept the 
Minister's claim that every tariff including the initial one was 
subject to homologation, or that homologation implied any form 
of approval, it would nevertheless once again submit a draft 
tariff to the Minister. 
34 
The company protested though35 against 
the Prefect seeking advice from the Chambre of Commerce-holding 
an- inquiry,. it said--where its competitors in river and road 
transport were-so well represented. Effective operation would 
be quite impossible if every Prefect along the railway's path 
were permitted to hold inquiries and to take upon himself the 
power to allow or disallow the company's tariff. The company 
was quickly assured by the Minister36 that final approval of a 
single uniform tariff would come only from himself. The second 
and major concession by the Minister concerned the classification. 
The company continued even after Legrand's strong reprimand to 
maintain that it must modify the classification, and it did so. 
in its tariff proposal of the 12th of September; it protested 
that37 
On se preoccupe beaucoup des industries rivales de leurs 
droits acquis, mais"par le fait seul de l'q-tablissement 
des chemins de fer n'a-t-on pas consacr6 l'aneantissement 
complet du roulage et une reduction du transport par eau? 
ý" 
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The Administration, it went on, shows too much concern to protect 
these industries.. The Administration quickly, though somewhat 
reluctantly, came round to the company's point of view. The 
Prefect of Police, who played an official role similar to though 
more important than that of the Prefects in each departement 
along the railway line, refused to sanction the company's four- 
class tariff submitted in September; he conceded however, that 
to establish separately rated sub-classes would be permissible, 
38 
and with this bit of casuistry agreement on a 'hew tariff was 
reached. Early in the new year. the company submitted a new 
tariff on this model, and Legrand accepted the compromise. In 
his final report to the Minister however, he warned39 
Je ne me dissimule pas, M. le Ministre, combien pourraient 
avoir de gravite dans quelques circonstances, des declasse- 
ments du genre de ceux dont il s'agit ici. I1 pourrait 
quelquefois en resulter des perturbations funestes Bans 
diverses industries, et aussi ne doit-on les autoriser qu'- 
avec reserve;... 
But, he concluded, 
Bans l'espece, les propositions de la compagnie me paraissent 
tres convenables. I1 est certain que, dans 1'etat actuel 
des prix du roulage, le maintien pour certains articles de 
la taxe du tarif equivaudrait ä une prohibition, et il ne 
peut qu'etre utile des lors, Bans l'interet du public 
d'autoriser l'abaissement des taxes qua demande la compagnie. 
He recommended full approval of the proposed tariff, and homolo- 
a tion came at the end -of April. 
40 
While in future the Administration adopted a'very 
permissive stance in its relations with the railway companies, 
this early experience demonstrated the inadequacy of the ad hoc 
system which depended for its legal base upon the sometimes vague 
cahiers des charges of individual companies. It also demonstrated 
the inability of local authorities to exercise regulatory powers 
of this kind by delegation. The growing number of railways 
coming into operation indicated that they should be taken more 
generally into account in administrative structures. The partisans 
of river transport would like to have seen not only administrative 
definition in the conduct of. railway companies' business, but also 
a considerable meaciire of constraint on competition. A special 
committee established jointly in 1845 by the three Conseils- 
generaux of Agriculture, of Manufactures and of Commerce considered 
this problem and recortunended very rigid' limitations upon rate 
41 
setting, which would have considerably reduced the competitive 
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pressure upon water-borne transport. Two ordonnances royaux 
were rendered in 1846 and 1'847. ' The first42 imposed only slightly 
tighter controls upon railway rate making, its most-important 
provision being a flexible, article forbidding the railways from 
charging any tariff not first approved and homologue by the 
Administration. To assist in enforcing this provision and to 
provide for more effective surveillance of inter-modal competition, 
the same ordinance also established commissaires royauxfor each 
railway company, who were responsible to a single Commissariat 
"central des Chemins de Fer. -At the beginning of 1846 the Minister 
of Public Works had established a new Service provisoire des 
Chemins de Per comprising 202'engineers and conducteurs taken 
from other services, 
43 
and this was complemented by a permanent 
system of four advisory committees established by the second 
ordinance, in 1847.44 Although tighter controls were'in this 
way imposed upon the railways, it is doubtful whether either the 
rouliers or bateliers received much protection from them. Their 
object was not protection, or as it later became known, 'co- 
ordination' of transport, but simply regulation of fair compet- 
ition. Control in future was more firmly placed at the centre, 
where it tended to be less sensitive to pressure from those 
injured by competition. 
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Competition with Road Transport. Between February 1844 
and May 1848 the Paris-to-Rouen company altered its tariff five 
times, always generally in a downward direction. The first to 
feel the effects of competition was roulage, and the rouliers 
began to lose traffic to the railway almost as soon as it began 
its operations. During its first six months of operation up to 
December 1843, most of the goods carried were messageries, 
" designated marchandises de rý ande vitesse, though there was also 
a small quantity of ordinary goods, designated marchandises de 
petite vitesse. The former were carried in wagons attached to 
passenger trains, the latter on goods trains. During these first 
months rates on the railway remained very close to the maxima 
allowed by the cahier des charges. Even at this level however, 
they were-a considerable threat to the rouliers. Competition 
with the rouliers"was for ordinary goods, and the railway company's 
highest rate for most of these was 27F. 40 per ton, the lowest 
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18F. 90.46 There were only a few perishable, fragile and 
dangerous goods which were charged a higher rate of 41F per ton. 
In 1843 roulage ordinaire from Rouen to Paris cost about 35 F 
per ton, while faster roulage acceldre cost 70 F or more. 
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Although roulage'accel6re came close to the railway in speed -- 
about, thirty hours compared with the railway's normal twenty-five 
-its tariff was comparatively high; on the other hand, though 
the rate charged by roulage ordinaire was lower than the highest 
rate on the railway, its slow speed - three to four days from 
Rouen to Paris - made it a less effective competitor in this 
respect. The railway could also offer much greater security from 
damage, for which road transport was notorious. This is not to 
say however, that the rouliers were immediately forced to the 
. wall as their collegues carrying passengers had been. During the 
first six months. of its operations the railway company's total 
revenue from the carriage of goods was about 550,000 F. 
48 In the 
absence of any record of the quantity or type of goods carried, 
they may be estimated to have been about 20,000 tons, including 
both grande and petite vitesse in both directions. 
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This was 
certainly less than the traffic carried by roula e, and in any 
casa, much of it. was taken from the compagnies de messageries. 
During all of 18.43 roulage is said to have carried a total of 
about 170,000, tons, between Rouen and Paris. In 1844 this amount 
fell by almost forty per cent to little more than 100,000 tons50 
but it was only over the next two or three years that the rouliers 
were compelled to give up much, though not all,. of their accustomed 
inter-city goods traffic. 
It is evident that the commissionnaires de roulage, the 
operators of roulage, had hoped at first to continue a large part 
of their inter-city goods services. They had little experience 
of price competition, and they seem-not to have expected much 
from the railway. If, as they hoped, the railway were to maintain 
a tariff close to its legal maxima, the effect of price compet- 
ition with it could be minimized. Moreover, the commissionnaires 
stated, 
51 
they had planned to become extensive users as well as 
competitors of the railway; this could be done if they were 
permitted to group their consignments for transport on the rail- 
way at'singlb bulk rates. In addition the commissionnaires 
hoped-still to operate over. their established and extensive routes, 
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using the railways to carry their wagons over certain trunk 
routes where they existed. Arrangements of just this kind were 
made between the railway and the compagnies de messageries in 
August, which allowed the latter not only. to group their parcels 
and to consign them to the railway at a single rate, but also to 
have their carriages and drivers themselves carried by the rail- 
way. In anticipation of the railway's coming, the commissionnaires 
stated, they had made new arrangements with clientele and new 
traites de relais to take account'of the new conditions they. 
thought would prevail. 
The railway company however, seems to have been determined 
that it should itself be the sole carrier of general merchandise 
on its line. Its management was confident that the advantages 
-offered by railway transport-in its words- "sous le rapport de 
la rapidite, de la sürete et de 1'6conomie sont tollement sen- 
sible, que les habitudes prises, les pr6jug6s, les intdrets 
rivaux eux-me-mes ne peuvent resister longtemps a rette superior- 
ite. "52 The company setup a bureau de reception on the Rue 
St. -Nicholas in the centre of Rouen, and announced in a public 
circular on the 14th of July 1843 that until its regular service 
for marchandises de petite vitesse began, it would carry all 
goods on its passenger trains, but at the regular rates. To 
overcome-the "habitudes prises" of its rivals' clients, the rail- 
way's agents actively solicited business in Rouen, sometimes, 
said the rouliers, offering to carry goods at less than the 
published rate. One of the chief advantages not only of road 
but also of water transport was direct door-to-door service, and 
to overcome it the railway offered pick-up and delivery ä domicile 
for a small extra charge of only OF. 30 per ton. Except for its 
chosen agents, this removed even the railway's delivery service 
from the grasp of the rouliers. 
The commissionnaires de roulage in Rouen very quickly 
understood that they were faced with a formidible new competitor, 
and they became increasingly alarmed by this threat. Their first 
reaction shortly after . 
the railway begab carrying goods, was to 
appeal to the local authorities for protection. Led by the 
Compagnie Veuve Malcouronne et fils, the largest of the rouliers 
in Rouen, five local companies with transport services to the west, 
south"and eist of, France joined in a petition to the Prefect 
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of the Seine-Inferieure asking him to enforce compliance by the 
company with the obligations stated in its cahier des charges. 
53 
They protested not only against the company's 'illegal' alteration 
of its tariff-until homologation, they believed, the company 
could legitimately charge nothing less than the legal maxima- 
but also against its attempt simply to act as a private common 
carrier. This, they maintained, it was not. It was a publicly 
sanctioned monopoly, upon whom strict statutory controls had 
been placed. They insisted especially that the company must be' 
compelled to stop experimenting' with its tariff and to observe 
the requirement that it give three months notice of any changes. 
Favouritism toward particular rouliers, they continued, must 
cease. The company, they complained in a second petition about 
"a month later, was behaving "absolument comme le ferait une 
entreprise particulibre livree li sa propre volonte. "54 Any 
further disregard of the law by the railway, they said, would be 
fatal to their existence. They protested also to the Conseil- 
g6n eral of the'Seine-Inferieure. 
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The Prefect was inclined to 
protect the commissionnaires de roulage, even if this should 
require the use of force against the railway. In this however, 
as we have seen, -he was overruled. The rouliers tried to compete 
by cutting their own rates, 
56 but when the railway drastically 
-reduced its rates in February 1844, by as much as one-third for 
some commodities--the-new rates were only 20F and 15F per ton- 
they were no longer able-to follow. By this time the rouliers 
were not alone in their growing sense of alarm. They had been 
joined in the chorus of protest by the maStre mariniers de la 
Seine, and both had the full support of the Chambres of Commerce 
in Rin and LeHavre. It was the common belief of all that the 
railway was bent on destroying every source of competition. In 
the Prefect's view, the situation wäs becoming explosive, and he 
warned 
the 
minister of impending violence in Rouen if the company 
were ndt either brought to heel, or its proposed tariff officially 
sanctioned. '' The latter in fact was very soon done. 
With little prospect of-help from the administrative 
authorities the commissionnaires de roulage turned to other more 
direct means, one of which yielded a measure of success. First 
they refused to transport any goods destined. for or which had 
been handled in any way by the railway; they refused even to 
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transport goods for any person who had any dealings with the 
railway. 
58 When the company countered these tactics by organizing 
its own services de correspondance, the rouliers brought action 
against the company in the Cour royale at. Rouen, but were 
unsuccessful. 
59 In another action however, they were more 
fortunate. Before the Tribunal de commerce'at Rouen, 
60 Colombet 
et Abrice, commissionnaires de roulage, alleged that when they 
had attempted to combine groups of small parcels for transport on 
the railway at a single rate, the company's. employees had dis- 
mantled their consignments and charged the full rate to each of 
the small parcels they contained; this was not done, they said, 
with parcels sent by the compagnies-de messageries. The court 
found in favour of the plaintiffs, and ordered the railway company 
to pay them 1,000 F damages and to refrain from dismantling their 
consignments in future. This was an important victory, for it 
allowed the rouliers to use the railway as they had hoped, as a 
link in their established routes. Attempts were also made to 
negotiate an agreement with the railway, but these failed owing 
to the exhorbitant demands of the commissionnaires de roula e. 
They demanded that in return for a. promise to send all their 
traffic by the railway where this was possible, the railway should 
charge them a rate forty per cent less than that charged to goods, 
coming to it directly, and that the latter should pay the full 
maxima. For the railway, its management stated, this would have 
meant "l'abandon dune portion si considerable de nos recettes 
qu'il nous a ete impossible d'admettre les propositions de traites 
qui nous ete faites. "61 Another year passed and once more the 
rouliers took the company to court. Before the Tribunal de 
commerce de la Seine, six of them demanded damages totalling 
almost 540,000 F. 
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They accused the railway of openly solic- 
iting traffic from the former clientele, of carrying on its own 
services de correspondance, and of giving privileged access to 
its stations to certain commissionnaires de roula e. Once again 
however, they lost. The company denied none of their allegations, 
all of its actions, it maintained, "being entirely within the law. 
As for the fate of the rouliers, its counsel commented with a 
fine sense of progress, "tout marche, le passe laisso ses ruines, 
et l'avenir'amene ses merveilles. "" 
61 
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Inter-city road transport along the Seine was certainly 
reduced to a tiny fraction of its former size by competition 
from the railway, ' but it was not entirely eliminated, even by 
the mid-1850s. The rouliers could exploit two principal advantages 
over the railway, flexibility in scheduling and door-to-door 
service, both particularly important to some shippers. The most 
important commodity to which this advantage applied was cotton 
cloth, sold-every week in Rouen on Thursdays and Fridays, 
assembled into wagon loads on Saturday and Sunday, and delivered 
by roulage to wholesalers in the-Place des Victoires in Paris 
early on Monday mornings. 
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The railway would accept consignments 
in Rouen only up to noon on Sunday, and guarantee to deliver them 
- and that only to its terminal at Batignolles - only by 
Tuesday morning. On weekdays goods were accepted up to eight in 
the evening for delivery to Batignolles by ten o'clock the 
following morning. The few hours between close of business and 
eight o'clock in the evening on Friday were too short for the 
merchants to prepare and deliver them to the railway. By using 
roulage accel6re they could still be assured of arrival before 
Monday morning even if they were not sent till late on Saturday. 
Because premium prices were obtained by goods delivered early, 
the rouliers, despite their higher rates continued for several 
years to carry this traffic. It was estimated in 1849 that of 
the fifteen tons of rouenneries sent on average each day from 
Rouen to Paris, nine went by road. In 1849 the-railway company 
attempted to put an end to this'. competition by offering terms to 
four of the ten or so commissionnaires de roulage in Rouen 
promising them good delivery times and concessionary rates. In 
an agreement which took effect in July 1849 the railway promised 
to carry goods consigned to it by the commissionnaires de roula e 
at special low rates and to permit them to consign goods at times 
convenient to the needs of their special trade. In return the 
rouliers were obliged to "demonter... les services de roulage 
.. 
acc6l&re existant aujöurd'hui entre Paris, Rouen et LeHavre... ", 
nor could they consign goods for transport to any of the remain- 
ing commissionnaires de roulage; it was hoped indeed that these 
would be forced off the road, and the company reserved the right 
to revoke the agreement 
. sans indemnite dans le cas of deux services de roulage 
accelere entre Paris et Rouen ou entre Paris et LeHavre 
existant actuellement ou crees p©sterieurement ä la signature 
des presentes se maintiendraient sUr la route pendant un delai 
de six mois. 
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Within a month however, the intended victims protested to the 
central authorities. in the-ensuing investigation of the agree- 
ment, which appeared at first to have been illegal, it became 
apparent that they too could have obtained the same concessions. 
By staying out they lost a great amount of traffic to the others. 
Despite this agreement the commissionnaires de roulage 
survived to prosper during. the 1850s. An examination of the 
Almanach du'Havre for the years 1.840 to 1860 shows that of the 
eight or so commissionnaires de roulage. active there in 1845, 
four remained in business during the 1850s, and four disappeared; 
at-the same time, -at least fifteen new ones came on the scene. 
Several continued to advertise "roulage accelere at ordinaire, 
departs tour les fours pour tous les pays", while several also 
advertised themselves as "Entreprise(s) general(s) des transports 
par chemins de far, grande at petite vitesse pour toute la France 
at etranger, delais garantis". Even on the route between Paris 
and LeHavre roulage continued for a while to survive. According 
to Adolphe Thibaudeau, the railway's general manager, by March 
1850 two charettes accelerees left Rouen each day in both direc- 
tions, and carried about 12,000 tons of goods per year. 
64 On 
many of their other routes of course the rouliers"faced no 
competition yet from the railway, and retained much of the 
accustomed business. Of far greater importance to the continued 
survival of the commissionnaires de roulage was the change in the 
nature of their businesses which many of them were able to bring 
about. They became more general commissionnaires de transports, 
continuing a trend the origins of which can be traced back to the 
beginnings of roulage accelere, acting not only as transporters 
of goods on their own account, but also accepting consignments 
of goods for the other modes of transport, both water and rail. 
Competition with Water Transport. For the first couple 
of years the bateliers do la Seine were able fairly effectively 
to prevent the railway from taking large amount of their accustomed 
traffic, though at some cost to their revenues. After a second 
tariff reduction by the railway late in. 1845 greater amounts of 
traffic were taken, but it seems to have been only after the 
railway's extension to LeHavre that it was able to take a large 
proportion of the river's traffic. Table 9 summarizes this 
history up to 1850.65 . 
i 
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Table 9 
Goods Traffic by River and Rail between Rouen and Paris, 
1840-1850 (tons). 
traffic by river traffic by rail 
upstream downstream to Paris to Rouen 
1840 234,103 158,864 - - 
1841 268,694 180,255 - - 
1842 258,850 168,383 - - 
1843 343,523 241, -525 ... ... 
"ý, __-1844 
251,144 162,196 78,100 26,042 
1845 281,421 164,943 103,190 42,948 
1846 245,958 150,885 195,815 51,661 
1847 248,131 144,176 268,302 58,701 
1848 133,054 86,779 141,083 59,024 
1849 166,179 154,079 178,369 97,808 
1850 197,502 149,857 180,387 107,952 
' The traffic taken by the railway from the river in 1843 
seems to have amounted to no more than about 30,000 tons, though 
more was taken from the rouliers. Goods traffic on the railway 
increased sharply at the beginning of 1844, partly at the expense 
of the river, but until the end of 1845 it continued to be fairly 
small compared with later years, and much smaller than that carried 
by the river. The impact of competition upon river transport was 
exaggerated in 1844 by a general decline in trade, and the loss 
of traffic by the river to the new railway was not so great as it 
first appeared to be. The total decrease in upstream river 
traffic from 1843 to 1844 amounted to almost 100, OOb tons or 
nearly thirty per cent. The bateliers had enjoyed very heavy. 
traffic in 1843, with particularly large cargoes of wines from 
Bordeaux and of construction timber (which together comprised 
forty per cent of the total), and, most of the decline in 1844 was 
owing simply to return by these commodities to more normal levels. 
In its first couple of years the railway made little or no impact 
upon the staples of river transport, construction timber, building 
stone and wine, or on several others. Significant amounts of 
about ten commodities did shift to'the railway in this initial 
period, but only one of them was of- any great importance to the 
bateliers. All of them were costly. goods for which speedy 
transport was valuable. The most important of them was spirits, 
and the others were. copper and tin, the two most valuable metals, 
raw cotton, hides and skins, coffee, olive oil, raw tallow and 
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soap". In 1843 all of these had amounted only to fourteen per 
cent of total river traffic, in "1842 nineteen *per cent. 
In its initial years, when the railway went only as far 
as Rouen, it was unable to show its full competitive strength. 
Moreover, as in the case of the rouliers, the bateliers, found 
a source of defensive strength in the traditional patterns of 
transport. Many storage and handling facilities and many indus- 
trial plants, where such goods as wine, timber, stone, grain and 
sugar were delivered, were located beside the waterways. Shippers 
-of these goods by railway were forced to pay high terminal and 
-cartage charges, and in the first couple of years with these 
added even to specially (and illegally) reduced railway rates, 
most shippers apparently still found it more economical, where 
time was not important, to ship by river. An example could be 
cited, the case of Lombard aine et fils, marchands de"bois in 
Paris. 
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Nous vendons tant ä Paris que dans la Banlieue (wrote Lombard) 
une tres-grande quantite de bois de sapin provenant du nord 
de l'Europe. Ces bois nous parviennent par les ports de (sic) 
Havre, Honfleur, Calais et Dunkerque. Notre interet nous 
commande de chercher les voies de transport les plus 
economiques. Depuis Rouen ä la Villette, par les bateaux 
normands"le transport de nos bois coüte 12F. 50 du tonneau. 
Le tarif du chemin. do for pour la derniZýre classe est de 
15F.; mais le Directeur, dans le but do s'attirer nos affaires, 
consentit au prix de 12F. Nous avons fait l'essai sur 150 
tonneaux de madriers en dimensions d'un maniement facile, 
et nous avons reconnu que nous ne pouvions donner suite a 
cette voie d'expedition. Los frais de port ä l'embarcadere 
de Rouen, ceux du debarcadEre des Batignolles ä notre chantier 
de la Villette nous ont cou-t6 3F. par tonneau. En outre 
pour des quantites importantes il resulte grand desordre. 
The impact of. competition however, should not be under- 
stated. The bateliers were able to minimize losses from their 
" accustomed traffic only by lowering their rates to stay below 
those of the railway, and-this could be done only at a 
considerable cost. The bateliers suffered a large decline in 
revenues in 1844 and 1845, almost half of it attributable to 
competition from the railway. In 1842 rates for river trans- 
port had been set by agreement at un unprecedented high level, 
and although somewhat lowered in 1843, they had remained 
very high. 
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-In February 1844 the railway reduced its rates 
to 15F and 20F per ton from Rouen to Paris, most of those 
68 
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commodities carried by river being rated at 15F. To retain their 
traffic. the bateliers were forced to follow. Beginning in 1844 
their rates were pulled down to levels which had been unknown 
since the severely depressed year of 1831. The average rates 
fell from 14F. 55 In 1843 to 12F. 93 in 1844; the maxima fell from 
19F. 00 to 13F. 80. At such low rates, according to one contemporary 
authority, 
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many of the, bateliers were barely able to meet their 
immediate direct costs of operation. Early in August 1844 the 
railway. company announced further-reductions; 
70 
new special rates 
were offered for direct shipments from Rouen to Paris, and applied 
first to seven commodities commonly carried by the river: iron, 
zinc, lead, oils, beer, and asphalt. 
There was genuine fear that with their rates being forced 
. even 
lower, the bateliers would be unable to continue their 
struggle. The Prefect in Rouen was-very alarmed and wrote to the 
Minister of Public Works71 that if the railway were permitted to 
continue in its present course, "la batellerie de Rouen et de 
. 
tout le littoral sera certainement'aneänti", adding "(j'insiste 
sur ce pointe)". The protests of the Chambres of Commerce, he 
warned, could not rauch longer be ignored. Letters of protest 
were received not only from the Chambre of Commerce in Rouen, but 
also from those in LeHavre and Paris, 
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complaining that the rail- 
way's rate, reductions were unfairly aimed at commodities habit- 
ually carried by the river, with the object, they said, of forcing 
the bateliers out of business. The railway's classification of 
goods, its lower rates for direct shipments and reported rebates 
to large shippers were all described as illegal. Moreover, they 
claimed, the railway company had recently made a secret agreement 
with a group of Northumberland mine owners for transport of large 
quantities of coal at special low rates, in violation of Section 
35 of its cahier des charges. 
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The special commission referred 
to above, formed by the Conseils-gdneraux of Agriculture, Manufac- 
tures and Commerce, commented that74 
Par la position toute speciale oti eile s'est trouvee placee 
par les elements de concurrence naturelle quelle devrait 
rencontrer dans son exploitation, cetbe compagnie a porte 
en naissant son peche original, nous voulons dire, sa tendance 
ä transgresser la loi et son cahier des charges. 
This was not, the view taken by the Administration, and although 
certain changes in the form of the tariff. were requested by 
Legrand and agreed to by the company, it was quickly authorized. 
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When once again the Prefect delayed homologation, he was firmly 
chastised.. 
75 
An inquiry was opened into the alleged illegal 
agreement for transport of coal, but very little seems to have 
come of it. It was common knowledge that similar agreements on 
a somewhat smaller scale were made by the"bateliers. 
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Having apparently received no protection from the Admin- 
istration, the bateliers, like the rouliers, were compelled to 
devise other means of defence. Following a half-hearted attempt 
late in 1845 to negotiate an agreement with the railway to end 
competition, 
77 
a group of about"five of the largest. operators 
of tugboats (Bertin, Expert, Hurault de Ligny, Lecoq and Pauwels) 
agreed early in 1846 to an informal alliance to compete against 
the railway, calling themselves the Compagnie de l'Union. 
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Between them they owned almost a dozen steamers, most of them 
tugboats. it was a very loose arrangement, as there were other 
alliances formed outside it by some of its members, but it does 
seem to have'included at least some kind of ccrnmon pricing policy 
and revenue pooling arrangement. One of the group's first actions 
was to sue the railway company for 600,000 F damages done to them 
by illegal application of its tariff. They won a limited victory 
by this means, being awarded 90,0'00 F plus cost. later in 1845.79 
During the next four or'five years the bateliers' strength 
was steadily eroded as their traffic and revenues continuously- 
declined. There were several reasons for this, including low 
water levels during 1846, further rail tariff reductions, the 
beginning of direct railway service from Paris to LeHavre, and the 
very serious economic and political crisis in 1848. Unlike road 
transport however, water transport continued during these years 
and through the 1850s to carry a large proportion of the total 
traffic. Low water levels on the Seine forced the bateliers to 
raise their rates slightly during 1846; this may also have made 
direct transport from LeHavre to Paris more difficult. In the 
following year, with the line opened to LeHavre early in March. 
1847, the railway was able for the first time to offer direct 
service from Lellavre to Paris.. "Sic Lutetia portus" (roughly 
"Thus'is Paris a seaport"') was the'device carried on the wagons 
of the Rouen-to-LeHavre railway. 
80 -The new railway carried about 
160,000 tons eastward"from LeHavre in its first year, much of it 
grain, of which large shipments were brought to LeHavre from 
foreign ports during 1847. About half of these goods seem to have 
"4 
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continued to Paris, 
81 
and with thoir"help traffic on the Paris-to- 
Roucn increased by almost 40 por"cent to about"14,000 tons per 
month. River transport direct from LeHavre to Paris fell at the 
same time by about one-quarter. The older alleges and bateaux 
normands operating on either side of Rouen managed to hold their 
own, though only owing to a large share in the transport of grain. 
About 46,000 tons of grain were carried by alleges to Rouen and 
trans-shipped there to bateaux normands for Paris. Without this 
the amount of goods carried by allCges would probably have fallen 
. 
by about thirty per cent, and that by bateaux normands by about 
twenty. Some of this potential fall in traffic must be attributed 
to the railway; some was also owing to reduced shipments of such 
staples of transport as wines. River transport direct from 
LelIavre to Paris was faced with real competition for the first 
time, and as a result water-borne traffic of this kind-fell by 
about one-quarter. A beneficial effect of this competition how- 
ever, was to bring about greater use of tugboats on the Basse 
Seine. Of the boats coming directly from LeHavre and destined 
for Paris, the proportion pulled by tugboats rose from 32 per 
cent in 1846 to 38 per cent in 1847. Of the boats coming only 
from Rouen, the proportion using tugs rose from only 30 per cent 
to 45 per cent. 
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Some credit for this may go to the newly formed 
Cie de l'Uhion. P 
1348 was a distastrous year for every kind of transport in 
the Seine'valley. The economic crisis had a much more serious 
effect upon the batellerie than competition from the railway. 
For a few weeks after the journees of February almost all 
commercial activity came to a halt, though it revived somewhat 
through the remainder of the year. In the words of the Chambre 
" of Commerce of 
Rouen, 83 the crisis 
a fait cesser Presque toute exp6dition d'outre-mer at de 
cabotage.... Le mouvement maritime est arretd, un grand 
nombre de navires sont desarm('-. s au port, les travailleurs 
nagu('Are si occup5s sont aux ateliers communaux oü ils se 
demoralisent et ne produisent rien. 
Over the whole of 1848, coasting trade to Rouen fell by almost 
sixty per cent from 1847, foreign trade by 54 per cent; coasting 
and foreign trade to LeHavre both fell by forty per cent. Traffic 
on the river from Rouen to Paris fell by 46 per cent, on the 
railway by 47 per cent. Shipments 'of wines, timber, building 
stone and grain were greatly reduced; and in several cases fell 
even farther in 1849. 
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While this economic crisis certainly caused considerable 
suffering amongst the seven or eight hundred men, maitres 
mariniers, compagnons and garcons de bateaux, who operated the 
marine normande, it also brought about some useful 'structural' 
changes. Aided by arrangements like the Cie de l'Union and other 
overlapping informal agreements, the owners of tugboats were 
unique in maintaining the position they had attained in 1847 
almost intact. Their traffic fell by little more than one per 
cent, and continued to rise again-in 1849. They were able to do 
this however, only at considerable sacrifice, for with further 
rate reductions by the railway, they were forced to lower their 
own rates to twenty per cent below those of 1847.84 Already 
they had been quite insufficient to cover costs. In 1849 the 
, volume 
of traffic still remained far below normal, and there 
were further substantial reductions in rates. Coffee, one of 
the principal commodities which had for many years been carried 
by chalands from LeHavre to Paris, had by this time gone entirely 
. 
over to the railway. 
Further structural changes affected the tugboat operators 
themselves. In a vastly reduced market, and under such intense 
and continuous competitive pressure, it was almost inevitable 
and indeed desirable that there be a reduction in the number of 
tugboat companies. Between 1848 and 1850 four companies went 
out of business and several others were forced considerably to 
reduce their operations. Owing to substantial losses, the Cie 
de 1'Union was forced to disband in 1850.85 Already in 1848, 
the first of its members, Lecoq had dropped out, selling his two 
remaining tugs, the AIGLES, to a newly formed rival group, the 
Association mariniere de Labrousse, Poulain, Potet et Cie. In 
the same year Bertin et Cie of LeHavre announced they would merge 
all their services with LeNormand-Baudu of Rouen, 
86 but in the 
following year, on the expiration of its charter, the Cie Bertin 
also decided to disband. 
87 
Its three old tugboats, by then over 
twenty years old, and twelve of its chalands, were sold at 
auction in the middle of 1849.. The remainder of its chalands 
seem to have been left idle in the Bassin Vauban at Leiiavre for 
several years. The Cie Expert, another member of the Union, 
though not forced entirely out of. business, seems to have been 
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compelled to sell some of his equipment, and to discontinue 
operations between Rouen and'Paris'. The Cie Hurault de Ligny, 
operators of one tug on the Seine-Maritime, were forced out of 
business. One of its competitors; the Cie Rouennaise, which had 
been formed in 1837, was also forced to disband when it came to 
the end of its charter in 1850.88 The number of steamers engaged 
in goods transport (including the tugboats) fell, according to 
Expert, 
89 from 23 before 1848 to only 13 by 1850. The number of 
chalands in operation on the'Seine, according to statistics 
published by the Chambre of Commerce in touen, fell from 53 in 
1847 to only 36 in 1850.90 The-number of companies operating on 
the Basse Seine was reduced from six or more to only three, 
LoNormand-Baudu, the Cie des Aigles (de Labrousse et Cie) and 
the Societe generale des remorqueurs parisiennes (also called the 
Cie Blanchon, and including elements of several old companies, 
among. them-Pauwels and Lacour de Riberprey). 
The effects of the crisis were quite different upon the 
traditional marine normande. Those who were unable to make use 
of tugboats --- certainly the great majority at this time, from 
lack of working capital to pay the charges - suffered the loss 
of more than three-quarters of their traffic, and the number of 
voyages fell from more than 500. in 1847 to little more than 100 
in'1848. They also suffered from the same competitive pressure 
upon rates as did the tugboat companies. The prevailing mood 
among the mariniers seems understandably to have been one of al- 
most unrelieved despair. By late 1848, in the words of an 
experienced observer of the Basse Seine, 
91 
en face de cette concurrence terrible, les mariniers ont 
perdu toute confiance en eux-memes, et voyant leur ruine 
presque imminente, ils n'ont plus pense qu'ä mettre 
profit leurs derniers jours d'existance.... 
Although after 1848 halage, like many independant crafts in 
industry, was certainly doomed to extinction, many of the 
bateliers did survive into the 1850s, turning increasingly to 
remorquage. Concentration of ownership increased only very 
gradually through the 1850s. 
92 
The effect of reduced revenues 
upon these individual bateliers was quite different than upon the 
tugboat companies. The latter were-composed of-shareholders or 
partners interested in an economic return on their investment; 
moreover, they hac'i relatively costly and complex equipment to 
i 
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maintain and replace. The level of long-run fixed costs (in 
the form of depreciation, interest and maintenance) was therefore 
quite high. Equally the length of time their payment could be 
postponed was also limited. in contrast to this, each maitre 
marinier was the. owner of his boat (and perhaps one or two 
others} and lived on board. It was possible for him to survive 
a long crisis on simple economic inertia. With relatively crude 
equipment and methods, he could reduce maintenance to a minimum, 
postpone indefinitely the accumulation of reserves for replacement, 
reduce'his own standard of living and the salaries of his 
employees. Even by 1854 the monthly income of compagnons mariniers 
remained as low as only 40 F, compared with more than 100 F in 
the mid-1840s. 
93 
By ceasing operations, his income would fall 
to nothing and his'boat deteriorate, making any later resumption 
of operations veryr difficult. 
Success and Failure for the Railway Companies. 
The railway companies were successful in this initial 
period in taking from road and water transport a substantial 
portion of their accustomed traffic. The companies' ultimate 
objective however, was not merely to carry the largest possible 
quantity of goods and passengers, but to maximize their profits. 
Though the Paris-to-Rouen achieved a considerable measure of 
success in this, the Rouen-to-LeIiavre did not. This can be seen 
in Figure 15.84 In the seven years between the commencement of 
its operations and the end of 1849, the return on total invest- 
ment to the Paris-to-Rouen company was never less than about 3.5 
per cent, even in the disastrous first half of 1848; it rose as 
high as 9.4 per cent, and over the whole period, excluding the 
first six months of 1848, averaged 7.1 per cent. For the Rouen- 
to-LeHavre, on the other hand, in the three'years following its 
beginning of operation in March 1847, the return on total invest- 
ment never rose above 3.2 per cent, and fell to less than one 
per cent in the first half of 1848; over the whole three years, 
with the exception of these six months, it returned an average 
of only 3.7 per cent. Since these percontages take into account 
total investment, including long-term debt and grants from the 
state, the return to shareholders was greater. After subtracting 
amortization and the amount due to'the company's 'founders', 
dividends from the Paris-to-Rouen came to as much as 10.3 per 
cent of*the par value of shareholders' equity; over the whole 
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period it averaged 7.5 per cent. Owing to very much higher costs 
to bondholders, the return to shareholders in the Rouen-to- 
LeHavre company in the first three years-of operation was never 
more than 4.5 per cent, and owing to a substantial net loss in 
the first half of 1848 averaged only 2.4 per cent in that year. 
One of the most important factors in the competitive 
success of the Paris-to-Rouen railway was its very large passenger 
revenues. The contribution by passenger receipts to the company's 
not revenues was very considerable, much greater'than that by 
goods., Without substantial revenues from both of these sources -- 
something none of its competitors had - the railway's profits 
would have been greatly reduced. If it had been forced to rely 
upon goods revenues alone, it would have been hard pressed to 
earn any profit at all. It would have'suffered from the same 
economic problem encountered by the early steamboats, under- 
utilization of capital. Its right-of-way, track, stations and 
rolling stock --- the high cost of which would not have been 
greatly reduced had the railway been built to carry only goods 
would have earned insufficient revenues to make them a paying 
proposition. A monopoly of passengers was also important; had 
the passenger traffic in the first half of 1846,, for example, 
been one-quarter less than it was, the return on shareholders' 
equity would have fallen from almost eight per cent to only 5.5 
per cent. With monopoly control of passengers, the company was 
able to charge them fares which contributed more than a fair 
share to, its fixed costs of operation and capital. Though goods 
traffic certainly more than met its direct variable costs, it 
is likely that it paid less than its share of fixed costs. 
95 
The ability to assign costs in this manner gave the railway a 
strong advantage in competition for goods traffic. 
The mariniets seem to have been unable, or unwilling, to 
reduce their rates below about eleven francs (on average), and 
this was also of considerable importance to the company's finan- 
cial success. To understand this it is necessary to examine in 
somewhat greater detail the competition between railway and 
mariniers.. There were few general principles upon which Adolphe 
Thibaudeau, directeur of the Paris-to-Rouen, could base his 
tariff-setting policy. One however, put into modern terms, was a 
commonly held belief that the price'elasticity of demand for rail- 
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way transport was very high. An article in the Journal des 
Chemins de Fer, 96 for example, shortly after the"commencoment of 
service on the Paris-to-Rouen advised its management that a low 
tariff would be to their advantage. It pointed to examples in 
Great Britain and in France to show that passenger and goods 
revenues tended to increase as fares were reduced; moreover, it 
attempted to show that because average cost fell as traffic in- 
creased, net revenues and therefore profits would rise as fares 
and rates were reduced. The company's shareholders agreed and 
at an early stage they urged that the tariff be reduced. 
97 The 
company's management seems to have taken this advice, for as we 
r_. have seen, the tariff was substantially reduced a number of times. 
After the first of these reductions, in February 1844, goods 
traffic on-the railway substantially increased, sufficiently so 
that although the revenue yielded by each ton fell from about 
21F. 80 to about 15F. 30, total revenues from goods increased almost 
two and a-half times. Though part of this increase can be 
attributed to the new availability of facilities for handling 
goods, 'it seemed nevertheless to be a good demonstration of high 
elasticity. The effect however, did not last. 
A well known phenomenon in oligopoly -- competition among 
a small number of rivals-is retaliation; rivals who are 
threatened by price reductions` will follow if they can with their 
own. 
98 
This the mariniers did, though slowly; although their 
average rate fell only from 14F. 55 in 1843 to 12F. 93 in 1844, 
they were able further to reduce it to only 11F. 70 in 1845. This 
reduction, along with a general increase in prosperity permitted 
them to retrieve part of the traffic and the income, they had 
lost in the previous year. The railway's management was clearly 
disappointed by this turn of events, as they later reported tö 
the shareholders. 
99 
By retaliation the mariniers had limited 
growth of the railway's traffic to little more than a third of 
their own; by lowering their rates to be competitive with those 
on the railway, they had in effect reduced the high elasticity 
of demand upon which the railway depended to take a large share 
of their traffic. 
When the railway reduced its tariff a-second time, in 
November-1845, the mariniers were. no longer able to follow. 
While the yield from each ton of goods carried by the railway fell 
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from 14F. 70 to 11F. 75, the average rate charged by the mariniers 
rose from 11F. 70 to 12F. 15. ' Asa result, in. 1'846' goods traffic 
on the railway once again rose steeply, reaching eighty per cent 
of traffic on the river, and in 1847 for-the first time exceeding 
it. River traffic from Rouen to Paris fell to its lowest level 
since 1840. Had the mariniers been able once more to follow the 
railway's price reductions, the result might have been quite 
different. An attempt has been made to show this with the graph 
in Figure 16. In this graph the upper line shows the effect of 
"reducing the railway company. 's goods tariff upon its return to 
-equity, using the value of elasticity which actually prevailed 
'during the first half of 1846. The lower line attempts to show 
the effect of the much lower elasticity which would have resulted 
if the mariniershad been able to lower their tariff. These show 
that if the lower rather than the higher elasticity had existed 
the company's return to equity would probably have remained at 
about six per cent instead of rising to eight per cent. 
100 
Why did such success elude the Rouen-to-LeHavre company? 
There seem to have been two main reasons. The more important 
reason had its roots in the railway's very high costs of con- 
struction. As a result of these very high costs, the company 
had to bear very large fixed charges upon its revenues. These 
fixed charges, the cost of amortization and of interest upon the 
company's bonded debt, amounted to almost 550,000F by the begin- 
ning of 1849,37 per cent of its total costs. This compared 
with the Paris-to-Rouen company's fixed charges which were only 
23 per cent of its total costs. The graph in Figure 17 attempts 
to show what the effect of these high fixed'charges-were upon 
the Rouen-to-LeHavre company's return to equity. If these 
charges could have been reduced to the same proportion as on the 
Paris-to-Rouen thecompany's profits could have been increased 
to over six per cent. 
The effects of these large fixed charges were not easily 
diminished. A slight improvement. in the dividends paid to share- 
holders was made possible by, a. change in the system of amortiza--. 
tion at the end of 1847.. According to the company's charter, the 
entire equity capital had to be paid-off in about fifty years 
from the beginning of operations.. To do this 200,000 F were 
deducted annually from net incomes and used to buy back shares 
from shareholders chosen by lot. Late in 1847 the company's 
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directors proposed that the amortization period be. extended to 
cover the entire 92 years-of. the concession, making it possible 
to reduce the annual amortization, payments to only 11,500 F. 
101 
This proposal received the overwhelming approval of the share- 
holders. The much larger problem of interest payments however, 
was, much more difficult to solve. In the first two years of its 
operation there was little. that could be done. After 1848 an 
opportunity appeared for the company to improve its position in 
the broader context of State assistance to several companies 
whose credit had been destroyed in the financial disaster of 
that year. By 1849 the social and economic crises seemed to have 
ended, and industrial production in many sectors had almost 
returned, practically prostrate financially. Late in 1849, in 
order to get railway construction going again, the government 
proposed several measures designed to put these companies back 
on their feet. Assistance was to be offered to companies which 
had not finished construction, first among them the Avignon-to- 
Marseille. This was certainly welcomed by the directors of the 
Rouen-to-LeHavre, but in their view the government should have 
extended. its aid beyond these companies: 
102 
Accorder une concession de 99 ans, une subvention de pros 
de 200 millions, garantir un interet de 5% ä un capital 
- qui-s'engage dans l'exploitation productive d'un chemin 
de fer,, doni la construction reste en grande partie Z 
la charge de 1'Etat, c'est reconnaitre implicitement que 
si la situation de'tous los autres chemins de for ne pout 
etre assimilee de tous points ä celle de cette nouvelle 
entreprise, le gouvernement-doit au moins prendre en 
serieuse consideration lour detresse et lour embarras. 
In this, conviction, the company proposed that it be given a 
guarantee of interest on its entire outstanding capital and, in 
order to reduce the burden of fixed charges, that the loan of 
1014F given by the state in 1842 be converted into a simple grant. 
Such a measure would have reduced fixed charges by about a third, 
permitting (as indicated in the graph in Figure 17) a return on 
equity of about six per cent. Although their proposals were 
sympathetically received, it was the government's stated policy 
that assistance would be-given only'in exchange for new obliga- 
tions, especially new construction, * to be undertaken by the 
companies. Since in this regard the Rouen-to-LeHiavre could offer 
nothing, it received no assistance. 
' 
... " .. 
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Fixed charges in connection with debt capital were not 
alone in creating problems for the company's management. This 
was made very clear in 1848. ' It became plainly evident then, 
if it had not been so before, that there were many elements of 
total operating costs which were not easily controllable, that 
in the short run at least were also fixed. For a few weeks 
after February 1848 traffic between Lellavre and Rouen came almost 
to a ständstill; with four'of its bridges and several of its 
stations either entirely or partly destroyed, it "came to a 
complete stop on the Paris-to-Rouen. However, ' while revenues 
fell, expenses did not, 
103 
Almost every category of operating 
expense, except 'traction' itself, which was directly related 
to the volume of traffic carried, remained close to its normal 
level. The over-all effect of this is visible in the graph in 
Figure 18. Though an advantage when revenues rose, stable opera- 
ting costs became a heavy burden when they fell. The same 
phenomenon was experienced by the Paris-to-Rouen, though with 
less damaging effect. 
The second major reason for the lower return to share- 
holders in the Rouen-to-LeHavre was its insufficient traffic. 
This applied to both passengers and goods, but only the latter 
were subject to competition. In 1849 for example, 'the railway 
seems to have carried a total of about 185,000 tons, for each of 
which, on average it received about 8F. 25, or OF. 09 per ton per 
kilometre of its track. ' In the same year the Paris-to-Rouen 
carried more than 275,000 tons for each of which it received 
about 12F per ton, also about OF. 09 per kilometre of track. 
Owing to its greater amount of traffic however, the Paris-to- 
Rouen earned a total of almost 24,000 F per kilometre of its line 
from goods traffic, whereas the Rouen-to-LeHavre earned only 
16,000 F. The graph in Figure 19 attempts to show the effects 
of this lower yield upon the profits of the Rouen-to-LeHavre. 
Had it been able to earn the same revenue from goods per kilo- 
metre as did the Paris-to-Rouen, the result would have been an 
annual return to shareholders of as much as 6.5 per cent of their 
equity. However, to do this using approximately the same tariff 
the railway would have been required to carry about 275,000 tons 
of goods per year, and for the company to have done so at this 
stage in its career would have been almost impossible. Already 
in September 1847 its directors had complained of insufficient 
" ý' 
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financial resources to handle adequately the 85,000 tons of goods 
consigned to the railway in its first six months of operation. 
104 
Complaints were being heard from shippers in Rouen and Lellavre 
about slow service on the railway. 
105 
Even without these 
problems of capacity, much additional traffic would in any case 
probably have been difficult to attract; the efforts being made 
by'the mariniers admitted the directors106 had been much more 
effective than had been expected.. After February 1848, with 
their finances in a state of ruin, the directors explained, 
107 
there could be no more thought of . 
active competition, as every 
effort would be required merely to ensure survival. 
0 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
The First Staoe'in Canalization of the Lower Seine 
In the two däcades"fo]. lowing 1840 the first stage in 
canalization of the lower Seine was completed. When the experi- 
ment with the invention of Poir6e at the old pertuis de la Morue 
was finished in 1840, planning for its use elsewhere on the Basse 
Seine was begun almost immediately. ' Between 1840 and 1845 the 
emphasis in this planning changed from a concern to make improve- 
ments merely where the volume of navigation was greatest, to 
where"it would be of greatest assistance to the batellerie in its 
struggle with the railway. At the same time, and for the same 
reason, planning was; begun for major improvements to the Seine- 
Maritime. The latter project was propelled mainly by constant 
pressure from the Chambre of Commerce in Rouen, and was in effect 
its response to what it called LeHavre's railway. 
The Programme of 1846. 
Construction of the lock and ddrivation at Marly was 
finished in July 1840. It had already been widely recognized- 
that the system of canalization devised by Charles Poirde was a 
complete success. 
1 
Among its most enthusiastic advocates were 
the engineers who worked with Poir6e in the Service de la Naviga- 
tion de la Seine. Some time earlier, in May 1839, the chief 
engineer for the 3e Section de la Seine, Z. -A. Michal, had pro- 
posed that the system be extended to the whole of the Basso Seine, 
2 
and more detailed plans were submitted early in 1840.3 Completion 
of the project produced a minimum depth of two metres over the 
23 kilometres between Marly and the entrance to the Canal de St. - 
Denis, and eliminated one of the most dangerous and time-consuming 
passages on the lower Seine. 
4 
Since this part of the river was 
upstream from Conflans, the project. benefitted all the vessels 
travelling between Paris Wand both the Basso Seine and the Oise, 
which together amounted to over 4,300 boats and*800,000 tons in 
1840. There seems to. have been unanimous agreement among the 
,. r 
.. 
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formerly skeptical users of the Seine that the system was a 
success. This was clearly evident at a meeting of bateliers, 
negociants and representatives of Chambres of Commerce held at 
the Bourse in Paris in July 1840.5 The savings in time made 
possible by these first improvements were at least one and a half 
hours for each passage of a bateau, chaland or p6niche du Nord, 
and the saving in fees to aides and pilotes and to chevaux de 
renfort was estimated in 1841 to be at least 300,000F 
per 
year. 
6 
. It was clearly 
desirable to contemporaries that the 
. system 
devised by Poiree be . extended eventually to cover 
the 
. whole of the 
Basso Seine. In 1838 the government had outlined 
its long-range plans for development of the country's waterways, 
stating that? 
La prosperite du commerce exterieur exige que les grands 
bassins qui debouchent ä la mer soient perfectionnes, et 
qu'on fasse aboutir ä nos grands ports et sur les points 
principaux de notre frontie-re de. terre, de grandes lignes 
de navigation.... 
Eighteen possible lines of water transport were mentioned, among 
them one from Strasbourg to LeHavre, comprising a total of over 
9,000 kilometres. It was obvious however, that improvements 
would have to be made gradually, and confined at first to where 
they were mdst needed. As military spending increased after 1840, 
funds available for public works were somewhat reduced. 
8 For 
these reasons, planning for major improvements on the lower Seine 
was focused at first upon the most heavily used portion between 
Conflans and Paris. During July 1840 a proposal was submitted 
for extensive improvements to the 4e Section by its chief engineer 
Octave Bleschamps, but nothing came of it. 
9. Michal was instructed 
by Legrand to draft a preliminary plan concentrating upon the 
sixty or so kilometres upstream from Conflans. His proposal, - 
which was contained in a report submitted by Poiree to the 
Conseil-general des Ponts et Chaussees in February 1841, was that 
four more complete systems of derivations and epis-mobiles be 
built, at Andresy, Maisons-Laffitte, Epinay and Suresnes. 
10 
Much 
smaller improvements were proposed for the remaining eighty or, 
so kilometres of the 3e Section as far down as Notre Dame de la 
Garenne, including more work on the tow paths and construction of 
a new arche-marinilre and epi-mobile at the Pont do Poissy. 
Similar simple improvements, including dredging, had been completed 
at Vernon, Meulan, Pecq and elsewhere since'1837.11 Discussion 
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in the Conseil-gdneral was brief, since. at this early stage there 
was no question of approval, except in principle., The Conseil 
simply recommended that Michal's proposal be submitted to a 
public inquiry. 
12 
This public inquiry was the first in a series of stages 
over the next two years in which detailed plans were evolved for 
two of the most important projects between Conflans and Paris. 
It was usual for there to he four steps between this stage and 
the beginning of construction. The first step was preparation 
. and approval 
(by the Conseil-gdn&ral and by public inquiries) of 
. an overall 
'conceptual' plan, encompassing the whole system of 
'improvements to a waterway. - The second was preparation and 
approval by the Conseil-general of detailed plans for the partic- 
ular projects tobe undertaken in the first stage of improvement. 
The third was legislative approval of the overall plan and approp- 
riation of funds for the first stage of construction. The last 
was preparation and approval by the Conseil-g6neral of the detailed 
working plans for each of the "travaux d'art" immediately prior 
to building. It is obvious that this could take several years. 
The recommended public inquiry took place at Versailles late in 
1841, and submissions were also invited from the Chambres of 
Commerce in Paris, Rouen and LeHavre. Though in general the plan 
put forward by Michal was accepted by the river's users, the 
Chambres of Commerce complained that it did too little for the 
160 or so kilometres from Conflans to Rouen, and in fact nothing 
at all for the 80 kilometres in the 4e Section. They asked 
that much more attention be given to the pressing needs of the 
marine normande, in particular extensive drddging, and reconstruc- 
tion of tow paths and arches marinieres. 
13 
Legrand seems to have 
been reluctant to include any further improvements to these 
portions of the Basse Seine in his programme for this decade. 
Nevertheless, he asked Bleschamps to prepare a supplementary plan 
containing some simple projects for the 4e Section. The plan 
submitted by Bleschamps included a number of small projects, which 
he estimated would cost 1.9 MF, most of this for dredging. 
14 . 
This plan*and the other prepared by Michal were approved by the 
Conseil-gdneral in July 1842.15 Detailed designs were then 
drawn up 'for the first parts of the- project to be built, barrages- 
dcluses at Andresy and Maisons-Laffitte (to cost 1.9MF) and lesser 
232 
improvements to three portions of the 3e Section (to cost about 
355,000 FZ. These were in turn approved by the Conseil-gen6ral 
late in 1843.16 
The expected course of planning then began to change. 
Gradually over the next three years planning for major improve- 
ments over the whole lower Seine was accelerated, so that by 
1845 the projects approved for Andresy and Maisons were joined 
by similar ones on what had been considered the less important 
lower reaches of the river. The reason for this was clearly the 
imminent advent of competition from the railway. 
17 
Since 1842 
concern had been growing both among the mariniers and in the Ponts 
et Chaussees-about the effects this might have upon water-borne 
transport. In 1842 the Conseil-general asked a group of delegates 
from the marine normande to one of its meetings to discuss longer 
, term planning for the Basse Seine. The delegates reiterated their 
support for the programme being undertaken by the government, and 
hoped that some results would soon be from it. Construction of 
the Paris-to-Rouen railway was at its height, and they stressed 
the need for an early. beginning on construction, 
18 
d'autant plus desirable ... que le commerce des transports 
par eau est menace d'une concurrence ruineuse par 1'ouverture 
... prochaine du chemin de fer de Rouen. Leur industrie doit 
perir si l'on ne se hate; 1'etat actuel de la riviere ne 
leur permettra de lutter qu'avec desavantage contre la 
Compagnie, de Chemin de fer. 
The mariniers wanted more attention paid to the 4e Section than 
was implied in the small supplementary plan submitted by Bleschamps 
late in 1841. Some -of the most difficult portions of the Basse 
Seine, they pointed out, 'lay between Vernon and Rouen. 
Accelerated planning for the 4e Section de la Seine began 
very soon after this. Less than a month later Bleschamps was 
removed from his position as inqdnicur-en-chef of the Section; 
19 
in his place were appointed two new men, Ademee 1"16ry from Vernon 
to Rouen, and Auguste Doyat from Rouen to the sea. 
20 
In March 
1843, Legrand asked for a report on the proposals submitted by 
Bleschamps and Michal for the whole of the lower Seine in 1840.21 
This was-followed by special meetings between Diichal and Mery to 
agree upon a set of technical. standards for the ouvrages d'art 
in the 3e and 4e Sections. 
22 
Then both engineers prepared final 
reports"outlihing their proposals for the whole of the Basse Seine. 
They had agreed that the. object of any improvements should be to 
1 
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create a channel with a minimum depth of two metres and minimum 
width of 30 metres; the number of tow path travers6s should be 
reduced; the tow paths should be raised above the level of highest 
water; and arches marinieres should be rebuilt where needed. 
Michal proposed eleven derivations, five of which he recommended 
for immediate construction (one more than in his earlier plan), 
plus other works, to a total estimated cost of 7 MF. 
23 Mary 
proposed three d6rivations and some other works, to a total 
estimated cost of 6.9 MF. 
24 
Both engineers expressed some 
concern that these works be completed soon, though the arguments 
they used were not the same. Mary was simply concerned that the 
batellerie be assisted in its struggle against competition from 
the railway. Michal adopted a more optimistic line. Less costly 
"transport made available by railways he stated, would tend to 
concentrate more population in. Paris, "teile qu'on ne pourra 
satisfaire a tous les besoins que par le concours simultand des 
chemins de fer et des lignes navigables". 
25 
This greatly on- 
larged-scheme for the Basso Seine was then presented to public 
inquiries late in 1844, and to the Conseil-general in February 
1845. The Conseil approved five major derivations, two of them 
above the Oise, three of them below. Their total cost was 
estimated at 10.5 MF. 
26 
The, barrage-Ccluse at Maisons-Laffitte, 
which had been-given-final"approval late in 1843', was cancelled. 
Plans were also being made to improve the Seine-Maritime. 
Since the collapse of the maritime canal company there had been 
almost no'-thought'given to this. With the great success of 
remorquage the dangers from the bore and from reefs had been 
greatly diminished, -and shipping accidents had been almost 
entirely eliminated. Any need for improvements had apparently 
ended. Nevertheless, as part of the overall planning for water- 
ways which had begun after the law of 12 July 1837, studies had 
been undertaken on the Seine-Maritime. It will be recalled that 
Charles Berigny had sketched out a proposal for canalization of 
the Seine-Maritime in the early 1820s. The first economical and 
technically feasible design tobe-drafted in any detail had been 
privately published by Pierre Frissard in 1832.2' In 1838 Octave 
Bleschamps was appointed chief of the 4e Section do la Seine, 
including the Seine-Maritime, and two years later he submitted an 
2 
avant=projet. 
8 Durinq. the late 1820s, Bleschamps had spent 
I 
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four years in the Seine-Inf6rieure, working part of this time 
under Frissard, and it is very probable that he took some of the 
inspiration for his design from the earlier one by Frissard. 
No, action was taken on the proposal of Bleschamps; Charles 
Poir6e was not in favour of his design, 
29 
and in any case, as 
we have seen, the attention of the Administration des Ponts et 
Chaussees was'focused elsewhere. 
In response to strong pressure from the Chambre of 
Commerce in Rouen, the proposal by Bleschamps was revived in 
1843. Support for improvements to the Seine-Maritime had always 
come almost entirely from Rouen, which saw them as the only 
means for assuring passage of large ships up to its port; only 
in this way would it be able over the long term to compete with 
" LeHavre for a share in growing overseas trade. In 1837, during 
the public, -inquiries into Poirde's project for the Basse Seine, 
the Chambreof Commerce had urged the Administration to give 
-more attention to the Seine-Maritime. 
30 
However, while the 
coasting trade remained safely the preserve of Rouen, inaction 
could be tolerated. Late in 1843, as construction of the Rouen- 
to-LeHavre railway was just beginning, the. Chambre in Rouen took 
the first steps in an intensive and ultimately successful campaign 
to obtain the improvements it wanted. A meeting with the Minister 
of Public Works. in December 184331 was followed in February 1844 
by the first in a long series of pamphlets addressed to the 
Chambres of Deputies and-Peers. 
32 
Very quickly these efforts 
found a favourable response; within weeks Auguste Doyat was asked 
. 
to have one of his engineers draw up a new avant-projet. 
Doyat presented his report at the end of March 1844. 
The design it contained, by Bouniceau, was very closely modelled, 
he acknowledged, upon the earlier avant-projet by Bleschamps. 
33 
The nature of the river here and the engineering solutions 
required for its improvement were quite different from those on 
the Basse Seine. The main components of Doyat's design were 
two parallel dykes, one along the north shore of the river from 
Villequier to. Tancarville and-extending beyond to a point opposite 
St. -Wandrille to Vatteville, and from Aizier to Vieux-Port. To 
this were added two jetties, one extending a short distance out 
from the 'quäy at Quillebeuf, the-, other running from the Pointe. 
de la'Roque, toward Tancarville, for a distance of 3,600 metres. 
(See Figure 21 below. ) By. conf iriing the river to a narrow and 
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permanent channel between Villequier and Quillebeuf, it was hoped 
both to deepen the channel and to eliminate the dangerous shift- 
ing 'Traverse'. By forcing the incoming tide into a gradually 
narrowing channel at the end of the Baie de Seine, it was hoped 
also that the bore would be reduced and in the end broken up by 
interference from the jetty at Quillebeuf. With the addition of. 
new tow paths from Rouen to La Mailleraye, Doyat estimated the 
whole project would cost about 14-MF. 
LeHavre was opposed to this plan. Owing to the great 
size of the estuary and to the complexity of its tides, such a 
project, though simple in conception, was difficult to design. 
None like it had ever been built on a similar scale, and the 
! correct dimensions and shapes of the dykes and jetties were very 
critical to its success. Public inquiries were held in Rouen 
late in'1844.34 Although the plan received almost unanimous 
support, there were serious objections stated from LeHavre. The 
Chambre of Commerce feared that any interference with the tides 
in the estuary would have adverse effects upon the port of LeHavre; 
its water level could be raised, and there was a strong possibility 
that sediments would accumulate around the entrance to the harbour, 
cutting it off from easy access to the bay. In any case, said 
therepresentatives of LeHavre, 
35 "la navigation maritime ne 
souffrira pas, par cela seul quelle devra aboutir a un point'du 
littoral plutöt qu'a' un autre". Although some of LeHavre persist- 
ence may have come simply from the spirit of inter-port rivalry, 
as this quotation indicates, its fears seem to have been genuine. 
There were also doubts about Doyat's plan among members of the 
Conseil-general des Ponts et Chaussees. 
36 
Having received the 
reports from the inquiry, the Conseil-g6neral recommended that 
only a trial project be undertaken, including only the parallel 
dykes between Villequier and Quillebeuf, and omitting for'the 
present any works in the bay. Unlike the plans for the Basse 
Seine which had been drawn up in some detail, those for the 
Seine-Maritime were still by this time only at the conceptual 
avant-projet stage. The difficult task of detailed design would 
come later. With tow paths from Rouen to La Mailleraye, it was 
roughly estimated that this first test on the Seine-Maritime would 
cost 3.5 MF. . 
Rýf"ý 
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The government was anxious to proceed with its programme 
for waterways. Therefore even though it had no detailed plan 
for the Seine-Maritime, it went to the Chambres to ask for funds. 
Only weeks later., early in March 1845, Dumon the Minister of 
Public Works presented a bill requesting 81.4 MF for a large 
programme of improvements to canals and rivers. 
37 
This was the 
first major piece of legislation on waterways since 1837, and it 
was the first outcome of the planning begun at that time. It 
very soon became evident that the bill would not be passed. The 
committee nominated to examine the bill believed that a great 
part of the government's ambitious plans for waterways should be 
abandoned. Almost 700 kilometres of railway had been built since 
, 
1837, and 3,000 more authorized; this fact, reported the committee, 
"a bouleverse tous les rapports economiques de nos voies de 
transport.... "38 The Administration had already tried to take 
account of this, not only by accelerating its planning on the 
Seine and elsewhere, but also by greatly reducing the number and 
total length of. canals in its long-term programme. Transport 
policy had been the subject of active public controversy for over 
two decades, but only since about 1843 had there been serious 
debate over the likely long-term impact of railways upon water- 
borne transport. It is clear that by 1845 those who believed 
that the government should continue building canals were in a" 
minority. In 1844 a committee of the Chambre of Deputies had 
come close to recommending that the new Rhine-to-Marne canal, still 
under construction, be filled in for use as a railway right-of- 
way. 
39 The committee considering the bill submitted by Dumon in 
1845 recommended several important amendments and deletions, 
particularly affecting canals. 
Although canals were no longer favoured as an alternative 
to railways, 'opinion in the Chambres and among the interested 
public was not opposed to further expenditure on river transport. 
Natural waterways had few of the disadvantages suffered by canals, 
in particular periods of very little or no water in summer, solid 
ice in winter, numerous locks, and inability to accommodate most 
steamers. Moreover, transport on natural waterways seemed to 
have some potential for further development. Wherever railways 
had been established beside canals, the committee stated in its 
report of over 150. pages, the canals had quickly suffered very 
.. 
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substantial losses of traffic. In general this had not occurred 
in competition between railt, ays and river-borne transport; "sur 
les rivibres", the committee stated, "la marine parait avoir plus 
de confiance, " though on the lower Seine, it admitted, "les faits 
sont plus incertains". A group of deputies had travelled to 
Rouen in May 1844 and had seen little evidence of any damage 
being done to river transport. 
40 
However, circumstances had some- 
what altered in the year since then, and in May 1845 Henry 
Maillet-Duboullay appeared before the committee in support of the 
. bill, and to ask that more money be spent on the Basso Seine. 
. otherwise, 
he feared, the railway would soon gain a monopoly. 
41 
The committee seems to have shared this fear, for it stated there 
was "une veritable urgence ä amdliorer le plus promptement possible 
cette ligne de navigation", and it recommended that the whole 
10.5 MF requested for the Basse Seine be passed. 0 
The committee opposed the request for funds to improve 
the Seine-Maritime. Its motives in doing this were quite un- 
connected with the debate over railways. Though the Minister 
had received petitions from several coasting ports in support of 
this project, 
42 he had presented it as a project mainly of local 
interest, necessary to ensure the future of sea-borne trade in 
the port of Rouen. Adopting the argument from LoHavre, the 
committee stated that not only was the project unlikely to be, 
successful in obtaining the results desired, but it might also 
become a threat to the future prosperity of LeHavre. It believed 
that the project was being promoted by the Chambre of Commerce in 
Rouen for entirely selfish reasons, regardless of the possible 
consequences. "Je crois que la vi. lle de Rotien ne sait pas cc 
quelle demande, " said the rapporteur, comte d'Angeville, "eile 
" veut jouer... un va-tout. avec le bas de la Seine. " Despite a 
petition to the Chambre of Deputies from the Seine-Infdri. eure 
containing almost 7,400 signatures, 
43 
and despite attempts by the 
Chambre of Commerce to demonstrate the project's potential benefits 
for the whole economy (which it claimed would be over 2 MF per 
year), 
44 the committee recommended that this portion of the bill. 
be defeated. In fact the entire bill was abandonned at this 
stage by the government. It was able only to*obtain 500,000 F 
for the dEGrivation at Andresy in the regular budget. 
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This was an unfortunate setback for the batellerie, 
and for, Rouen. Confidence among the batollerie had by this time 
been greatly affected by competition from the railway; it was 
late in 1845 that negotiations were started between the railway 
and the marine normande. There was no doubt however, wrote the 
Minister in response to several petitions, 
45 
that the government 
would reintroduce the bill in the following year. In the mean- 
time it joined openly with the lobby from Rouen to overcome the 
resistance, to improvements on the Seine-Maritime. Directing its 
attention toward what seemed the, most concrete obstacle, it 
attempted to, disprove the technical objections to the project. 
First it appointed an expert commission nautique, comprising 
three Ingenieurs des Ponts et Chaussees, including Doyat. 
46 
Second it encouraged the Chambre of Commerce to send a delegation 
to Great Britain to view similar projects there, on the Clyde and 
the Wash, and allowed Doyat to accompany it. 
47 Several pamphlets 
were published in Rouen, including a lengthy rebuttal of the 
report by comte d'Angeville, 
48 
and several reports on the visit 
to Great Britain.. Discussion of the bill introduced in 1845 was 
resumed in January 1846, and the commission maintained its 
opposition to the Seine-Maritime project. However, opinion had 
changed since the following year. During two days of debate 
several speakers attacked the alleged unfair and. illegal methods 
of the railway companies; one of the strongest speeches was made 
by Victor Grandin from Elbeuf, never a friend of the railways. 
it had often been claimed, he said, that49 
les chemins de fer... ne doivent etre consider6s et ne doivent 
se considerer quo comme le compl6ment et le perfectionnement 
des autres voies de transport .... Dbs le premier 
jour, le 
chemin de for n'a eu qu'un soul but, celui d'absorber a son 
profit la totalite des transports, voyageurs et marchandises. 
Une seule pensee domine et stimule 1'activite de ses 
administrateurs, l'habilite de ses avocats: le mono ole! 
Even LeHavre seems to have withdrawn its objections to the Seine- 
Maritime project, perhaps in order to facilitate passage of that 
for the Basso Seine. Amendments from the Chambre of Deputies 
added another 300,000 F to the amount passed for the Basse Seine 
and another one million francs for the Seine-Maritime, and the 
bill became law on the 31st of May 1846.50 
Rapid trogress on the Seine-Maritime. 
During most of this decade, despite the Administration's 
occasional statements of concern that the waterways be maintained 
as viable competition for the rapidly spreading and powerful rail- 
239 
This was an unfortunate setback for the batellorie, 
and for-Rouen. Confidence among the batellerie had by this time 
been greatly affected by competition from the railway; it was 
late in 1845 that negotiations were started between the railway 
and the marine normande. There was no doubt however, wrote the 
Minister in response to several petitions, 
45 
that the government 
would reintroduce the bill in the following year. In the mean- 
time it joined openly with the lobby from Rouen to overcome the 
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Second it encouraged the Chambre of Commerce to send a delegation 
to Great Britain to view similar projects there, on the Clyde and 
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Several pamphlets 
were published in Rouen, including a lengthy rebuttal of the 
report by comte d'Angeville, 
48 
and several reports on the visit 
to Great Britain. Discussion of the bill introduced in 1845 was 
resumed in January 1846, and the commission maintained its 
opposition to the Seine-Maritime project. However, opinion had 
changed since. the, following year. During two days of debate 
several speakers attacked the alleged unfair and-illegal methods 
of the railway companies; one of the strongest speeches was made 
by Victor Grandin from Elbeuf, never a friend of the railways. 
It had often been claimed, he said, that49 
les chemins de fer... ne doivent etre consider6s et ne doivent 
se considerer quo comme le compl6ment et le perfectionnement 
des autres voies de transport .... Des le premier 
jour, le 
chemin de for n'a eu qu'un soul but, celui d'absorber a son 
profit la totalitd des transports, voyageurs et marchandises. 
Une seule pensee domine et stimule l'activit6 de ses 
administrateurs, 11habilite de ses avocats: le monopole: 
Even LeHavre seems to have withdrawn its objections to the Seine- 
Maritime project, perhaps in order to facilitate passage of that 
for the Basso Seine. Amendments from the Chambre of Deputies 
added another 300,000 F to the amount passed for the Basse Seine 
and another one million francs for the Seine-Maritime, and the 
bill became law on the 31st of May 1846.50 
Rapid trogress on the Seine-Maritime. 
During most of this'decade, despite the Administration's 
occasional statements of concern that the waterways be maintained 
as viable competition for the rapidly spreading and powerful rail- 
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ways, 'very little money was. spent, on them. The number of water- 
way improvement projects undertaken during the 1850s was very 
small, and as Louis Girard has pointed out, 
51 
only one waterway, 
the Seine-Maritime, received any new appropriations. Most of 
the impetus for continuing and enlarging the work on the Seine- 
Maritime came from the Chambre of Commerce in Rouen. At every 
stage of the work, 'it exerted pressure upon the government to 
proceed quickly. LeHavre remained opposed to most of the project, 
but with its relatively small and very prosperous population, its 
objections made little impression. 
Rouen was greatly aided in the decisive first stage by 
two factors. The first was the need during 1847 and 1848 to 
, occupy a 
large number of-workers thrown out of their jobs by the 
economic crisis. The second was the immediate and remarkable 
success of the first dykes-in obtaining their desired object. 
When the law of 31 May 1846 was passed, planning for the Seine- 
Maritime had not yet gone beyond a rudimentary conceptual stage. 
Although the law had opened credits totalling 2.1 MF for expen- 
diture during 1846 and 1847, none of this was spent until 1848. 
Before any work could begin, a detailed working plan had to be 
approved. A first draft was submitted to the Prefect in Rouen 
early in 1847, and the Chambre'of Commerce urged the Minister of 
Public Works thät'it be quickly approved. Not only, it said, - 
was there an imminent danger from the opening of the new railway 
to LeHavre, but also52 
Nous avons autour de nous tant de bras inoccupes dans un 
moment of les subsistances sont si cheres, qu'il ya veritable- 
ment grande urgence ä leur venir en aide. 
In November the City had opened Ateliers de Charity; by the 
beginning Of March they were supporting more than 3,000 workers, 
and the City was almost desperately seeking additional means of 
occupying more. 
53 
The plea from the Chambre of Commerce was 
supported by the Minister of Commerce. Instructions were given 
by the Conseil-general in May 1847 for the final working plan's to 
be prepared, and late in November the Prefect of the Seine- 
Inferieure called together a'commissionýof the river's users to 
advise Doyat and his engineers on the best course for the dykes 
to follow. Within weeks a detailed plan was presented to the 
Conseil-general, "and'it met late in February 1848 to give them 
54 its approval. Construction began in May; through the summer of 
' .. ' 
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1848 there were over 1,000 workers employed in building now tow 
paths from Le Croisset to to Mailleraye, and *another 700 on the 
two dykes downstream from Villequier. 55 By the end-of the year 
53 of the 60 kilometres of tow paths planned had been completed, 
and the dykes had already shown themselves completely success- 
ful. 55 
Planning was very-soon begun to extend the dykes in 
both directions. Reluctance in the Conseil-g6ndral des Ponts et 
Chaussees to proceed so quickly was easily overcome by the 
" Chambre of Commerce in Rouen. Despite their apparent success in 
.. eliminating the Traverse between Villequier and Vacqerie, there 
was still great uncertaintyabout what might be the effect of 
extending them farther out toward the bay; LcHavre remained 
completely opposed to any such extension. For this and for 
financial reasons, the Conseil-general wished to proceed cau- 
tiously and by easy stages. The projects built during 1848 had 
cost only two-thirds of the estimated 3 MF, and early in 1849 
. Doyat's engineersrequested permission to use some of what re- 
mained to continue the dyke on the right shore another six 
kilometres' from Norville to opposite Courval. At the same time 
they asked for approval in principle to extend the new tow path 
from La Mailleraye down to Caudebec, and to build further dykes 
from Villequier upstream to La Mailleraye and from Courval out 
to La Roque. 
57 
The Conseil-general readily approved the extension 
to Courval; it also agreed that further studies should be done 
with a view to improvements upstream from Villequier. Beyond 
Courval however, it believed that any further study should be 
postponed. In Rouen it was believed that ih order-to suppress 
the bore and to ensure entirely safe navigation across the bay 
" to Quillebeuf and upstream, the dykes must eventually be taken 
all the way to iionfleur. Upon hearing of the Council's decision, 
the Chambre of Commerce in Rouen wrote to the Minister and very 
quickly succeeded in having it reversed. 
58 
The Conseil-general 
then agreed to extend the dyke, on the right shore another 6.4 
kilometres from Courval to opposite Quillebeuf, and reluctantly 
advised that public inquiries be held to determine whether and 
how it should betaken farther. 
59" 
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Rouen was determined that the. system of dykes should 
be extended into the bay to La Roque. Public' inquiries were 
held in the early autumn of 1850 in Rouen and Evreux, and the 
results were very much in favour of this proposal. Only LeHavre 
raised any serious objections. The inquiries were also asked 
whether. dykes should be built upstream from Villequier to La 
Mailleraye, and there were-no objections to this. The advantage 
lay very much with Rouen, and during what remained of 1850 and 
through 1851 the Chambre of Commerce exploited this by continuing 
to exert pressure upon the Administration to approve further 
", dyking. A long pamphlet was published just before the 
inquiries, 60 
and another shortly after them, including extensive extracts from 
their proceedings and several official reports and other documents. 
in a preface the President of the Chambre invited his colleques 
in other coasting ports to write to the Minister in support of 
further improvements in the Seine-Maritime. 
61 
Delegates were 
sent to Paris to speak to officials in the Ponts et Chaussdes 
. and 
to the Minister. Rouen's only desire, said the Chambre of 
Commerce, was to secure a fair share of the commerce coming into 
the lower Seine; it had no ambition to displace LeHavre from its 
predominant role in overseas shipping. "Au Havre et son chemin 
de fer, la grande navigation transatlantique, " it wrote, "et a 
la Seine Maritime pour le port de"Rouen, tout le petit et le 
grande cabotage. I1 y aura du travail pour tout le monde. "62 
LeHavre feared that the ambitions of Rouen went farther 
than this, and, that in pursuit of them permanent damage could be 
done to the port of LeHavre. However, the President of the 
Chambre of Commerce in LeHavre urged his collegues, 
63 
il faut, dans cette-question, laisser de cot6 les considera- 
tions qui tiennent ä la rivalite commerciale entre les deux 
" places et s'attacher principalement au danger que les 
travaux projet6s peuvent.. faire courir au port du Havre. 
`These dangers had been strongly stated by Renaud, ingeniour-en- 
chef for the port of LeHavre, at the inquiry in Rouen. Any 
permanent restriction and redirection of the river's current to 
the south shore of the bay (as was planned), would permit gradual 
accumulation of sand and gravel along the north shore and 
eventually block. the entrance to the harbour*at LeHavre. It 
seemed inevitable in fact; said Renaud, that "l'intdret des ports 
de l'embouchure de la Seine est oppose de celui de la naviga- 
tion. 64 . in February. 1851"the Chambre of Commerce sent its own 
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delegates to Paris, and they seem to have been successful in 
persuading both de Franqueville, the new Directcur-g6n6ral des 
Ponts et Chauss6es, and the Conseil-gdndral to delay any further 
dyking downstream from Quillebeuf. 
65 
The. Conseil-g6n6ral based 
its decision not only upon the continuing uncertainty about the 
likely effects of further dyking, but also upon the belief that. 
any benefits it might yield would not justify the estimated 
expense of 4.5 MF. Rouen remounted its offensive. To LeHavre it 
promised that 
66 
en ce qui touche ä l'amelioration de la Seine, en desirant y 
faire monter les navires de fort tonnage qui pourront souls 
bientot soutenir la concurrence avec les Chemins de fer, 
eile serait des premiers si cot amelioration ne pouvait 
titre obtenue qu'en ensablant les abords du Havre, a renoncer 
a cette 616ment de prosperitd. 
As a result of further pressure on the Minister, the Conseil- 
g6n6ral partially reversed its'decision. It approved extension 
of the dykes as far as Tancarville, and permitted further study 
of dykes to La Roque. A decree on the. 15th of January 1852 
granted 2.8 MF for this purpose. 
67 
Pressure from Rouen for more dyking was continuous 
throughout the decade, and LeHavre'continued to oppose it. 
Another decree in August 1853 granted a further 2.5 MF for ex- 
tension of the dyke on the south shore to La Roque. Work had to 
be suspended temporarily in 1856 owing to lack of funds, but by 
1860 the dyke was virtually complete. (See Figure 21. ) The 
threat to the harbour at'LeHavre failed to materialize, and 
although the bore began to reappear in 1858, the dykes were 
considered to have been a great success. Marine insurance rates 
for ships using the Seine-Maritime fell to one-quarter their 
former level, transit times were reduced to half, and the port of 
Rouen began to receive a somewhat greater share of overseas 
shipping. 
68 
The average size of ships in foreign trade entering 
the port of Rouen during the 1840s had been less than 90 tons; 
during the 1850s it was almost 110 tons, and in 1860 it rose to 
131 tons. The first ships began arriving from America in 1852, 
including the MARY ANNAii, with a cargo of over 500 tons of cotton; 
in 1856 the IIördelaise ship LA BRUNE brought a cargo of wool 
direct, from, Sydney, Australia. The Chambre of Commerce estimated 
in 1858, that taking into account both coasting and foreign trade, 
improvements to the Seine-Maritime made possible annual savings 
245 
of between three and four million. francs. 
69 
Quoting the words 
of the chief engineer for the 4e Section in 1861,70 
la Seine presente, sur toute sa longeur, depuis Rouen 
jusqu'ä Tancarville, un veritable canal avec 6 metres 
50 centimetres de profondeur de haute-mar de vive-eau, 
et 4 metres 50 centimetres de morte-cau, sur ses passes 
les plus maigres. L'amelioration definitive de cette 
partie de la Seine maritime est done, en quelque sorte, 
un fait consomme, et ii ne reste plus ey ajouter, e titre 
de complement,... qua quelques travaux dune secondaire 
importance. 
Faltering Progress on the Basso Seine. 
There was a sense of urgency about the Basse Seine in 
1846. The debate in the Chambre of Deputies in January had 
; indicated this. Competition from the new railway was 
beginning 
to show a marked adverse effect upon the batellerie. Moreover, 
very high water levels on the Seine during the winter had caused 
serious flooding, and left great accumulations of sand at several 
places in the channel. Navigation in the summer of 1846 there- 
fore, was even more than usually difficult. In July a group of 
bateliers petitioned the Minister for immediate dredging of the 
most difficult passages near Triel and Notre Dame de la Garenne. 
71 
Steamers were being held up for several days at a"time by a newly 
formed sand bank near Oissel. *Local engineers of the Ponts et 
Chaussees were able to remove it during the summer, first by 
manual dredging, and later with a steam dredge brought down 
specially from Mantes. 4,000 F for this job were taken from funds 
for maintenance of Rouen harbour. In addition to several 
72 
other small jobs of this kind, extensive dredging was begun with 
the funds given for this purpose in the law of 31 May 1846; over 
130,000 F were spent by the end of the year. 
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Work also began almost immediately on the other 
projects authorized in 1845 and 1846. There were not the same 
causes for delay as there were on the Seine-Maritime. The method 
to be used on the Basse Seine had been tested, and had long . - 
before been found successful. Detailed designs had already been 
prepared for several projects. The derivation at Andresy was 
begun early in 1846 and largely completed in the following year; 
its cost was 1,004,914 F, only very slightly above estimates. A 
second derivation was begun at Goulet (between Vernon and Les 
lndelys)_ in 1847,. and the new lock there was opened for use in 
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November 1849.74 Its total cost was 1,07,929 F, considerably 
above the originally estimate.. 'At the same time'construction of 
new tow paths was begun at several places between St. -Cloud and 
Poses, eliminating most of the former time-consuming traverses. 
Over one million francs had been spent for this purpose by the 
end of 1848. Small improvements were made to arches marinibres 
at'Aisnieres`, Meulan, Vernon and Pont de l'Arche. 
75 The pont 
do Poissy, an old bridge with 23 narrow masonry arches, was 
partially rebuilt at a cost of almost 400,000 F; 
16 three of the 
old arches were replaced by-a single iron structure over 32 
.,. metres wide. By the end of 1850 over half of the total authorized 
funds had been spent, and by the end of 1853 more than three- 
quarters. 
There seemed to be little doubt about the commitment of 
the Administration to assisting the batellerie in meeting competi- 
tion from the railway. The Minister of Public Works, M. Lacrosse, 
flanked by"his engineers, by the Prefect of the Eure and the 
. Bishop of Evreux, spoke at the opening of the lock at Notre 
Dame 
de la Garenne in 1849. "Le gouvernement", he said, 
77 
tourne tous ses efforts vers le d6veloppement des forces 
productives. de la nation, et parmi cos forces on pout placer 
au premier rang la marine du commerce: ainsi l'am6lioration 
des fleuves doit-elle etre 1'objet dune constante 
preoccupation. 
And this assurance was-renewed in 1854 by his successor. In a 
circular to all inspecteurs divisionnaires des Ponts et Chaussees, 
Magne the Minister of Public Works stated that78 
. 
le rdseau des voies navigables occupe une place considerable 
Bans le systeme des communications int&rieures du pays, et 
les efforts de l'administration doivent*tendre ä ce que la 
navigation conserve, meme en presence des chemins de for, 
toute son importance et toute son activit6. 
By the middle of the decade there were six locks in use 
on the Basse Seine (including the one built in 1813 at Pont de 
l'Arche) and nine barrages mobiles. 
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The important derivation 
at Poses was given over for use in the summer of 1852, and com- 
pleted in 1854. The one at Meulan was completed in 1856. A 
minimum cif lm. 50 or lm. 60 was available in all-but a very few 
places, and the length of the seasonal dtia e was greatly reduced. 
Boats of, all kinds were carrying 85'to 90 per cent of their maxi-- 
mum. potential loads; by 1854 the"average tonnage being carried 
upstream in chalands and bateaux normands was 320 tons, an in- 
crease of almost a third since the 1840s. Voyage times for horse- 
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pulled bateaux normands were reduced from what had formerly been 
eight to twelve days to only four or five; voyage- times for 
chalands and bateaux pulled by tugboats were reduced from four 
or five days to only two. 
80 
Michal, who in 1847 had been placed 
in charge of all the 2e and 3e Sections of the Seine, calculated 
the saving in transport costs brought about largely by these im- 
provements to be about 2.7 MF. 
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The funds authorized in 1845 
and 1846 were exhausted in. 1857. Although several important 
projects in the programme had not been built, the improvement 
. had been sufficient 
to consider it at an end. By 1855 considera- 
. tion was 
being given by the Conseil-gdn&ral des Ponts et Chaussees 
`to a second programme of improvements which would eventually 
raise the minimum water depth to 1.8 metres. 
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Unfortunately unforeseen events during 1857 and 1858 
quickly rendered the unfinished programme of 1846 insufficient. 
However, despite earlier repeated assurances of good will from 
the Administration, no funds were available until late in 1859. 
During 1857 and 1858 water levels on the Basse Seine fell to their 
lowest in 140 years. 
83 Moreover they did not quickly rise again, 
and it became evident that levels somewhat lower than in the past 
would be permanent. Bateaux normands and chalands were forced 
to reduce their loads to less than half of capacity; average 
loads fell to only 130 tons in 1858. This natural phenomenon was 
said to have been aggravated by effects of the dyking in the 
Seine-Maritime, and near Pont de l'Arche, one of the most dif- 
ficult passages on the Basse Seine, by construction of a new 
bridge. To add to the problems of the bateliers, three locks 
were in need of reconstruction, the old lock at Pont de l'Arche 
which was only 80 metres long (the newer ones were all 120 metres 
long), and the two new locks at Poses and Andr6sy. On several 
occasions during 1858 and 1859 the bateliers urgently petitioned 
the Minister for immediate dredging of the worst of the new haut- 
fonds, and for some promise that the programme undertaken in 1846 
would be completed. 
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The Minister asked for reports from his 
engineers, on these petitions, and he soon found their voices 
added to those of the batel'lerie. They were reduced in 1858 to 
funds adequate for no more than the minimum of simple maintenance. 
"Je me bcirne ä signaler cette insuf"fisance absolu' wrote the 
chief engineer of the 3e Section-to the Minister early in 1858,85 
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bien convaincu, que je suis, qua votre excellence 
reconnaltra que l'on ne pout pas laisser plus longtemps 
on souffrance une navigation Ala plus important de France, 
sinon comme tonnage, au moins comme valour des marchandises 
transporteesl pour laquelle 1'Etat s'est ddjA impos6 de si 
grands sacrifices, et qui par le developpement qu'elle a 
pris et le succes de la lutte quelle soutient contre le 
chemin de for de Rouen, justifie si completement ce quo 
l'on a fait pour eile. 
He indicated there were five projects for dredging costing 
little more than 100,000 F which had been approved by the 
Conseil-general, and. "three more costing'another 80,000 F which " 
had recently been presented by his engineers. This relatively 
small amount of expenditure, he said, would bring an immediate 
and large benefit. The Minister's only response to these peti- 
tions was that while he agreed that additional works were urgently 
, needed, since he had no funds at his disposal for this purpose, 
he could do nothing. 
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Fortunately a way was soon found out of this impasse. 
With the war in Italy ended in July 1859 the Administration could 
once more turn its full attention to peaceful works. Fresh from 
the last of his foreign triumphs, the Emperor addressed an 
important letter to his Minister of State, -outlining a new economic 
policy. 
87 "Le moment est... venu", he declared, "de nous occupor 
des moyens d'imprimer un grande essor auk diverses elements de 
la richesse nationale. " Prominent among these were the various 
modes of transport. "Un des plus grands services A rendre au 
pays est do faciliter le'transport des matieres de premiere 
necessite, pour l'agriculture et l'industrie.... " Therefore, he 
continued, "le ministre-des'travaux publics fora executer le 
-plus promptement possible les voies de communication, canaux, 
routes et chemins de fer.... " A credit of 750,000 F had already 
been authorized for rebuilding the dam at Andresy. 
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Dredging 
was renewed, and in 1861 a decree granted the funds necessary for 
construction of the long planned derivation at Martot. 
89 
This 
was the beginning of a new programme to raise the minimum water 
level to two metres. After 1880 the so-called Plan Freycinet 
raised this to 3m. 20, the present minimum depth on the Basso 
Seine. 90 
a 
CHAPTER NINE 
New Sources of Competition, 1850 to 1860 
As the economic crisis came to an end in 1849 and 1850, 
goods and passenger traffic along the Seine revived. Through 
the early years of the new decade both rail and water-borne 
transport experienced almost unbounded prosperity. Though 
severe competition continued, *the bateliers regained some of 
their lost self-confidence.. Since 1848 they had been able to 
organize themselves for better defence against the railway, and 
with improvements being made to the river and signs of further 
important.. innovations in steamer transport, the future. seemed 
to promise better things. For the railway companies the outlook 
was clearly not so bright. There was the prospect of increased 
competition from their rivals on the river, and new competition 
from other railway lines. Both became really effective after 
about 1854. By 1860 what might be called the first phase in 
'modernization' of the transport system in the lower Seine 
valley had been completed. 
Prospects for the New Decade: the Railway Companies. 
Despite the severity of the economic crisis in 1848, it 
was not of long duration. In the spring of 1848 all the opera- 
tors of transport in the valley of the Seine had suffered very 
large reductions in the traffic and revenues, and for the rail- 
way companies these had been aggravated by destruction of bridges 
and stations between Paris and Rouen. Their financial situations, 
" especially that 6f . the Rouen-to-LeHavre company, 
had been pro- 
. carious. Nevertheless, 
by the beginning of 1849 traffic and 
revenues were returning to near their old levels. The opening 
of the branch line from near Rouen to the port of Dieppe in 
July 1848 undoubtedly helped in this recovery. More important, 
was the general economic recovery'which began in 1849. The 
foreign and coasting trades of France, which can probably be 
taken as approximate indicators of 'economic activity, began a 
very. strong revival in 1849. in the words of a negociant in 
6 
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LeHavre, this was a year "signal6e par une prosperitd commerciale- 
dont le passe offre peu d'exemples". 
1 
The revival continued 
through 1850, though there was a setback j. n 1851. Finally, 
in 1852 prosperity returned "avec un dlan. extraordinaire et 
soutenu", 
2 
pulling the volume of trade and transport back up to 
the level of the good years before 1848. 
Although both traffic and profits began soon to return to 
normal levels, it must have been clear to the directors of the 
three railway companies that their prospects for the coming 
decade were not so bright as this early return to normality 
seemed to indicate. Competition in this new decade promised to 
be more difficult. Not only did both of the old sources of 
competition, road and inland water transport, still remain, but 
-it was clear that new and even stronger ones were about to appear. 
Steps had been taken in 1849 to eliminate the last vestiges of 
direct competition from the rouliers. However, inland water- 
borne transport, while showing signs of weakness in 1849 and 
1850, still remained a'strong rival. Indeed, one of the principal 
threats to the continued growth and profitability of the railway 
companies came from water-borne transport. In 1851 the newly 
formed Cie Pieau began to build and operate a fleet of fast new 
cargo steamers, first between Paris and Rouen, and later to 
Lellavre and beyond. The most obvious challenge to the two 
principal railways in the Seine valley came from the many other 
railway lines which were. being completed during the late 1840s 
and the '1850s. ' By promising to provide speedy and economical 
overland transport, these new railways threatened to eliminate 
a large part of the domestic coasting trade flowing through the 
ports of Rouen and LeHavre. The same threat had begun to worry 
the courtiers de. commerce at LeHavre in 1849; LeHavre's natural 
advantage over other ports owing to'its closeness to Paris, they 
said, 
3 
a cesse a l'egard de plusieurs at va cesser pour les autres 
par l'etablissement des chemins do for. Dejä vous avez vu 
les lignes de paquebots pour le Nord disparaltre apres 
de longues annees de possession, parcoque les affaires de ce 
genre sont maintenant. a Dunkerque. Dieppe s'est emparre 
des bois"du Nord, des charbons, at les liquides qui nous 
venaient du Midi prennent de plus en plus cette voie qui 
ne"tardera pas ä leur titre exclusive. Cherbourg so prepare 
ZL devenir 1'Entrep8t de la Manche. Les produits de 1'Espagne 
et. du Portugal vont. maintenant ä Nantes. Le cabotage avec 
Bordeaux et Marseille disparaltra entierement quand la 
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communication directe avec la capitale sera an activit6. 
New lines had been opened_to Boulogne and Dunkdrque on the 
Channel coast in'1848, and to Calais in 1849. To the south a 
line had for several years been making its way along the Loire 
to the sea; it had reached Saumur in 1848, Angers in 1849, and 
finally Nantes in 1851. This completed over 440 kilometres of 
line from Paris to the port at Nantes. At the same time another 
line was being built southward from Tours to Poitiers, and north- 
ward'from Bordeaux to Angouleme. When the gap between Poitiers 
and Angouleme was filled in 1853-it completed almost 600 kilo- 
metres of line joining Paris overland with yet another port on 
the Atlantic. Two years later the connection was made between 
Paris and the Mediterranean. 
4' 
There is no doubt that it was obvious to the directors of 
the three railway companies that if an economic rate of return 
on their shareholders' investments were to be maintained, careful 
and, -aggressive management would be needed. Profits were the 
net result'of`both costs and revenues, and the directors pointed 
their attention toward improving both. Their efforts to reduce 
costs met with only light success. We have already seen the un- 
successful attempts made by the Rouen-to-LeHavre company after 
1843 to reduce the heavy burden-of fixed charges which resulted 
from its, high construction and land costs. Reducing operating 
expenses proved to be almost as difficult. In 1848 the directors 
of the Paris-to-Rouen had stated their determination not to 
authorize any additional expenditures except those absolutely 
required for continued operations. 
5 Some economies were brought 
about when this company took over operational management of the 
branch line to Dieppe, and lower expenses for personnel were 
made possible by transferring the responsibility for track sur- 
veillance to the maintenance function. In 1850 however, both 
the remaining independant companies were compelled to agree to 
an increase in both operating'and maintenance rates in now 
contracts with Buddicum and' Co. and with MacKenzie and Brassey. 
6 
This probably almost eliminated the beneficial effects of the 
economies already achieved. Overall the companies' managers were 
fairly successful. Slightly more efficient operation during the 
1850s is indicated by a small improvement in operating ratios. 
" 
., 
" 
.ý 
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That for the Rouen-to-Lellavre company improved from an average 
of about 52 per cent before 1.848 to about 46 per cent after 1848. 
That for the Paris-to-Rouen improved from an average of about 
48.5 per cent to about 45.5 per cent.? 
More of the directors' attention was focused upon their 
market, and the revenues it provided. The level of revenues was 
perhaps more easily changed, and profitability was probably seen 
to be more closely related to the level of goods and passenger 
traffic and revenues than to the variable cost per unit of out- 
put. The same aggressive methods of pricing as had been adopted 
in the previous decade were continued by both companies in the 
; 
1850s, and in the effort to. combat the increasing number of 
their competitors, some new ones were added. To these were also 
added other non-price devices to help in seizing and holding a 
share of the market. 
Careful analysis of the companies' performance indicates 
that the closest link existed between the volume of their pass- 
enger revenues on both lines moreover, were usually greater than 
those from goods. For some time there had been no strong compet- 
ition for passengers at any of the points served by the companies' 
lines. The railways had absorbed most of the market for pass- 
enger transport, and to attract any large number of additional 
passengers would be difficult, except perhaps by offering 
considerably reduced fares. In fact, this is what the companies 
attempted to do. Even with much reduced fares for some passengers, 
the revenues earned from them could be sufficient to cover their 
direct transport costs and make a small contribution to over- 
heads. The variable cost per passenger was. quite low (see 
Chapter Seven, note, 95). Special low fares were offered on 
excursion trains to Dieppe and elsewhere. 
8 
To secure a larger 
and more stable market to points beyond its lines, the two 
companies made agreements for correspondence with the passenger 
steamers from LeHavre to Caen and, Morlaix. The companies' main 
source of, competition was from other lines carrying passengers 
to other ports for cross-channel travel. In an effort to retain 
a share of this. traffic, agreements were made in 1849 with both 
the London-to-Southampton and the London-to-Brighton railways, 
and special low rates were offered over both routes. 
9 Despite 
these efforts however, with the grädual improvement of service 
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by way of Boulogne and an end to the large movement of passengers- 
occasioned by the Great Exposition in London during 1851, most 
of this traffic-was lost. 
10 
Competition was almost equally 
difficult for'the large numbers of emigrants travelling to 
America. The number of emigrants embarking at LeHavre had been 
quite large in the 1840s, and rose to over 39,000 during the 
famine year of 1847. Their numbers continued to climb in the 
1850s, 'with about 50,000 in 1851 and almost 100,000 in 1854.11 
London, Liverpool, Antwerp, Rotterdam and Bremen were strong 
competitors for this traffic, despite what seemed to be LeHavre's 
natural advantages of close proximity to south Germany where 
many of the emigrants originated. To strengthen itself against 
these arrivals', agreements were made by the railways both with 
. the Chemin-de fer de 1'Est and with commercial emigration agents. 
For example, the Cie Favier, Gervais et Voinier of Nancy guaranteed 
the railways 25,000 emigrants per year during five years for 
embarkation at LeHavre. They were charged three francs from 
-Mannheim to Strasbourg, and 30F from there to LeHavre; the regular 
fare for the journey from Strasbourg to LeHavre was 44F. 45.12 
Similar-methods were used to attract and retain goods 
traffic, and these became the object of heated controversy. 
Although changes were made in the pricing policies used in the 
1840s, their central feature remained 'price discrimination'. 
Price discrimination of one sort, by commodity type, had been 
practised by both companies from the beginning, and was sanctioned 
by law-in their cahiers des charges. However, the use of this 
device provoked much more controversy in this decade than it 
had in the forties. The basis for price discrimination is quite 
simple, and so was the reason why the railways could so readily 
use'this means 'of competition. It can be defined briefly as the 
sale of commodity or service at more than one price. Of course 
the seller must be able to divide his market into segments, and 
in markets characterized by imperfect competition, such as those 
faced by the transport industries, this has often been possible. 
In each of these separate segments-of the market prices are based 
primarily upon what the buyer, or shipper, is willing to pay, 
rather than upon unit cost. In other words, they are based upon 
the value-of'service rendered. The'simplest kind of price dis- 
crimin'ation was practised between commodities of differing values; 
a low-valued commodity such, as coal could only be carried at low 
f 
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rates, whereas a highly valued commodity such as manufactured 
textiles could easily be carried even if charged a fairly high 
rate. For railway companies this was just sensible pricing 
policy, for it allowed there to carry many more goods and earn 
more revenue than if they had charged a single rate to all. 
Discrimination could also be made to apply to various destina- 
tions, depending upon the existence of competitors, and to ship- 
ments of varying size. Some shippers of course would be charged 
rates higher than average variable cost,. while, others who would 
not ship except for less, would'be charged less. The range over 
which prices could be varied was determined to a large degree by 
the structure of the railway companies' costs. Where the variable 
; cost of carrying a 
ton of goods was low in relation to total 
cost, there is a wide range over which rates can vary - and very 
low rates charged where there is competition --- while still 
having every ton carried meet its direct costs and contribute 
some amount to fixed costs. 
All the necessary conditions existed for price discri- 
mination to be practised by the railways operating in the Seine 
valley. First, their market was easily separable in several 
ways. Second, analysis of the companies' cost structures indicates 
that their variable costs of operation were proportionately low. 
(See Chapter Seven, Note 95. ) Price discrimination by commodity 
types was not the only kind which had been used before 1848. 
Granting by the railways of special discounts to shippers of 
large quantities had been pointed out several times by the Chambre 
of Commerce in Rouen, as had distance differentials. Both of 
these were continued and broadened in application during the 
fifties. As other lines were completed, some of these rates 
were designed to. attract traffic to the port of Leiiavre which 
might otherwise have gone to other ports; being midway between 
Lellavre and Paris, Rouen suffered particularly from this practice. 
"Tarifs de detournement"13 were another device used to penetrate 
farther inland and to defeat competitors in road and water-borne 
transport. Since railway lines almost all radiated from Paris, 
the distance between two points on'different lines might be much 
greater following the tracks than by a direct lateral route. In 
order to forestall potential competitors for traffic between 
these two points, railway companies acted'in concert to set rates 
"4 
' 
"" 
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based upon the lateral rather than the real railway distances. 
The first of these was between the Chemin de for du Nord and 
the Paris-to-Rouen in 1847.14 Raw cotton. for example, was 
transported from LeHavre to Lille for only 39F. 50, whereas 
normally it would have paid 52F. 75. As successive sections of 
the Chemin de for de Ceinture circling Paris and joining the 
various radial lines were completed, such agreements became 
easier and more common. Agreements were made with the Cie 
d'Orl6ans in 185415 and with the Cie do 1'Est in 1856,16 and. the 
rate reductions were considerable. Another variation upon these 
distance differentials were the "tarifs de transit" or "tarifs 
internationals", designed to give attractive reduced rates for 
long-distance traffic from ocean ports to points in south 
"Germany and Switzerland. In this period there were also the so- 
called "tarif s particuliers" (called "tarifs de favour" by their 
opponents), several examples of which have already been cited 
from the years before 1848. In the 1850s the companies also 
continued their aggressive policy of frequent changes in rates 
and rearrangements of the classification system. From 1848 
to 1860, seven more significant taiiff changes were made; in 
1854, there was a. complete change in the system of classifica- 
tion leaving only two classes, instead of the previous six. 
17 
Inevitably' these pricing devices provoked' hostility, but 
though it became increasingly widespread, it did not seriously 
affect the railways until later in the decade. 
18 In the climate 
of republican sentiment which had followed the journ6es of 
February 1848, the railways had come close to nationalization, 
and though that threat was soon ended in the June reaction, 
hostility toward the companies remained. It came both from 
small-scale water transport operators and companies, and more 
importantly from some of the Chambres of Commerce. There is no 
evidence however, that the issue was an important one in Rouen 
and LeHavre during the early 1850s. Rouen's long-standing con- 
flict with the railway companies seems to have subsided for a 
time. Once recovery from the economic crisis had begun, the 
prevailing mood in Rouen seems to have become one of optimism, 
and the Chambre of Commerce was occupied principally with its 
efforts to have the Seine-Maritime' improved and to organize a 
successor to the defunct Cie Rouennaise de remorquage. Nor was 
the issUe a live one in Lefiavre. This was owing in part no 
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doubt to the fact that Leilavre benefitted from some forms of 
differential tariffs. Early in 1852 the Chambre of Commerce in 
LeHavre received 'a complaint against the railway from a certain 
Vigot, a commissionnaire de roulage and forwarder in Leiavre. 
19 
He complained that the company was giving special low rates to 
some of its users and not to others. Far from the immediate 
reaction of hostility toward the company which seems to have 
been habitual in Rouen, the Chambre in LeHavre agreed that it 
seemed hardly possible20 
de contester aux . chemins de-fers le droit d' abaisser leurs tarifs, ce qui en d5finitive, tourne au profit 
du Commerce en lui procurant des transports a meilleur 
marche. 
On looking farther into the matter it became apparent that 
there had indeed been some unjust discrimination, but in 
writing to the Minister asking that this be corrected, the 
members emphasized that these "tarifs ä prix reduits" were de- 
signed in this case to compete with the Chemin do for du Nord, 
which used the port of Boulogne, and that for this reason they 
were essential to LeHavre's continued prosperity. 
This position seems to have agreed well with that of the 
Minister and his Administration. * During an inquiry into dif- 
ferential tariffs by the Conseil d'Etat in 1850, Legrand, who 
was still' Directeur-general des Ponts at Chauss6es, had defended 
their use by the railways. While not agreeing with Adolphe 
Ttiibaudeau of the Paris-to-Rouen, that the railways must have 
"la liberte absolue, illimitd, dont jouissent tous les 
-industries "21-he stated that22 
Les prix differentiels sont la base de toutes les op¬rations 
des industries de transports. Interdire ces tarifs diffdr- 
entiels, c'est paralyser cette industrie, at je le declare, 
sans tarifs differentials, vous ne trouverez pas de compag- 
nie qui se charge d'exploiter vos chemins de far. 
He pointed out that despite a certain opposition to them, dis- 
tance differentials had been specifically authorized in several 
cahiers des charges since 1843. As for agreements between rail 
way companies and shippers, Thibaudeau_stated that it would be 
very difficult in practice td prevent them. The government- 
evidently agreed with this. A few weeks later when the mariniers 
complained to Bineau, the Minister of Public Works, of the in- 
creasing number of "traitds de favour" being made by the railways, 
_ ." i 
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he replied that such agreements were merely part of "une concur- 
rence qui est dans la nature mama des choses.,... tout cc qu'(e je 
peux) faire c'est de veiller ä co quo cette concurrence soit 
sinc6re et lgale'.... "23 The matter was at least temporarily 
resolved in 1852, though certainly not to the advantage of the 
mariniers, by putting this principle stated by Bineau into leg- 
islation. During lengthy parliamentary debates in 1851 and 1852 
the so-called "Kesther Amendment" was inserted into the law of 
concession of the Cie de l'Ouest, stipulating that special low 
"ratesýmade available to 
individual shippers must be made avail- 
-able to all others on the same terms. An arrete of 
July 1st, 
1852 extended this requirement- to all other companies. 
24 More 
extreme suggestions such as that which appeared in the Journal 
du Havre in 1850, that the government impose minimum limits upon 
railway rates to protect water transport, 
25 
got nowhere. The 
railways were left relatively free therefore, within the wide 
limits, of the law as enacted in the forties and the arrete of 
1852, to continue their campaign of attrition against the 
batellerie . Later 
in the decade the controversy revived and 
more severe restrictions were imposed upon the railways. 
Prospects for the New Decade: the Batellerie. 
For' the mariniers'de la Seine the economic crisis had been 
very serious. As we have seen, their traffic was reduced to a 
fraction of its level in 1847. Traffic levels were well on their 
way to full recovery during 1850, and the river continued to, carry 
more goods than its rival the railway, both upstream and down. 
Even by the middle of 1850 however, in the words of a well- 
informed commentator, the batellerie remained "au paroxisme du 
crise". 
26 
The source of their continued crisis was low rates; 
still being forced down by unrelenting competition. Average 
rates for river transport from Rouen to Paris were forced down 
to as low as 9F. 09 per ton in 1850, while evidence indicates that 
operating costs on the river had changed little since the 1830s, 
when rates had been 25 to 50 per cent higher. During 1848 many 
of the independent bateliers normands had been forced temporarily 
to suspend operations, and in 1849 and 1850 several tugboat 
operators-had been forced to withdraw all or part of their serv- 
ices from the Basse Seine and the'Seine-Maritime. This had left 
only four large companies operating on the Seine. 
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Despite the continuing crisis in water-borne transport, 
there were signs by 1850 of optimism about the future. The. 
batelierie continued to carry more goods than were carried on 
the railway. Four tugboat companies had survived the crisis, 
and were responsible for an increasing proportion of the total 
goods transported from Rouen to Paris. The majority of the 
bateliers normands had survived the crisis, though with much 
reduced-. incomes. Moreover, by. the early 1850s, it began to seem 
that some of the handicaps which had been suffered by the 
batellerie during the 1840s could over time be considerably 
diminished. Even by 1849, according to Louis d'Artois, editor 
of the Moniteur de la Marine and one of river transport's 
strongest defenders, the'common view of its prospects were begin- 
"ning, to change. 
27 
... On ne la considere plus comme une industrie im- 
puissante et use que doit tomber sous la moindre effort 
des chemins de fer. 
Cette modification dans 1'opinion general est due 
d'abord aux ressources reelles, immenses, que renferme 
la navigation, ressources dont la marine elle-meme ne 
so doutait peut-etre pas, decouragee quelle etait par 
la perspective de ruine et d'aneantissement qu'on ne 
cessait de. lui montrer, par 1'abandon et le dedain dont 
eile est l'objet, par le vertige que entrainait tous les 
esprits ä la suite des chemins de fer. 
One of the greatest handicaps suffered by-the batellerie 
had been the unimproved channel of the Seine. In the opinion 
of Louis d'Artois, one of the main reasons for the gradual 
revival of confidence bong the bateliers was the visible progress 
being made in canalization of the Seine. This progress was due 
principally, he said, 
28 ' 
aux hommes sages que 1'engouement general (for railways) n'a 
pu aveugler, quo 1'experience et la veritable science an ont 
preserves;... il est dü aux ingenieurs, qui, loin de desesperer 
de la navigation, de la regarder. comme devant titre detronee, 
annihilee'par les chemins de for, ont compris qu'il y avait 
chez eile des elements de vie et de force quo ceux-ci ne 
detruiraient pas.... 
By 1850 two major derivations had been completed at Andresy and 
at Goulet, and good progress was also being made on the Seine- 
Maritime.. Of course, water-borne transport would for some time 
remain handicapped relative to the railway owing to the lack of 
a complete network of adequate waterways. 
29 This became parti- 
cularly evident later in the decade as gradual completion of the 
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Chemin de for de Ceinture provided easy direct connections among 
. 
the major. railway lines. 
30 
The second greatest handicap suffered by the batellerie 
was its very dispersed and artisanal structure. Steps were also 
being taken to reduce the effects of this. The railways by 
their nature were highly-concentrated in ownership. Water trans- 
port was technically very different; the waterways, in the words 
of Louis d'Artois, 
31 
... appartenant 
ä tous, ouvertes ä tous, sont exploit6es 
par un grand nombre de compagnies ou d'individus, agissant 
isolement, ä lour fagon, sans'accord, sans harmonie. 
In 1848 approximately 140 bateaux normands and chalands were 
actively operated between Rouen and Paris by no fewer than 45 
owners; the largest of these, LeNormand-Baudu et Cie, owned only 
29 of them, in addition to five of the 21 active steamers and 
tugs. By, 1850, when traffic had risen again to almost 200,000 
tons, there. wcre approximately 200 boats in operation, spread 
among, some 85 owners; of these the largest operator, still 
LeNormand-Baudu, owned 39.32 The extreme degree of dispersion 
indicated by these figures had for a time been diminished some- 
what by . 
they existence of several. loose associations or companies 
of maitres mariniers; the only one of these which had survived 
until 1850 however, was the Compagnie Fleury, bringing together 
fifteen owners of one and two boats each. 
33 Others, like the Cie 
Blanchon and the Cie Läcour-Deriberprey, had by this time gone 
a step farther-by associating themselves more or less closely 
with tugboat companies, especially the Cie des Aigles (also known 
as the Cie Delabrousse). The tugboat companies themselves were 
also quite unconcentrated, as their number indicates, although 
such expedients as the abortive Cie de 1'Union went some way 
for a while toward improving this. 
The first result of such an industry structure was that 
the bateliers tended to compete among themselves as well as with 
the railway. Once more in the words of Louis d'Artois, 
34 
... les elements dont se compose le corps des mariniers et 
entrepreneurs de transport par eau.... l'erapeche de so sou- 
mettre. facilement ä cette unite. d'action qui favorise si 
puissamment les progrbs de la marche envahissante des 
" chemins de for. 
It had been possýble. in the past for water-borne carriers to 
come together to set tariffs, but such' arrangements had lasted 
only for limited periods. This had. occurred in 1842. The Cie 
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de l'Union had been formed partly for the same purpose in 1846. 
These agreements had a strong tendency however, to break up when 
subjected to strong pressure, such as had occurred when the rail- 
way first began operations or when the crisis of 1848 greatly 
reduced total available traffic. The rates set by water-borne 
transport in response to those set by the railway tended to be 
lower than necessary to retain a reasonable share of, the total 
traffic.. In 1848 for example, when the railway lowered its rates 
so that total shippers' costs between LeHavre and Paris were 
between 21F and 22F, -competition among themselves to secure what 
remained of the traffic in that crisis year forced the bateliers' 
rates, "down 
to as low as 16F per ton.. 
35 
Moreover, lack of co-ordina- 
tion, in the words of Louis d'Artois, would have helped to avoid 
"les longs sejours que necessite une charge cueillette, laissant 
leur meuble inutile pendant un temps souvent beaucoup trop 
prolonge. "36 The lack of capital resources affected the batoliers' 
ability to innovate, though the largest of them was able to 
expand and innovate to. some degree in the early 1850s. Innova- 
tions. had to await the entry of new companies with outside 
capital. 
Efforts had already been started in the forties to reduce 
these handicaps, most important among them the. well-known improve- 
ments to the Seine, and the organization of 'reunions syndicales' 
for a more systematic defence of its interests. This was 
certainly the most readily obtainable remedy'for the handicap of 
structural dispersion. A reunion syndicale had been formed in 
Paris, as, early as 1845, and during the early days of the Second 
Republic its scope was enlarged to form a "Syndicat national de 
la Marine". 
37 
It seems to have been composed mainly of the 
larger companies operating on the Seine and elsewhere; LeNormand- 
Baudu, Muleur and Dally (of the Cie, des remorqeurs parisiens), 
and, the Cie des Aigles were all members. One of its most 
important activities was, publication of the weekly Moniteur de 
la Marine, edited by the secretary of the syndicate Louis 
d'Artois.. One of his most constantly reiterated messages was 
the imperative need for greater "unite d'action" among the 
bateliers. Taking up his call-the bateliers du Nord, who operated 
on the-Oise, and the canals of the north of France and Belguim, 
formed an association early in 1850.38 The bateliers normands 
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had tried and failed to do the same'at the end of 1848.39 With 
the improvement of conditions over the next two or three years 
they succeeded in 1852 in forming the so-called "R6union syndicale 
des mariniers et proprietaires de bateaux. de la Seine et d 
1'0ise". 40 Meetings were to be held by the syndicate each month, 
and aside from conciliating disputes among its members, promoting 
their knowledge of the regulations governing the use of these 
rivers and bringing together relevant documentation, the syndicate 
. would also 
act in defence of its membership by informing the. 
Administration of-their needs, and persuading it to adopt policies 
to meet them. These were approximately the same functions as 
had been performed with some success by the Sicat national 
since 1848. 
", Fundamentally, success in competition meant prices (and 
costs) lower than those on the railway, and transport speeds 
higher than those-on the railway. To achieve success therefore, 
not only must costs on the waterway be reduced, but also prices 
on the railway must be*kept from descending any farther. The 
Syndicate continuously lobbied the Administration for stricter 
interpretation and enforcement of the railway's cahiers des 
charges, demanding an end particularly to all forms-of price 
discrimination.,, Every effort was made by the bateliers to obtain 
elimination of charges or undesirable. operating 
procedures 
imposed upon them. by the Administration. This was a constant 
theme in the Moniteur de la Marine. With a few exceptions howr- 
ever, these efforts were unsuccessful. Permission for night 
lockages was obtained in 1850.41 Relief from the droits de 
navigation, from plombage de douane, from payment of fees to 
gardes ponts at railway bridges and pilots in the Seine-maritime 
were refused. 
Two successful defensive actions were fought to prevent 
increases in existing competition facing the batellerie. The 
tugboat companies defeated an attempt by the Chambre of Commerce 
and City Council in Rouen to promote establishment of a replace- 
ntent for the old Cie Rouennaise do remotquage. 
42 
More important 
was the defeat of a proposal for an entrepöt du chemin de for 
at LeHavre. For some time LeHavre had been short of space in 
its customs warehouses. The City, 'which administered thorn on 
behalf of the Douane, had been forced to'lease extra space in 
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1834 and again in 1844.43 For various reasons these arrangements 
remained insufficient, and two years later when the Rouen-to- 
LeHavre railway was shortly to begin its. operations a proposal 
had been made to construct a further succursale de l'entrepöt 
immediately adjacent to the railway's terminus. Put forward by 
a local land developer, M. de Mondsir, it had also had some 
financial. support, from the railway company and from the Banque 
du Havre. 
44 
The Chambre of Commerce and the City Council in 
LeHavre were both generally sympathetic to the idea, but they 
had feared it might promote the development of a railway monopoly. 
In the financial turmoil caused by the journ6es of February 1848 
both Dubois of the Banque du Havre45 and de Mondesir were forced 
" into bankruptcy, and nothing further was heard of the scheme for 
more than two years. In 1850 it resurfaced, 
46 
this time with 
strong support from both the City Council and Chambre of Commerce, 
47 
but with equally strong opposition from the Chambres of Commerce 
in Rouen and Paris and the Syndicat national de la Marine. 
48 
They also feared that control of the entrepöt by a company so 
closely allied. with, the railway would give it excessive power, 
and would simply be another stage in the development of a rail- 
way monopoly. It would introduce another means by which the 
railway could control and impose 'accessory charges' not subject 
to administrative sanction. In particular, it would be a means 
of lowering still further the total cost of railway transport. 
A bitter debate ensued between the supporters of the railway and 
the defenders of the batellerie. 
49- 
Following petitions from 
the batellerie to the Minister of Commerce and vehement opposi- 
tion by the Syndicate expressed in the Moniteur de la Marine, a 
special' commission was established to study. the matter. 
50 six 
weeks later the Minister announced on behalf of the government 
that in order to maintain a balance of competition between rail 
and water it had decided not-to permit the establishment of the 
entrepöt. 
S1 
This was an important victory for the batellerie. 
It prompted the directors of the'Rouen-to-Leiiavre railway to 
complain, with considerable exaggeration, that "toutes les fois 
qu'une question se presente. dans, l'intdret du chemin de for, alle 
est decide par le gouvernement dans 1'interet de la navigation.. 
,, 52 
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Innovation in River Transpor. t: aSecond Stage. Probably 
the most powerful and best reason for a Yevival of confidence in 
water-borne transport was evidence of continued potential for 
technical innovation. All of the measures described above, which 
were designed either to reduce the cost of water transport or to 
prevent any further. reduction in the cost of railway transport, 
were in'the long run insufficient to enable the batellerie to 
prosper. This was clearly shown later in the decade. Much more 
radical means than these were required, and when in fact they 
appeared, their successful development contributed to the revival 
of confidence. The most effective way to reduce the cost of 
water-borne transport would. be. through major increases in produc- 
tivity made possible by technical innovation. There had been a 
few attempts in these years to improve the performance of water- 
borne transport. During 1848 the Cie des Aigles and others had 
increased-transport speeds-slightly, and in 1851 the Cie des 
remorqueurs parisiens introduced a new system of winches for 
pulling its boats through the Canal St. -Denis. 
53 
These improve- 
ments were small at best, and contributed little to increasing 
the competitive strength of water transport. What was needed to 
increase productivity was considerably more speed, but without a 
large increase in operating costs. Such an increase in produc- 
tivity had'been produced in the first stage of innovation during 
the 1820s with tugboats, and by the early 1850s this system had 
been extended to at least three-quarters of the goods moving from 
Rouen to Paris by water. Further increases in productivity by 
tugboats seems not to have been-possible in the 1850s. They had 
reached their limit of load-pulling capacity,, ' and their only 
chance was therefore to increase their speed; long trains of three 
or four chalands per tugboat however, and use of locks after 1840 
stood in the way of this. 
Late in 1851'a new type of steamboat began to appear on 
the lower Seine, the so-called PORTEURS; they were light, lightly- 
powered and fast, In December 1848 Gäche freres, a company of 
shipbuilders in Paris and Nantes, -had secured a-patent for a new 
type of steamer, 
54 but in the economic crisis which followed its 
exploitation was delayed for over three years. Early in 1851 a 
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group of Paris merchants led by Charles'Pieau formed a new 
company for this purpose. 
55. 
The, PORTEURb, built by Gäche freres 
in Paris, were faster than any steamers previously used on the 
Seine. They were light, with very small engines of only twenty 
to thirty horsepower (compared with 60 to 140 for the tugboats), 
and of comparatively small payload (80 to 100 tons compared with 
200 to 500 tons for chalands). 
56 
With relatively shallow draft 
and much smaller size than the long trains of chalands, they were 
able to travel from Rouen to Paris in less than thirty hours, 
compared with 65 or more for chalands, and three or four days for 
bateaux hales. 
57 
Improvement'of the river channel also contributed 
considerably to year-round reliability and to cargo capacity, 
and despite their small size, owing to their very much greater 
speed, they were Sable to achieve a high rate of productivity and 
relatively low operating costs. In 1854, for example,. when there 
were between nine and twelve PORTEURS on the Seine, each was able 
on average to perform over 1.2 million ton-kilometres of goods 
transport, compared with about two-thirds that by the older 
chalands. 58 PORTEUR NO. 1 began operating from Rouen to Paris 
Table 10 
Comparison of Productivities of Chalands and PORTEURS, 1854. 
Chalands PORTEURS 
number in use -51 11 
trips per boat per year 
those operating LeHavre-Paris 5 35 
those operating Rouen-Paris 12 60 
tons carried per boat per year' 
those operating LeHavre-Paris . 
3,900 
those operating Rouen-Paris 3,060 4,500 
ton-km. performed in 1854, total 
LeHavre to Paris 11,860,000 4,850,000 
Rouen to Paris 29,700,000 8,700,000 
average ton-km. performed per boat 815,000 1,200,000 
late in October 1851, and in the few weeks remaining in that year 
made 25 trips between Rouen and Paris, carrying almost 1,300 tons 
of goods. 
59 Traffic rapidly increased, and four more boats of 
the type were introduced in 1852, -four in 1853 and a further three 
in 1854. - Until the end of , 
1852, the PORTEURS seem. to have confined 
their voyages almost entirely to the Basse Seine, and did not 
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venture out to LeHavre. They did quite frequently travel up- 
stream as far as Montereau -on. the upper Seine., and with the 
introduction in 1853 and 1854 of seven slightly larger PORTEURS 
numbered from 6 to 12, direct service was extended to LeHavre. 
The network was extended much farther still when in 1854 Pieau 
was given authority to operate a similar service from Paris to 
Reims, Lille and Valenciennes. 
60 
In this first half of the decade 
Pieau had only one imitator, though there were to be many more 
in the, latter half., These first imitators were the'so-called 
. HELICES operated 
by the Cie_LeNormand-Baudu; they were propellor- 
, 
driven steamers operated between Paris and LeHavre. 
61 
" Prosperity Until the Mid-18506. 
For a few-years, as if to compensate for the terrible 
years of crisis, both railway and bateliers enjoyed considerable 
prosperity. Performance by the batellerie in particular seemed 
to justify the optimism expressed in 1850. Although slow, the 
revival of goods traffic on the Basso Seine was faster than on 
'several other rivers in France. 
62 
Although goods traffic on the 
railway between LeHavre, Rouen and Paris had risen continuously 
to a high level, the waterway matched its pace of growth and 
continued to carry an even greater amount of traffic. In both 
1852 and 1853 water-borne goods traffic from Rouen to Paris 
exceeded 300,000 tons; downstream traffic reached almost the same 
level. Many commodities carried on the river had recovered the 
levels attained before 1848; little if any traffic however, was 
regained by the river from the railway. The most remarkable 
performance was given by cargoes of wines, Which in 1852 rose to 
almost 120,000 tons, the greatest amount ever recorded; in the 
following year they declined to just under 90,000 tons, still" 
very high. The high level of traffic in 1853 was also partly 
owing to very much larger than normal cargoes of grain, amounting 
to almost 20,000 tons. The defenders of the batellerie of course 
were eager to point out its value in this connection; as they 
had predicted, the railway proved unable to carry all of the 
large and. unexpected amount of grain required in Paris and at 
other points along the Seine. 
63 
The early 1850s were the best 
years ever for the tugboat , 
companies' and the bateliers who used 
them. In-1852 they transported over 198,000 tons from Rouen to 
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Paris, of which almost 64,000 tons came direct from Lelavre. In 
1853 they transported almost 175,000 tons. LoNormand-F3audu,. with 
eight steamers (including two HELICES) and more than thirty-five 
bateaux and chalands, carried more than a. quarter of the total 
traffic. Next to them in size, as Table 11 shows, 
64 
were the 
tugboat company Delabrousse freres, Poulain, Pottet at Cie (owners 
of the two tugboats the AIGLES) and the twenty-five or so in- 
dependent bateliers who regularly used their tugs. Even the 
bateliers relying upon halage did well in these years, transport- 
ing over 90,000 tons upstream ih both 1852 and 1853, and downstream 
reaching almost 220,000 tons, three times the amount pulled by 
tugboats in that direction. It was*no wonder that even in the 
middle of 1854, when traffic had declined from these high levels, 
*Louis d'Artois described the state of the marine normande as 
65 116mminemment prospere". 
Table 11 
Goods Transport by River from Rouen to'Paris, 1853 and 1854. 
1853 1854 
Company 
voyages tonnage voyages tonnage 
LeNormand-Baudu 273 79,212 175 44, "909 
Muleur et Dally 148 31,340 133 27,517 
Delabrousse et Cie 199 73,500 149" 51,586 
Blanchon 52 16,508 32 8,862 
Blanchet 28 9,423 31 9,146 
Fleury-Desseaux 60 15,786 22 5,374 
Vergught 25 9,047 5 1,700 
Brouet 43 8,142 70 9,272 
Varnier-Roger 199 13,254 196 16,190 
Ch. Pieau et. Cie 374 24,520 578 43,966 
Leloup-Ruel et Deli sle - - 10 991 
Guibert - - 10 454 
Festugieres - - 2 413 
Fournier et Lavaux - - 12 1,923 
Lebarazer - - 1 121 
Others " 112' 20,439 138 23,630 
TOTALS 1,513 301,172 1,564 245,247 
* Includes 8,154 tons carried in 32 voyages by Cardet who took 
over gome of LeNormand-Baudu's equipment after July 1854. 
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Railway goods traffic from Rouen to Paris was less than 
200,000. tons in 1852, but it reached over 296; '000"tons in 1853. 
Downstream traffic on the railway amounted to little more than 
half that carried on the, river. Nevertheless, both companies 
were able to earn substantial profits in the period up-to the 
end of 1854. The average return to shareholders in the Rouen-to- 
LeHavre company in the five years from 1850 to 1854 was almost 
five per cent, a full point better. than during the previous three 
years; _the 
highest return was almost 8.5 per cent., For the Paris- 
. to-Rouen the average return was almost nine per cent, 
almost two 
per cent higher than in the previous seven years; its highest 
return until the end of 1854. was 12.8 per cent. After 1854 these 
two companies were merged with the new Compagnie de 1'. Ouest, and 
their individual accounts and financial statements were no longer 
published. 
By 1853 the railway seems to have become the principal 
carrier of goods travelling directly from LeHavre to Paris. For 
some time it had carried more of these goods than the batellerie. 
Railway traffic from LeHavre to Paris amounted to about 180,000 
tons in 1853,66 compared with 58,000 tons by river. Approximately 
211,000 tons of goods were sent from LeHavre only as far as Rouen, 
and of these water-borne transport had retained a far greater 
share; it is estimated that the railway carried about 60,000 tons, 
the batellerie about the same amount, and coasting vessels about 
91,000 tons. 
Table 1267 
Goods Transported from LeHavre by River and Rail, 1850-1860. 
(metric tons) 
LeHavre to Rouen LeHavre to Paris 
Railway River Coasting Ships " Railway 
River 
1850 165,382* 22,322- 65,233 - *** 48,173 
1851 169,863* 85,545** 84,767 - - 
1852 191,697** 37,867 76,944 - 63,647 
1853. 240,977** 57,902 91,112 - 57,474 
1854 
. 
304,308** . 
36,086 86,234 - 67,060 
1855 26,408 39,544. 94,237 161,204 74,427 
1856 32,259, 32,128 109,632 172,732 101,437. 
1857 22,210 . 38,803 116,380 135,359 121,812 
1858 18,165 54,530 101,902 . 
115,446 84,711 
1859 . 19,433 
45,894 96", 230 126,057 107,964 
1860 28,344 24,709" 54,550" 134,682 131,692 
Covers period from 1. III. 1850 to 28.11.1851, etc. 
** Includes traffic from LäHavre to Rouen and LeHavre to Paris 
*** Unknown. ". 
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In 1853, as Table 13 shows, 
68 thgre were three companies engaged 
in water transport on the'Seine-Maritime. It was a profitable 
trade, for the cargoes they carried were almost all of quite high 
value and earned them good rates. A table of these commodities 
carried by river transport from LeHavre is given in Appendix III. 
Many of the less costly goods shipped to Rouen were brought by 
the coasting trade, and despite the considerable movements of 
Goods Transp 
Table 
ort 'by River 
13 
Steamers from Lellavre to Rouen, 
1853 and 1854 
1853 1854 
Company 
voyages tonnage voyages tonnage 
LeNormand-Baudu 361 65,533 178 33,598* 
Muleur et Dally 233 41,399 441 36,167 
Ch. Pieau et Cie 52 5,914 215 23,811 
Festugieres - - 2 793 
Guibert - - . 
10 455 
Lebarazer - - 1 121 
Leloup--Ruel et Delisle - - 58 6,697 
Coulley et Cie 5 1,499 
Others 14 2,530 - - 
TOTALS' 660 115,376 910,103,142 
* Includes 4,625 tons carried in 21 voyages by Cardet who 
took over some of LeNormand-Baudu's equipment after July 
1854. 
goods from LeHavre to Rouen by steamer and by railway, the coast- 
ing trade to Rouen remained prosperous. In 1852 goods entering 
Rouen in coasting vessels amounted to almost 400,000 tons (of 
which 77,000 tons came from Lellavre); in 1853 this figure dropped 
by about twenty per cent, but still remained above 300,000 tons 
(of which over 90,000 tons came from LelIavre). The coasting trade 
had not grown significantly since the 1830s. Foreign trade was 
growing quickly, especially into the port of LeHavre. Having 
fallen to about 350,000, tons (inbound) in 1848, from 600,000-tons 
in 1847, it rose again to exceed 600,000 tons for the first time 
in 1853. Outbound tonnage was growing equally quickly and by 
1'853 exceeded any-amount registered in'the past. Though foreign 
i 
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trade into the port of Rouen. had, not quite regained the level it 
had reached in the late 1840s, it had nevertheless risen to over 
80,000 tons in both 1852, and 1853, almost double the figures for 
1848 and 1849. 
Changes in the Pattern of Trade and Transport, 1854 to 1860. 
The changes which had occurred in the valley of the Seine 
since the introduction of railways had in one sense not been 
fundamental ones. The pattern of trade and transport, that is the 
routes` followed by commodities between their origins and destina- 
tions, had not changed. Goods continued to flow into the ports 
of'LeHavre and Rouen from both coasting and foreign trade; the 
, railway and waterway simply competed 
to carry them from there to 
Paris. Although there had been a strong challenge to the water- 
way from the railway, and considerable erosion of the former's 
position, both modes of transport continued to carry large 
amounts of cargo. In 1854 the trend of growth in goods movements 
up the Seine was broken and the established system of transport 
through the ports of Rouen and LeHavre to Paris received the first 
in a series of shocks which were eventually to bring fundamental 
changes. The origin of this first shock was the beginning of 
direct railway transport between the port of Bordeaux and Paris. 
The effect of this was to short-circuit a large part of the 
established coasting trade, much of it in wine and spirits, upon 
which the flow of goods between the ports on the Seine and Paris 
had for so long depended. In the following year the direct rail- 
way line to Marseille was also opened, though this had a smaller 
impact upon transport along the Seine. The effect of these now 
railway connections was dramatic, though perhaps in the case of 
Bordeaux a little exaggerated at first by a poor wine crop in 
1854. The fall in traffic to Rouen and Lellavre from the several 
ports in and nearýBordeaux was sixty per cent from 1853 to 1854, 
and this became 80 per cent by 1855.69 Traffic from the Medit- 
erranean, though not as large, was almost equally reduced; from 
1854 to 1855, the total amount of goods sent to Rouen and LeHavre 
fell'by 53 per cent. Altogether,, -between 1853 and 1855 the 
total coasting trade into. Lellavre and Rouen (other than that 
between them) fell by over, thirty per cent, and that into Rouen 
-alone by over 45 per cent. The result-was felt in a considerable 
"ý 
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fall in the amount of traffic being'carried up the Seine. However, 
owing to constantly rising foreign trade, the fall in river traf- 
fic was not so dramatic as the fall in coasting trade. Taking 
into account carriage by both railway and waterway, the fall in 
upstream traffic from Rouen to Paris from 1853 to 1855 was twenty 
per cent; for river transport other than the new services grande 
vitesse it was 25 per cent. Rates on the river, moreover, fell 
again, for the first time going below 9F per ton. 
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These changes in the pattern of trade and transport had a 
, 
very adverse effect upon the port of Rouen. They were aggravated 
. 
by entirely unforeseeable non=economic factors such as extra- 
ordinarily low water levels-on. the Seine in 1858. It was inevitable 
that Rouen should find itself bypassed by direct rail transport, 
both between distant ports like Bordeaux and Paris, and as it had 
been for some time from LeHavre. The same was true of competition 
from the new bateaux vapeurs ä grande vitesse. The reasons were 
simple; in the words of a study prepared by the Soci6t6 libre 
d'6mulation du commerce et de 1'industrie de la Seine-Infdrieure 
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in 1861, 
pouvait-il , 
en titre autrement? Le commerce recherche les 
voies rapides peut-titre plus encore qua les voies economiques, 
les entreprises de chemins de far lui offrent toutes les 
facilitefs desirables; transbordement du navire Bans les 
wagons, sejour an gare, tarifs, differentials.... 
More than any other port in France, the port of Rouen had suffered 
from these changes. It was the leading centre of the coasting 
trade, and it depended to a very large degree upon the trade in 
wines Wand spirits and in goods from the Midi. Formerly, in the 
words once again of the Societe libre d'emulation, 
les caves de Dieppedalle n'etaient pas assez vastes pour 
contenir tous les liquides consignes ä Rouen, de nombreux 
commissionnaires de transit etaient occupes ä recevoir, 
soigner, expedier les marchandises.... mais tout cela est 
change. Rouen nest plus l'entrepot do Paris; las vins, 
los esprits, les marchandises du Midi prennent las voies 
ferrees, les caves de Dieppedalle restent vides, nous n'avons 
plus de transit. 
The situation was not hopeless however, as the Societe libre 
pointed out. Rouen's foreign trade was growing, and if it could, 
be given-adequate facilities, both technical and commercial, this 
could be made to replace the declining coasting trade. The im- 
" provements being made to the Seine Maritime had already gone some 
way to encouraging this. 
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The adverse impact upon the marine normander which had 
. always 
depended primarily upon trans-shipment of foreign and 
coasting trade at Rouen, was severe. After surviving the on- 
slaught of competition from the railway for more than a decade, 
it began in the later 1850s permanently to decline. With rapid 
transport by rail, and to an increasing extent by high-speed 
steamers, these slower vessels had difficulty competing. The 
old bateaux hales, despite improvements to the river, were still 
taking-four to five days from Rouen to paris, 'while tug-pulled 
chalands took sixty hours or more. The railway could transport 
goods over this route for delivery in Paris within 48 hours; the 
PORTEURS could do it in only thirty. As the railways were extended, 
the waterways became increasingly handicapped; the railway, 
remarked Louis d'Artois in the Moniteur de la Marine, 
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were 
"mieux servis, dans leurs operations, par le mauvais tat des 
voies navigables, que par la puissance meine de lours moyens et 
par leur union. " Added to this in the late fifties was an extended 
period of low. water levels in the Seine, levels lower in fact 
than had ever before been recorded. 
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The bateliers were able to 
carry much less than full loads, and were forced for long periods, 
in 1858 to. sit idle waiting for sufficient water depth to proceed 
upstream through the canal St. -Denis. Further delays were caused 
by damage and_premature decay of the locks at Andresy. The goods 
transported upstream by bateaux hales fell-from almost 100,000 
tons in 1853 to less than a third'of that by 1860. Traffic 
carried in, tug-pulled chalands, which for more than a decade had 
been the dominant means of water-borne transport on the Seine, 
fell from almost 20.0,000 tons in the early 1850s to about 120,000 
tons in 1860. In the carriage of downstream cargoes, always much 
less remunerative than those upstream, they maintained better 
traffic for a few years, but even these had suffered considerably 
by 1860. Rates of carriage were forced down to less than 8F per 
ton upstream by 1860, and the state of the batellerie was described 
then as "vraiment affligeante". 
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Petitioning the Minister in 
1858 for further improvements to the river channel, reduction of 
the droits de navigation and other*, 'charges, and prohibition of 
the tarifs d'abonnement, the mariniers ccmplained even of trouble 
in recruiting crews for their boats 
5 
Dejä cc personnel diminue, et nous ävons beaucoup de peine . le 
recruter dans les familles oü on ¬tait marinier de p6re an fils, 
mais qui sont äujourd'hui trop decquragees par 1'etat dune 
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industrie si profond6ment atteinte, par l'incertitude de 
l'avenir et par les diff"icultds prdsentes a. ne. pas chorcher 
a se creer d'autres resources. 
It is evident that the batellerie was suffering from steady 
attrition in the number of vessels in service. The number of 
bateaux normands fell from what had been well over 150 before 
1848 to less than a third of that in 1860. The number of chalands 
in service fell from a high point of over fifty in 1853 to only 
about thirty in 1860.76 
" The railway was not excluded from this change in the 
pattern of trade and transpört. Owing to the almost total lack 
of statistics on the commodities carried by the railway, it is 
difficult to determine to what extent it was dependent upon move- 
ment of goods by. the coasting trade for its own traffic. The 
only statistics available, those for 1854, are very little help; 
not only do they show only the total of traffic flows in both 
directions, as can be seen in Table 14,77 but the breakdown into 
commodities is very much lacking in detail. Total traffic flows 
between all the important origin and destination points are 
available only from 1855,78 and give very little guidance there- 
fore in assessing changes from before that time. For 1855 these 
" show much more traffic destined for Paris originating in LeHavre 
(161,204 tons) than in Rouen (69,141 tons); given the balance 
between overseas and coasting trade in. these ports, it would 
appear that the railway was carrying predominantly goods from 
the former. What little evidence exists suggests this had also 
been the case in 1853 and before. Nevertheless, judging from 
the figures given in Table 14, a considerable volume of the 
railway's traffic did come from the coasting trade; "cereals, grain, 
flour, wines and spirits, and a considerable proportion of the 
construction materials"came from other ports in France and not 
from abroad. Diversion of this trade to other railway lines 
directly connecting ports such as. Bordeaux with Paris was there- 
fore a serious threat to the railway companies' continued 
financial health. Several steps taken by the railways in these 
years can, be explained by a'desire on their part to minimize 
this diversion and its adverse effects upon their profits. 
The first step was designed both to reduce the competition 
for goods along the Seine and to"decrease the diversion of coast- 
ing and foreign trade to other railways. There had been rumours 
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Table 14 
Goods Carried by the Three Seine Valley Railways: 
Traffic in both directions,, 1854. (tons) 
Commodities Rouen-Paris LeHavre-Rouen Dieppe-Rouen 
C&r6ales, graines, ' 
legumes secs 41,416 42,716 2,838 
Farines 21,038. 23,439 2,267 
Vins, vinaigres, esprits 27,625 16,826 5,048 
Huiles 11,428 9,638 1,408 
Denrees alimentaires 12,539 14,558 5,689 
Sucre brut et raffine 9,981 10,074 668 
Denrees'coloniales 14,779 15,894 267 
" Cotons et laines en balles 35,478 . 54,995 1,857 
Fils, tissus et divers 12,829 9,664 1,233 
Fonte, fer et metaux 45,072 25,524 1,959 
Quincaillerie, verrerie 3,644 3,742 431 
Bois de chauffage, charbon 
de bois 208 3,137 836 
Mate'riaux de construction, 
bois, 'pierres, briques 21,788 26,800 12,574 
Pierre ä plätre et ä chaux, 
plätre, chaux ' 12,070 14,951" 5,466 
Engrais et amendements div. 4,854* 4,935 36 
Houille 4,331 45,153 30,158 
Coke 1,430 174 11 
Autres marchandises 169,144 126,344 16,106 
TOTAUX 449,654 448,564 88,882 
on several occasions in the early fifties of agreements between 
the railway companies and elements of the batellerie. It will be 
recalled that a similar agreement had failed to materialize in 
the previous decade. In 1854, just as the Seine railways were 
about to merge with others in Normandy and Brittany, they finally 
reached agreement with the most important company among the marine 
normande. In exchange for a sum reported by the Zloniteur de la 
Marine to be-1,080,000E the Cie LeNormand-Baudu sold its entire 
fleet of tugboats and chalands to the railway. 
79 
Though for a 
time some of this fleet was leased back to LeNormand-ßaudu's former. 
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agent in LeHavre, Cardet, its activities were greatly diminished 
(as is evident in Tables 11 and. 13),, and the railway is said to 
have obtained a share of the revenue it-earned. 
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What was 
intended to be an equally important part of the agreement with 
LeNormand-Baudu involved the establishment over the next ten 
years of a new fleet of steam-propelled coasting vessels designed 
to connect the'railway'at LeHavre'with ports in France, on the 
North Sea and in the Mediterranean. LeNormand-Baudu is said to 
have agreed to use three-quarters of the price paid to him for 
this purpose., Unfortunately for the railway, this part of the 
agreement does not seem to have been very successful. The first 
,, of the new steamers, the MEDITERRANEE, sank on 
its first voyage 
in 1854,81 and of two others launched in 1856, the SEINE and the 
ISLY, the latter. was compelled to convert from steam to sails 
late in 1857. 
ß2 
In the rest of the decade, there is no evidence 
of any other ships being operated by LeNormand-Baudu. 
In 1855 the three railways in the Seine valley finally 
reached agreement to merge with the Paris-to-Cherbourg and the 
small Cie de 1'Ouest which had been formed in 1851, to form the 
new large Cie des Chemins de fer de 1'Ouest. Negotiations for 
this merger had been going on for several years, 
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and it put 
within the control of a single company all the ports along the 
coast from Dieppe to Brest, though this was slight compensation 
for loss of a, share in the coasting trade from Bordeaux. Compared 
with arrivals from the region of Bordeaux and the Charente of 
almost 114,000 tons in 1853, those from the ports north of 
Granville were less than 40,000 tons. An attempt to extend this 
influence toward Nantes and the Breton ports was thwarted when 
permission was denied to the Cie de l'Ouest to build a branch 
line from LeMans to tap the traffic of the Paris-to-Nantes at. 
Angers. 
Beginning in 1854 there was a strong revival of local 
opposition to the methods of competition used by the railways. 
The changing structure of trade and transport begun in the mid- 
1850s, and tighter competition between railway lines and ports 
which accompanied it were quickly felt by all the established 
centres of trade. Declining use of-ports and the coasting trade, 
declining water-borne traffic, more direct and inter-line railway 
transport which by-passed traditional entrep6t towns and cities 
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like Rouen, Lyon, Strasbourg, and even Paris, sharpened general 
awareness of the competitive methods being used by the railways. 
The Chambre of Commerce in Rouen protested to the Minister immedia- 
tely it discovered the agreement between LeNormand-Baudu and the 
railway companies; the Chambre of Commerce in LeHavre also pro- 
tested, though they were largely appeased by explanations from 
the companies that one of the purposes of the agreement was to 
divert more of the coasting trade away from Rouen and into 
LeHavre. 
84 Rouen's demand that the Administration disallow the. 
takeover of LeNormand-Baudu, as-it had a similar one on the Rhone 
in the previous year, 
5 
met with no result. Rouen's response to 
8 
this development was not unexpected, wrote an editorialist in the 
Journal des Chemins de Fer; it had never approved any of the 
. companies' actions. 
"A l'exemple des doges de V6nise", he wrote, 
"eile a epouse la fleuve". 
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The question of price discrimination was also actively 
revived, with the Chambre of Commerce in Rouen taking a leading 
part. Early in 1854 the Chambre of Commerce in Strasbourg 
canvassed its counterparts in other cities for support in opposi- 
tion to the recently introduced 'tarif international' of the Cie 
de l'Est, which it said was forcing it out of its accustomed role 
in the transit trade with Germany and Switzerland. Rouen willingly 
gave its support. 
87 , LeHavre did not; it needed them to compete 
with its rival in this trade, the port of Antwerp. 
88 With the 
opening of the second section of the Ceinture in March 1854, goods 
in transit through Le-Havre rose by. more than 85 per cent over 
1853; 89 nevertheless they remained barely a third of the transit 
traffic through Antwerp. 
90 
Letters opposing tar ifs diff6rentiels 
and tarifs de faveur were sent by the Chambre of Commerce in Rouen 
to the Minister of Commerce and Public Works at the end of 1854 
and again late in 1855; on the second occasion they received the 
cautious support even of their rivals in LeHavre. 
91 
Further 
petitions both to the Minister and to the Senate early in 1856, 
protesting once again the takeover of LeNormand-Baudu and the 
continued use of price discrimination met only with polite acknow- 
ledgements. 92 With no results from this line of attack, the 
railways' opponents shifted their attention to the courts. En- 
couraged by ä judgement in the Tribunal du commerce de Rouen in 
1855 which if allowed to. stand would have destroyed the system of 
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tarifs de faveur, 93 the Chambre of Commerce decided to support 
the plaintiff when the case was appealed first to the Cour 
Imperiale in Rouen and later to the Cour d'Appel in Paris. To 
their chagrin however, the decisions on both appeals wont against 
them. 94 
In the meantime, in face of this opposition to their 
tarifs de faveur, several railway companies, including the new 
Cie de 1'0uest decided to abandon them in favour of a new arrange- 
ment, the so-called tarifs d'abonnement. " Under these the discounts 
formerly offered only to a few-individuals with large quantities 
to ship (the tarifs de faveur)were extended to all on condition 
only that they undertake to send all of their goods exclusively 
by rail. These new tariffs came into effect in 1856,95 but 
fearing. that they also would provoke a hostile response, the 
Minister gave them only provisional approval. After a few months 
of trial he went farther still by asking the Chambres of Commerce 
for their opinion on the merits of the new tarifs d'abonnement; 
"vY a-t-il lieu d'admettre", he asked, 
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comme condition des tarifs reduits, un engagement, pris par 
l'expdditeur de confier pour un temps ddtermind au chemin de 
fer, ä l'exclusi. on de toutes, les autres voies de transport, 
toutes les marchandises soumises au tarif gdneral? 
To this 44 out of 49 respondants replied 'no'. Following rumours 
that another agreement had been made between elements of the 
marine normande and the railway, the Chambre of Commerce in Rouen 
took advantage of a visit by the Emperor to their city to make 
their opposition to tarifs differentiels and de favour known at 
the highest level of government. 
97 
Though one may doubt any 
connection between events, within a month the Minister of Public 
Works,. issued a circular stating that all tarifs de favour were 
to cease at the end of 1857,98 and also called an official inquiry 
by the Comity consultative des chemins de fer into the new tarifs 
d'abonnement. 99 Opposition, both from the Chambres of Commerce, 
the Syndicat de la Marine and-from the general public had evidently 
made itself felt, for on January 25th 1860 an arret6 ministerielle 
declared all tarifsd'abonnement to be illegal. 100 
The Success of Innovations in Water Transport. While the 
older means of water-borne transport suffered from the loss of a 
large proportion of their traditional cargo, the newer bateaux 
vapour ä grande vit esse continued to increase their traffic. 
. -ý i 
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Had these-new vessels not been in operation at this time, it is 
likely that water-borne transport would have fallen far behind 
the'railway in its share of the total traffic. In the event the 
new fast steamers were able to prevent this. There is no doubt 
that the, key to their success was their speed. in 1856 an 
official report to the Prefect of the Seine-Inf6rieure101 remarked 
on the 
excellente organisation du service accdldrd des bateaux 
Porteurs qui rend ä domicile, en moins de temps que le 
chemin de fer, les'marchandises qui lui"sont confi6es 5 
Rouen et au Havre pour Paris..... 
Despite higher rates than those on the railway they were able to 
capture an increasing share of the total traffic on the Seine. 
The cargoes they were especially well suited to carrying were 
. costly imported commodities and manufactures. Since many of these 
goods were carried directly from abroad to the port of'LeHavre, 
they were; not being diverted to other inland transport routes, as 
many of the goods in the coasting trade were. It was these goods 
. which in'the 
words of a contemporary required "exactitude, rag- 
ularite et rapidite". Most important among the goods they carried 
in increasing quantities were raw materials like vegetable oils, 
certain chemicals, copper, dye woods, hides and raw-cotton, 
tropical products like coffee and sugar,. and manufactures like 
cotton textiles. The total traffic in these few'types of goods 
amounted to almost 83,000 tons from Rouen to Paris in 1860. They 
were over 70 per cent of the total carried by the services de 
rg ande vitesse. 
The traffic carried by them, as can be seen in Table 1,, 
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grew rapidly and continuously from small beginnings in 1851. In 
1853 there were still only two companies engaged in the business. 
Pieau et Cie carried about five-sixths of the traffic, and Le- 
Normand-Baudu et Cie carried the remainder. In the next year 
the goods carried from Rouen to Paris doubled in quantity, despite 
takeover of LeNormand-Baudu by the railway. Eleven more vessels 
were added to the 'fleet' in 1855 and 1856, and in the latter 
year traffic more than doubled. again. By the and of the decade, 
the services de rg ande vitesse were carrying more than two-fifths 
of the total water-borne goods traffic from Rouen to Paris. They 
seem tö haves made similar progress*on the Seine-Maritime. Much 
of their traffic was carried directly from Leliavre to Paris, and 
by late-in the 1850s*water-borne transport was very closely rival- 
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ling the railway in this field. The PORTEURS of Pieau at Cie 
gave door-to-door'service from LeHavre in less time than the 
railway; other new steamers like the ten EXPRESS of the Cie 
Leloup-Ruel et Delisle and the four COURRIERS DE LA SEINE of 
LeNormands Fils, though not as fast as the PORTEURS, offered 
regular service and at rates very little above those of the 
chalands. The services de ratende vitesse also carried increas- 
ing amounts of goods to destinations on the lower Oise, the Aisne 
and in. the north of France. The two SERVICES DE L'OISE put into 
service in. 1856 and 1857 by Gilles Cardin were reserved for this 
traffic. In 1860 about 68,000 tons of goods (excluding coal were 
transported by water between Rouen-and various points on the Oise, 
Aisne and the waterways of the north. 
Table 15 
Goods Carried from Rouen to Paris, 1846 to 1860 
(metric tons) 
Brande vitesse. chalands bateaux ha16s railway 
remorquds 
1846 -* 75,605 170,253 195,815 
1847 - 107,853 140,746 268,302 
1848 - 106,404 22,649 141,083 
1849 - 117,049 49,123 177,779 
1850 - 118,570 78,927 180,287 
1851 1,285 165,632 60,133 184,264 
1852 11,967 198,096 91,502 199,298 
1853 30,391 172,586" 98,193 296,291 
1854 55,332 154,694 35,221 293,766 
1855 50,634 151,857 52,555 255,955 
1856 103,430 131,496 40,759 292,074 
18.57 93,043 150,962 39,292 272,576 
1858 87,343 125,541 52,780 244,543 
1859 103,372 131,751 30,204 243,694 
1860 115,817 122,950 30,093 231,332 
* None. 
Between 1852 and 1860 more than fifty new steamers were 
commissioned for operation on the Seine. The Cie Pieau had not 
for long been alone in the field with its new steamers. During 
the decade following 1851 fifteen other new companies were formed 
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Table 16 
-'Bateaux a vapeur ä grande vitesse', 1851 1860 
Date of 
Name of Ship 'Owner, Commissioning Service 
PORTEUR- Cie Pieau 1851 Rouen-Paris 
PORTEURS 2,3,4,5 1852 
PORTEURS 6,7,9,10 1853 LeHavre-Paris 
PORTEURS 8,11,12 1854 
VILLE DE SOISSONS Georges & -! Cie 1852 Rouen-Paris 
HELICE NO. 1,2 L eNormand-Baudu 1853 of 
HELICE 3,4,5 Cardet Acne' 1856 LeHavre-Paris 
EXPRESS Cie Leloup-Ruel, Delisle 1855 
EXPRESS 2,3,4,5 1856 
EXPRESS 6,7,8,9,1 0 1857 
ANNA Cie Masson 1855 Rouen-Soissons 
SERVICE DE L'OISE 1. Cardin 1855 Rouen-Soissons 
GLANEUR Boivin & Cazanave 1855 Rouen-Port Audemer 
HERCULE Fournier & Lavaux 1854 Rouen-Paris 
MARECHAL BOSQUET Vaghi & Cie - 1856- LeHavre-Paris 
SERVICE DE I, 'OISE 2. Cardin 1857 Rouen-Soissons 
DU TREMBLAY Vaghi & Cie 1856 LeHavre-Paris 
VILLE DU HAVRE 1857 
VILLE DE PARIS 1857 " 
GRAVILLE Bertin & Cie 1857 
PORTEURS 13,14,15 Larget & Cie 1858 Rouen-Creil 
ROUENNAIS Bertin &, Cie 1858 of 
LE VAILLANT Vaghi & Cie lß58 LeHavre-Rouen 
COURRIER DE LA SE INE LeNormand fils 1858 Rouen-Paris 
COURRIER DE LA SE INE 2, -3,4 1859 LeHavre-Paris 
ST. -OUEN Bertin & Cie 1858 of 
PORTEURS 28,29 Pieau & Cie 1859 Caen-Paris 
PORTEURS 26,30 1860 LeHavre-Paris 
HONFLEURAIS Lacoudrais & Cie 1854 Honfleur-Paris 
LAROMIGUIERE Festugiares &, Cie 1854 Bordeaux-Paris 
PARIS-ET-LONDRES 1,2,3 Armand & Guibezt 1854 London-Paris 
PAQUEBOT DE LA SEINE 1-4 Jouvellier & Cie1857 Rouen-Creil 
VILLE D'AMIENS Larget & Cie 1860 
VILLE DE SEDAN 'Morianne 1860 Rouen-Reims 
SEINE-ET-TAMISE Gauddt Freres- 1858 London-Paris 
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to operate services'de grande vitesse. Table 16 shows an outline 
of this remarkable development. 
103 
The first other company to 
follow Pieau's example was LeNormand-Baudu, an established 
operator. In 1854 Cardet aind, who had been an agent of LeNormand- 
Baudu, took over some of the latter's steamers, including two 
HELICES and two of its four other older ones; two years later 
three more'HELICES, also built by LeNormand-Baudu in Rouen, were 
added to Cardet's small fleet. 
104 
After Pieau, one of the most 
important of the new companies to appear was the Cie des Bateaux 
express de la Seine, formed in 1854 also by two former agents of 
LeNormand-Baüdu, C. '-A. Leloup-Ruel Qf LeHavre and A. -J. Delisle 
of Paris. 
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Between 1855 and 1857 they commissioned ten new 
steamers' named-EXPRESS, operating as both goods carriers and as 
tugboats between LeHavre and Paris. They also acquired twenty 
or so`chalands, among them a dozen new ones. In 1853 the son of 
Louis Bertin formed a new company at Leilavre, the Compagnie 
G6n6ra1 des-paquebots de la Basso'Seine. 
106 Its object was. to 
carry both goods and passengers from Paris to LeHavre; passenger 
service began late in 1854, but does not seem to have lasted beyond 
1856.107 In 1856 Bertin formed a second company called'the Union 
du Commerce, Cömpagnie de Transport par Eau, 
108 
aqd in the follow- 
ing two years put into service three new steamers. Other companies- 
formed during this, decade were the important'Cie Larget, formed 
in-1-858 to operate four new steamers largely between Rouen, Paris 
and Creil (on the Oise); LeNormand fils; and the Cie Cardin fill, 
successor to a very long-established family enterprise serving 
the Seine and the Oise. 
This remarkable development of services de grande vitesse 
was extended into the foreign coasting trade. Several fast 
steamers were'comm'issioned to connect Paris with Caen, Bordeaux, 
London and the Mediterranean. Evidence of these developments can 
be' seen'in-Tables 11 and 16 above. 'In 1857 a now and very ambit- 
ious company was announced, 
109 
the Compagnie frangaise do Naviga- 
tion ä vapeur, de roulage et des messageries, with a capital of 
20 MF. Its organizers planned that its vessels would connect 
Paris-directly with a large number". of'French and foreign ports, 
including several in Italy and in the colony of Algeria. Opera- 
tions began in April 1857 with services between Paris and LeHavre. 
'ý.. 
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The company lasted for only a very-short time; in February 1858 
it was forced to declare bankruptcy, and its directeur was sent 
to prison for an infraction of the new law on companies. The 
company's operations in the Mediterranean seem to have been 
halted by a new common tariff for textiles agreed to by the Cie 
de 1'Ouest and the Cie Paris-Lyon-Marseille. 
110 
other less 
-ambitious and better founded companies however, were-able to 
continue and expand operations, especially to Great Britain, 
during 
the 1860s. 
Attempts to establish new bateaux vapour grande vit 
in the domestic coasting trade were less successful. As the 
, /railways 
had done after purchasing the equipment of LeNormand- 
Baudu, Pieau and others also tried to obtain a greater share of 
the domestic coasting trade by establishing connecting services 
out of Rouen and LeHavre. Twenty-three such steamers were put 
into service in the four years from 1854 to 1857, the most 
important of them being the ten PORTEURS MARITIMES owned by Pieau 
and several others built for LeNormand-Baudu. However, these ships 
'also found it difficult to compete with the new interior lines 
of transport being established by the railways. In January 
1859 the Cie de 1'0uest and the Cie Paris-Orl6ans were given 
permission to use a new common tariff for wines and spirits 
between Bordeaux and the Charente. and ports on the Normandy coast, 
including Rouen; the reductions in. the_price of railway transport 
were as much as sixty per cent. Pieau was forced following this 
to reduce his fleet of coasting steamers from ten to only three. 
lll 
** 
The last years of this decade were the end of what might 
be called the first phase in the development of a system of 
mechanized transport in the lower Seine valley. Horse-drawn 
intercity road transport had been almost entirely eliminated. 
Horse-drawn river transport from Rouen to Faris had been reduced 
to only ten per cent of the total. Steam-propelled tugboats had 
been operating for more than thirty years, and-a new generation 
of fast steamers for almost a decade. A railway had been 
established for almost twenty years. Finally, the. first phase 
of improvements to both the Seine-Maritime and the Basse Seine 
was completed at about this time'. A new era of competition had 
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just begun, as more railways were built to join Paris with every 
important point in the interior and on the coasts; railway 
company mergers served to intensify inter-line rivalries. 
During the 1850s a third stage of innovation in river 
transport began, 'and by the mid-1860s it had taken over a large 
proportion of water-borne transport. This was the system of 
touage ä chaine noy6e. During the 1820s two experts on steam 
navigation, Tourasse and Mellet, had attempted to pull chalands 
with so-called toueurs; 
112 these were vessels propelled not by 
means of paddles or propellors, "but by means of a chain laid 
in 
the bed of the river along which the vessel was pulled by its 
own steam-powered capstan. In theory the system should have been 
very efficient; Tourasse estimated that by applying power 
. directly to a chain rather than through paddles to water, 
the 
same engine could be made to pull about six times the weight. A 
vessel using this new principle was operated experimentally on 
the Basse Seine between 1821 and 1826. However, there were 
several technical problems which could not be solved, and the 
idea had to be abandoned. Some years later the invention of 
Tourasse and Mellet was revived, and for several years a system 
of touage seems to have been operated successfully on the Seine 
close to Paris. Then in March 1853 three separate applications 
were made to the Minister of Public Works for permission to 
establish a service de touage ä chaine noy6e on the Seine between 
Paris and Lefavre. 
113 
In the public inquiry which was subsequently 
ordered by the Minister, there were many who expressed fears 
that any company given exclusive privileges to operate such a 
service would quickly become a monopoly. The commission of 
inquiry at Rouen rejected the idea for this reason. 
114 Despite 
these objections however, a concession was given in 1854 to one 
of the three applicants, Godeaux fils et Cie., to operate a 
service between Paris and Rouen. 
115 By 1857 it was operational 
between the mouth of the Oise at Conflans and Paris, and remorquag 
between these two points was very greatly reduced. By 1860 
however, touage had made little difference to operations between 
Rouen and Paris. 
During the 1860s the new system of touage was extended to 
cover the-whole of the Basse Seine and the Seine-Maritime. Godeaux 
began' operating to Rouen in 1863 with three toueurs, and by 1867 
116 
there were six, in 1860, he applied and was authority 
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to extend the system to Lefavre117 and within four years there 
were two toueurs in operation on'the Seine-Maritime. 
118 Their 
efficiency in pulling large loads easily bore out the early 
hopes of Tourasse and Mellet. Beginning in the 1860s, touage 
took over a major proportion of the water-borne goods traffic 
on the Seine and on several other important waterways in France; 
its-domination was to last until the end of the century. Even 
by 1867 there was only one tugboat being used on the Basse Seine; 
in 1860 there had been five. ' On the Seine-Maritime tugs were 
not so dispensible, and by 1867. ten of them were still in opera- 
tion there. Though touage was somewhat faster than remor uage, 
for several decades it could not replace the services de grande 
vitesse. The fast steamers continued therefore to operate on 
the e for some time, and as the river was progressively 
improved and deepened, they increased in size. By the 1870s 
PORTEURS of over 200 tons were being used on the Basso Seine. 
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" It should now be possible to describe more generally 
the process-of innovation and change in the transport system 
which occurred in the lower Seine valley. Louis Girard iden- 
tifies two stages in the process of change. in the first, he 
7_says, 
l "each new kind of transport is conceived as a way of 
complementing the particular method prevailing at the time. ". 
In the second, "the new method of transport attains its typical 
form and develops its own capacities to the full.... (It) 
seeks to become predominant by asserting its complete indepen- 
dence. " The motive force for change which gives this process 
its character is the small innovation, at first integral to the 
existing system of transport, but improving it in some way. 
The events described in the nine chapters above tend to con- 
firm the pattern suggested by Girard. Successful attempts to 
change the transport system on the lower Seine started with 
modest innovations designed to solve specific technical pro- 
blems"or to overcome particular physical obstacles; they also 
met the'peculiar economic needs of the local economy. When 
first introduced, these innovations were conceived by users 
of the system, and usually by the innovators as well, simply 
as improvements to the existing transport system. Gradually 
they were extended over the whole existing system, some of 
them eventually displacing it. Attempts to displace the 
existing system with complete and independent new systems 
failed. 'Remor ua e and navigation acc6l6r6, for example, 
succeeded; the first steamers, which would have displaced many 
of the existing vessels on the lower Seine, did not. The 
short line of railway through the Seine valley from Rouen to 
Paris succeeded; the larger scheme for an independent railway 
across the plateau from Paris to the sea did not. The simple 
invention-of Poir6e succeeded; the. ambitious scheme to displace 
river navigation by a maritime canal did not. 
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The pattern of success and failure evident in these few 
examples suggests, at least in the case of the lower Seine, an 
additional element in the process outlined by Girard, The quest- 
ion must be asked, why did the several attempts to innovate on 
a large scale fail? It is clear that from the early 1820s there 
was a fairly widespread desire for improvement in the transport 
system. Shippers wanted faster, cheaper transport, and they 
looked principally to Great Britain-for an example of what could 
be done to provide it. The changes which came about over the 
next few decades were to a-considerable extent the outcome of 
this original desire for improvement. There were techniques 
available which at several points between 1820 and 1860 could 
have been used to bring about rapid and radical change in the 
transport system. Why when both the desire for change and the 
technical means to bring it about. existed, was change such a 
very slow process? It is clear that resistance of various kinds 
stood between the desire for change and its realization. While 
this may appear a rather-commonplace statement, it may be use- 
ful to view the process of change in part as a gradual defeat 
and accommodation of the resistance to it. Certainly in the 
case of the lower Seine, 'the process of change we have witnessed 
acquired its character as much from the nature and the sources 
of this resistance as from the innovations which gradually 
overcame it. In the lower Seine'valley, where there was a long 
and well-established existing transport system, resistance to 
change was likely to be considerable. 
Corresponding approximately with the two stages suggested 
by Girard, there seem to'have been two stages of resistance to 
change. In the first there was resistance to large innovations 
which sought to displace the existing system. Resistance could 
of course be deliberate, and came from the many people involved 
in the existing system, who were naturally opposed to anything 
which threatened their settled livelihood. These people were 
assisted to a very large degree during this first stage by 
resistance of another kind, which came from the technical, eco- 
nomic and political environments in which innovation took place. 
During this first stage smaller innovations seen as comple- 
mentary to. the existing system were generally welcomed for the 
impr. ovements they brought. At'the, same. time, attempts to 
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displace the existing system were resisted. 
The earliest'example of successful innovation was 
remorguage. It was welcomed for the assistance it brought'in 
avoiding the barre and in increasing the speed of transport. 
" The maritime canal on the other hand met with deliberate resist- 
ance in Rouen and. LeHavre, neither of which had any important 
part in the new system it would have created. More effective 
in; preventing, approval and construction of the canal was the 
inability of its. designers to devise an economical means for 
crossing the river-at several points. The Conseil-gdndräl des 
Ponts et Chaussees, not wishing to create a monopoly for the 
canal, insisted that it not interfere with river-borne navigation. 
Within the existing state of technique this requirement could 
not be satisfied economically. A few years later, the shorter 
line of railway through the valley from Rouen to Paris was at 
first quite readily-and widely accepted. It was not thought 
during most of the 1830s that railways would compete for many 
of the goods then carried by inland water-borne transport. By 
going as far=as Rouen, this railway would not disturb the exist- 
ing pattern of transport in which Rouen was the head of ocean 
navigation. Moreover, it. would serve both transport between 
Rouen and Paris, and also the-: needs of the many small towns in 
the valley between. In contrast to this, the railway which it 
was proposed to build across. the plateau would have been inde- 
pendent of the existing. transport system. Since it would 
depend principally upon transport between LeHavre and Paris 
and beyond, and would by-pass the principal centres of popu- 
lation in the valley, its probable revenues were smaller. This 
and. its much greater. expected construction cost combined to 
make financing the project very difficult. Only a smaller 
project within the confines of the present transport system and 
population distribution could be economic and financially viable. 
The plateau route was forced to seek substantial aid from the 
State, and in doing so it became embroiled in the general debate 
over. railways. This served as another obstacle to its success. 
The second stage of resistance began when it became- 
evident that the innovations which had been successful during 
the first stage were extending themselves beyond their original 
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limited roles, and were threatening"to'become independent and 
displace the existing system. What occurred was. a, reaction 
against this threat, and during-this stage the resistance to 
change became much more deliberate, Even in the 1820s the 
Chambre of Commerce in Rouen saw that remorguage and chalandage 
were beginning to become independent of the traditional system, 
avoiding as they could any. trans-shipment in Rouen. The Chambre 
reacted by attempting to ensure with their own tugboats that 
coasting vessels would continue to come up to Rouen. The reaction 
to the railway was much stronger. By 1846 it hardly needed 
Victor Grandin, the vocal deputy from Elbeuf, to point out that 
; railways were not simply "le compldment at le perfectionnement 
" des autres voies de transport. " During the following years there 
were several factors which resisted the railway companies and 
prevented them from achieving their principal objective, "celui 
d'absorber a (leur) profit la totalite des transports, voyageurs 
at marchandises. " The'first was the restraint upon the companies' 
use of their tariff as a competitive weapon; this was used by 
the Administration specifically to. protect the existing system 
of transport. The State was also involved in attempting to 
improve the river and thereby enable the existing system to 
. compete and'survive. 
As we have seen the operators of the exist- 
ing system themselves came together to protect their interests " 
acid succeeded for example in preventing the railway from estab- 
lishing its own independent entrepöt-in Lellavre. By grouping 
together, the use of tugboats was greatly extended to increase 
the speed of navigation. The most successful response to the 
threat from the railway was the introduction of bateaux vapeur 
rrande vitesse. Taken together these responses prevented the 
railway within the period up to 1860, from becoming entirely 
independent and displacing water-hörne transport. The rail- 
way and other important innovations had undoubtedly made great 
progress, but resistance to their. innovations had made the 
process of change a very slow one, - It also ensure that what- 
ever the change, the modified system would always contain 
elements of the old. 
i 
. 's - .. . - 
ý;,: 
's 
_ý+ý. 
_,.., 
ý, t- ý .rýýý' 
,. ýý- 
-ýý ý ^ý 
ý". 
'. 
f 4 .. 
Xk 
} 
Pin 
ýý_rýý.. 
<ýfý"ýý 
t-_., 
i 
291 
APPENDIX I 
Seaborne-Shipping in the Port of Rouen 
A. Sources 
Statistics on both foreign and coasting trade into and 
out of Rouen are printed continuously from 1825 to 1860, and 
beyond, in: 
Direction general des Douanes'. Tableau g6n6ral du Commerce 
de la France. (Paris 1818 ... ) 
Beginning in 1850 a separate. volüme was published for the 
coasting trade: 
Direction general des Douanes. Tableau g6n&ral du mouvement 
de cabotage. (Paris 1850 ... ) 
, These volumes contain a large quantity of other material in 
great detail, including numbers of ships registered in all 
important ports (by tonnage classes); a breakdown by countries 
of origin and destination of foreign and colonial trade (from 
1841); a breakdown by ports of origin and destination of the 
coasting trade (from 1837); tonnage of particular commodities 
shipped in and out in foreign trade (from 1857); tonnage of 
particular commodities shipped in and out in coasting trade 
(from 1838); a breakdown by customs ports of entry of 'transit' 
trade (from 1832); a breakdown by entrepöts of 'mutations 
d'entrepöt'. 
Many of the same statistics for Rouen, in addition to 
some others (concerned principally with exports of textile 
manufactures) are contained in the following publication, 
available in the Bibliotheque municipale de Rouen: 
Chambre de commerce de Rouen. Statisti uc es de Commerce 
maritime du port de Rouen de l'annee 1843 ä 1867. (Rouen 
1844-1868). 
A detailed breakdown of foreign trade in the Port of 
Rouen by countries and by commodities exists in manuscript in: 
Archives departementales de la Seine-Maritime. Series M. 
Statistiques: commerce, industrie, enquetes, (1830-1837). 
"Douanes. Direction de Rouen. Bureau do Rouen. Etat des 
principales Narchandises exportfies (et importfies) pendant 
le ler Semestre 1833.... " 
Manuscript records of individual ships arriving and departing the port of Rouen for the years 1830,1837,1838,1846, 
1848 and 1855 are contained in separate bundles in: 
Archives departementales de la Seine-Maritime. Series M. 
Mouvement des Ports. 
" .. 
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B. Shipping to and from Foreign and Colonial Ports 
(Total Net Registered Metric Tonnage of ships, 
excluding ship. -, 'in ballast) 
Year Arrivals Departures 
. Year Arrivals Departures 
1825 20,717 7,750 1843 111,653 9,216 
1826 16,662 6,631 1844 77,835 13,987 
1827 14,394 5,233 1845 110,140 22,368 
1828 21,545 6,830 1846 121,511 23,243 
1829 37,282 6,082 1847 102,927 24,027 
1830 21,315 7,155 1848 46,502 29,444 
-1831 7,280 3,350 1849 43, G40 34,105 
"1832 22,117 7,185 - 1850 61,272 44,442 
1833 18,185 5,524 1851 71,112 45,971 
X834 17,013 5,844 1852 84,884 44,620 
1835 27,892 5,897 1853 81,475 46,903 
1836 45,514 6,457 1854 69,875 36,426 
1837 37,402 7,249 1855 110,082 39,231 
1838 65,509 6,236 1856 136,367 46,624 
1839 59,313 5,892 1857 120,496 57,101 
1840 74,410 7,924 1858 127,386 79,350 
1841 79,096 9,241 1859 118,780 66,025 
1842 107,651 12,686 1860 120,377 48,662 
C. Shipping to and from other Ports in France 
(Total Net Registered Metric Tonnage of ships, 
excluding ships in ballast) 
Year Arrivals Departures Year Arrivals Departures 
1825 173,983 174,891 1843. 306,019 173,598 
1826 167,514 185,780 1844 260,378 159,719 
1827 141,470 148,979 1845 291,080 158,768 
1828 157,336 162,344 1846 334,516 156,909 
1829 159,181 174,837 1847 253,203 146,239 
1830 183,048 182,361 
, 
1848 154,359 94,231 
1831 105,231 109,874 1849 191,879. 104,400 
1832 118,619 114,611 1850 192,647 123,089 
1833 146,696 153,995 1851 204,971 140,388 
1834 119,983 70,872 1852 263,219 141,578 
1835 125,316 72,499 1853 237,204' 130,881 
1836 220,119 154,985 1854 184,368 127,672 
1837 269,992 133,037 1855 152,049 121,632 
1838 281,268 112,557 1856 152,173 137,589 
1839 259,308 105,473 1857 174,511 1.52,358 
1840 246,076 89,613 1858 170,528 146,354 
1841 263,224 110,537 1859 158,925 117,476 
1842 287,. 384 116,811 18,60 146,925 111,347 
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APPENDIX II 
Seaborne Shipping in the Port of Leflavre 
A. Sources 
Statistics on both foreign and coasting trade into and 
out of LeHavre are contained in all of the same sources as 
those listed for Rouen, with the exception of the publication 
by the Chambre de commerce de Rouen. 
B.. Shipping to and from Foreign and Colonial Ports 
(Total Net Registered Metric Tonnage of ships, 
excluding ships in ballast) 
Year Arrivals Departures Year Arrivals Departures 
1825 157,013 101,179 1843 426,049 299,658 
1826 209,129 91,537 1844 393,780 293,325 
1827 184,608 93,733 1845 456,429 303,304 
1828 190,186 91,950 1846 486,093 313,484 
1829 244,815 102,499 1847 599,644 330,548 
1830 205,622 87,530 1848 356,459 277,642 
1831 150,089 102,703 1849 391,362 315,014 
1832 213,252 104,061, 1850 417,927 327,336 
1833 202,384 118,862 1851 495,593 419,769 
1834 231,862 134,558 1852 -509,416 431,421 1835 249,789 . 137,326 1853 605,556. 
456,767 
1836 . 279,007 161,418 1854 631,580 509,481 
1837 322,742 217,535 , 1855" 760,419 485,176 
1838 402,163 251,699 1856 912,514 575,195 
1839 421,362 296,452 1857 964,132 650,306 
1840 420,079 257,685 1858 939,033 601,265 
1841 429,931 284,938 1859 860,626 574,631 
1842 454,013 '284,223 1860 950,471 611,472 
C. Shipping to and from other Ports in France 
(Total Net Registered Metric Tonnage of ships, 
excluding ships in ballast) 
Year Arrivals Departures 
1825 119,481 101,172 
1826 118,305 116,944 
1827 97,503 109,278 
1828 104,766 123,844 
1829 124,479 161,122 
1830 150,848 170,920 
1831 118,289 155,375' 
1832 
. 170,031 
191, Q40 
1833 159,093 193,450 
1834 167,211 181,040 
1835 168)250 187,126 
1836 158,269 181,343 
1837 155,440 211,555 
1838 
. 
172,663 . 212,524 1839 206,148 231,623 
1840 180,229 229,038 
1841 170,978 212,284 
1842 180,700 228,376 
Year Arrivals Departures 
"1843 146,224 219,398 
1844 190,176 213,536 
1845 204,625 217,899 
1846 234,401 260,378 
1847 261,117 243,059 
1848 161,607 163,351 
1849" 164,364 169,078 
1850 156,409 184,583 
1851 179,247 191,304 
1852 193,287 201,170 
1853 210,627 210,187 
1854 179,328 230,294. 
1855 184,478 224,674 
. 
1856 251,358 239,783 
". -1857 
291,515 288,116 
1858 300,466 265,684 
1859, -258,890 263,465 
1860 249,287 234,371 
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Water-Borne Transport on the Lower Seine 
A. Sources 
The principal source for these statistics is: 
Chambre de commerce de Rouen. Statistiaues du Commerce 
maritime du port de Rouen de l'ann6e 1843 1867. (Rouen 
1844-1868). 
Others were found in:. 
Archives d6partementales de. la Seine-Maritime. Series M, 
Commerce et industrie, Statistique"industrielle et commerciales, 
enquetes (1820-1837). 
A valuable source for the very early period is: 
S. Flachat. Du Canal Maritime de Paris 21 Rouen. -(Paris 
December 1829 vols 1 to 4. 
'An equally valuable source for the-1850s is the weekly publica- 
tion, Le Moniteur de la Marine, 'of which there is a full set in the 
Bibliot que Nationale, Paris. 
B. Goods Transported by River between. Rouen and Paris 
I (metric tons) 
Year, 
-Upstream 
Downstream Year Upstream Downstream 
1818 120,832* 163,965 1840 227,533 158,864 
1819 73,342 167,500 1841 . 264,624 180,255 1820 98,834 155,044 1842 248,468 168,383 
1821 133,144 175,103 1843 336,687 241,525 
1822 149,456 169,852 1844 244,263 162,196 
1823 107,352 175,552 1845 272,668 164,943 
1824 149,836 198,303 1846 237,058 150,885 
1825 156,648 179,899 . 1847 242,407 144,176 1826 179,421 190,871 1848 128,372 86,779 
1827 112,712 -** 1849 158,045 154,079 
1828 136,028 - 1850 183,983 149,857 
1829 182,415 - 1851 . 212,872 165,365 1830 209,056 - 1852 288,418 166,844 
1831 145,801 - 1853 281,082 170,714 
1832 176,276 - 1854 214,031 164,529 
1833 202,984 - 1855 234,042 191,732 
1834 170,061 - 1856 247,889 178,387 
1835 179,668 - 1857 244,413 180,822 
1836 170,638 - 1858 24,6,226 209,087 
1337 218,507 - 1859 238,548 198,728 1838 244,558 - . 1860 . 241,075 208,742 1839 233,998 162,223 
* Figures for 1818 to 1838 include goods transported from Rouen 
** -Unknown. 
to Oise. 
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C. Goods Transported by River between Rouen and the Oise 
(metric tons) 
Year Upstream Downstream Year, Upstream Downstream 
1818 -- 1840' 6,570 28,561 
1819 -_ 16,793 1841 4,070 42,657 1820 16,793 1842 10,382 36,002 1821 - 27,120 1843 6,836 52,682 1822 46 495 1844 6,881- 106,004 1823 , - 31 053 1845 8,573 88,940 1824 , - 46 537 1846 8,900 75,885 1825 . , - 41 185 . 1847 5,724 70,223" 1826 
8 
, 51,165 1848 4,682 68,890 1 27 _ 1849 8,128 98,000 
1828 1850 13,519 101,632 
1829 - 1851 14,176 109,516 
1830 _ - 1852 13,138 127,726 
1831 _ -_ 1853 20,089 103,627 
1832 
' -_ 1854 31,241 157,106 1833 , - 1855 21,001 102,839 1834 _ -_ 1856 28,606 120,254 
1835 -_ 1857 21,252 121,570 
1836 - 1858 19,439 89,605 
1837 -_ 1859 26,780 113,413 
1838 - 1860 27,885 104,264 
1839 71', 043 25,948 
* Unknown. 
D. ""Goods Transport Downstream to Rouen, by Vessel Type 
(metric tons) 
Year Grande Vitesse 
1847 -* 1848 - 1849 - 
1850 - 1851 - 1852 7,621 
1853 20,347 
1854 30,930 
1855 33,575 
1856 64,709 
1857 62,255 
1858 67,529 
1859 - 66,825 
1860 84,582 
* None. 
4 
. . "ý. 
Remorqu6s 
35,330 
24,370 
28,493 
39#593 
54,636 
48,658 
53,407 
48,695 
51,442 
42,313 
67,440 
63,568 
82,352 
93,756 
Hal6s 
206,790 
155,551 
193,399 
193,587 
178,098 
163,938 
217,909 
194,972 
209,553 
191,619 
173,237 
167,595 
162,963 
134,402 
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APPENDIX IV 
Railway Capital Expenditures and Funds 
A. Sources 
All data are taken from Reports to shareholders 
contained in the Journal des-Chemins de Fer. 
B. Capital Expenditures 
Paris-to- Rouen-to- Rouen-to- 
Rouen LeHavre Dieppe 
Expenses before company 
incorporation 
....... 592,155 188,604 46,335 General Costs ......... 1,050,122 1,080,738 327,089 Land ..... " ............. 5,639,177 9,502,131 1,800,680 Engineering services .:. 558,305 783,758 328,857 Earth Works, Bridges, etc 27,272,663 24,699,950 7,232,902 
Stations .............. 6,372,285 9,877,718 973,994 Iron Way .............. 9,271,551 6,317,687 2,185,159 
Rolling Stock ......... 7,356,558 3,201,424 132,337 Interest on Equity before 
opening of railway .. 1,590,816 1,767,513 
745,779 
Interest on Bonded Debt 
" before opening of 
railway .....:....... 347,177 484., 765 - Loss. on issue of equity, 
or bonds ........... 171,975 1,226,555 32,325 Less Interest on idle 
funds during 
construction ....... 862,187 385,689 - Less Resale of Land ... - 315,672 - Share in construction of 
Crossing of Rouen .. 6,953,555 -** - Expenses re Fecamp 
project ............ - - 154,623 
TOTAL 0 66,314,152 57,290,309 13,960,008 F 
GRAND TOTAL 137,564,469 F 
* This includes 450,410 F for acquisition of studies made by 
Riant et Cie. 
** The contribution of the Rauen-to-LeHavre company to the cost 
of the crossing of Rouen was not given separately in the 
company's accounts. 
C. Capital Funds 
Paris-to-Rouen Company 
Equity (72,000 shares @ 500F) ...... 
State Loan @ 5% ...:................. 
Loan of 1845 @ 4$ ................. 
Loan of-1847 @ 5% ................. 
Loan of 1849 @ 4% ................. 
State Loan of 1844 @ 3% ........:.. 
TOTAL ............................. 
Rouen-to-LeHavre Company 
Equity (40,000 shares @ 500F) ..... 
State Grant ....................... 
Grant from LeHavre ................ 
State Loan @ 3% ................... 
Loan of 1846 @ 5% ................. 
Loan,. of 1847 @ 5% ..., ...........:. . 
Loan of 1847 @ 5% ................. 
TOTAL ..:........:................. 
Rouen-to-Dieppe Company 
Equity (36,000 shares @D400F) ..... 
36,000,000F 
14,000,000 
6,000,000 
5,000,000 
3,000,000 
4,000,000 
68,000,000F 
20,000,000F 
8,000,000 
1,000,000 
10,000,000 
10,000,000 
5,000,000 
5,000., 000 
59,000,000F 
14,400,000F 
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APPENDIX V 
Railway Company Operating Accounts 
A. Sources 
The data included in-the tables below are taken 
from the accounts of the Paris-to-Rouen railway company. and 
the Rouen-to-LeHavre railway company, which were published with 
their semi-annual reports to shareholders in the Journal des 
Chemins de Fer. One exception is the report to shareholders 
of the Paris-to-Rouen company for the period ending December 
1847; owing to the Revolution of 1848, the Journal des Chemins 
de Fer ceased publication for several weeks. These figures 
were obtained therefore from Arch. Nat. 65 AQ E. 563, which 
contains all of this company's reports from 1842 to 1854. 
No accounts are given for the Rouen-to-Dieppe company 
because it published its own accounts for only three accounting 
periods, from July 1848 to March 1851. On the 1st of April 
1851 its operations were managed by the Paris-to-Rouen company; 
from that time on the accounts of the latter company include 
costs and revenues from the Rouen-to-Dieppe line. 
The accounts given below'end at the end of 1854. 
From the 1st of January 1855, their operations were merged with 
those of the new Cie des Chemins de Fer de 1'Ouest. This 
company's accounts were not sufficiently' detailed to determine 
the costs and revenues from the individual former companies' 
lines. 
B. Paris-to-Rouen Railway Company, Operating Accounts 
(see page 307) 
C. Rouen-to-LeHavre Railway Company, Operating Accounts 
(see page 309) 
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1 H. Cavaillas, La route francaise; son histoire, sa fonction, 
(Paris 1946); Pierre Dauzet, Le si cle des chemins de fer en 
France, 1821-1938, (Fontenayý-aux-Roses 1948). 
2 The most important of these'are his thorough study of the 
origins of the Cie de 1'Est, Une Eta e de la construction des 
grandes lines de chemins de er en France. La ligne de Paris 
a la fr5nt1dre Al ema ne (1829-1852), (Paris 1932), 4 volumes. 
Also very valuable is L' re du rail, Paris 1954). 
3 Monographs on the development of railways in the Rhone 
valley: Les oppositions locales aux chemins de fer dans_la vallee' 
du Rhone, 1832-33, (Montpellier 1924), and Essai historique 
sur les premier chemins de fer, du Midi lan uedocien et de 
1a. vallee. du Rhone, (Montpellier 1935). This was followed by 
Une Bataille de reseaux: Besan on, I 'Est et la P. L. M. (1842-1860), 
Montpellier 1937), and-finally two things of a more general 
nature, "Les grandes etapes du reseau Ferroviaire Frangais", 
, Revue 
des Deux Mondes, 15 September 1941, and Geographie des 
c emins de f er, (Paris 1942). 
4 Most notably La Politiaue des Travaux Publics du Second 
Empire, (Paris 1952), 
Histor of Europe, vol 
(Cambridge 1965), part 
nd "Transport", in'Cambridge Economic 
6, The Industrial Revolution and After, 
Ir pp 212-273. 
5 Potentially most interesting is M. Caron's recently completed 
thZise de doctorat d'Etat, "Histoire de l'exploitation d'un 
grand-reseau frangais: la Compagnie des Chemins de Fer du Nord 
de 1846'a 1936", reported in "Sou tenance de Th7lse pour le doctorat 
Os lettres en Sorbonne", Revue historique, No. 494 (April-June 
1970), pp 522-529. It is to be-hoped his will soon be published. 
6 There are very useful sections on public works and transport 
in. La banque et le credit en France, 1815 ä 1848, (Paris 1959); 
and in Recherche sur la formation de la Brande entreprise 
capitaliste (1815-1848), (Paris 1959). A valuable reference is 
"Les Archives des compagnies de chemin de fer", in Histoire des 
Entreprises, vol 1 (1958). 
7 Girard, "Transport", 22' cit., p 213. 
8- A_somewhat similar work has been published by Felix Rivet, 
La. navi ation ä vapeur sur la Saone et le Rhone (1783-1863), 
Paris 1962). Based upon the extensive records of several large 
steamer companies at Lyon, this book examines in great detail 
the development of steamer services and their subsequent 
competitive struggle with the railway. It adopts wholeheartedly 
the point. of view of the steamer companies. It is conspicuously 
lacking in any form of quantitative analysis, and contains no 
systematic presentation of traffic statistics. 
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1 These figures and the information following on goods 
brought to Paris by water are taken from several tables contained 
in a publication by the Departement de la Seine, Recherches 
statisti ues sur la ville de Paris et le d6 artement de la Seine, 
Qariis 1821-18291, vol 2. 
2 St6phane Flachat, Du Canal maritime de Paris ä Rouen, 
(Paris December 1829), vol 2, pp 288-295. 
L 
,3 See Pierre Dardel, Navires et Marchandises dans les ports 
; 'de Rouen et LeHavre au XVIII si c e, (Paris 1963). 
4 Ibid., p 241. 
5 Flachat, og. cit., vol 2, p 121. 
6 In published works and documents these terms are sometimes 
confused; here they will be used consistently as defined in the 
text. 
"7L. Sekutowicz, La Seine Maritime. Etude sur l'importance 
economique du port de Rouen, (Paris 1903), 16. 
8 Chambre de Commerce de Rouen, ETný 
faire pour'llamelioration de la nave at 
(Rouen November 1844), p 87; H. Wallon, 
de Quillebeuf et les services u'il ar 
a Seine, (Rouen 1902), 154. 
9 P. -F. Frissard, Navigation fluviale du Havre a Paris. 
Amelioration de la navigation du Havre a Rouen, (LeHavre 1832), 
p 34. 
10 Doyat, Rapport sur les enquetes faites sur les projets 
r6sent6s pour 1' m1 oration de cette rive re (the Seine)..., 
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Cost figures for river transport in this era, after the inno- 
vations of the. previous decade. had been made and the subject 
became of lass inWimt to the public, are difficult to obtain. 
There are several however, for the early 1830s, which cover 
only bateaux acceleres ordinaires. Those. of B¬rigny correspond 
fairly closely with those given by Charles Monier, another 
Ponts et Chauss6. es engineer, in Do 1'Etat*actuel de la naviga- 
tion do la Seine entre Rouen et Paris, et les moyens de le 
perfectionner, (Paris 1832). Another slightly earlier estimate, 
which gives the same cost per ton, is contained in Tourasse 
and Mallet, Essai sur les Watteaux ä Vapeur. Considerations 
sur les Chemins de fer, (Paris 1828-29. ), p 229. The figurc3of 
Berigny are the most detailed, -and the most recent, and take 
explicitly into account all costs, direct and indirect.. 
45 Proces-verbaux des seances de 1 commission charg6e 
- ---- --- ---r 
46 Arch. Nat. F14.1646, report of engineers on project for 
improvement of Route Royale NO. 14 between LeHavre and Harfleur. 
47 The Times, 1 August 1840, meeting of shareholders 
of the Paris-to-Rouen railway company, Liverpool, 22 July 1840. 
48 Almanach du Havre, 1841. 
49 See for example Mary, "Notice sur les voitures ä vapeur 
employees an Angletorre sur les routes ordinaires, " Annales 
des Ponts et Chaussees, (1833.1), pp 111-131, and L. Marion 
"Extract d'un momoire sur l'emploi'des Voitures ä vapour marchant 
sur les routes ordinaires, " Bulletin de la Socidte Libre 
d'Emulation de Rouen, (1839), pp 99-110, who says they were 
considered as an alternative to branch lines during planning 
of the Paris-to-Rouen railway. In 1868 and. 1869 goods and 
passenger services by locomotives routiers were established 
between LeHavre and nearby Montivilliers, Arch. V. du Havre, 
12.7. 
50 These figures are taken from'the following publications, 
for 1822,1-linistere de l'Interieur, Administration Generale des 
Ponts et Chaussees et des Mines, Statistique des Routes Royales 
de France, 1824, (Paris 1824); for 1827, E. Grangez, Discussion 
et documents sur les canaux, sur les routes et sur le: - chemins 
de for de la France, (Paris 1830), p 129; for 1836, NinistEýre 
des Travaux Publics, de 1'Agriculture, et du Commerce, 
Statistique des routes royales de France, (Paris 1837). Defini- 
tions of the terms used here are: on tat d'entretien - in a 
good state of repair requiring only normal maintenance; 
ä reparer - requiring repairs, major or minor, to bring it up to 
good condition; 
ä terminer - sections of road officially scheduled, but not yet 
built; often means diversions for gradient improvements. 
51 Ministhre des Travaux Publics, op. cit., (1837). 
52 Arch. Nat. AD XIX. N 2, Circular of the 14th of December 1833, NO. 31. 
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Total costs per voyage between Rouen and Paris in about 1834 
(1) upstream: 
towing-by horses 
............. i.... 
1,280F 
crew wages and food ................. 500 depreciation and interest on 
capital at 5% P. A. ........... 500 droits de navigation ................ 336 
costs at bridges and pertuis ........ 216 loading and unloading ............... 595 
commission at 2jß .................. 88 
general administrative costs "....... 140 
3,655 F. 
(2) downstream: 
towing by horses .................... 160 F 
crew wages and food ................. 250 depreciation ...................... 
150 
droits de navigation ............... 
116 
costs at bridges and pertuis ...... 104 loading and unloading. .............. 255 
commission at 22% 20 .................. 
general administration ............ 60 1,116 F 
Total costs per round-trip voyage therefore were 4,761 F. 
Revenue per voyage varied according to the season, as 
the load varied. Using the information supplied by Collignon, 
in Du concours des canaux et des chemins defer et d l'acheve- 
ment de canal de-la Marne au Rhin, (Paris 1845), p 70, it 
appears that the annual maximum freight rate would be charged 
during five months of the year when watet levels were lower 
than one metre at Vernon, about 16 F per ton in 1834 and 1835. 
The maximum load was also reduced probably to about 200 tons. 
For the rest of the year the freight rate would be close to 
the minimum, about 12F. 50, and the possible load would be 350 
tons. The revenue for upstream voyages averaged therefore at 
3,880 F. For downstream voyages the tonnage capacities were 
the same; revenue from general cargo was between 6 and 7F per 
ton, and from plaster 2F per ton. Average revenue for down- 
stream voyages was 1,133 F. This leaves a net revenue of 252 F 
per voyage; assuming about 2 voyages per year, this is a return 
on capital over and above normal interest, ie. a profit, of 
about five per cent per year. 
To test the assumptions used above the following calcula- 
tion was done. The principal assumption was that full (seasonal) 
capacity loads were carried. In 1835, of the 820 voyages 
reported, 411 were by Bertin's chalands, leaving 409 by bateaux 
acc6ler6s and others. If each of the latter carried an average 
of 290 tons, then the total amount carried by them would be 
about 120,000 tons. If. this amount is added to the 50,000 tons 
estimated to have been carried by chalands, the resulting total 
annual tonnage is 170,000 tons; the actual recorded total up- 
stream freight in 1835 was 179,668 tons. 
CHAPTER FIVE 348 
53 Ministore des Travaux publics, Direction g6n6ra1 des 
ponts et Chauss6es et des chemins de for, Documents statistiques 
" sur les routes et ponts, (Paris 1873), 'Notice histor que'.. 
54 F61ix Ponteil, Los Institutions de la France do 1814 a 
1870, (Paris 1965), pß. 97. 
55 Berthault-Ducreux, Historique, situation et raison d'etre 
du service d'experiences sur l'entretien des routes, (Paris 
0 
56 For an excellent treatment of MacAdam's techniques, see 
R. J. Forbes' article,. "Roads to c. 1900", in A History of 
Technology, eds. Singer et al., (London 1958), vol 4, pp 5'20- 
547. 
57 Navier, "Considerations sur les travaux d'entretien des 
routes en Angleterre, " Annales des'Ponts et Chaussees (1831.2), 
pp 132-156; this report had been submitted by Navier in 1822. 
58 Annales des Ponts et Chaussees, lois et ordonnances, 
1839, p 114. 
59 In his Cours d'economie politique, 2e edn. vol 2, cited 
by Cavailles in La route franc, aise, (Paris 1946), p 172. 
60 Cavailles, op. cit., p 173. 
61 Garnier, "Experiences et observations sur les frais 
d'entretien des routes en empierrement, et. principalement sur 
1'usure des Chaussees, " Annales des Ponts et Chauss5es (1845.2), 
p 178. 
62 Circular of 21 January 1656, "Routes inp6riales - 
entretien", Annales des Ponts at Chaussees, -lois et ordonnances, 
1856. 
-63 Ordonnance of 15 February 1837, Annales des Ponts et 
Chaussees, lois et ordonnances, 1837. 
64 Calculated from data obtained in the Journal du iiavre, 
1827 and 1835. 
65 Berigny,. a. cit. 
66 J. Vidalenc, Le d6partement de 1'Euro sous la Monarchie 
Constitutionelle, (Paris 1952), p 55, "Rapport du Pr6fet au 
Conseil-general de 1'Eure, " 1845. 
67 ADSM, Series S, Navigation, statistiques des bateaux 
vapeur naviguant sur les fleuves (1834-1850), 1844. 
68 Michel Chevalier,, "Statistique des travaux publics sous 
la monarchie. de 1830", Journal des Economistes, vol 21, (1848), 
p 292. 
CHAPTER FIVE 349 
69 Ernest Grangez, Prelcis historique et statistique des voics 
navigables de la France et dune partie de la Belgique, (Paris 
i855),, p 746.1 
70 Prows-verbaux des seances de la Chambre des d6putes, 
Impressions, C1835), Annexe NO. 188, "Expose des Motifs et 
projet de toi sur les rivieres..., seance-du 2 Avril 1835", 
p 137-138. 
71 Michel Chevalier, "Des chemins de for compar6cs aux 
lignes navigables, " Revue des Deux Mondes, vol 13(1838), p 811. 
72 Arch. Nat. P14.6813, "Memoire sut les moyens de 
perfectionner la navigation de la Seine entre Paris et Rouen... "., 
20 January 1834. 
73 R. Musset, "La canalisation des rivieres en France", 
Annales de Geographie, vol 47 (1938), pp 500-504, contains an 
excellent concise description of the evolution of canalization 
techniques in France. 
74 Ibid., p 501. 
75 An experiment of this kind was carried out on the Loire 
at Chouze (Indre-et-Loire) in 1825; the cost was considerable, 
and the result was a channel even more obstructed by alluvions 
than before. See Beaudemoulin, "Considerations sur le systf*-Ime 
de retrecissement par des digues submersibles propose pour 
l'amelioration des rivieres a fond mobile et essaye sur la 
Loire, en 1755 et en 1825",, Annales des Ponts et Chaussees 
(1833.1), pp 330-375.1 
76 The word 'pertuis' has two meanings. It denotes both the 
rapids formed by shallow water at various-places on the lower 
Seine, and also the openings in dams, through which water is 
allowed to flow. 
77 Arch. Nat. F14.6813., "Examen du projet presente par M. 
1'inspecteur-general Berigny", by inspecteurs-g6neraux Cayenne, 
Vauvilliers, Prony, Lamande and Lamblardie, 1 March 1835. 
. 78 In 1830 Coic had proposed a series of 
by-passing canals, 
or "canaux de derivation", to be built at seven places; they 
would be created in the river-bed by joining up islands and 
building locks in the channels so created. At three other places, 
where there were bridges, independant canals would be built; 
see Coic and Duleau, Reconnaissances-de la Seine de Rouen a 
St. -Denis, en 1829 et 1830; et travaux proposes pour rendre cette 
Partie de la Seine facilement navigable, (Paris 1830), pp 50-51. 
79 Charles Monier, Do 1'Etat actuel do la navigation de la 
Seine entre Rouen et Paris, et les moyens dc la perfectionner, 
(Paris, November 1832). 
-80 Arch. Nat. F14*. 10912.90, Proces-verbaux des seances du 
Conseil-general des Ponts et Chaussees, sessions of 9 and 24 
April, 9,16,, 23,30 June, 7,10,16 and 21 July, 1836. 
81 Arch. Nat. F14.2302.1, dossier personnel, Charles-Antoine- 
Francois Poit6e, 11 November 1785-31 March 1875. 
' CHAPTER FIVE 350 
82 Another of these dams was built by Poir6e and Chanoine 
at Epineau on the Loire, near becize, in 1836. It and the 
system in general are described by Chanoine in his'"Memoire. 
sur le barrage d'Epineau", Annaics de: Ponts at Chauss6es 
(1839.1), pp 238-280; there are diagrams in the volume numbered 
1839.2, plates 157,158. 
83 Arch. Nat. F14*. 10912.90, M. Sit., sessions of 21 and 
25 August and 1 September, 1836. 
84 Chambre de commerce de Rouen, Ra orts sur les questions 
relatives ä l'amelioration de la Seine-et sur la proposition 
de divers barrages, (Rouen 1837). 
85 Proces-verbaux des s6ances de la Chambre de commerce du 
Havre, vol 5 and 6,8 April 1836 and 3 June 1836; the CC Havre 
received a letter from the Prefect on the 6th of April 1836 
outlining proposals by Berigny and-by Poiree; 'a committee of 
three was selected to report on the matter. 
86 Chambre de commerce de Rouen, 22. cit. 
87 Bibliotheque do la Chambre de commerce de Rouen, Documents, 
I-7-D2.6, "Projet d'am6lioration do la Navigation de la Seine, 
entre Paris et Rouen", signed Poiree, 18 February 1836. 
88 Arch. Nat. F14.6815, Projet de Poiree, Report by Cayenne, 
9 December 1836. 
89 Arch. Nat. F14*. 10912.92, Proces-verbaux des s6ances du 
Conseil-general des Ponts et Chaussdes, sessions of 9,13,16 
and 20 December 183,6. 
90 Le Moniteur Universel, 13-14 June 1837. 
91 Situation des Travaux, M. cit., 1837,1838. 
92 Arch. Nat. F14.2302.1,2R. cit. 
93 Situation des Travaux, op. cit., 1837. 
94 Ibid., 1838,1839,1840. 
95 See J. Aubert, Barrages et canalisations, (Paris 1949), 
p 147. 
96 Bibliotheque de la Chambre de commerce de Rouen, oR. cit. 
" .4 
CHAPTER SIX 351 
1 Edward Charles Blount, Memoires of Sir Edward Blount, 
Ed. S. J. Reid, (London 1862), p. 52; Blount states that he 
approached Dufaure in 1838; he must mean 1839, as Dufaure did 
not become Minister of Public Works until the 12th of May 18,39. 
2 R. Guyot, La premiere entente cordiale, (Paris 1926), 
p 140n3. 
3 Ibid., p 142. 
4 In-1838 and 1839 there were only two companies formed in 
each year, and in the following years of 1840,1841,1842 and 
1843 respectively, there were only zerö, one, five and three 
companies. formed; this contrasted with 29 in 1836 and 15 in 
1837. H. G. Lewin, Early British Railways, (London 1925), 
p 186. 
5 S. A. Broadbridge, "The Early Capital Market: the Lancashire 
and Yorkshire Railway, "' Economic History Review, vol 8 (1955), 
p 212. 
6 C. H. Ellis, British Railway History, (London 1954), vol 1, 
p 83. 
7 The Railway Times, vol 2,10 August 1839. 
8 Ibid., vol 3,7 March 1840. 
9 Loc. cit. 
10 Arch. Nat. F14.8863, Chambre'de commerce de Rouen to 
Minister of Public Works, 28.2X. 1839; Chambre de commerce 
d'Elbeuf to Minister of Public Works, 24. XI. 1839; petition from 
the citizens of LeHavre to Minister of Public Works, 20. XII. 
1839; ACCIII 21, Chambre de commerce de Dieppe to'the Chambre 
de commerce du Havre, 16. VIII. 1839. 
11 Ibid., Committee of. Chambre de commerce du Havre and 
Conseil municipal du Havre to Minister of Public Works, 
10.11.1840. 
12 Ville de Rouen, Conseil municipal, Analyses des proces- 
verbaux, (Rouen 1899), vol 4,12.11.1840. 
13 This is apparent from correspondence in ACCIH 21, during 
the early months of 1840. 
14 ACCIH 21, Clerc to CC Havre, 12. IV. 1840. 
15 ACCIII 21, M. Chevalier to J. Clerc, 28. IV. 1840. 
16 The Minister's words were reported by J. Clerc in a letter 
to CC Havre, on the 22nd of may 1840, in' ACCIII. 21. 
. 17 The English capitalists involved, wrote Guizot, "are among 
the best money securities this country can offer. " Furthermore, 
one of themt. Mr. Easthope, is proprietor of the Morning Chronicle, 
and a member of the House of Commons. Without immediate reference 
0- 
J 
CHAPTER SIX 352 
to the Rouen railway, it is well to be on amicable terms with 
him; " Francois Guizot, An Embassy to the Court of St. James 
in 1840, (, London 
, 
1862)_, p 112. 
18 Loc. cit. 
19 Ville'de Rouen, . cit., vol 4,23.21,2.1840. 
20 Report of the Coimnittee of the Chambre des Pairs on the 
Paris-to-Rouen railway bi11; Le Moniteur Universel, 8. VII. 1840, 
p 1633. 
21 Arch. Nat. 42 AP 172, (Fonds Guizot), Jaubert to Guizot, 
18. V. 1840. 
22 ACCIH 21, Mermillod to Reilly, 15. V. 1840. 
23 Le Moniteur Universel, 24. V. 1840, p 1166f. 
24 Bulletin des Lois, 9e serie, vol 21 (1840), law of 
15 July 1840. 
25 Arch., Nat. 42 AP 172, letter of 18. V. 1840. 
26 A good examination of the Commission's work is contained 
in Picard, Les chemins do for francais, (Paris 1884), vol 1, 
pp 178f; its membership was drawn from the Administration, the 
'haute banque', and from business: the comte d'Argout, Baude, 
Cayenne, Frangois, baron de Freville, Jaubert, Kermaingant, 
Legentil, Rivet and Vivien; Valentin Smith was its secretary. 
The prdc6s-verbaux of its meetings are contained in Arch. Nat. 
Series 12AQ. 
27 The Railway Times, 8 August 1840, Shareholders' meeting. 
of the Paris-to-Rouen railway, 30 July 1840. 
" 28 This information was given by Jaubert during the debate in the Chambre des deputes, and can be found in Le Moniteur 
Universel, 17. VI. 1840, p 1466. 
29 Report of the committee of the Chambre des deputes on 
the Paris-to-Rouen railway bill, rapporteur Garnier-Pages, 
session of 9. VI. 1840, Le Moniteur Universel, i1. VI. 1840, p 1366. 
30 Alphonse Charles Courtois, Bourse des effets publi_ques. 
Paris-Lyon-Marseille. Tableaux des cours des principaux 
valeurs du 17 janvier 1797... ä nos jours.. _, (Paris 1862), 
p 259. 
31 The Railway Times, vol 3,8 August 1840. 
32 Le Moniteur Universel, 17. VI., 1840, p 1466. 
33 Ville do Rouen, off. cit., 1. VI. 1840. 
34 The Railway Times, vol 3,4. VII. 1840. 
35 Maurice L6vy-Leboyer,, Les Banques europeennos et 
1' industrialisation internationale dans la premiere itie du 
XIXe si cle, (Paris 1964), p 664n14.6. 
4 
CHAPTER SIX 353 
36 Detailed revenue calculations were presented to the 
meeting of shareholders of the Paris-to-Rouen railway at 
Liverpool on 22 July 1840, and reported in The Railway '. Dimes, 
vol 3,1. VIII. 1840: 
Table of Estimated Revenues for the Paris-to-Rouen Railway 
Passengers: 
Passengers now travelling by 'diligence' .... 132,987 
Crie-quarter of passengers now travelling 
by steamer (though it was believed 
that all of these would use the 
railway ................................ 
29,707 
Passengers now travelling in private 
carriages .............................. 
22,164 
1-. 'Ni ssageries', now carried by 'diligence',... 
120,702 
Goods: 
188,500 tons'of goods which now go by road, 
which now do the journey in 2 to 10 
days, to be charged 22s (27F. 50) ....... 
207,350 
97,500 tons of goods which now go by 
water, to be charged 20s per ton (25 F). 97,500 
272,000 tons of goods from intermediate 
points on the line, to be charged an 
average of 5s per ton (6F. 25) .......... 
68,000 
Total gross revenue from present estimated 
traffic charges at railway rates,...... 676,410 
37 Arch. Nat. 42 AP 172, Jaubert to Guizot, 18. V. 1840. 
-38 Report of the committee, of the Chambre des deputes on 
the Paris-to-Rouen railway bill, Le Moniteur, Universel, 
ll. VI. 1840, p 1366. 
39 Report of the committee of the Chambre de Pairs on the 
Paris-to-Rouen railway bill, Le Moniteur Universell 8. VII. 1840, 
p 1633. 
40° Arch. Nat. 42 AP 172, Jaubert to Guizot, 5. XI. 1840. 
41 ACCIH 21, Clerc to CC Havre,. 13. VII. 18.40. 
42 Ibid., Clerc to CC Havre, 3. VIII. 1840. 
43 Ibid., CC Havre to Minister'of Public Works, 10. XII. 1840. 
44 Ibid., Clerc to CC Havre, 4.111.1841. 
45 Reported in the Journal du. Havre, and 'copied in the 
Railway Times, vol 5,12. I11.1842. 
CIIAPTER2 SIX X54 
46 ACCIii 21, proces-verbal du Conseil municipal du Havre, 
21. IV. 1842; Charles Laffitte i! s said to have insisted upon 
this as a condition for the company's acceptance of the lower 
tariff; from the Journal du Havre, reported in the Railway Times, 
vol 5,30. IV. 1842. 
47 Stated at the Liverpool meeting of British shareholders 
of the Paris-to-Rouen railway, 29. IX. 1842, The Railway Times, 
8. X. 1842. 
48 Teste, the Minister of Transport, presented his bill on 
the 29th of April 1842; Le Moniteur Universel, 30. IV. 1842, 
p 966. 
49 Report of the committee of the Chambre des deputes, 
rapporteur Vitet, session of 25. V. 1842; Le Moniteur Universel, 
-28. V. 1842, p 1295f. 
50 Bulletin des lois, serie 9, ler partie, vol 24 (1842), 
p 657; law of 11". VI. 1842. 
51 The company's charter containing 'a list of subscribers, 
dated 31. XII. 1842, is contained in Bulletin des lois, serie 9, 
partie supplementaire, vol 23 (1843), p 161, ordinance of 
29.2.1843. 
' 52, Journal des Chemins de Fer, vol 8, (1851), p 53. 
53 Ibid., 15. IV. 1843, p 493. 
54 Amongst these there were several very large subscribers, 
the ship-owner Albrecht 300 shares, the bankers Dubois and 
Delessert. 400 and 380 respectively, and merchants Du Rouveray 
et Cie-380 shares. 
55 Journal des Chemins de Fer, 27.. VII. 1844, p 414. 
56 Ibid., 25.1.1845, p 31. 
57 Ibid., 8.111.1845, p 128. 
58 Participants in this company included Charles' Seguin, an 
administrator of the St. -Etienne-Roanne railway and the Montereau- 
Troves railway, several British from the Brighton area, including 
Henry Simonds, an administrator of the Chichester and Brighton 
Railway, Dulong, directeur de materiel for the Entreprise des 
messagerics general, baron Felix Heron de Villefosse, and Thomas 
Cretu; in Journal des Chemins de Fer, 8.11,17. V. 1845. 
59 Ibid., 9. VIII. 1845. 
60 Bulletin des lois, serie 9, vol 31 (1845), p 368, law of 
19. VIII. 1845. 
61 Bulletin de. s loin, s6rie 9, vol 31 (1845)1'p 602, ordinance of 
18.2X. 1845; the concession, was signed on the 13th of September. 
A company charter was registered'ori the 8th of October 1845, 
Bulletin des lois,. serie 9, partie supplcmentaire, vol 28, p 457. 
CHAPTER SIX 355 
62' Arch. Nat. F12.6065, list of subscribers to Rouen-to- 
Dieppe railway shares. The exact breakdown of shareholders 
according to this list is: shares subscribed in Paris and 
banlieue 24,557; in Great Britain 5,455; in Rouen and its 
dependent towns 2,496; in Dieppe 1,964; in Fecamp 254; in 
Lelavre 78; elsewhere in France outside of Paris 1,149. Amongst 
individual subscribers were the three Seguin brothers (Camille, 
Paul, and Charles) 1,050 shares; several banks, Macuard et Cie 
266, Rougemont de Lowenburg 349, A116gri at Cie 25, Lecointe 
des Arts at Cie 233, Fould, Fould et Oppenheim 266; Madam 
Jaubert, 250, Thomas Brassey 133, Buddicom 66, Allcard, Buddicom 
and Co. 13, Henry Barbet (mayor of Rouen) 263. 
63 Meeting of shareholders at Liverpool, 24. XI. 1841, in 
The Railway Times, vol 4,27. X2.1841. 
64 A. -J. Tudesq, in Les Brands notables en France (1840-1849) 
, (Paris 1964), 424f, analyzes the social composition of several 
societes anonymes, amongst them several railway companies. 
Their most salient characteristics were a preponderance of 
bankers and of aristocratic notables of all kinds. In the 
second respect, the Paris-to-Rouen certainly conformed; however, 
it was exceptional in two other ways, first in the large number 
of British directors, and second in the considerable previous 
railway experience of the four British directors. 
65 Nouvelle biographie g6nerale, (Paris 1866), vol 45, 
"Adolphe Thibaudeau", b. 1795 - d. 1856. 
66 Meeting of shareholders of the Paris-to-Rouen railway, 
Paris, July 1840; The Railway Times, vol 4,11 December 1841. 
67 Charter of the Rouen-to-LeHavre railway company, Bulletin 
des lois, serie 9, partie supplementaire, vol 23, p 161, 
ordinance-of 29.1.1843. 
68 Charter of the Rouen-to-Dieppe/Fecamp railway company, 
Bulletin des lois, serie 9, partie supplementaire, vol 28, 
p 457, ordinance of 14. X. 1845. 
69 Bertrand Gille, Recherches sur la formation de la rande 
entreprise capitaliste (181: 5-1848), (Paris 1959), p 100. 
70 A. L. Dunham, The Industrial Revolution in France, 1815- 
1848, (New York 1955), pp 446-7. 
71 This condition was written into the company's charter in 
1840. 
72 Robert Keith t"Ziddlemas, The Master-Builders, (London 1963), 
p 35. 
73 See Joseph Devey, The Life of Joseph Locke, Civil Enger, 
(London 1862), passim. 
74 Michael Robbins, "From R. B. Dockray's Diary - Ii, " Journal 
of Transport History, vol 7, NO 2,. (November 1965), entry of 
21. VIII. 1860. 
75 Alphonse Joanne, Atlas historique et statisti uq e des 
chemins de fer frangais, "(Paris 185,9), p 18. 
CHAPTER SIX 356 
76 The Railway Times, vol 2,10. VIII. 1039, shareholders' 
meeting of the London and Southwestern Railway. 
77 Ibid., vol 3,20.11.1840, report from the Ilampshire 
Independent. 
78 Meeting of' shareholders of the Paris-to-Rouen railway, 
Liverpool, 22 July 1840; The Railway Times, l. VIII. 1840. 
79 Meeting of shareholders of the Paris-to-Rouen railway, 
Liverpool, 24 November 1841, The Railway Times, 27. XI. 1841. 
80 Meeting of shareholders of the Paris-to-Rouen railway, 
Paris, '31 'October 1844, Journal des Chemins de Fer, 2. XI. 1844, 
p 581. 
81 Journal des Chemins de Fer, 28. X. 1843, p 729. 
82 Report of the committee of the Chambre des deput6s, session 
of 25. V. 1842, Le Moniteur Universol, 28. V. 1842, p 1295f. 
83 Meeting of shareholders of the Rouen-to-LeHavre railway, 
Paris, 10 December 1845, Journal des Chemins de Fer, 13. XII. 1845, 
p 934. 
84 Le Moniteur Universel, 12. Vi. 1845, p 1673f. 
85 Harold Pollins, "A Note on Railway Construction Costs 1825 - 
1850, " Economica, vol 19 (1952) N. S., pp 395-407. 
86 The law on' expropriation for the public utility, 3. V. 1841, 
Bulletin des lois, serie 9, vol 22, (1841), p 650. This law 
replaced those of 8 March 1810 and 7 July 1833. 
87 This was a complex process which was the source of delay 
only on a very few occasions. It took the following form: 
Taking into account the outline of a route prescribed in the 
cahier des charges the company drew up an avant-projet, which 
was approved by the Minister. Detailed plans and etats parcellaires 
were then prepared and sent by the prefect of each departement 
to the mayors of each affected commune. After receiving their 
responses, in the form of proces-verbaux, the prefects named 
committees of inquiry composed of members of the Conseils 
generaux, representatives of the communes affected and of the 
company. The proces-verbaux of these groups were then sent to 
the government-appointed Ingenieurs de control, upon whose advice 
the Conseil-genCral des opts et chausseeý-s and Minister approved 
the final plan agreed to in this process. The prefects then, 
by an arrete de cessibilite, declared the designated lands to 
be transferred to the public domain. The value of expropriated 
land was then fixed by local juries. This account is taken from 
Joseph Locke, "Address of the President, " Proceedings of the 
Institution of Civil Engineers, (1858), pp 6-7. 
88 The Railway Times, vol 5,17. IX. 1842. 
89 Some examples are given in 'the journal des Chemins de Per, 
15.11I". 1842, p 27. 
CHAPTER SIX 357 
90 The cost of land per kilometre of railway line is given 
for 
.a number 
of lines in Arch. Nat. AD XIX. N. 8,7, fiinst re 
de l'Agriculture, du Commerce at des Travaux publics, Documents 
Statistiques sur les Chemins de fer, (Paris 1856), p lxxvi. 
91 Journal des Chemins de Fer, 13. X2.1845, p 934. 
92 Meeting of shareholders of the Rouen-to-LeHiavre railway, 
10 December 1845, Journal des Chemins do For, 13. XII. 1845, 
p 934-36. 
93 Levy-Leboyer, op. cit., pp 368-369. 
94 The Railway Times, vol 4, II. XII. 1'841, änd the testimony 
of William Reed to the House of Commons Select Committee on 
Railway Act Enactments, in Great Britain, Second Report from the 
Select Committee on Railway Act Enactments, Parl. Papers, 1846, 
HIV, 687, questions no. 83-94. According to Reed the cost of 
rails was about two-thirds higher than it had been on the London 
and Southwestern. The contract for supply of rails is said to 
have been given to five firms, among which were Fourchambault, 
Anzin and Le Creusot; Vauquesal-Papin, "Origines de la construc- 
tion de la ligne de Paris ä Rouen, 1825-43, " La vie du Rail, 
NO. 1089 (1967), p 13. 
95 Meeting of shareholders of the Paris-to-Rouen railway, 
30 August 1842, The Railway Times, vol 5,17.2X. 1842. 
96 Journal des Chemins de Fer, 17. XII. 1842, p 277. 
97 Ibid., 24. VI. 1843, p 573. 
. 98 In May 
1844 8,000 tons of' rails were ordered. from four 
factories, Alais,, Moyeuvre, Hayange, and Le Creusot at a price 
of 340 F per ton; ibid., 18. V. 1844, p 250. A further 6,000 tons 
werd ordered in June 1844 for 347F. 50 per ton; ibid., 25. V. 1844, 
p. 271. 
99 Orders were placed with Decazeville, Alais, Maubeuge, and 
Fourchambault; all met their delivery dates by the end of April 
1847; see meeting of shareholders of the Rouen-to-Dieppe railway, 
30 April 1847, ibid., 1. V. 1847, p 342f. 
100 Levy-Leboyer, op. Lit., pp 348 and 357. 
101 Locke, op. cit., p 19. 
102 During the period 1840 to 1843 no new orders were received 
by French locomotive manufacturers, while 57 were imported and. 
50 were built by Buddicom at his factory in Rouen. Flachat (ed. ), 
Compte rendu des travaux du comity: de 1'Union des constructeurs, 
(Paris 1841), p 110. 
103 Flachat, op. cit., "Petition adressee a M. le Ministre des 
finances, " 7. VII`1841, p 79. 
104 Dictionary of-National Biography, "Joseph Locke", vol 34. 
CHAPTER SIX 358 
105 Flintshire County Record Office, 135/5, Locke to Buddicom, 
28. XII. 1840. 
106 Ibid., Locke to Buddicom, 9.111.1841. 
107 Ibid., Locke to Buddicom, 19. IV. 1841. 
108 Blount, op. cit., p 75. 
109 P. Duchemin, Sotteville-les-Rouen et le faubourg St. -Sever, 
(Rouen 1893), p 495. 
110 Testimony of Braspey to the parliamentary select committee 
on Railway Act Enactments, op. cit., question no. 824. 
111 Meeting of shareholders of the Paris-to-Rouen railway, 
Paris, 30 August 1842, The Railway Times, vol 5,17. IX. 1842. 
112 Journal des Chemins de Fer, 12. X2.1843, p 258. 
113 Ibid., 25.11.1843, p 410. 
114 Meeting of shareholders of the Paris-to-Rouen railway, 
Paris, 31 July 1845, Journal des Chemins de For, 2. VIII. 1845, 
p 582. 
115 Meeting of shareholders of the Rouen-to-LeHavre railway, 
Paris, 29 October, 1846, Journal des Chemins de Fer, 31. X. 1846, 
p 868. 
116 Ibid., 11. IV. 1846, p 305. ' 
117 These 665 locomotives had been built by Robert Stephenson 
224, Sharp Roberts 196, Hawthorn 70, Nasmyth 60, Forster 80, and 
Fairbairn 35; 'ibid., 4. IV. 1846, p 279. 
. 118 Ibid., 24. VIII. 1844, p 458. 
119 Testimony of William Reed to the parliamentary select 
committee on Railway Act Enactments, op. cit., question no. 504. 
120 The Railway Times, vol'4,27.11.1841. 
121 Journal des Chemins de Fer, 21.11.1846, p 153. 
122 Locke, RE. cit., p 21. 
123 Much has been written about Brassey, and nothing of a 
general nature can be added here. The reader can refer to 
Middlemas, op. cit., Helps, Life and Labours of Mr. Brassey, 1805-- 
1870, (Boston, Mass. 1874), and Thomas Brassey (his son), Work 
and Wages practically illustrated, '(New York 1872). 
124 Helps, "op. cit., .p 
80. 
125 Flachat, op. cit., pp 135-138. 
". 126 Testimony of William. Reed, off. cit., questions no. 327 
& 328. 
CFJAPTER SIX 359 
127 Maurice Wallon writes in Les Saint-Simonians et les 
Chemins de Fer, (Paris 1908), p 74, that Le Coürricer frangais 
-reported in 1837 that troops were being used to construct a 
bridge at Aisni(res on the Paris-to-St. --Germain railway. 
128 Locke remarked that-little difference in unit costs would 
result from using British workers paid at twice the rate received 
by French workers; "although labour in France (is) one-half the 
price it (is) in England, it (is) well known that the workmen 
of France (do) only one-half the work that men in England 
(perform). " From the meeting of shareholders of the London and 
Southwestern Railway, 29 February 1840, The Railway Times, vol 3, * 
7.111.1840. 
129 Tables of industrial wages, in Rouen are given in Archives 
departementales de la Seine-Maritime, Series 11, Statistiques 
industrielles (1840-1852). In March 1841, for example, charpentiers 
were receiving 2F. 50 to 3 F, constructeur. --mecaniciens 3F to 4F, 
filateurs 2F to 2F. 25, masons 2F. 50 to 2F. 75, teinturiers en 
bleu 2F to 2F. 50. 
130 Helps, op . cit., p 63. 
131 Ibid., p 67. 
132 Testimony of William Reed, M. cit., question no. 505. 
133 Brassey's testimony to the select committee on Railway 
Act Enactments, M. cit., question no. 863. 
134 The Railway Times, vol 5, 
-135 Testimony of William Reed, 
13,6 Helps, op. Lit.,. p 91. 
10. XIi. 1842. 
op. cit., question no. 409. 
137 The "excavateur americain" was first used in France on 
the Chemin de fer du Nord on the 30th of October 1843, by the 
British contractor Sherwood; Journal des Chemins de For, 4. XI. 1843, 
p 740. 
138 Ibid., 9. IX. 1843, p 675. 
139 These cost figures are derived from data contained in 
J. Weale, Ensamples of Railway Making, (London 1843), pp xxi-xxvi, 
which contains a picture of the machine on page xxiii, and from 
evidence given by one of Brassey's agents, Mr. Ballard, in 
Helps, 22. cit., p 77. 
140 Journal des Chemins de For, 23.111.1844, p 138. 
141 Testimony of William Reed, OR. cit., questions no. 38.6, 
398-400. 
142 Ibid., question 357, 
" 143 It was built for the Graville-LeHavre section and ' 
supervised by Dr. Douglass;. Journal des Chemins de Per, 29.111.1845, 
p 204. ' 
CHAPTER SIX 360 
144 A school was opened at 55, rue St. -Hilaire in Rouen in 
January 1844; the other two. were opened 'during, the rest of 1844. 
All were operated on the principles of the Soci6t6 nationale 
pour 1'education des pauvres, and were financed by donations 
from the railway company's directors, from i3rassey (500 F), the 
King (1,000 F), the British Ambassador, the British Queen-Mother 
and many others. Journal des Chemins de Per, 13. IV. 1844, p 190, 
and 18.1.1845, p 33. 
145 Unemployment in England was very high at this time, and a 
large number of unemployed came over to France to work on railway 
construction. They were undetered by advertisements such as 
that which appeared in The Railway Times on 31. VII. 1841 warning 
that "it is the intention of the Directors of the railway to 
employ the native Workmen of the country. They do not at 
present hold out any prospect of work to British labourers beyond 
tithe number already on the line. " It may be doubted how many 
of the people to whom such an advertisement was directed would-or 
could read it. 
146 There is an interesting series of correspondence between 
Gilbert Gordon and the Foreign Office in the Public Record 
Office, FO 27/608-676. It is evident that Gordon gave money to 
a large number of unemployed British workers from his own pocket. 
At the beginning of 1843 he sent in a list of 204 British 
subjects who had received official assistance during 1842; among 
them there are 117 workers from the. Paris-to-Rouen railway and 
their families; FO 27/655/14 enclosure, 11. I1.1843. 
147 Helps, op. cit., p 93. 
148 Journal des Chemins de Fer; 30. XII. 1843, p 832. 
149 . Ibid., 27. I. 1844,. p 38. ' 
150 Ibid., 17. VIII. 1844, 'p 447. 
151 Ibid., 30. X2.1844, p 632. 
152 Ibid., 27.111.1847, p 222. 
153 Ibid., 28.11.1846, p 189. 
154 Ibid., 23, , 28.11.1846, pp 162 & 253. 
155 Ibid., 24.1.1846, p 63,. 
156 Ibid., 9. V. 1846, p 420. 
157 Meeting of shareholders of the Paris-to-Rouen railway, 
Paris, 30 August 1842, The Railway Times, 17. IX. 1842. 
158 Journal des Chemins de For, 1851, p 53. 
159 Approved by a shareholders' meeting in Paris, 30 July 
1840; The Railway Times, vol 3,8. VIII. 1840. 
160 Meeting of shareholders of the Paris-to-Rouen railway, 
Paris, 31. October 1844, Journal des-Chemins de Fer, 2. XI. 1844, 
p 581. 
CHAPTER SIX 361 
161 The loan consisted of 6,000 bonds with a par value of 
11000 F, put, on sale to non-shareholders at 1, -250. F; each paid 
annual interest of 40 F, ie. 4%. of the par value. Similar bond 
issues had recently been made by the Paris-to-Orl6ans and Paris- 
St. -Germain companies. From the Report to shareholders, 31. VII. 
1845, Arch. Nat., 76AQ4. .. 
162 B. Gille, La banque..., a. cit., p 349. 
163 3,833 bonds at 1,000 F each were sold to existing share- 
holders; 694 were bought by the company's amortization fund. 
Report to shareholders, 24.1.1846, Journal des Chemins de For, 
24.1.1846, p 63. 
164 Gille, op. cit., p 34.9. 
165 Ibid., p 353. 
166 Report to shareholders of the Rouen-to-LeHavre railway 
company, special-meeting of 10. XII. 1845, Journal des Chemins de 
Fer, 13. XII. 1845, p 934. 
167 Report to shareholders of the Rouen-to-LeIiavre railway 
company, meeting of 29. X. 1846, Ibid., 31. X. 1846, p 868. 
168 Ibid., 15. VIII. 1846, p 699. 
169 Gille, op. cit., pp 357-361. 
170 Journal des Chemins de Fer, 7. Xi. 1846, p 882. 
171 Gille, op. cit., p 356. 
172 "Report to shareholders of the Rouen-to-LeHavre railway 
cömpany, meeting of 12.1.1847, Journal-des Chemins do Fer, 
16.1.1847, p 44. 
173 The best rate of interest obtainable from a relatively 
riskless investment of funds during 1846 - and it should be 
remembered that risks during this period of crisis were not 
inconsiderable - was about 4.2%, from 5% rentes. The 'opportunity 
costs' of internal funds was therefore only 4.2%; the cost of 
outside borrowing was 5% or more. With respect to risk it might 
be recalled how the Paris-to-Rouen company barely escaped a 
minor disaster in 1840, - from the failure of its bankers Messrs. 
Wright and Co. of London. The company's funds on deposit with 
this firm had only shortly before been converted into Exchequer 
Bills; The Railway Times, vol 3,5. XII. 1840. 
174 Gille, op. Lit., p 364. 
175 Ibid., p 366. 
176 Journal des Chemins de Fer, 13. Xi. 1847, p. 844-5. 
177 Ibid., 11. XII. 1847,. p 909-10;. 
178 Ibid., 1. I. 1848, p 3. 
CHAPTER SIX 362 
179 Ibid., 11.1II. 1847, pp 912-13. 
1.80 Report to sharcholders of the Rouen-to-LöIlavre railway 
company of 30 April 1848, Journal de Chemins de For, 6. V. 1848, 
p 244. 
181 Journal des Chemins de For, 13. V. 1848, p 256. 
182 Ibid., 13. V. 1848., pp 242f. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 363 
1 Quoted from Le Tem s of 25 August 1837 in Wallon, Los Saint-- 
Simoniens et les Chemins de fer', (Paris 1908), p 75. 
2 Vauquesal-Papin, "Origines 
de Paris ä Rouen, 1825-1843", La 
1967), pp 14-15. 
do la construction do la ligne 
vie du Rail, NO. 1090 (2 April 
3 The classes of accommodation available on the railway are 
described as follows in the company's cahier des charges. First 
class in "voitures couvertes et ferm6es a glaces, suspendues sur 
ressorts"; second class in "voitures couvertes et suspendues sur 
ressorts"; third class in "voitures decouvertes mais suspendues 
sur ressort". See cahier des charges, Article 35 (tarif), in 
Loi qui atitorise 1'etablissement d'un Chemsn de fer de Paris'a 
Rouen, Bulletin des Lois, sdrie- 9, vol. 21 (1'840), p 279. 
4 Le Moniteur industriel, 16 May 1837. 
5 Guido du voyageur sur les bateaux ä vapeur de Paris ä Rouen, 
(Paris, n. d. (1840)) 
6 Guide du voyageur par le chemin de for de Paris A Rouen, 
(Paris 1843). 
7 Ch. -J. Minard, Second memoire sur 1'importance du Parcours 
partiels sur les chemins de fer, (Paris 1843), p 10. In France 
as a whole the volume of passenger travel by road seems to have 
increased substantially during the 1830s; the revenue frorn the 
'droit sur les voitures publiques' rose by 64 per cent from 1830 
to 1840. See J. Dupuit, "Considerations sur les frais d'entretien 
des routes", in Annales des Ponts et Chaussees, (1842.1), p 73. 
8 This agreement 'took effect from the. 10th of August 1843, 
Journal des Chemins de For, 2. December 1843, p 789. 
9 "L'enquete sur l'application des tarifs des chemins de fer- 
faite en 1850 par le Conseil d'Etat", in Annuaire officiel des 
chemins de fer, ed. Petit'de Coupray, (Paris 1855), p 376. 
10 Report to Shareholders of the Paris-to-Rouen company, 
22 May 1844. 
11 One recalls for example the 'Hirondelle'ridden so many times 
by Madame Bovary between Rouen and Yonville-L'Abbaye, the little 
town on the plateau not far from Neufchatel-en-Bray where she 
lived. 
12 Minard, op. cit., p 10. As in the case of road passengers 
these figures are for 1842. Kinard states that the passenger 
steamers between Rouen and Pecq (the terminus of the Paris-to- 
St. -Germain railway) operated during only six months of the year. 
13 Journal des Chemins de Fer, 13 May 1843, p 526. 
14 Ibid., -8 July and 5 August 1843, pp 592 & 637. 
15 Report'to shareholders of the'Paris-to-Rouen company, 
31 July 1845. 
16 Loc. cit. 
17 Journal des Chemins de Fer, " 19 October 1844, p 554, Report 
CIMPTER SLVEN 364 
to a meeting of British shareholder held at Liverpool. 
18 Ibid., 23 March 1844,. p 143. 
19 Ibid., 6 July 1844, p 362. 
20 By late in the 1850s.. the traffic using the eight stations 
from Maisons. to Mantes was almost as great as that using the two 
stations at Rouen and almost as great as all that using all the 
stations on the line from Rouen to LelIavre. See for example 
the table "II. Traffic par gare", in Journal des Chemins de ]? er, 
1857, pp 44-45. 
21 Complete operating accounts for the three railway companies 
covering the period up to the end of 1854 are contained in the 
Appendixes numbered V, VI arid. VII; beginning in 1855 these 
. companies were merged with the new Cie des Chemins de fer de 
, 1'Ouest. 
22 Various reports to shareholders of the Paris-to-Rouen company 
and the Rouen-to-LeHavre company. 
23 The dispute was over the arrangement or the tracks connecting 
the Gare des Batignolles with the main line, owned by the Paris- 
to-St. -Germain railway. The details of the dispute are summarized 
in the Journal des Chemins de Fer, 10 February 1844, p 64. 
" 24 The concession "est un contrat par lequel un entrepreneur, 
en se chargeant d'executer, en totalite ou en partie, des ouvrages 
destines ä l'usage du public, regoit comme remuneration, au lieu 
du payement du prix des travaux, le droit de les exploiter on 
percevant des taxes sur ceux qui les utiliseront. Une compagnie 
de chemin defer exploite donc temporairement une voie dependant 
du domaine public.... ", Clement Colson, Abrege do la Legislation 
des Chemins de Per et Tramways, (Paris, 2nd edition, 1903), p 24. 
The essential nature of this contract is brought out in 
Article 35 of the cahier des charges for the Paris-to-Rouen: 
"Pour indemniser la compagnie des travaux et depenses qu'elle 
s'engage A faire par le present cahier des charges, et sous 
condition expresse quelle an remplira exactement toutes les 
obligations, le Gouvernement lui concede pour le laps de quatre- 
vingt-dix-neuf ans, ä dater de la loi qui ratifiera; s'il y 
lieu, la concession, l'autorisation de percevoir les droits do 
peage et les prix de transport ci-apres determines.... " 
25 Arch. Nat. F14.9435, Prefect Seine-Inferieure to Sous-secre- 
taire d'Etat des Travaux Publics, 6 July 1843. 
26 Loc. cit. 
27 Ibid., Sous-secretaire d'Etat to Prefect, 25 July 1843. 
28 Ibid., Minister of Public Works to Prefect, 14 September 
1843. 
29 Ibid., Petitions of Z9 July,,, 25 August, and 31 August 1843. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 365 
30 Ibid., Chambre of Commerce of-Rouen to Prefect, 26 September 
1843. 
31 Ibid., Paris-to-Rouen railway company to Sous-secrdtaire 
d'Etat, 28 August 1843. 
32 Ibid., Paris-to-Rouen-railway company to Prefect, 26 
September 1843. 
33 Ibid., Sous-secretaire d'Etat to Paris-to-Rouen railway 
company, 9 September 1843. 
34 Ibid., Paris-to-Rouen railway company to Sous-secrdtaire 
d'Etat, 12 September 1843. 
35 Ibid., Paris-to-Rouen railway company to Sous-secretaire 
d'Etat, 30 September 1843. 
36 Ibid., Minister of Public Works to Paris-to-Rouen railway 
company 3 October 1843. 
37 Ibid., Paris-to-Rouen railway company to Minister of Public 
Works, 12 September 1843. 
38 Ibid., Prefect of Police to Minister of Public Works, 
9 October 1843. 
39 Ibid., Report to Minister of Public Works by the Sous- 
secreta ri d'Etat, 24 January 1844. 
40 Ibid., Prefect of Police to the Minister'of Public Works, 
17 April 1844. 
41 Extrait des proces-verbaux des conseils generaux de 
l'agricülture, des manufactures et du commerce. Session 1845- 
1846. Rapport fait au nom de la Commission des Chemins de fer 
et de la Navigation de la Seine par M. Pauwels, seance du 14 
janvier 1846, (Rouen, n. d. ). 
42 Ordinance of 15 November 1846; see Alfred Picard, Los 
Chemins dc Fer francais, (Paris 1884), vol. 1, pp 571-574. 
43 Journal des Chemins de Fer, 21 February 1846, p 153. 
44 Ordinance of 6 April 1847; see Picard, -op. cit., p 605. 
This ordinance established the Commission g6n_e"ale des chemins 
de fer; it was composed of four committees, the Section des 
traces, the Section de 1'exploitation sous le pointe de vue 
technique, the Section de l'exploitation sous lo pointe de vue 
commerciale, and the Section des re-glements. This set of committees 
replaced the earlier Commission superieure and Commission admin- 
istrative des chemins de for, established by ordinances of 22 
June 1842; see Bulletin des Lois, * ser. 9, vol. 25-(1842), pp 96-. 
100. 
45 The Chambre"of Commerce in Rouen complained to the Minister 
of Public Works that it was no longer being consulted before 
approval of railway tariffs; Arch. Nat. F14.9435, CC Rouen to 
Minister of Public Works, 7 June. 1847. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 366 
46 Ibid., Chemin de fer Paris a Rouen. Tarif des merchandises 
transportOes ä Petite Vitesse, 12 September 184-3. 
47 Journal des Chemins dc For, 23 September 1843, p 690. 
48 From weekly reports in ibid. 
49 This is a generous estimate; goods carried in September 
and October 1843 were 3,008 and 3,332 tons respectively. Edmond 
Teisserenc, "Les canaux et, les chomins de fer", Revue inde'pendante, 
vol. 15 (1844), p 584. 
50 Ch. Collignon, Du concours des candux et des chemins de fer 
et de i'achevement du canal de la Marne'au Rhin, (Paris 1845), 
p 273. 
51 Arch. Nat. F14.9435, Petition from commissionnaires de 
roulage to the Prefect of the Seine-Inferieure, 29 July 1843. 
52 Journal des Chemins de Far, 25 May 1844, p 272. 
53 The petition referred to above in note 51, signed by five 
commissionnaires de roulage, Malcouronne, Boursier, C. Duchemin, 
Huet et Lapoigneux, and Lasseur et Felix Larget. 
54 Arch. Nat. F14.9435, Petition from the same five 
petitioners to the Prefect, 25 August 1843. 
55 Ibid., Petition from the same to the Conseil-gen6ral de la 
Seine-fnferieure. 
56 Journal des Chemins de For, 25 May 1844, p 272. 
57 Arch. Nat: F14.9435, Prefect to the Minister of Public 
Works, 15 October 1845. 
. 58 Journal des Chemins de For, 25 May 
1844, p 272. 
59 Ibid., 13 July 1844, p 377. 
60 Ibid., 13 July 1844, p 395. 
61 Journal des Chemins de Fer, 25 May and 13 July 1844. 
62 Details of this case are given in ibid., 3 and 10 January 
1846. 
63 Arch. Nat. F14.9436, "Rapport de 1'inspecteur de 1'Exploit- 
ation Commerciale des Chemins de'Fer du 2e Arrondissement", 
24 August 1849. 
64 Quoted in record of "L'Enquete sur l'application des tarifs 
des chemins de fer-faite en*1850 par le"Conseil d'Etat", contained 
in the Annuaire officiel des chemins de for, ed. Petit de Coupray, 
. 
(Paris 1855), p 387. 
" 65 The sources of -the figures in Table 9 are as follows. For the traffic by river, the "Note" by Michal dated 27 May 1853, in 
Arch. Nat. F14.6814; for-the traffic-by rail, the same-source 
CHAPTER SEVEN 367 
except for 1.844, for which more reliable figures seem to be given 
in the Report to shareholders of the Paris-to-Rouen company of 
23 July. 1846. Goods by rail include only 'petite-vitesse'. A 
detailed breakdown of commodities carried by river is given in 
Appendix III; unfortunately there are no equivalent figures for 
the railway. 
66 From a letter of 12 September 1844, quoted in Ch. Collignon, 
op. cit., pp 104-05. 
67 Water-borne transport rates are given in Michal, "Note", 
in Arch. Nat. F14.6814,27 May 1853; see Table 4 in Chapter Three. 
68 Arch. Nat. F14.9435, Paris-to-Rouen railway company to 
Minister of Public Works, 3- February 1844, attachment 'Modifica- 
tions au projet de tarifs deg Marchandises de Petite Vitesse", 
,, 
and Journal des Chemins de Fer, 24 February 1844. 
69 Edmond Teisserenc, Etudes sur les voics de communications 
perfectionnees et sur les Lois economiques de la production du 
transport, (Paris 1847), p 81. 
70 Arch. Nat. 'F14.9435, Ordonnance du Prefet de Police, 
16 August 1844. 
71 Ibid., Prefect of the Sine-Inferieure to Minister of 
Public Works, 15 October 1845. 
72 Ibid., Chambre of Commerce of LeHavre to Minister of 
Public Worrs, October 1845 and CC Rouen to Minister, 20 November 
1845; see also resume given by the Prefect in a letter to the 
Directeur-general des Ponts et Chaussees on 22 November 1845. 
73 Germoniere, Chambre de Commerce"de Rouen. Rapport sur la- 
questidn relative au transport des marchandises par la compagnie 
du chemin de for de Rouen ä Paris, (Rouen 1845). 
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75 Arch. Nat. F14.9435, Directeur-gen6ral des Ponts et 
Chaussees to Prefect, 26 December 1845. 
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1846 and 30 June 1847, cited in 
February 1850. 
by LeNormand-Baudu and a certain 
'ä forfait' between 15 December 
Le Moniteur de la Marine, 16 
77 Journal des Chemins de For, 24 January 1846, p 64; and , 
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deputes on 3 March 1846, in Le Moniteur Universel, 4 March 1846, 
p 543. 
78 Le Moniteur de la Marine, 9: February 1850; a verbal agree- 
mentmwas made between these companies on 25 March 1846. 
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695. 
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84 Le Moniteur de la Marine, 23 July 1848. 
85 Ibid., 9 February 1850. 
86 Ibid., 6 September 1848. 
87 Ibid., 4 August 1849. 
88 Archives departementales de la Seine-Maritime, Series S, 
Navigation, statistiques des bateaux a vapeur naviguant sur los 
fleuves. (1835-1850), and a second liasse for 1851 to 1860. 
89 Expert et Vieillard, Remorquago. Seine maritime, (Le}Iav. re 
1852), and by the same authors, Remorquage. Basse Seine, (LcIiavre 
1853).. 
90 Chambre de commerce de Rouen, off. cit., 1847,1850. 
91 Le Moniteur de la Marine, 20 September 1848; statement by 
Louis d'Artois, editor of the Moniteur. 
92 Counts of boats and their owners were made from weekly 
lists of arrivals in Paris given in Le Monitcur de la Marine. 
93 Ibid., 19 February 1854. 
94 The sources for these graphs are the Reports to shareholders 
of the Paris-to-Rouen and Rouen-to-LeHavre railway companies, 
each of which contained a financial' report; all references to 
company financial results in the following pages are taken from 
the same sources. 
95 Railway costs can in general be broken into long-run fixed 
costs associated with capital (intetest and amortization payments), 
and operating costs. Within the latter there is a fixed cost 
component (the size of which varies , according 
to the time horizon 
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being considered), and a variable component dependant entirely 
upon the volume of traffic carried.. This can be reduced to the 
following functional relationship:. 
Y=a+ bX ., 
Where Y= total operating costs; a= fixed operating costs; and 
b= variable cost per. unit carried. The argument in the text 
is that while goods more than paid for the component 'b' directly 
incurred by their carriage, and that they contributed toward 
defraying 'a', their contribution'to 'a' was proportionately 
smaller'than their share of total revenues. if rates had been 
based entirely upon fully allocated cost, rather partly upon 
competitive considerations, then these proportions should have 
been approximately equal. 
An attempt has been made to determine in a very rough manner 
the parameters 'a' and 'b' in the above function for the Paris- 
to-Rouen railway. Unfortunately the data available in the 
'accounts of the company and elsewhere are much too few to enable 
one to make any accurate calculations. Modern railway costing is 
based upon regression analysis, and a much simplified version of 
this has been used in what follows. Using the data available in 
the Reports to Shareholders of the Paris-to-Rouen company, a 
simple cost function was developed; it is a modification of the 
simple linear function above: 
Ya+ by + cZ 
Where Y= total operating costs; a= fixed operating costs; 
b= variable cost per unit X of passengers; and c° variable cost 
per unit Z of goods. Note that the data used expresses goods and 
passengers in simple tons and numbers carried, "and not in ton- 
kilometres or passenger-kilometres. Regressing X and Z on Y, the 
following equation was obtained: 
Y=1,300,000 + 1.0-X + 3.1 Z (R2 = 0.46) 
In other words, fixed operating costs were approximately 1.3 MF; 
these costs would have been incurred even if'the line were closed 
down for a short time. The average passenger carried added 1F 
to company costs, and-the average ton of goods added 3 F. 10. 
Taking the first half of 1847 as an example, the direct variable 
costs of carrying approximately 506,000 passengers and 164,000 
tons of goods was 1,016,000 F. Total revenues from. these two 
sources were 4.65 MF, of which 1.9 r2F (41%) from goods and 
2.75 MF (59%) from passengers. After meeting variable costs the 
total amount from both sources left to meet fixed operating costs 
and the costs of interest and amortization was 3.65 MF, to which 
goods revenues contributed only 26% and passenger revenues 74%. 
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company on 8 July 1843, reported in the Journal des Chemins do, 
For, 12 August 1843, p 647. 
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TOTAL ..................................... 4,500,000 F 
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Further improvements were undertaken during the 1860s, the 
dykes being extended further out into the bay. Construction of 
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sur los fleuves (185171860) 
S. Navigation de la Seine, affaires diverses (B-C) 
S. Navigation de la Seine{ affalres diverses (D) 
S. Navigation de. la Seine, aiffairos diverses (G-Pg) 
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2. Archive- departernentales de Seine-maritime, 
Unfortunately no catalogues have yet been prepared 
for'the documents in these archives in the post-ltevolutionary 
period. Though difficult to use however, they are a fairly 
rich source on econo-mic and' social history. I would like 
to thank idle Jouen and others on the staff of the archives 
in Rouen for the great assistance given me in locating 
documents. 
(ä) Two series were used, the first of them Series, 1,1 
(Administration g nerraI') this series contains much 
statistical material on commerce and industry from the 
Revolution to the late nineteenth century. The following 
is a partial list, showing only those bundles found to be 
useful for this thesiss 
M. Statistiques industrielles 
(1820-1837). 
Li. Statistique genorale de la 
rurale) (1820-1845\ . 11. Statistiques. Commerce, na 
agriculture (1830-1848) 
M. Statistiques industrielles 
Li.. Statistiques industrielles 
14. Statistiques industrielles 
et commerciales, enquttes 
France (essai de statistic'u)e 
vitiation, industrie, 
(1840-1852) 
(1842-187) 
(1661-1865) 
Ii, Liouveraent des ports (1830) 
M. Mouvement des ports (1637-1838) 
Iv i. Liouvement des ports (181-46) 
M. l, iouvement des ports (18!; 8) 
M. Douanes, entrepbts, docks et magasi. ns gencraux, 
arrondissement du Havre (An 1X-1860) 
M. Commerce, societe anonymes des Paquebots'ä 
vapeur (1830-1836) 
V". Faillites" (1806-18L0) 
MI, Chambre de Commerce du- }iavre (1806-1830) 
M. Chambre de commerce, ville du Havre, matibres 
diverses (AnX-1831) 
l:!. - Chambre de commerce du Havre, vffaires genorales (1809-1872) 
M. Chambre de commerce du Havre, affaires genorales (1820-1881) 
(b) Series S (Travaux Publics): 
S. pones et chaussees, navigation, ports, affaires 
g$nerales, budgets (1806-1830) 
S, Navigation de la Seine; dossier du Conseil general (1856-1870) 
S. Navigation de la Seine, dragages (3 lia; ses) 
,. Navigation de la. Seine, amelioration, affaires diverses" 
S. Navigation de la Seine, compagnies de transport 
acce1ere de marchandises (A-Z) 
S. Naviration, statistigiies bateaux vapour naviguänt 
sur la mer ýl847-1860) h va. S. Navigation, statistiques des bateaux vapour 
naviguant sur los flueves (1831.1. -1550) 
S. Navi Tation, stati. stiques des bateaux ä vapour . navig; i, 'lri 
sur los fleuves (185171860) I. 
S. Navigation de ]. a Seine, affaires diverses (B-C) 
S. Navigation de la Seine, affaires diverses (1)) 
S. Navigation de. la Seine, dffaires diverses (G-Pg) 
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S. Chemins de for de 1'. 0'ue , t, ligne do Paris ta Rouen 
et au Havre, affaires generales. (1825-1854) - 
-S. Chemins do for de 1'0uost, liane de Paris ä Rouen 
et au Havre, matieres diverses, (DaE). (1840-79) - S. Chemins do for do 1'0uest, ligno Paris-Rouen- 
LeHarve, matihres diversos, (Ia0). (1843-1853) 
S. Chemins de for de l'Ouest, liane Paris-Rouen- 
LeHarve matieres. diverses. (1842-1863) 
S. Chemins de for do l'Ouest, ligne Paris-Rouen- 
LeHarve ville de Rouen, affaires diverses. (1841-45) 
S. Chemins de for do l'Ouest, ligne Paris-Rouen- 
LeHarve, affaires g6neralos. (1833-1840) 
3. Archives do la Chambre-de Commerce et d'Industrie du Havre 
Useful material was found-in several bundles in the 
'archives ancienn. es' , which include a total of 25 bundle, -_ 
covering from early in the eighteenth century up to about 
1865. There is a further much larger collection of 
documents for the years from 1924. to 1940. Both series 
are well classified. Of particular value in the prep- 
aration of this thesis was the collection of manuscript". 
"Registres des deliberations de la Chambre de Commerce", 
which extend from 1802 to the present; they are indexed 
from 1832. I should like to thank the conservateur des 
archives, II, blomillon, for the great assistance he so 
kindly have me in finding the documents I needed. 
4. Archives de la Chambre de Commerce de Rouen! 
These were formerly a very good source of material 
on the nineteenth century;. unfortunately they were almost 
totally destroyed by aerial bombing in 19144. One 
important document was discovered. 
5. Archives de la'Ville du Havret 
There' eras a small amount of useful material here, in 
series F (Administration, commerce et Industrie) ,I 
(Routes) , 
and O(Tra-7aux Publics). See L. Preteux, Rejerttoire 
Numeri ue des Archives Communales, Fonds ivioderne, 1. d00- 
1d70. (LeHavre 1934). 
6, Archives de la Ville de Rouens 
The'document formerly kept in these archives ýrtýre almost 
totally destroyed by fire in 1926. Nothing of any use 
was found among what romaine. 
?. Bibliotheaue Iý1ationales 
Section des Cartes et Plans. 
8. riintshire Coy,: nty Record office (Hawardon, Nr Chester) t 
This was the home of William Buddicom. His papers 
have deposited with the. County Record Office as r'N0., 135. 
9. British Transport Historical. Recordst 
Reference was made to the Jogrnal, of the London and 
Southwestern Railway Company., series LSV/. 
Unfortunately none of tho. rocords of any of the original 
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three railway companies, in the Seine valley (the Paric- 
torI; ouen company, the. Rouen-to--LeHavre company, and the 
Rouen-to-Diene company) 'have survived. for are there 
any surviving records from the river transport companies 
which operated during the four decades before 1660. 
B. Contemporary Published Sources 
1. Government Documents 
Almanach ßo real, later Almanach Royal ct National, later 
Almanach Imperiale. 
Bulletin des Lois. 
Le I+loniteur universel. 
Proces-verbaux des sgances de la Chambre dc's dcLnutes. 
lü3o- 
1. 'iinistere de 1'Agriculture at du Commerce. Documents 
statittiaues sur les Chernins de fors. Par st5 
P, Iiniseere de 1'Agriculture et du Commerce. Enquete 
sur les noyens d' as:.: urer la regula. arite eT la 
s ireti de 1' exbloitä ton cur los, Chem _nc: de ier. Paris 1858. 
Miniuttere de 1'Agriculture et du Commerce. Rapport... 
sur les voies do communication proures . aciliter le transport de la houille sur -Ces 
licux de 
conoonimation. Parrs 1t 6O. 
Direction general des Douanes. "Tableau general du 
mouvement du cabotage. Paris 1851. 
Administration des. Douanes. (Later Direction general 
des Douanes. ) Tableau general du Commerce de la 
France. Paris 1616. 
LiinistZire de l'Interieur. Catalogue des specifications 
de tous les principes, movens et Drocedes. pour 1_es- 
guck 1-L a ete cris des brevet r d' invers ti on, de 
perfectionne,.: ient et d irnoor. tationx J'6 . 
lis le 
er sui 
^1791... , 
ýusau' au lst Ju1y 1b? _ý. Paris 1826. 
Ministare de 1'Tnterieur. Circulaires, Instructions et 
autres actes dmaner>> du i.. inisti5re de 1' SntE'-r , eur. 
ou r. e1 ý, i 's de ce ýc rte; iient de : L' 9'j a 1. 
T2i 
inciujiverlentt, Paris. 
P. linistbre do 1'Interieure, Direction GEInerale des ponts 
et Chaussees. Cor; 1DtC rendu de l' emDloi *des fonds 
votes par la loi du o1 ov rýbea^ 1c 1, pour 
suppler eý nt au cr lit des routes royales.. , Paris 1835. 
Ministore de 1' Interieur. Rapport au F of sur la 
navi. pation intgr3. ourc d-e _o. rbra'ince. 
Paris 16 August 
1620. 
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M nistbre de 1' Interieur. 
canaux au 31 Lars 1823 
lti2 j-lö2q continued -as: (31- Ji11et 1331,1332, 
autres ouvrages. Paris 
Ra'opor"t ur la -situation der 
4 
31 i.: aro 1429 Paris 
Situationr , xi. i 1 ,, arc 2890 
31 Gctobre 1u ' cue;; r., ný. ýtx Pt 
JIinistýre de 1'Interieur. 
instructions emanees 
de 1831 1837. Part 
Receull des circulaires et des 
du l+. inie t 're do ' Sntcrieur 
1848-49.3 vol. 
Ministore de 1'Interieur. 
instructions et autres 
1'Interieur, ou relate 
1821- incliistivernerlt. 
Receuil des circulaires 
actes emanes du lý: ina st're de 
sue ce ctena. rtement, e 179_7 
Paris 1 21. 
Iviinistbre de 1'Interieur. Administration Generale des 
ponts et chaussees et des mines. Statisti ue d¬. s 
Routes Royales de France, 1824. Paris -1624. 
Irlinistbre des Travaux Publics. Album de statistiquce 
zraphicjue 
do 1900. Paris 19077. 
Idinistbre des Travaux Publics. Direction Genoral des 
ponts et chaussees et des mines. Cotpte-rendiu 
des trayaux des ingdn; _eurs des mines, 
1n35. Paris 1U35. 
Ministore des Travaux Publics. 
caanaux. Paris 1840. 
Documents relatifs aux 
Ministore des Travaux Publics. Direction Generale des 
ponts et chaussees et des chenins de' fer. Documents 
statistioues sur les routes et pones. Faris I73. 
Ministore des Travaux Publics. Enqubbte sur l'exploitation 
et la construction des chemins de for. Paris 1 3" 
TYiinistore des Travaux Publics. Direction General des 
porits et cha. ussees et mines. Situation des y'ravaux. 
Paris l834 and 1836-1846.12 vols. 
ltilinistbre des Travaux Publics. De l'Agriculture, et 
du Commerce. Stati, ti ue des routes royales de 
France. Paris 1 37. 
1 inistbre des Travaux Publics. Tableaux analvtioues 
presentant la ; situation et le moritant des d penses 
vies travaux des fonts et chaussees et_des L tlmen'tE 
c iv, iI s executCý s pG'r1dn t]'e;: erci se %'ari S3 uJ y 
Seine, Departement de la. Recherchen statistiques Sur 
la ville de Paris et le dererimien-t de la Seine. 
i eceu: il de 
, 
tableaux dresse d'apr. s les ordres de bi. 
. le comte de Chambrol, Prefot. Paris 1821-29.4 vols. 
Ville de Rouen, Conseil f, iunicipal. Analyses des procbs- 
verbaux der, seances, du. 22 decembre idDO au 27 aoü-G 
1677. Rouen 1699. vol 1,1600-16 0. vol 2, -16 41-1377. 
Great Britain. Parliamentary Papers. Resort from the 
Select Committee on Tail%va Labourers. Par?.. Papers, 
1, X111,489, 
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Great Britain. Parliamentary Papers. Re art of the 
Select Committee on Railway Act Enactcrients. Pant. 
Papers, i346, XIV, 52. 
Great Britain. Parliamentary Papers. Second Renor. t from 
the Select Committee on Railway-Act Enactment,. Par!. 
Papers, IU 46, XIV, 
2. Journals and Periodicals. 
Annale, des Ponts et Chaussees (1826-1865) 
Archives du Havre (1937-1840) 
Bulletin de la Societe Libre d'Emulation de Rouen 
LJ - 1-1 ' ,2r;, %- 
Journal de 1' ä. ndustriel et du capitaliF, te 
Journal des Chemins de Fer (1842-1860) 
Journal des Econorai rtes (1842-1860) 
Journal du Genie Civile (1827-1848) 
Journal du Havre (1826-1860) 
ftiemorial do Rouen (1837-1852) 
Moniteur de la biarine (1848-1868) 
Railway Magazine (1835-1039) 
(1836-3.34o) 
Receuil deg ublicationc do la Societe Havrais des 
Etudes Diverses (Jd34-ld6o) 
Revue der, Deux kondes (1837-1860) 
3. General., 
Almanach commercial et maritime du Havre our 1' . e. nnec 
_lý' , next 1 
1rý23 LeHavre , 182 '. 
Almanach du commerce de Paris et du denartement de la 
Seine-Infricure. Faris ü'l. 
Almanach du commerce du Havre. LP-Havre 1834-1901. 
Almanach de Rouen et des denartements de la Seine- 
Inferieure et de l'Lure. Rouen 1ý2 lu'28 l 3'9 
Beug,,,, not, Auguste-Arthur, Cte. Vie de Becquey. Paris 1852. 
Blaise, Ad. "Des transports sur los canaux et sur les 
chemins de fer", Journal des Econoaistes, vol 19 
1847-i3, , PP 55--68. 
Blount, Edward Charles. blernoires of Sir Edward Blount. 
Ed. S. J. Reid: London 1902. 
Borcly, - A. -E. Histoire de la vile du Havre et de son 
ancien grouvernement. 2 vols. LcHavre 
Burat, Amedee. Le cor: imorce do . houilles en France. Paris 1852. 
Chambre de Commerce de Rouen: ' Expose des Travaux. 
Rouen 1846-1865. The only- remaining source, --'or the 
proceedings of the Chambre of Commerce of. Rouen. 
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Chambre do Commerce do Rouen. Sta"ti tinues 
maritime du port do Rouen do 1' annf; e 1. c., 
Rouen 10 -lcý The essential source 
statiotiques of river transportation on 
Seine. 
du commerce 
for 
tho Basso 
Chambre de Commerce du Havre. Extrait du procb;, -verbal. 
d' installation des Nouveaux Liombros. LeHavre 1bT`l"ý 
Chäptal, J. -A. -C. Do 1'industrie franoaioo. Paris 1819. 
Chaudron-Junot, J. Re ita Lion fi ram -port 
de la sous- 
comrnissiön de l' entree t. Paris 1832. 
Chevalier. 1. Iichel. "Des chemins e for comparees aux 
Ionde? h.. vol 13 lignes navi{; ables" , 'Revue des Doux 
1838. Pp 739-813. 
Chevalier, I"ilchel, Des inter'ts matericls on France. 
Travaux publics. Ro. tes. Canatxc. Chemins de fer. 
lc M5. rar: ý. 
Chevalier, Michel. Lettres sur l'Amerique du Nord. 
Paris vols. 830'. ,ý 
Chevalier, Tliichel, Politique industrielle, of svstbrne 
de la i: iediterran5c. Paris Y67)72, 
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vol 21.1848. pp 281-300. 
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des Fants et" Chaussees. 1856.2. p. 396-300. 
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supporters of railways and waterways. Supports the 
latter. 
Considerations , enerales sur 
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par A-x'. V, e. Nantes, Paris Tb-41. 
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